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Moving Beyond (Traditional) Alliance Theory: the Neo-Gramscian Approach to the U.S.-Japan Alliance

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Abbreviations and Acronyms

ACCJ	American Chamber of Commerce in Japan
ACSA	Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement
AEI	American Enterprise Institute
AMD	Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty
AMF	Asian Monetary Funds
APEC	Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation
ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations
ASW	Anti-submarine Warfare
ATOP	Alliance Treaty Obligations and Provisions
AWACS	Airborne Warning and Control System
BCM	Bilateral Coordination Mechanism
BMD	Ballistic Missile Defence
BRAC	Base Realignment and Closure
CIMIC	Civil-Military Co-operation
CLB	Cabinet Legislative Bureau
CNAS	Center for New American Security
CRM	Common Strategic Objectives, Roles and Missions
CSIS	Center for Strategic and International Studies

DARPA	Defence Advanced Research Agency
DPJ	Democratic Party of Japan
DPRI	Defence Policy Review Initiative
DUT	Dual-use Technology
EAEC	East Asian Economic Caucus
EAEG	East Asian Economic Group
EAS	East Asian Summit
EASG	East Asia Strategic Guidelines
EASR	East Asia Strategy Report
EDOP	Exclusively Defence-Oriented Policy
EPA	Economic Partnership Agreement
FDI	Foreign Direct Investment
FSX	Fighter Support Experimental
FTA	Free Trade Agreement
GATT	General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
GDP	Gross Domestic Products
GNP	Gross National Products
GPOI SML	Global Peace Operations Initiative Senior Mission Leaders
GPR	Global Posture Review
GSOMIA	General Sharing of Military Information Agreement

GRIPS	National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies
HA/DR	Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief
HNS	Host Nations Support
IDEA	Initiative for Development of Economies of Asia
IGS	Information Gathering Satellites
IISS	International Institute for Strategic Studies
IMF	International Monetary Funds
IPE	International Political Economy
IR	International Relations
ISR	Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance
IT	Information Technology
JCIE	Japan Center for International Exchange
JCP	Japanese Communist Party
JDA	Japan Defence Agency
JDP	Japanese Democratic Party
JDRAC	Japan Demining and Reconstruction Assistance Center
JFRI	Japan Forum on International Relations
JICA	Japanese International Cooperation Agency
JIIA	Japanese Institute of International Affairs
JSC	Joint Staff Council

KHI	Kawasaki Heavy Industries
LDP	Liberal Democratic Party
MCAS	Marine Corps Air Station
MDA	Mutual Defence Assistance
MDBP	Midterm Defence Build-up Programme
METI	Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry
MELCO	Mitsubishi Electric Corporations
MHI	Mitsubishi Heavy Industries
MITI	Ministry of International Trade and Industry
MOD	Ministry of Defence
MOF	Ministry of Finance
MOFA	Ministry of Foreign Affairs
MOU	Memorandum of Understanding
MSA	Mutual Security Assistance
NAFTA	North American Free Trade Agreement
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NCW	Naval Centre Warfare
NDPG	National Defence Programme Guideline
NDPO	National Defence Programme Outline
NEC	Nippon Electronic Company

NEDO	New Energy & Industrial Technology Development Organization
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
NICT	National Institute of Information & Communications Technology
NIMBY	Not In My Backyards
NPA	National Police Agency
NSC	National Security Council
ODA	Official Development Assistance
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OEF	Operation Enduring Freedom
OEN	Okinawa Environmental Network
OPAC	Okinawa Peace Assistance Center
OPRF	Ocean Policy Research Foundation
PAC-3	Patriot Advanced Capability-3
PKO	Peacekeeping Operations
PSI	Proliferation Security Initiative
QDR	Quadrennial Defence Review
RAF	Royal Air Force
RIMPAC	Rim of the Pacific Exercise
RMA	Revolution in Military Affairs
RMC	Roles, Missions and Capabilities

SACO	Special Action Committee on Okinawa
SAM	Surface-Air Missile
SCAP	Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers
SCC	Security Consultative Committee
SDF	Self-Defence Force
SDP	Social Democratic Party
SDI	Strategic Defence Initiative
SM-3	Standard Missile-3
SOFA	Status of U.S. Forces Agreement
SPF	Sasakawa Peace Foundation
TMD	Theatre Missile Defence
TPP	Trans-Pacific Partnership
TSD	Trilateral Strategic Dialogue
USAF	United States Air Force
USFJ	United States Forces Japan
USJBC	U.S.-Japan Business Council
WESTPAC	Western Pacific Missile Defence Architecture Study
WMD	Weapons of Mass Destruction
WTO	World Trade Organisation

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Declaration

I hereby declare that this thesis is my own work of research. In preparing this thesis, I followed the guidelines established in the Guide to Examinations for Higher Degrees by Research of the University of Warwick. This thesis has not been submitted for a degree at any other university.

Misato Matsuoka

Abstract

While the nature of security is transforming, alliances remain at the centre of foreign policymaking in the contemporary era. Although such ideas as “the end of alliances” and “the end of alliance theories” have been discussed with the emergence of a “coalition of willingness”, alliances have continuously evolved in the post-Cold War and post-9.11 contexts. The forms of security are transforming by comprehending not only the traditional but also non-traditional types, consisting of peacekeeping operations (PKO), humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HA/DR), global commons and energy security. In the face of changing and malleable international security surroundings, alliances have been reshaped. Yet, alliances remain to be treated as mere military alliances rather than political ones in the realm of IR scholarship and a negative perception of the interdependence of allies still exists, which may have limited the understanding about alliance relationships in the post-Cold War period.

This PhD thesis aims to refine the theory of alliance by incorporating the neo-Gramscian account of hegemony, which is crucial to be taken into consideration. This research project is intended to go beyond the military understanding of alliances. In light of alliance politics, it is important to explore not only material but also the economic and ideational aspects of alliances. In consideration of the current circumstances, it seems that it is not only material elements that have bolstered the alliance, which underlines the importance of examining other elements such as ideology. Although some literature addresses the causes of the continuity of alliances, there have not been in-depth investigations about the durability of the U.S.-Japan alliance, particularly within the International Relations (IR) framework. Furthermore, the alliance may have become deeply embedded in Japanese society as the pillar of Japanese foreign policy, which is another aspect that shall be examined.

Introduction Chapter

“Like Oscar Wilde’s picture of Dorian Gray, an ageing alliance may appear robust and healthy so long as its formal institutions continue to operate, even if the basic rationale for the arrangement is crumbling” (Walt 1997, p. 67).

Introduction

While the nature of security is transforming not only with traditional but also non-traditional forms consisting of peacekeeping operations (PKO), humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HA/DR), and energy security, alliances remain at the centre of foreign policymaking in the contemporary era. Although such ideas as “the end of alliances” and the “end of alliance theories” emerged with the end of the Cold War and a “coalition of willingness”, alliances continuously evolved in the post-Cold War and post-9.11 contexts. In the face of alternating and malleable international security surroundings, alliances have been reshaped and played an important role in international politics. Nonetheless, in the realm of IR scholarship, alliances remain to be treated as mere military alliances, not necessarily political. Specifically, as mainstream alliance theories exhibit, negative perceptions of the interdependence of allies still exist, which may have limited the understanding about alliance relationships in the post-Cold War period.

Regarding the case of the U.S.-Japan alliance, it has been reconfigured, redefined and reinforced with changing regional and global circumstances taking into account not only joint military operations and joint intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) activities, but also the values of democracy, the rule of law, free and open markets, and respect for human rights. The significance of the U.S.-Japan alliance was underscored in the wake of the 2011 Tōhoku Earthquake and

Tsunami in Japan, or “Great East Japan Earthquake”, with the presence of “Operation Tomodachi”.¹ Conversely, criticism of the alliance remains in the eyes of some scholars and activists due to Japan’s continuing dependence on the US and the burdens placed on local citizens in the prefectures hosting US bases in Japan (McCormack 2007; Magosaki 2012).² Ongoing opposition and critiques against the U.S.-Japan alliance put into scrutiny the durability of the alliance in the post-Cold War period,³ which can be annulled at any time if both sides agree.⁴ Additionally, whilst it has been widely recognised that the increasing importance of the alliance is due to the emerging threat from North Korea and China’s rise, it is questionable whether these factors are the sole determinants of the endurance of the alliance.⁵ While the alliance was formed in consideration of the Cold War contexts, US alliances have been harnessed despite the discourse on US decline. Especially, in the midst of US fiscal austerity, it is questionable that the U.S.-Japan alliance will continue to develop (de Koning & Lipsy 2011).⁶

This leads us to one major research puzzle: “Why has the U.S.-Japan alliance continued to endure and been strengthened”? In order to answer this puzzle, this

¹ This was an assistance operation by the US Armed Forces to support Japan in the realm of disaster relief which took place from 12 March to 4 May 2011.

² For example, John Dower, an author of *Embracing Defeat*, has been one of the activists against Japan’s dependence on the US.

³ It is also worth noting that it is not only the citizens living nearby US bases but also policymakers, especially from the US side, who believe that reducing bases in Japan is in their national interest considering financial burdens. For instance, US Admiral Mike Mullen indicated that “Our national debt is our biggest national security threat” (Bassett 2010).

⁴ Article 10 “allowed for the abrogation of the treaty if both parties agreed that the United Nations has made satisfactory arrangements to provide for the stability of peace and security in the Japan area”.

⁵ In the realm of threat productions, Hughes’ (2009) article discusses “supersizing” the North Korean threat to Japan which has led to its remilitarisation while such articles as Broomfield’s (2003) work examines the theory of China’s threat to other nations.

⁶ de Koning and Lipsy (2011) analyse Japan’s military reemergence in the context of austerity, concluding that “Japan’s experience indicates that austerity can serve as a wakeup call for defense establishments to reallocate resources more efficiently and reduce waste” (de Koning & Lipsy 2011, p. 45).

research project is intended to go beyond the military understanding of alliances. In light of the politics of alliances, it is important to explore not only material but also economic and ideational aspects of alliances that are interrelated. In consideration of the current circumstances, it seems that it is not only material elements that have bolstered the alliance and this underlines the importance of examining other elements, such as ideology. Although some literature addresses the causes of the continuity of alliances (Walt 1997), in-depth investigations on the durability of the U.S.-Japan alliance have not been made particularly within the International Relations (IR) framework. Furthermore, it is worth noting that, with regard to the U.S.-Japan alliance, the alliance may have become deeply embedded in Japanese society as the pillar of Japanese foreign policy which is another aspect that shall be examined.⁷

The aforementioned circumstances demonstrate the significance of examining the nature of the alliance relationship between the US and Japan by exploring the persistence of the U.S.-Japan alliance under these manifold conditions, which have not been closely examined in the IR field. My Introduction Chapter elucidates the importance of adopting the neo-Gramscian framework to alliance theory and the U.S.-Japan alliance, underlining the relevance of this research project. Prior to the literature review for this research project, which is fully explored in Chapter One, this chapter presents the following sections: first, the aim and purposes of this research project are illustrated by taking into account the features of the U.S.-Japan alliance and existing relevant literature. Second, original contributions to the background knowledge for this research project are addressed by underscoring the importance of this research project in the discipline of IR. Third, research questions

⁷ This is clearly listed in Japan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) document (2013).

consisting of my central research question and sub-research questions are presented, which are answered in subsequent chapters. The central research question and sub-research questions are closely examined to display the relationship with the subsequent chapters of the research project. Fourth, prior to the concluding section, the structure of the research project is presented in line with the sub-research questions.

Research Aim

The major aim of this research project is to refine alliance theory by taking an alternative IR approach to exemplify the alliance system in the post-Cold War era. Since alliances are often treated merely as military alliances in the field of the IR scholarship,⁸ this research project is intended to go beyond a military understanding of alliances and encapsulate the political dimensions of alliances. Although some research recognises and provides explanations about the continuity of alliances, the durability of alliances including the U.S.-Japan alliance is not sufficiently examined in depth. In addition, although the U.S.-Japan alliance is seen as indispensable for Japanese foreign policymaking especially from the Japanese perspective, this aspect of the alliance politics has not been fully explored. In a similar vein, whilst it has been commonly acknowledged that the salience of the U.S.-Japan alliance in the post-Cold War era is enhanced by the threat generated from North Korea and China, some literature illustrates that threats can be created based on the security interests of the states (Broomfield 2003; Hughes 2009) which may not comprehend the logic of persisting alliance system in the contemporary periods. Considering these existing

⁸ Although some scholars (Inoguchi, Ikenberry & Sato 2011) treat alliances as political, it is rarely analysed in this way.

viewpoints and the changing features of international security environments, it is important to explore the political relevance of alliances from the alternative IR perspectives by closely examining alliance relationships.

Neo-Gramscianism as an Analytical Framework

In this regard, in order to embellish alliance theory, this research project critically investigates the features of the U.S.-Japan alliance in the post-Cold War era by adopting the neo-Gramscian perspectives. This theoretical framework has not been used previously in the context of the U.S.-Japan alliance and not even in the scholarship of alliance theory and security studies. One of the prominent characteristics of this IR theoretical framework that should be noted is its viewpoint on hegemony by taking into account both coercive and consensual roles of hegemony, which is further explained in Chapters One and Two. The neo-Gramscian standpoint on hegemony is crucial to be considered in understanding the power dynamism in the context of the current alliance system in the post-Cold War periods. Additionally, unlike other mainstream IR theoretical approaches to the U.S.-Japan alliance, which are further exemplified in Chapter One, another feature of neo-Gramscianism is its comprehension of not only material but also ideological dimensions of hegemony that may have played a larger role in the post-Cold War era. In this regard, it can be argued that the US-led hegemony, or “historic bloc” in the neo-Gramscian terms, has been bolstered with US-led liberal ideas such as democracy and liberalism in the context of the Asia-Pacific region.

In order to investigate what unites these allies, neo-Gramscianism, especially in consideration of its concept of hegemony, is a crucial theoretical framework to understand the alliance relationship between the US and Japan. In doing so, another

major purpose of this research is to embellish neo-Gramscianism in the IR field and alliance theory since this theoretical notion of hegemony may be applicable not only to the alliance between the US and Japan but also to other US-led alliances in the Asia-Pacific region. In fact, as is further exemplified in Chapter Two, neo-Gramscian perspectives can be considered difficult to be operationalised regardless of its insightful perspective on hegemony. Yet, in an attempt to overcome this hurdle, this research project aims at developing this IR theoretical framework as a useful analytical tool by elucidating the strengths of neo-Gramscianism, particularly in comprehending the sustainability of asymmetrical power relationships. As is noted in the later section, the key notions of neo-Gramscianism are illuminated in Chapter Two to evolve into a research method in the field of IR.

Original Contributions

With regard to the research aims of this project, the original contributions to the background knowledge are as follows: the first contribution is the application of the neo-Gramscian theory to the scholarship of the U.S.-Japan alliance. The IR literature on the U.S.-Japan alliance has been primarily examined from mainstream realist, liberal and constructivist perspectives which are further scrutinised in Chapter One. Whilst the explanations that have developed within these theories can remain valuable in comprehending the alliance mechanism in the post-Cold War period, the neo-Gramscian notion of hegemony is useful in articulating the power relationship between the US and Japan, which has not been explored in depth in the existing literature. In particular, in consideration of the characteristics of the postwar regime crafted by the US after the Second World War, there are some recognitions about the relationship between the US and Japan which can be characterised as a paternalistic

relationship (McCormack 2007; Shibusawa 2010) but no IR theory explains the mechanism of this power relationship, which can be illuminated through the neo-Gramscian lenses.

The second contribution to knowledge is the implementation of the neo-Gramscian theories not only to the case of the U.S.-Japan alliance but also to alliance theory which so far has been predominantly studied from neorealist perspectives in the realm of IR scholarship. As is exemplified further in Chapter One, much literature on alliances relies on the concept of “alliance dilemma”, which perceives dependence on allies as negative. In this regard, it is important to move away from this negative perception since alliances remain functioning as the main component of diplomacy even in the contemporary era since the features of alliances can be transforming from the ones prior to the First World War. Although there are various theories of alliance, the power relationship among allies is rarely discussed. In this respect, the neo-Gramscian account of hegemony is able to shed light on the power in the alliance mechanism. Since the purpose of this research project is to refine alliance theory, the incorporation of the neo-Gramscian perspective of hegemony is one of the visible contributions to this research aim. Alliance relationships can be understood not only in material but also in economic and ideational senses which are further explored in the later chapters. Application of this theoretical framework to the scholarship of alliance theory enables us to explain the dynamism of alliance politics which can be useful in the post-Cold War or post-9.11 contexts where non-traditional forms of security are seen as relevant.

And, lastly, the third contribution is the applicability of the neo-Gramscian theory to political discourse in the realm of policymaking, taking into consideration not merely the strategies of hegemonic states but those of non-hegemonic states, which

are important factors to be taken into account in the IR field. With regard to hegemonic discourse, less attention is paid to the role of non-hegemonic states. The political strategy of non-hegemonic states cannot be ignored in understanding not only in academic terms but also policymaking terms, which may have been already acknowledged but rarely discussed. In this sense, the U.S.-Japan alliance is one of the proper examples for understanding policymaking in the alliance contexts. In the case of the US-led alliances, not only the US perspective but also those of US allies are crucial for understanding the sustainability of hegemony. This research project is also aimed at underscoring the dynamic nature of hegemony at a practical level in alternating international environments by adopting the concepts of neo-Gramscianism.

Research Questions

In this research project, the central research question is based on the main research puzzle that is indicated earlier: “Why has the U.S.-Japan alliance continued to endure and been strengthened”? As is elaborated previously, few studies scrutinise the durability of this alliance, which has not been deeply investigated regardless of the condition that it can be annulled based upon the agreement between the allies according to the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, which is the foundation of the U.S.-Japan alliance. As the alliance is regarded as the centre of Japanese foreign policymaking, it is essential to unravel this feature of its diplomacy, especially in the surrounding and transforming regional security environments with the decline of the US and the rise of China. In order to provide the answer to this central research question, my research employs a neo-Gramscian perspective on hegemony and its other relevant key concepts.

Stemming from this main question, the sub-research questions can be drawn in the following ways. The first sub-research question is: “In what ways has the U.S.-Japan alliance been developed?” This research question intends to explore in what ways the alliance relationship between the US and Japan has been evolving. This is closely examined in Chapter Three by illustrating the historical trajectory of the alliance relationship between the two countries and elucidating not only the hegemonic but also non-hegemonic viewpoints of the alliance. While some literature discusses how the U.S.-Japan alliance has been or should be functioning (see Chapter One), there are few explanations about in what ways the alliance may have evolved. In an attempt to demonstrate this development, which is rarely considered in the context of alliance theory, Chapter Three attempts to illuminate the interactions between the US and Japan within the neo-Gramscian framework.

The second sub-research question is: “How has Japan increasingly come to accept US foreign policies?” (see Chapter Four). Japan has had difficulty in contributing militarily to international security in the past due to its constitutional restraints and the “Yoshida Doctrine”. For instance, the 1991 Gulf War demonstrated when a sole financial contribution could be made instead of sending Japanese troops to the conflict area. However, the roles of the Japanese Self-Defence Forces (SDF) are alternating with a wider range of activities by encompassing humanitarian and reconstruction assistances (see Chapter Three), specifically in the post-Cold War period. Indeed, while more discussions on the significance of liberal or common values of the alliance have emerged (see Chapter One), few critical analyses have been made regarding its roles in the alliance structure with the use of ideology. While “alliance dilemma” features prominently in IR scholarship (see Chapter One), the ideological component of power is seldom taken into consideration, which can be

provided by adopting neo-Gramscianism. Additionally, the Japanese National Security Council (NSC) displays the influence of US foreign policymaking.

The third sub-research question is: “Are changing features of the U.S.-Japan alliance leading to a consolidation of a ‘US-led transnational hegemony’?” This question implies the hypothesis that US liberal ideologies such as democracy and market economy have been integrated into the U.S.-Japan alliance and Japanese foreign policymaking. In this regard, the neo-Gramscian concept of hegemony, specifically “historic bloc”, is considerably explored taking into account the ideational dimension of power which is examined in Chapter Five. In line with this, a related question emerges: “how does ideology consisting of liberal values influence the alliance”. Whilst it has been discussed whether the alliance has become weakened or not, some scholars including the participants of “the Future of the Japan-U.S. Alliance”, who can be regarded as “organic intellectuals” in neo-Gramscian terms (see Chapter Two), argue that the U.S.-Japan alliance should be renewed to bolster the alliance relationship between the US and Japan (Study Group on the Future of the Japan-U.S. Alliance 2010). In this sense, it is important to look into not only bilateral but also multilateral dimensions of the alliance at the regional level (see Chapter Five).

Lastly, the fourth sub-research question is: “Has the U.S.-Japan alliance become common sense?” which is fully explored in Chapter Six. As indicated earlier, the idea that the alliance is the pillar of Japanese foreign policymaking may have become deeply rooted in the Japanese society. Considering the recent trends of the U.S.-Japan alliance including the 3.11 Tohoku Earthquake and Tsunami and other SDF activities relating to PKOs and HA/DR activities, the perception of the alliance relationship has become more positive (see Chapter Six). One of the evident changes

is the increasing usage of the term the “U.S.-Japan alliance” in the media, academia and the public domain with regard to Japanese security issues, particularly after the end of the Cold War, which is clearly described in Chapter Three. Using the research method which is introduced in Chapter Two, this sub-research question is closely scrutinised within the neo-Gramscian framework which is in support of the central research question.

Arguments

This thesis is based upon the hypothesis that the U.S.-Japan alliance has developed, which has also harnessed the US-led historic bloc in the Asia-Pacific region. Within the neo-Gramscian theory of alliance, not only to the military but also economy and other elements of politics are related to this development, which may have overlooked the durability in the contemporary era. This hypothesis is supported by the arguments provided in subsequent chapters as follows. Firstly, since the postwar period, it is clear that the U.S.-Japan alliance has developed through the interplay of coercion and consensus, and the roles of “organic intellectuals” through the neo-Gramscian lenses. This can be observed in the influences of the “Yoshida Doctrine” on the U.S.-Japan alliance and Japanese foreign policymaking, which is explored in Chapter Three. Secondly, in the realm of force interoperability and military-industrial relations, Japan has come to accept US foreign policymaking in the post-Cold War period. Thirdly, from the neo-Gramscian viewpoint, the U.S.-Japan alliance has harnessed the US-led historic bloc in the Asia-Pacific. The second and third arguments are examined by using “social forces analysis”, which is explained in Chapter Two. Lastly, the importance of the U.S.-Japan alliance has become common sense for Japanese foreign policymaking. Furthermore, in

consideration of the aforementioned arguments, this research lies in the assumption that the U.S.-Japan alliance is already “entrapped” or “entangled”. While the existing theory of alliance is reviewed in the subsequent chapter, this thesis argues that the neorealist understanding of alliance cannot explain the durability of alliances, specifically in the post-Cold War period.

Structure of the Research Project

Regarding the central research question and sub-research questions, the subsequent chapters are structured in the following ways. Chapter One reviews the literature, which is relevant to exhibit the gaps in the existing literature and to substantiate the role of neo-Gramscianism to fill these gaps. In particular, IR literature on the U.S.-Japan alliance, alliance theory, the theory of hegemony and neo-Gramscianism are re-examined in this chapter with rigorous scrutiny by underlining the importance of dealing with the aforementioned research questions regarding the features of the U.S.-Japan alliance in the contemporary era. Chapter One is aimed at bridging alliances and hegemony by comprehending existing arguments and analysis of the relevant literature. In terms of Introduction Chapter that illustrates the relevance of this research project, Chapter One elucidates in what ways neo-Gramscianism is contributable for alliance theory, which is part of original contributions to knowledge.

Chapter Two explicates the theory of neo-Gramscianism and demonstrates the research methods used as the analytical tools for the remaining chapters of my thesis. More precisely, as one of the original contributions, this chapter closely examines neo-Gramscianism to underscore its key elements of hegemony in an attempt to develop it as a research method. In doing so, the neo-Gramscian theory of alliance is

established by articulating the main concepts within this theoretical framework that are applied to the rest of the chapters while taking into account the existing literature of this IR theoretical framework. Chapter Two exemplifies the research method founded upon neo-Gramscianism and exhibits in what ways this theoretical framework can be adopted to the case of the U.S.-Japan alliance and alliance theory.

Chapter Three entails the historical trajectory from the postwar until the early post-Cold War periods in order to illustrate the neo-Gramscian account of the U.S.-Japan alliance that is supportive for the first sub-research question. This theoretical understanding of hegemony, which is further clarified in Chapter Two, is deployed to this chapter to illustrate the development of the U.S.-Japan alliance. In particular, within this theoretical framework, Chapter Three intends to show in what ways US hegemony, or “US-led historic bloc”, has been reinforced by means of the U.S.-Japan alliance. Using these theoretical concepts which have not been explicitly explained in the existing literature neither in English nor Japanese, this chapter elucidates the development of the alliance through the lenses of neo-Gramscianism.

Chapter Four and Chapter Five employ Robert W. Cox’s “social forces analysis,” which is one of the analytical tools for neo-Gramscianism (see Chapter Two). While Chapter Four closely investigates the bilateral cooperation of the US and Japan in the alliance context, Chapter Five explores economic and ideational aspects of the alliance, which are closely related to regionalism in the Asia-Pacific. In an attempt to answer the second sub-research question, Chapter Four explores the influences of US foreign policymaking on Japanese foreign policymaking at the bilateral level. Chapter Five demonstrates the way the alliance has evolved not only in the military but also economic and ideational terms to answer the third sub-research question. This chapter relates to the issues of regionalism in the Asia-Pacific, which are

relevant to be taken into consideration regarding the sub-research question and the neo-Gramscian view on US-led historic bloc and are crucial for the central research question.

Chapter Six, which addresses the fourth sub-research question, uses the neo-Gramscian discourse analysis of the U.S.-Japan alliance by displaying in what ways the U.S.-Japan alliance has become “common sense”. The chapter closely investigates both hegemonic and counter-hegemonic discourses of the alliance by using the concepts of “rhetorical strategies” and “rhetorically marginalised” (Rupert 1995; 2000) (see Chapter Two and Six). Furthermore, Chapter Six also looks closely into the features of the alliance as common sense by taking into account the existing arguments about it. This chapter is crucially important to display the neo-Gramscian viewpoint on the formulation of the historic bloc through the interaction of hegemonic and counter-hegemonic discourses.

My Conclusion Chapter summarises the research project by underlining the features of alliances in the contemporary era. Based on the analyses that constitute from Chapter Three to Chapter Six, this chapter provides the answers to the four sub-research questions. Subsequently, it addresses the central research question by linking these answers to the concepts of neo-Gramscianism. Furthermore, in consideration of alternating international security environments and the coexistence of both traditional and non-traditional forms of security, my Conclusion Chapter also reemphasises the significance of refining alliance theory by adopting the neo-Gramscian framework. It takes into consideration the insights presented in the previous chapters and suggests the alternative usage of the neo-Gramscian theory of alliance to other case studies in the realm of the studies of alliance politics which is an essential step to enrich the scholarship of security studies and IR.

Conclusion

This chapter lays out the relevance of applying neo-Gramscianism as an alternative IR framework for alliance theory and the U.S.-Japan alliance. The neo-Gramscian approach to hegemony, which is further exemplified in Chapter Two, enables us to understand the current features of the U.S.-Japan alliance and other alliances, which may provide a more holistic picture of the alliance system in the contemporary period. Moreover, while security landscapes in the Asia-Pacific region have been transforming, the U.S.-Japan alliance has been bolstered with US-led liberal values such as freedom, democracy, human rights, and the rule of law. In order to achieve the research aims listed in this chapter and to contribute original perspectives on this issue, the subsequent chapters are provided to demonstrate the neo-Gramscian perspective on alliance theory and the U.S.-Japan alliance. The central research question and the supporting sub-research questions, which support the central question, are answered in the following chapters through the neo-Gramscian lenses.

The next chapter presents the review of the literature of IR theories, alliance theory and the theory of hegemony to elucidate the suitability of the neo-Gramscian framework for alliance theory and the U.S.-Japan alliance to answer the research questions that are presented in this chapter. Showing the gaps among the existing literature with rigorous investigations, Chapter One is intended to provide the possible insights on alliances including the U.S.-Japan alliance on the grounds of neo-Gramscianism, which has not previously been used in the existing literature. While this theoretical framework has been acknowledged as one of the IR theoretical paradigms, it is rarely used in the realm of security studies and diplomacy. The

subsequent chapters deal with the sub-research questions within the neo-Gramscian framework, followed by the concluding comments.

Chapter One: Literature Review

Introduction

The Introduction Chapter underscores the significance of using the neo-Gramscian framework for the analysis of the U.S.-Japan alliance by presenting research purposes, original contributions of the literature of relevant studies for the U.S.-Japan alliance and alliance theory, and the central research question and sub-research questions. Chapter One examines not only the literature on the U.S.-Japan alliance but also the theories of alliance and hegemony. It is important to scrutinise this literature due to their reductionist or mechanical considerations and lack of understanding about the non-hegemonic role of the allies which is not fully explored. In this respect, this chapter underlines the relevance of adopting a neo-Gramscian framework to alliance theory and the specific case of the U.S.-Japan alliance. Chapter One explicates this theoretical framework to show in what ways it may be able to bridge the gap among the existing literature. Taking into consideration of the neo-Gramscian account of hegemony, this chapter displays the applicability of it to the International Relations (IR) framework in the study of both alliance theory and the U.S.-Japan alliance.

The chapter is composed as follows: first, a review of the existing literature regarding the U.S.-Japan alliance is explored, exemplifying its mainstream realist, liberal and constructivist approach to the U.S.-Japan alliance and, in doing so, highlighting the gap between previous arguments and viewpoints set out in later sections of my thesis. Second, the literature review provides a framework from which to consider the existing IR analyses of the U.S.-Japan alliance. This section clarifies the definition of alliances which may have been altered in the contemporary

era, while closely examining the existing theories of alliance. Furthermore, before scrutinising the theory of hegemony, the linkage between alliances and hegemony is elaborated which is crucial to be taken into account. Third, the theory of hegemony is revisited by underscoring the gaps in the current literature. In particular, the theory of hegemonic stability is scrutinised to signify that the previous literature has been dependent on this theory in investigating alliance relationships which may have undervalued the non-hegemonic roles of the states. Additionally, the neo-Gramscian concept of hegemony, particularly the “consent and coercion” dimensions of hegemony, is rigorously examined. Fourth, stressing the key elements of this theory, the final section of the chapter crystallises the connection between neo-Gramscianism and the U.S.-Japan alliance by exhibiting the potential explanations about the alliance from this IR theoretical viewpoint.

IR Literature of the U.S.-Japan Alliance

This section explores the IR⁹ explanations of the U.S.-Japan alliance that have been pervasively approached from mainstream realist, liberal and constructivist perspectives. Moreover, while these viewpoints are respectively investigated, “analytical eclecticism”, which is suggested by some scholars as one of the research methods to fill the gap in existing IR theories, is also exemplified in order to exhibit the limitations of these existing IR explanations.

a) Realism

There are various realist interpretations of the U.S.-Japan alliance. Among neorealists or structural realists, there are basically two different viewpoints on the international system: balance-of-power theory and balance-of-threat theory. Balance-of-power theorists generally assume that rising states, or “rising powers”, which is the common term in the contemporary world, would seek power when it is empowered materially. Within this theory, it was recognised that Japan would seek strategic independence while reducing its dependence on the US in the context of the U.S.-Japan alliance. For instance, Waltz (1993) foresaw that Japan would obtain nuclear weapons soon and seek for strategic independence to reduce its vulnerability to US power. He also warns that the potential great powers, including Japan, would make an attempt to challenge the US due to its growing economic power (Waltz 1993).

In a similar vein, Layne (1993) argues that the U.S.-Japan alliance would be terminated as Japan would start balancing its power against the US according to

⁹ Indeed, it is said that IR has committed a negation of political theory (Walker 1993). This issue has been discussed in Bieler and Morton's (2007) book.

balancing logic. In this regard, he suggested the concept of “the strategy of preponderance”, explicating that the US adopted this strategy by incorporating other great powers into its alliance system after the Second World War. However, Layne (2003; 2006) also proposes an “offshore balancing” strategy to disengage US military commitments to other countries by decreasing the size of its ground forces in other regions which is less expensive than the strategy of preponderance. Waltz (1993) also exemplifies the aspect of US hegemony, stating that “hegemony leads to balance... That is now happening, but haltingly so because the United States still has benefits to offer and many other countries have become accustomed to their easy lives with the United States bearing many of their burdens” (Waltz 1993, p. 77). In addition, neorealists have been critical of hegemonic stability theorists, as is exemplified in this chapter about the theory of hegemony, who believe that “benign hegemon” including alliance formations is the most efficient system of stability in the international system since other potential great powers would balance against the hegemon, which is precarious (Layne 1993; Waltz 1993; Layne 2006).

Conversely, defensive realists provide different insights from balance-of-power theorists taking into consideration certain social elements. Midford (2000) argues that the U.S.-Japan alliance has become more important for Japan’s “reassurance strategy” than the military balance of power. In particular, according to him, Japan’s “pacifist outlier strategy” has been designed to reassure its neighbours, who remain deeply suspicious due to its experience of Japan’s invasion and occupation during the imperial period (Midford 2000). He incorporates the notion of “reassurance” into a balance-of-threat theory based upon the assumption that Japan avoids aggressive policies due to its awareness of the perceptions of other Asian countries stemming from the period of Japanese colonialism. In the case of the U.S.-Japan alliance, he is

critical of the explanations about the balance-of-power theory because of its combination of a significant underproduction of military security and its extreme dependence on the US (Midford 2002). Midford (2002) clarifies that the U.S.-Japan alliance is regarded as an “expanding bottle” with its participation in regional security and as a way to build up security contacts with other Asian states. This perspective seems to be relevant in explaining in which ways Japan has adapted its policy to regain the trust from other Asian countries. Twomey (2000) claims that the U.S.-Japan alliance has worked as part of “circumscribed balancing” which contains a socialisation-against-aggression effect and forces Japan to engage in restrained behaviours. His argument is that Japan has been socialised against aggressive defence policies after the Second World War (Twomey 2000). According to him, “circumscribed balancers” are less concerned about the peripheral areas and issues but are rather concerned about the bilateral military balance (Twomey 2000). Midford and Twomey have elaborated their insights by taking into account social influences on security policies. Lind (2004), however, explains that Japan’s postwar security policy is consistent with a “buck-passing strategy,” which involves a closer military cooperation with the US, US bases in Japan and the creation of a world-class military force. According to her, whilst Japan has become capable of enhancing its military power and expanded its military roles,¹⁰ it is only when allies fail at responding to growing threats that it needs to do so (Lind 2004).

Aside from these explanations, the U.S.-Japan alliance has been examined on the basis of realist logic using different theories. For instance, “mercantile realism” was

¹⁰ Some examples are given such as a series of joint studies on sea-lane defence by the US and Japan, joint operations, and interoperability, and joint military training of the two countries (Lind 2004). However, Hanami (1993) also argues that “A substantial military budget does not easily translate into a substantial fighting force” (Hanami 1993, p. 595).

developed by Heginbotham and Samuels¹¹ (1998) assuming that states balance not only with military growths but also with technical or economic gains. They argue that Japan was able to enjoy a cheap ride in defence spending and ignore regional military threats by balancing with the US in techno-economic terms (Heginbotham & Samuels 1998). The concept of “reluctant realism” emerged from Green’s (2001) idea that Japan must take more assertive steps to preserve its international status considering that the U.S.-Japan alliance is still not a fully operational military alliance. According to him, Japan has moved towards a greater realism in regards to national security and identity and the demise of idealism (Green 2001). However, Heginbotham and Samuels (1998) fail to take into account the changing defence posture of Japan which has become more aware of regional threats such as North Korea and China.¹² The country has become concerned about its military capabilities, by increasing its military cooperation with the US as the recent continuous changes in the National Defence Programme Guidelines (NDPG) show, which is further exemplified in Chapter Four. Furthermore, they were not aware of the changing security environment and material capabilities of Japan. Japan does not only consider the economic aspects of its policies but also military aspects so it is not solely about technocratic competitiveness.

Regarding these existing realist frameworks of the U.S.-Japan alliance, the alliance mechanism has been thoroughly examined with regard to the balancing logic although understanding about the durability of the alliance is limited because of the

¹¹ Samuels (2007) also explains Japanese foreign policies by elaborating the concept of “Goldilocks consensus”, locating Japan “not too close and not too far from the hegemon-protector, that makes it stronger but not threatening, and that provides new and comprehensive options” (Samuels 2007, p. 198).

¹² Additionally, Midford (2002) also argues that Japan should have spent more on defence and have exported weapons if she was really pursuing a mercantilist strategy to maximise its technoeconomic competitiveness (Midford 2002, p. 17).

following reasons. First, while realist scholars have investigated the U.S.-Japan alliance in consideration of power balancing and the states' material capabilities, these insights are likely to be abstractive which may overlook some other elements. For instance, with regard to the notion of "balancing", Twomey acknowledges that "balancing is an imprecise concept" (Twomey 2000, p. 170). Realist scholars have rarely looked into the history of the relationship between the states, which may not be explainable in balancing logic. In addition, although some defensive realists consider social or perceptual influences on foreign policymaking, realists' ideas are based on purely international systemic factors with a focus on regional instability in East Asia and changing distribution of power with the US that may not sufficiently explain the continuity of the US-led alliance system in the Asia-Pacific region.

Second, realist assumptions on alliance and hegemony are exclusively based on the material capabilities of states such as military spending. Lind (2004) discusses Japan's military expenditure but the total expense does not explain the security policy itself and the development of the U.S.-Japan alliance. Her analysis focuses on the material component of the alliance. Moreover, regarding the concept of hegemony, neorealists tend to base their argument on the theory of hegemonic stability to explain US strategy towards Japan, which is firmly based on material capabilities. In consideration of these features of realist explanations about the U.S.-Japan alliance, the strengthening alliance relationship between Japan and the US and the implications of the evolving features of the alliance system are seldom discussed.

b) Liberalism

Liberal explanations on the U.S.-Japan alliance look into the role of ideas and institutions in creating the US-led liberal order in the Asia-Pacific. Unlike some neorealists, who view the alliance formations negatively, most liberals agree that liberal values are the indispensable factors to sustain the U.S.-Japan alliance for regional stability, which are predominantly observable in the post-Cold War period. Different from the realists' focus on material capabilities, liberals give a greater role to the concept of shared ideas. One of the basic liberal assumptions is that the shared values of the regional future and liberal political order stabilise the region. For example, Mochizuki and O'Hanlon (1998) argue that the U.S.-Japan alliance should be supported by democratic principles and shared political values since the systems based on liberalism are far more stable than an anarchical international environment in a way realists assume. According to them, liberal notions can resolve international conflicts through peacekeeping, sea operations or freedom of navigations, minesweeping and modest size units for land operations (Mochizuki & O'Hanlon 1998).

In a similar vein, O'Hanlon (2007) clarifies that Japan has changed its defence posture for the purpose of multilateral security missions including humanitarian relief, or humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HA/DR). In his account, despite its military capabilities, Japan is unlikely to become aggressive because of its interest in liberalism or multilateralism (O'Hanlon 2007). O'Hanlon (2007) also explicates that "the same liberal and moral values that influence many pacifists can lead to a strong argument in favour of Japan's doing its fair share to help with global security problems that are likely to remain prevalent and to put many innocent lives at risk in the future" (O'Hanlon 2007, pp. 101-102).

Neoliberal institutionalism explores the institutional mechanism of hegemony which is at the centre of the U.S.-Japan alliance. Ikenberry (1998) exemplifies the liberal feature of US hegemony which locates the US at the centre of an expanding institutionalised and legitimate political order. He argues that liberal order functions as a strategic restraint by reassuring partners and facilitating cooperation because of the phenomenon of increasing returns that provides institutions with a “lock-in effect” (Ikenberry 1998). He elucidates that alliances are not simply an aggregate of power for balancing against external threats as realists argue, but rather the alliance mechanism allows alliance partners to restrain each other and manage joint relations (Ikenberry 1998). Regarding the U.S.-Japan alliance, he notes that: “The U.S.-Japan security alliance also had a similar ‘dual containment’ character. These institutions not only served as alliances in the ordinary sense of organized efforts to balance against external threats, but they also provided mechanisms and venues to build political relations, conduct business, and regulate conflict” (Ikenberry 1998, p. 69).

Furthermore, he contends that this strategy has long been a part of US foreign policymaking which ripens economic interdependence and institutional cooperation (Ikenberry 1998). Ikenberry (2002) points out that the US’ involvements in East Asia after the Cold War were developed with the “East Asia Strategic Report (EASR)”, or the so-called “Nye Report”, in 1995. This report indicates that the US’ military umbrella in the Asia-Pacific region has important outcomes for the stability and functioning of regional political and economic relations and on the success of the US’ economic, political and security goals such as non-proliferation such as “security is like oxygen”. In this report, Nye (1995) elaborates that US strategy of “deep engagement” has consolidated the hegemonic order in the Asia-Pacific region. This report also emphasises that the US’ military umbrella in the region has significant

outcomes for the stability and functioning of political and economic relations in the region (Nye 1995).¹³

In addition, on the basis of a neoliberal institutional framework, Ikenberry and Inoguchi (2003) argue that the U.S.-Japan alliance is not merely a military pact but “a political partnership” with an institutional mechanism. They maintain that the U.S.-Japan alliance is a crucial mechanism, which restrains the use of power and allows Japan to solve its security issues without becoming a militarised great power (Ikenberry & Inoguchi 2003). They also indicate that such liberal ideas as economic interdependence have also strengthened the alliance, saying that “free trade helped cement the alliance and in turn the alliance helped settle economic disputes” (Ikenberry & Inoguchi 2003, p.23). Ikenberry and Inoguchi (2007) also make their arguments that with a bilateral alliance system, the US bonded its partner states together and reduced uncertainty and insecurity in the Asia-Pacific region. They clarify that bilateral security can be regarded as political logic, providing Japan and other countries with security protection and access to the markets, technology and supplies within an open world economy, while Japan and other countries would become stable partners providing diplomatic, economic and logistical support for the US (Ikenberry & Inoguchi 2007).

Taking into account these perspectives, it seems that an increasing role of liberal norms in the U.S.-Japan alliance has been strongly supported by policymakers. Particularly, US policymakers such as Joseph S. Nye¹⁴ and Richard L. Armitage have stressed the liberal features of the U.S.-Japan alliance. Likewise, as already

¹³ Even in his review of this report which was released six years later, he stresses the significance of liberal and democratic norms within the alliance system (Nye 2001).

¹⁴ Nye (1990) argues that soft power is “the ability of a country to structure a situation so that other countries develop preferences or define their interests in ways consistent with its owns,” (Nye 1990, p. 168) which stems from cultural and ideological attraction as well as rules and institutions.

indicated in my Introduction Chapter, the study group of the U.S.-Japan alliance remarks that the alliance should be strengthened with liberal norms (Study Group on the Future of the Japan-U.S. Alliance 2010). The report is also noted that, while redefining the traditional alliance, the new forms should be incorporated to develop the alliance.¹⁵ The role of these actors is exemplified further in Chapter Two in relation to the neo-Gramscian concepts and it is observable that the role of ideas has played a bigger role in policymaking.

Yet, although liberals examine the institutional mechanism of the US-led liberal grand strategy, their analysis may not be sufficient to comprehend the alliance mechanism between the US and Japan for the following reasons. First, liberal norms used by the governments and their intentions are not critically examined. Liberals rarely investigate how the concept of liberal values has been transformed in the context of the alliance. Their less critical views on the roles of liberal values seldom consider possible maladaptation of US foreign policies to Japanese policies in terms of constitutional, legal and normative constraints. Second, when examining liberal grand strategies, US foreign policies are narrowly focused and seldom investigate the perspectives of other states including Japan. It is significant to consider the pervasiveness of economic interdependence as a gradual, not a rapid, process, so it is worthwhile to look into the intentions of Japanese policymakers to explain an expanding role of the U.S.-Japan alliance in the region.

Third, although liberals attempt to overcome a reductionist neorealist analysis, liberals may have failed in doing so indeed. Liberals differentiate themselves from realists as they focus not only on the distribution of material capabilities but also on international institutions, processes and politics. For instance, Ikenberry (1998)

¹⁵ The “green alliance” emerged to underscore the relevance of environmental cooperation.

criticises neorealism for overlooking the liberal character of US hegemony and the importance of international institutions in facilitating cooperation and overcoming fears of domination or exploitation. Nonetheless, as Nye argues, “When ideals are an important source of power, the classic distinction between *realpolitik* and liberalism becomes blurred” (Nye 1990, p. 170). With regard to power relationships, it seems that realists and liberals may share the same reductionist notion of power and liberals may not adequately explain both the durability of Western order and its features.

c) Constructivism

Unlike realists and liberals, constructivists do not focus on the power relationship between the two countries, but rather focus on the influences of domestic norms on institutions. In the context of the U.S.-Japan alliance, it has often been explained that the existing pacifist norms have prevented Japan from expanding its military capabilities and roles. Katzenstein and Okawara (1993) contend that Japanese security policies are shaped by the domestic governmental structure and the interaction between social and legal norms. According to them, these are the factors of Japan’s mixture of policy flexibility and rigidity in the face of changing environments (Katzenstein & Okawara 1993). They clarify that “The normative consensus that embraces Japanese security policy is shaped by the historical lessons of World War II and the reemergence of Japan as a peaceful and prosperous actor in world politics since 1945” (Katzenstein & Okawara 1993, p. 104).

The concept of “the culture of antimilitarism” is regarded as one of the prominent features of Japanese diplomacy in which Japan’s experience of the defeat came to be interpreted and institutionalised in its political system and defence policy (Berger

1993). Regarding the U.S.-Japan alliance, Berger (1993) argues that, in spite of its capability of developing a formidable military-industrial base independent of the US, Japan remains dependent upon the US for its military security. He explains that “With the assistance of the United States, Japan should seek to create a diverse network of institutional security ties centring on, but not relying exclusively on, the present Mutual Security Treaty with the United States” (Berger 1993, p. 121). Berger (1999) indicates that military-related initiatives are likely to have the greatest chance of success to induce Japan to expand its military and security roles which do not counter Japan’s antimilitaristic culture. He further explains that the Japanese public is more aware of the dangers of the overly strong state which led to the decentralised police force and the overconcentration of power of one single government (Berger 1999).

In addition, Berger (2007) elaborates a “liberal adaptive state” model to describe Japan’s greater flexibility in policymaking and the process of adaptation in foreign policy, defence and national security policy. Emphasising the role of the norms, Berger (2007) argues that liberal values have gradually moulded Japanese foreign policy over the past two or three decades. Notwithstanding, he also acknowledges that liberal values are not the sole determinant for the alliance considering terrorists threats with its purpose to disrupt terrorist networks internationally and engaging in preventive attacks on states in fear of terrorists’ purchase of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) (Berger 2007). Furthermore, Singh (2008) updated the existing constructivist analysis, which is based on the continued use of Japan’s peace-state identity. He argues that “the peace-state conception no longer captures the nature of Japanese post-Cold War security policy. Instead, the current trajectory is better captured by the international-state label” (Singh 2008, p. 304). The aforementioned

constructivist analysis provides the central role of ideas in shaping foreign policymaking which is primarily examined in the context of Japanese foreign policymaking and the U.S.-Japan alliance. Within a constructivist framework, domestic norms exert influences on institutions which have prevented Japan from expanding its military capabilities and roles.

However, constructivist explanations may not sufficiently explain the duration of the U.S.-Japan alliance since the changing nature of the alliance cannot be explained by only taking into account normative constraints. Constructivists are inclined to disregard the elasticity of norms in response to the changing environments, which is difficult to display that norms actually constrain the security policies. Moreover, constructivist views are inclined to focus less on the impact of international variables on Japan's security policies. By emphasising the role of domestic factors, constructivists seldom consider the role of the international environment which has the potential to influence and shape Japan's postwar norms, institutions and "culture of antimilitarism". In addition, the significance of domestic norms, institutions and political culture as a constraint on Japanese security strategy have been declining. For instance, Midford (2002) argues that there is no evidence that pacifist norms or antimilitarism has played a role in the case of Self-Defence Force's (SDF) attempts to fund the acquisition of in-air refuelling tankers which were repeatedly blocked. In this regard, we can see the limited explanations about the continuous development of the U.S.-Japan alliance from the viewpoint of constructivism.

"Analytical Eclecticism" as the Means to Bridge the Gap in IR Theories?

Although realist, liberal and constructivist frameworks respectively provide some explanations about the U.S.-Japan alliance, they have not elaborated the durability of

the alliance, which may have missed some elements that should be considered although it may not be adequately explained in each IR framework respectively. Nonetheless, some recognises the valuable insights provided by each IR theory in an integrated way. Barany and Rauchhaus' (2011) study on the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) "evaluates the utility of IR theory[, presenting] the logic of, and deduce hypotheses from, the three leading approaches to IR: neorealism, neo-liberal institutionalism, and constructivism...these IR theories can offer a coherent explanation for the alliance's enlargement and the development of out-of-area operations" (Barany & Rauchhaus 2011, p. 287).

Considering these features of the existing IR theories, the research method called "analytical eclecticism" was proposed as an alternative IR approach to bridge the gaps between realism, liberalism and constructivism. In order to overcome the gap in existing IR theories of the U.S.-Japan alliance, analytical eclecticism has been recognised as a potential method to substantiate the weaknesses of each theory. According to Sil and Katzenstein (2010), going beyond the paradigm, or research traditions, does not mean ignoring the existing paradigms but to "explore substantive relationships and revealing hidden connections among elements of seemingly incommensurable paradigm-bound theories, with an eye to generating novel insights that bear on policy debates and practical dilemma" (Sil & Katzenstein, 2010, p. 2).

Regarding cases in the Asia-Pacific region, it is argued that "Japan's and Asia-Pacific's security policies are not shaped solely by power, interests, or identity but by their combination. Adequate understanding requires analytical eclecticism, not parsimony" (Katzenstein & Okawara 2001/02, p. 167). Developing an "eclectic approach", Katzenstein and Okawara (2001) contend that Japanese security policies have been influenced by normative structures and institutions. They remark that "an

eclectic theoretical approach finds that there is nothing ‘natural’ about a multipolar world with US primacy and nothing that is ‘normal’ about a Japan without the institutional legacy of Hiroshima and defeat in World War II (Katzenstein & Okawara 2001, p. 155). Combining the elements of each of these IR theories was seen as the strength of utilising this particular research method. For example, Izumikawa (2010) adopts this method to examine features of the U.S.-Japan alliance, by merging realist viewpoints on “entrapment” and constructivist’s “antimilitarist culture”.

Nonetheless, there are the downsides of making use of analytical eclecticism as a research method. Miyashita (2007) claims that “he [Katzenstein] does not fully elaborate his point by specifying how exactly different perspectives can be combined, or how power, interests, and identity interact with one another to shape policies” (Miyashita 2007, p. 107). Analytical eclecticism can be a usable method to consider all power, interests and identity as the elements of foreign policymaking yet it is not an adequate guide as a research method. The strength of this method can be its capability in taking into consideration useful elements within existing IR theories which may be able to bridge the gaps between the existing IR approaches in examining the U.S.-Japan alliance. Conversely, this research method may be difficult to use due to its lack of guidance and a requirement of a highly discerning ability in selecting the elements of existing IR theories. Furthermore, using analytical eclecticism does not necessarily help to underscore the features of the U.S.-Japan alliance relationship which is one of the aims this research project is intended to attain. While it may be possible to select realist, liberal or constructivist perspectives on its alliance relationship, it does not reach the point of exemplifying the

relationship between the US and Japan in consideration of the postwar experiences and the progress of alliance solidification.

This opening section has fully explored the IR literature on the U.S.-Japan alliance by discussing the gulf which exists among these theories. Even though these three theoretical approaches may possibly supplement each other by means of analytical eclecticism, it is suggested to use an alternative IR framework in explaining the alliance. Moreover, this section also shows that a single IR theory may not be able to address all aspects of alliances such as the asymmetrical power relationship between the US and Japan in relation to hegemony which is a crucial insight to be considered in understanding the durability of the alliance system. Therefore, it is worthwhile to explore different IR theory approaches to the U.S.-Japan alliance. In the subsequent sections, prior to exemplifying an alternative IR theory, the theories of alliance and hegemony are re-examined in order to elucidate the aspects that shall be substantiated by an alternative IR theory.

Theories of Alliances and Hegemony

The following sections explore the existing theories of alliances and hegemony. It is relevant to scrutinise the theory of alliance and hegemony since the problem in understanding the durability of the U.S.-Japan alliance seems to be not only due to the gap in the aforementioned IR theories but the assumptions about alliance and hegemony to begin with. Reductionistic or mechanical viewpoints on these concepts have tended to be used in the scholarship of the U.S.-Japan alliance, which are likely to fail in explaining the transforming nature of the alliance and the sustainability of the alliance system. Moreover, the mainstream theories of alliance and hegemony are inclined to overlook the non-hegemonic role of the allies. It is hegemonic power that

has been focused on in the existing theories. In order to examine the changing features of the alliance system, investigating alliance theory and hegemony is an essential step to encapsulate the characteristics of the U.S.-Japan alliance in the post-Cold War period.

The literature review on theories of alliance and hegemony aims to illustrate the lacking insights of these viewpoints, which can be filled with the neo-Gramscian standpoint of hegemony. As analytical eclecticism may not be a sufficient method to provide the answer for the research question presented in the Introduction Chapter in addition to the difficulty in applying this method as recognised by other scholars, it is worth adopting an alternative IR framework to elucidate the features of the alliance relationship in the contemporary era. As is exemplified earlier, the thoughts based upon realist, liberal and constructivist framework are limited in their capacity to take into account the non-hegemonic role of the states in consideration of alliance relations. Although each IR approach has strength in providing certain views on alliances, neo-Gramscianism can be a more comprehensible theoretical framework in terms of material, institutional and ideational aspects of power. This point will be further explored in the later section of this chapter.

Literature of Alliances

The following sections investigate the concept of alliances and alliance theory since there is limited recognition about the linkage between alliances and hegemony, while alliance theory has been used in comprehending the dynamic of alliances in the contemporary era. Hui (2004) underscores the importance of adopting a dynamic view of alliance politics and the impact of alliance statecraft on alliance formation and dissolution. While some scholars including Morrow (1991) acknowledge that

alliances are a tool for hegemonic states, closer examination of the association between alliances and hegemony is needed to comprehend the alliance power dynamics in the contemporary periods. Moreover, much literature of alliances frequently used quantitative methods which may be useful to generalise the tendency of alliance formations, particularly in the realm of comparative politics, but may not be able to explain the durability of alliance systems without an in-depth investigation of alliance relationships. As this section shows, there can be a restricted understanding about the durability of the alliance.

In this section, the various viewpoints on alliances and alliance theories are explored by identifying the issues regarding the difficulty in understanding the trend of alliances in the contemporary world, particularly in the post-Cold War era. Firstly, the discussions about alliance, whether it is diminished or redefined, are presented in order to illustrate how the notion of alliances may have become fuzzier. Unlike the Cold War when US-led alliances played a greater role in countering Soviet Union-backed communist expansion, the purposes of alliances after the Cold War seem to have become more flexible while the functions have been evolving with emerging threats including non-traditional forms such as terrorism, climate change and natural disasters. Secondly, the existing theories of alliance, which have mostly adopted a quantitative approach, are closely scrutinised. While “alliance dilemma” has become a predominant theory in the discipline of IR for the examination of alliance relationships, other theories of alliance such as “autonomy-security trade off model”, “economic theory of alliance”, “alliance cohesion” and “wedging strategy” are rigorously investigated.

“End of Alliances”, the “End of Alliance Theories” or Alliances to be Redefined?

There is little literature on the “end of alliances” debate which does not distinguish between the different levels of the changes (Sandler 1993; Neuman 2001; Menon 2003; Weitsman 2003; Tetrais 2004). Some scholars argue that the concept of alliances is dead and has been replaced by different concepts such as international coalitions (Menon 2003). In Menon’s (2003) account, “the new world threatens to render that system of alliances superfluous, not because of the shortcomings and errors of particular U.S. leaders, but on account of deeper global changes that transcend the comings and goings of presidents, prime ministers, and foreign ministers” (Menon 2003, p. 3). Contrary to this perspective, there are those who argue that dealing with contemporary security threats take place in both the form of formal partnerships and *ad hoc* coalitions (Norris 2003), or that *ad hoc* coalitions and bilateral alliances gains territory at the expense of permanent and multilateral alliances (Tetrais 2003). Tetrais (2003) exemplifies that “Permanent alliances will survive, but only as long as they demonstrably serve common strategic and political interests. Some alliances created to combat communism have proven useful for other purposes” (Tetrais 2003, p. 142).

Alternatively, others argue that the concept of alliances is not dying but changing (Campbell 2004). In the case of the US alliance system, it is neither dead nor necessarily in decline, but rather, its nature and purpose are being altered in response to the challenges of a new era. According to Campbell (2004), the current US alliance system, which was constructed in part from the legacy of post-World War II alliances, is predictably quite different from what it was during the Cold War. He argues that: “The reality is that we are currently seeing a change in U.S. alliances or, more precisely, a change in emphasis among the many alliances. In the face of new

kinds of security concerns, the United States has in fact given more value to those alliances that can reliably support U.S. interests in the war on terrorism and participate decisively in coalitions of the willing” (Campbell 2004, p. 158). While the alliances are seen as relevant, the components of the alliance are expanding and its role is diversifying. In this regard, alliances itself have not come to an end, but rather have been reshaped. With regard to the development of the US-led alliance system in the Asia-Pacific region, which is explored in Chapter Five, alliances are one of the important aspects of US hegemony. Furthermore, alliances have traditionally been regarded as short-lived. According to Leeds and Savun (2007), they found that the average lifespan of 304 alliances formed between 1815 and 1989 is 9.3 years. Nonetheless, some alliances do endure, for example the U.S.-Japan alliance which has been in existence for more than sixty years and NATO has lasted far longer than any alliances indicated in Singer and Small’s (1966) quantitative study of alliances (Kreps 2010).

The problem of understanding alliances, particularly in the contemporary era, is the existence of the “asymmetrical” nature of the alliances. Without an attention to this feature, this may lead to lack of consideration of the non-hegemonic role of the states. For instance, Leeds, Ashley, Ritter, Mitchell, and Long (2002)¹⁶ define alliances as “written agreements, signed by official representatives of at least two independent states, that include promises to aid a partner in the event of military conflict, to remain neutral in the event of conflict, to refrain from military conflict with one another, or to consult/cooperate in the event of international crises that create a potential for military conflict” (Leeds, Ashley, Ritter, Mitchell, and Long 2002, p. 238). However, with regard to the degree of the independence of states, this

¹⁶ They created the database on alliances called “The Alliance Treaty Obligations and Provisions Project (ATOP)”. See <http://atop.rice.edu/data>.

may not be adaptable to US-led alliances including the U.S.-Japan alliance where autonomy and security were exchanged (Morrow 1991). In this respect, both asymmetric and symmetric aspects of alliances have rarely been taken into account within theories of alliance. In order to take into account the asymmetric relationship between allies, the concept of hegemony is essential to be taken into account, which should be re-examined.

In consideration of the traditional account of alliance theory, the problem of examining alliances in the contemporary era can be its limited understanding about alliances. Much research on alliance is restricted to a military context. The redefinition of the alliance should be made with regard to the contemporary world not simply interpreting it as military compact or mutual defence cooperation but how the alliance has transformed and developed throughout different historical periods with variant aspects of security. According to Tetrais (2003), the concept of “alliance” has become unclear, which can be a potential source of misunderstanding. According to him, the term “ally” has become broadly applied and “[w]hile any country that has offered support since September 11 to the global war on terrorism has been called an ally, only 23 countries are formally obligated by treaty to defend the United States from an armed attack” (Tetrais 2003, p. 148). In fact, the very term of “alliance” may be a growing source of strategic confusion and, as is indicated in Chapter Five in terms of “political alliances”, it may be relevant to consider political aspects of alliances in order to understand the features of the contemporary alliance system.

Theories of Alliances

This section reviews the existing literature on the theory of alliance including “alliance dilemma,” which has been predominantly utilised within the IR theory by

laying out some points which previous research has not covered regarding the analysis of alliances.

a) *Alliance Dilemma*

As indicated earlier, “alliance dilemma” has been a useful concept in explaining alliance relationships in the IR literature. Christensen and Snyder (1990) analyse alliance patterns in the multipolar system focusing on the roles of security dilemma and perceptual variables. They use the concepts of “chain-ganging” and “buck-passing” to describe the alliance game in the multipolar world (Christensen & Snyder 1990). While their study is based on the European contexts before the Second World War, they argue that offensive military advantage was associated with chain-ganging whereas defensive advantages were linked with buck-passing.

Snyder (1984) further examines the dynamics of the security dilemma of the alliance game, explicating out that “security dilemma” emerges during the formation of the alliance. He describes the condition after the formation of the alliance as “alliance dilemma” using entrapment and abandonment as the two factors of the dilemma (Snyder 1984). According to him, “the principal ‘bads’ are ‘abandonment’ and ‘entrapment,’ and the principal ‘goods’ are a reduction in the risks of being abandoned or entrapped by the ally (Snyder 1984, p. 466). His assumption is based on the idea that the alliance formation and duration are greatly affected by the international system (Snyder 1984). Snyder (1990) characterises the alliance endurance as management, or rather “intra-alliance politics” or “bargaining” in his terms, which entails the coordination of foreign policies and military plans, and the allocation of burdens or division of labours. He defines the post-formation of

alliance as a continuing bargaining process for allies to maximise their benefits while minimising their risks and costs (Snyder 1990).

Realists' notion of alliance dilemma, or "entrapment and abandonment", has been adopted to the studies of the U.S.-Japan alliance (Hughes 2001; Hughes 2004; Hughes & Fukushima 2004; Hughes 2007). Samuels exemplifies that "Fears of entrapment and of abandonment have propelled Japan into a perpetual 'hedging cycle' vis-à-vis its alliance partner" (Samuels 2007, p. 199). In addition, Hughes and Krauss (2007) point out the possibility for the US, a hegemonic state, to be entrapped in regional crises in the Asia-Pacific.¹⁷

Walt develops the theory of balance of threat, arguing that the alliances are formed as the response to a threat (Walt 1985; Walt 1987; Walt 1997; Walt 2009). He stresses the role of intention or perceptions of the states, claiming that "Intentions, not power, are crucial" (Walt 1985, p. 13). According to him, it is not only power but threats, which tend to make states ally with or against the foreign power (Walt 1985; Walt 1987). With regard to the duration of the alliance, he claims that the alliance may endure if hegemonic power by a strong alliance leader exists, or if they have become the symbols of credibility (Walt 1997). Walt (2009) argues that "weaker clients have to worry more about abandonment—because the unipole needs them less—and the unipole will be less likely to be dragged into conflict by reckless or adventurist allies" (Walt 2009, p. 98). While criticising the fact that previous analyses of alliance studies only consider bipolar and multipolar systems, he develops his argument with regard to the role of the US in the unipolar system.

¹⁷ A similar comment was made that the US had the danger of being entrapped unlike Japan's situations during the Iraq War in 2003 (Interview with Tsuyoshi Sunohara, 19th April 2013).

However, like other neorealists, he regards that the international environment is an important factor in influencing the attitudes of the states.

Conversely, Schweller (1994) criticises Walt's balance of threat theory since he views the formation of alliance as the expectation of gains or profits. According to him, "Balance-of-threat theory is designed to consider only cases in which the goal of alignment is security, and so it systematically excludes alliances driven by profit" (Schweller 1994, p. 79). Arguing that balancing merely considers security, Schweller develops the theory of bandwagoning for profit. Schweller (1994) explicates that alliance formations are often motivated by opportunities for gain as well as danger. With his claim that power, not threat, drives the state choices, he focuses on the positive inducements of power. He makes his argument that bandwagoning basically involves the expectations of gains, regarding alliance politics as a positive sum game for the allies (Schweller 1994).

b) Autonomy-Security Trade-off Model

Within an autonomy-security trade-off model, asymmetric alliances are acknowledged. Morrow's (1991) autonomy-security trade-off model explains both symmetric, where both allies obtain security or autonomy benefits, and asymmetric, where one ally gains security and the other autonomy, alliances and the conditions under which each type occurs (Morrow 1991, p. 905).¹⁸ According to him, the critical test of this model is whether asymmetric alliances are more common and last longer than symmetric alliances. The model shows why alliances are more likely to break when the allies' capabilities change (Berkowitz 1983; Morrow 1991, pp. 905-

¹⁸ Morrow's (1991) autonomy-security trade-off model implies that asymmetric alliances are easier to form and to maintain than symmetric alliances.

906). Morrow (1991) explains that “Asymmetric alliances should be easier to form because each side receives different benefits, and both sides can deliver their end of the bargain. Assuming there are an equal number of opportunities to form both types of alliances, we should expect to see more asymmetric than symmetric alliances and more allies that are unequal in power than allies that are equal” (Morrow 1991, p. 915).

Morrow (1991) also argues that asymmetric alliances are one of the tools hegemons use to extend their control over the international system and provides its allies with security from their neighbours. With regard to US-led alliances and the British Empire, he clarifies that the US is the best example to use of the strategy for extending hegemony through a network of asymmetric alliances, which was established after World War II (Morrow 1991). In his account, “These alliances both protected U.S. allies and provided the United States with bases for the projection of power and the position to intervene on behalf of ‘friendly’ governments. Great Britain depended on its empire to extend its control during the *Pax Britannica*, but it also extended its control of India through asymmetric alliances with native princes” (Morrow 1991, pp. 929 - 930). Yet, he also argues that “alliances in a balance of power system should be non-ideological and last as long as the immediate threat [capability-aggression],” (Morrow 1991, p. 926) which show less consideration about ideational roles of alliances.

c) *Economic Theory of Alliance*

Economic perspectives on alliances have also been taken into account in the scholarship of alliances, particularly in relation to burden-sharing among states.

According to Theis (1987), “the economic theory of alliances is a useful and appropriate tool for understanding how alliance members will deal with each other on important issues such as sharing the burdens of defense” (Theis 1987, p. 328). He maintains that “An understanding of the way in which substitution possibilities can be affected by factors such as transportation networks and weapons technology can be also useful in clarifying in burden sharing and suboptimality in the provision of the collective good in a post-1945 alliances such as NATO” (Theis 1987, p. 325). Gowa and Manfield (2004) claim that “alliances are particularly likely to stimulate trade when the conditions of the new trade theory hold” (Gowa & Manfield 2004, p. 776). Moreover, Fordham (2010) presents the evidence that international trade helps explain these alliances. According to him, “Empirical analysis indicates that trade increases the probability of alliance formation in major power–minor power dyads and decreases the chance that alliances will dissolve” (Fordham 2010, p. 685).

The “free-rider” theory has been seen to be useful in discussing burden-sharing among allies based upon Olson and Zeckhauser’s (1966) work. They argue that some allies become “free-riders” at the other ally’s expense once an alliance is formed since the decisions about how the common burden is to be shared are not specified in the alliance treaty. According to them, “Often the smaller and weaker nations gain relatively more from the existence of an alliance than do the larger and stronger powers, and once an alliance treaty has been signed the larger powers are immediately deprived of their strongest bargaining weapon - the threat that they will not help to defend the recalcitrant smaller powers in any negotiations about the sharing of the common burden” (Olson & Zeckhauser 1966, p. 273). Their study closely examines the logic of free-riders in the alliance mechanism although does not look into the sustainability of the alliance system.

Contrary to their argument, the model presented by Boyer (1989) illustrates that “small nations may well make contributions to the alliance effort that are commensurate to their size and in accordance with the comparative advantages they possess in the production of certain goods (Boyer 1989, p. 712). He also argues that “one should recognize that both military expenditure and foreign aid yield an externality that enhances alliance security...they exhibit varying degrees of ‘publicness’ similar to the types of goods” (Russett 1970; Sandler 1977; Boyer 1989, p. 713). According to him, “if one disaggregates the Western alliance system and analyses military expenditures from the perspective of a bilateral U.S.-Japan alliance and multilateral NATO...Japanese behaviours fits with the Olson and Zeckhauser model” (Boyer 1989, p. 716). Boyer’s (1989) study shows that “although a nation may appear to be free riding on the security contributions of other alliance members with reference to a particular type of alliance contribution, this should not lead one to assume that this same nation will be free riding in all categories” (Boyer 1989, p. 723). He also further argues that the question about free-riding logic should lead the researcher to examine other types of alliance contributions to explore the continuity of alliance relationships (Boyer 1989).

d) Alliance Cohesion

“Alliance cohesion” is another theoretical concept to understand alliance mechanisms. Kim (2011) examines alliance cohesion in consideration of goals, threat perception, strategic compatibility and command structure based upon Holsti, Hopmann and Sullivan’s (1973) definition. This notion is defined as “the ability of alliance partners to agree upon goals, strategy, and tactics and to coordinate activities directed towards those ends” (Holsti, Hopmann & Sullivan 1973, p. 16). In the

context of the U.S.-Japan alliance, Kim (2011) exemplifies that “This strengthened relationship [between the US and Japan] has been investigated through four operational indicators of alliance cohesion: homogeneity in goals, threat perception, strategic compatibility and command structure” (Kim 2011, p. 356). He also argues that, in the post-Cold War era, Japan has changed its defence posture owing to more imminent threats from North Korea and the rise of China which has led the US-Japan alliance to become more cohesive (Kim 2011).

Alliance cohesion is also referred to as “the degree of convergence among member states’ commitments to the alliance. The key indicator is whether states defect – remove or reduce troops – prior to the end of hostilities” (Weitsman 2003 p. 85; Weitsman 2004, p. 24; Kreps 2010, p. 191). Weitsman’s (2003) study on the Central Powers and Triple Entente illuminate numerous facets of alliance politics. According to her, “each alliance had a complex and long lived peacetime history with repeated challenges and crises, and each alliance endured to prosecute the war” (Weitsman 2003, p. 80). Furthermore, Kreps (2010) further points out that elite consensus can be regarded as a determinant of alliance cohesion and has limited the influence of public opinion. She claims that the revisionist view of public opinion—that public opinion has a bottom-up effect on foreign policies—may be in need of a revision” (Kreps 2010, p. 194). According to her, “elite consensus” “refers to the absence of a coherent opposition to the government’s basic foreign policy” (Kreps 2010, p. 198).

e) *“Wedging Strategy”*

Adopting wedging strategy to alliance theory, Izumikawa's (2013) work attempts to fill the gap by developing a theory of wedge strategy, which is defined by Crawford (2011) as “a state's attempt to prevent, break up, or weaken a threatening or blocking alliance at an acceptable cost” (Crawford 2011, p. 156). In response to Crawford's viewpoint, Izumikawa (2013) argues that, with regard to the policies of former US President Eisenhower, “It is also worth emphasizing that the outcome of the Eisenhower administration's policy illustrates the utilities of coercive wedging, despite Crawford's dismissal of the strategy” (Izumikawa 2013, p. 528). Izumikawa (2013) develops a theory of wedge strategy that explains when a state is likely to use coercive or reward wedging for security. According to him, “the two basic factors—the law of diminishing return and the cost of obtaining security—apply to this theory. These factors govern all kinds of goods, including security, but IR scholars rarely accept them explicitly” (Izumikawa 2013, p. 506). This theoretical adoption is aimed at refining alliance theory although it is not concerned with the asymmetrical or symmetrical relationship of alliances when examining case studies.

Analysis of Existing Theories of Alliance

Each alliance theory has explored their mechanisms in various ways. However, among these theories, the strengthening relationship of the allies has not been fully explored. More precisely, within IR literature, although alliance theory developed by realists has been used to analyse the U.S-Japan alliance, this type of alliance theory may be overly reductionist and mechanical. Alliance theories are mostly analysed from realist perspectives, which assume that an alliance dilemma exists because of its anarchic international environment. Snyder (1984) regards alliance formation as

one of the means for states to accumulate power while realists rely heavily on the logic of balance among the states. Furthermore, alliance theorists seldom examine the strengthening ties between the allies. Although the theories of balancing or security dilemma have been useful, they do not illustrate the on-going security discussions particularly after the Cold War. As Snyder (1990) admits, the significance of balancing, or the “global balance” in his term, varies among regions. In the case of alliance dilemma literature, there are more discussions on how to avoid the alliance dilemma. Realists’ negative assumption of alliance dilemma may have limited the observations of the relationships between or among the allies in the contemporary era.

Additionally, as realists view being caught in either entrapment or abandonment negatively, they rarely examine the continuity of the alliance. For instance, “dependence” has also been acknowledged as a factor by alliance theorists although it is viewed negatively. Snyder regards dependence as negative, arguing that “the greater one’s dependence on the alliance and the stronger one’s commitment to the ally, the higher the risk of entrapment” (Snyder 1984, p. 467). He also discusses the “balance of dependence”, describing it as a “relative bargaining power” (or intra-alliance leverage) where it may shift due to the changes in security environments and their perceptions of it (Snyder 1984). In realist terms, the interdependence of the allies is considered to be negative, a form of “entrapment”. While there are further considerations of dependence in the literature, interdependence has not been closely investigated due to its negative perception of over-dependence.

Walt (1997) examines alliance endurance but he explains how to escape from the alliance dilemma instead of seeing the possibilities of the transforming nature of the alliance. He acknowledges that a source of alliance durability can be hegemonic

power, which is led by a strong alliance leader. He mentions that alliances are likely to persist when there is a large asymmetry of power, shared political values, and highly institutionalised mechanisms (Walt 1997). In the context of Asia where historical antagonism still remains and multilateral institutions are weak, he explains that it is unlikely for Japan, South Korea and Taiwan to abandon the US alliance since the alliance hinders regional competition and hedges against the rising power of China (Walt 1997). Walt (2009) also elaborates alliance theory by taking into account a unipolar arrangement by the US, indicating that unipolarity may change the tension between abandonment and entrapment. It is also suggested that the US military presence is a form of “insurance policy” (Walt 2009).

Alliance theory based upon the neorealist account may have been useful (for the cases of the Senkaku/Diaoyu/Diaoyutai Island, for instance) yet this aspect of alliance theory has not dealt with the durability aspect of alliances, which can be used for political means. There is less focus on the interdependence of alliances although there are more studies on the strategic usages of alliances. As the core realist assumption is the importance of state autonomy, they view entrapment as a negative phenomenon. Indeed, it is relevant to examine the interactions between the allies in depth in this regard, particularly in peacetime when there is less emphasis on military build-up and more emphasis on international cooperation. Additionally, Russett (1968) points out that there are two major conflicting theories with regard to the alliance formations: one derived from game theory and the one applicable to the post-1945 international system, or the Cold War system, which focuses on the role of ideology. In this respect, the research on “alliance cohesiveness” may have contributed to understanding the sustainability of alliances, taking into account the threat variable. However, the cohesiveness of the alliance does not consider the

power dimensions of allies. Instead of using dependence or interdependence, alliance cohesion theory considers the material capabilities of the states, not the economic or ideational dimensions. “Free-rider” theory has taken into account the way smaller states may act; however, power has not been considered as well.

Furthermore, rigid assumptions of alliances may mislead any prediction of the security arrangement. For instance, Layne foresaw that Japan would become strategically independent according to its growing material capabilities, particularly economic growth, and abandon the alliance. Yet, the U.S.-Japan alliance still persists today and is strengthening. Baker and Glosserman (2013) also recognise that the traditional realist viewpoint on alliances may have been problematic because of the tendency to see alliances as a response to a military threat. They also note about the problem of viewing China’s rise as a common threat in the Asia-Pacific region by focusing on its anti-access/area denial (A2AD) military strategy and the territorial disputes between China and its neighbours (Baker & Glosserman 2013). According to them,

More broadly, there is general recognition that to remain relevant the alliances must emphasize shared interests and demonstrate their centrality to the maintenance of regional stability... Ultimately, the question of sustainability of the system will be driven by the development of a sustained sense of shared values and a perception that the system of alliances contributes to the regional public good, however that good comes to be defined by the alliance partners as well as all the other nations in the region (Baker & Glosserman 2013, p. 16).

This observation shows the relevance of scrutinising not only military but also economic and ideational facets of alliances in order to understand the contemporary alliance system.

Linking Alliances to Hegemony

Among these studies of alliance, there is no consensus on the theory of alliance although each perspective may substantiate the other. The difficulty in explaining the durability of the alliances perhaps lies in scarce recognition of the relationship between hegemony and alliances, which is intimately associated with the concept of power. The linkage between hegemony and alliances has rarely been highlighted in these studies yet the concept of hegemony should be taken into account to exemplify the durability of the alliance in consideration of power. As has been recognised by such scholars as Morrow (1991), the distinction between symmetrical and asymmetrical alliance relationship is seldom highlighted in the literature of alliances. In the context of asymmetric alliances, the notion of hegemony cannot be ignored in consideration of the process of formulating alliances. In addition, the literature regarding the U.S.-Japan alliance and other alliance tend to focus on the alliances itself, and is unable to comprehend and elucidate the power balance between or among allies that is also crucial to comprehend the power relationship between the allies. Alliance theory has been based upon rational choice theory, which barely takes into account the complicated relationship among allies, not only in defence but also in economic and ideational factors.

In this regard, it is important to scrutinise not only the theory of alliance but also that of hegemony since an obstacle in understanding the durability of the U.S.-Japan alliance seems to be not only the gaps in these IR theories but the way alliance and hegemony have been understood. Reductionistic or mechanical viewpoints on these concepts tend to be used in the scholarship of the U.S.-Japan alliance, which are likely to fail in explaining the transforming nature of the alliance. Moreover, the mainstream theories of alliance and hegemony are inclined to focus on the

hegemonic role of the states rather than the non-hegemonic role of the allies. In order to explore the changing features of the alliance system, investigating alliance theory and hegemony is an essential step to comprehend the characteristics of the U.S.-Japan alliance in the post-Cold War period.

The neo-Gramscian approach to hegemony is useful in investigating the interdependence of the allies in the alliance contexts. Even though Walt is aware of the hegemonic feature of the US in the Asian region, he solely focuses on the US role. Closer examinations of the hegemon and non-hegemon states can be made through the neo-Gramscian lenses instead of relying on the theory of hegemonic stability. Considering broadening definitions of security with non-territorial concerns, going beyond a traditional understanding of alliance theory is necessary, which has not taken into account the political features of the U.S.-Japan alliance and embraces not only military but also economic and ideational considerations. In this regard, the neo-Gramscian framework is useful in comprehending both alliance and hegemony since it acknowledges a close linkage between hegemony and alliances. In order to underscore the connection between alliances and hegemony, the next section explores the theories of hegemony, specifically hegemonic stability theory, which has been predominantly used in the IR field, and the neo-Gramscian theory of hegemony, which is later to be applied to alliance theory.

Theories of Hegemony

This section looks into hegemonic stability theory, which has been influential in the study of alliances, and the neo-Gramscian theory of hegemony. In examining hegemonic stability theory, the section underlines some weaknesses that can be overcome by adopting a neo-Gramscian perspective on hegemony.

Hegemonic Stability Theory

Like alliance theory, hegemony is often treated as a structural variable within hegemonic stability theory, which has been elaborated by neorealism or neoliberal institutionalism. Hegemonic stability theory was first illustrated by Kindleberger using game theory, or “the logic of collective goods” in his terms. He argues that only a hegemonic state has sufficient power to provide the public good of international economic stability (Kindleberger 1973). Kindleberger summarises in his book that “for the world economy to be stabilized, there has to be a stabilizer, one stabilizer” (Kindleberger 1973, p. 305). Neorealists such as Gilpin and Krasner develop the theory of hegemonic stability although their approaches differ from Kindleberger’s. Gilpin (1981) argues that the presence of a hegemonic power is at the centre of preserving stability in the international system. He mainly discusses hegemonic struggle which is defined as the international hierarchy of prestige where states that will govern are determined (Gilpin 1981). Gilpin (1981) elucidates the cyclical nature of hegemonic powers, saying that “the conclusion of one hegemonic way is the beginning of another cycle of growth, expansion, and eventual decline” (Gilpin 1981, p. 210).

From a neoliberal institutionalist perspective, Krasner (1982) investigates the hegemonic leadership and considers the roles of the international regime in forming hegemonic stability (Krasner 1982). Webb and Krasner (1989) argue that the theory of hegemonic stability, which focuses on security aspects, better explains developments within the western bloc and between the East and the West than analyses that ignore the implications of international economic transactions. They also argue that the security version of hegemonic stability theory developed by Krasner and Gilpin (1989) is different from Kindleberger’s (1973) assumption as it

does not assume that states have a common interest in international economic liberalisation and stability (Webb & Krasner 1989).

In neorealist terms, the theory of hegemonic stability is taken into account in explaining the U.S.-Japan alliance although it is criticised as well. Layne (1993) discusses the hegemonic stability theory, arguing that US “strategy of preponderance”, which incorporates Western Europe, Germany and Japan into US-led alliances by creating an open global economy and international environments, is not effective. He also criticises Webb and Krasner’s (1989) presumptions on hegemonic stability theory as being a form of “benign hegemon”, claiming that a strategy of preponderance will fail because it is not coercive enough to prevent Japan and Germany from becoming great powers, but it is coercive enough to antagonise them (Layne 1993). Ikenberry (1998) who developed the theory of US liberal grand strategy claims that the neorealist version of hegemony does not examine the liberal characteristics. Snidal argues that hegemonic stability theory ignores strategic interaction, saying that “the theory ignores the impact of bargaining, negotiation, strategic rationality, and, of course, cooperation through collective action” (Snidal 1985, p.600). He also points out that different issues will pose different degrees of publicness or even fundamentally different strategic structures which are not addressed in hegemonic stability theory (Snidal 1985). In addition, regarding the discussions about the US declining hegemonic power during the 1970s, Strange (1987) argues that structural power decides outcomes, in both positive and negative senses, much more than relational power does, and the US structural power has increased.

Keohane (1984) elaborates a refined version of hegemonic stability theory, drawing upon the institutionalist tradition. According to him, cooperation can

develop on the basis of interests whereas institutions can affect the patterns of cooperation (Keohane 1984). Keohane is sceptical of a deterministic version of hegemonic stability theory, which relies on the realist concepts of interests and power since he hardly believes that hegemony is either a necessary or a sufficient condition for the emergence of cooperation (Keohane 1984). He assumes that “international regimes depend on the existence of patterns of common or complementary interest that are perceived or capable of being perceived by political actors regardless of hegemon’s presence” (Keohane 1984, p. 78). His refined version of hegemonic stability theory does not only assert a direct linkage between power and leadership but also considers domestic attitudes, political structures and decision- making processes (Keohane 1984).

Moreover, Keohane and Nye (1989) clarify both the positive and negative roles of the hegemon, saying that “A hegemonial power can change the rules rather than adapt its policies to the existing rules...When the hegemonial power does not seek to conquer other states, but merely to protect its favored position, other states may benefit well” (Keohane & Nye 1989, pp. 44-45). While they see the coercive nature of hegemony, they also recognise the consensual aspect of hegemony. Based on the liberal viewpoints, Russett (2011) describes hegemony as “the in-between sense of something less formal and perhaps less oppressive than empire, but with more emphasis on expecting cooperative behaviour than the mere distribution of unipolar power may carry” (Russett 2011, p. 2). He indicates the role of soft power which is the ability to attract others instead of using coercion (Russett 2011).

The theory of hegemony has been elaborated by neorealists and neoliberal institutionalists although they do not necessarily discuss the perspectives of non-hegemonic states; their observations emphasise more on the role of hegemonic

leadership. Grunberg (1990) indicates that “The theory of hegemonic stability is of American origin and is quite strongly biased in favor of the United States” (Grunberg 1990, p. 444). The ethnocentric appeal of the theory has been pointed out by Russett (2011), which also exhibits the lack of weakness of the consensual aspect of hegemony. Although some theorists, including Krasner and other liberal theorists, acknowledge the role of non-hegemonic states, they do not elaborate it sufficiently. Krasner (1982) acknowledges that “consensual knowledge can greatly facilitate agreement on the development of an international regime” (Krasner 1982, p. 204). Keohane (1984) mentions that the hegemon power seeks to persuade other states to conform to its vision of world order, indicating that “Such acceptance rested, in turn, on the belief of leaders of secondary states that were benefiting from the structure of order that was being created” (Keohane 1984, p. 137). Worth (2011) also notes that the orthodox IR theory of hegemony tends to focus on the roles of the dominant states.

This may be an implication that the consensual aspect of hegemony plays its role in formulating hegemony but the overall analysis is merely focused on the role of hegemonic power. Although it is acknowledged, little attention is paid to the consensual aspect of hegemony especially when discussing the relationships between the allied states. The issue that has rarely been brought up is what makes the non-hegemonic states entrench their laws throughout the interactions with the hegemon state. Furthermore, as Howson and Smith (2008) point out, “while the operation of hegemony in the Asia-Pacific region has attracted investigation and discussion, most of this work presents a picture of regional economic, social, and political operations as becoming ossified to Occidental or, more specifically, US *domination* within a zero-sum game” (Howson & Smith 2008, p. 1), which may have obfuscated many

socio-historical antagonisms throughout the hegemonic process. In this sense, the role of consensual aspect of the hegemony should be examined more profoundly to understand the formation and strengthening of hegemony with the presence of alliances. This is also an attempt to overcome the ethnocentric viewpoint¹⁹ of hegemony by considering the non-hegemonic role of the states which still play, perhaps more importantly, an essential role in sustaining existing hegemony in the international system.

Neo-Gramscian Theory of Hegemony²⁰

In order to re-investigate both alliance theory and the theory of hegemony in the context of the U.S.-Japan alliance, a neo-Gramscian perspective on hegemony is adopted to explain the continuity of the alliance. This theoretical framework is able to illuminate the transforming nature of the U.S.-Japan alliance since it embraces both the hegemonic and non-hegemonic roles of the allies. From this IR theoretical approach, not only the coercive role of the hegemonic state is considered, but also the interplay of consent and coercion is explored to underscore the interdependence of the two countries. Additionally, this theoretical approach allows the investigation of state's material capabilities and how ideology is used to construct and to legitimatise a hegemonic order. Since this approach has not previously been applied to the case of the U.S.-Japan alliance, it is relevant to adopt this viewpoint to understand the formation and firmness of US hegemony in the Asia-Pacific region.

¹⁹ Indeed, it is arguable that IR itself can be regarded as ethnocentric or Western-centric approach (Hobson 2007). Still, I believe that Gramscianism/neo-Gramscianism is not purely ethnocentric since it considers the counter-hegemonic and non-hegemonic roles of the actors.

²⁰ Worth (2011) argues the need to reconsider the concept of hegemony. He indicates that "The move – or what has often been called the 'critical' or 'neo-Gramscian turn' – in IR towards widening the understanding of hegemony in global politics should not...be underestimated" (Worth 2011, p. 374).

Cox (1987) defines hegemony as a form of dominance where the dominant state creates an order based ideologically on consensus, and ensures the supremacy of the leading state or states and leading social classes and offer satisfaction to the less powerful actors. Coercion is not a sufficient condition of hegemony but when the consensual aspect of power is in the forefront, hegemony prevails (Cox 1981). He also acknowledges the complexity of a particular social formation since counter-hegemonic forces will come to challenge the prevailing institutional and political arrangements (Cox 1987). Cox (1993) exemplifies that hegemony at the international level is an order within a world economy with a dominant mode of production which penetrates into all countries and links into other subordinate modes of production. In particular, he argues that hegemony arises from “a coherent conjunction or fit between a configuration of material power, the prevalent collective image of world order (including a certain norms) and a set of institutions which administer the order with a certain semblances of the universe” (Cox 1981, p. 5). Cox (1981) emphasises that hegemony is based on a configuration of material power, the prevalent collective image of world order and a set of institutions.

Neo-Gramscianism is in contrast to neo-realism which possesses the abstractive and reductionistic nature.²¹ Cox (1981) raised the issue of the false assumption made by problem-solving theory consisting of neorealism and game theories, arguing that the social and political order is not fixed but, at least in the long term, is changing. Gill (1993b) argues that a mechanical theory such as the neo-realism’s Prisoner’s Dilemma, which led to the creation of alliance dilemma, and hegemonic stability theory have limited scientific validity in explaining complex social transformations

²¹ It is also noted that “Notably, it challenges a conception of the social universe understood in terms of abstract individualism, whereby primordial units... compete for relative shares of wealth- and power-conferring resources” (Germain & Kenny 1998; Ayers 2008, p. 4).

and the constituents of world orders. He also explains that the neorealist's theorisation has been centred on historical cycles of hegemony or the rise and fall of great powers, in which the "historical forces" are likely to be misinterpreted (Gill 2003). As Gill explains, "the concept of mechanical causality is inconsistent with historicism, since historicism is concerned with explanation, rather than causality" (Gill 1993b, p. 27). It is worth noting that, although Gramsci accepts Marx's analysis of the structure and dynamics of capitalism, he was unwilling "to embrace the more mechanical and economistic interpretations of Marx" (Rupert 2007, p. 93). Worth (2011) also argues that, from the neo-Gramscian viewpoint, hegemony should focus on how relationships of consent are constructed and deconstructed at every level of interactions (Worth 2011, p. 383). Hence, it is worth acknowledging a less rigid nature of hegemony that can be seen through the neo-Gramscian lenses.

The neo-Gramscian's hegemony draws upon the historic process of consensus formation. According to Gill (2003), this approach, called "transnational historical materialism", attempts to illustrate the dynamics of the contemporary era of global capitalism. From this perspective, "structural changes in the capitalist system require a more flexible analytical approach, one which allows for the possibility of the analysis of transnational social forces, including the interplay between different interests within each state" (Gill 1990, p. 46). The strength of the neo-Gramscian approach is its deliberation of constructive dialogue with the different perspectives including the hegemonic theorisation in International Political Economy (IPE) and IR studies (Gill & Law 1988; Gill 1993a). It is worth noting that neo-Gramscianism has been predominantly located within the sub-disciplines of IPE. However, as Worth (2011) notes, "if IPE is to delve into the study of social and cultural movements within global society, then broader studies within IR would also benefit

from a Hall-spined understanding of hegemony for a theoretical departure point” (Worth 2011, p. 387). Also, the attempt at bringing political theory and IR together is made (Bieler & Morton 2007). Hence, as is explained in the Introduction Chapter, this thesis is aimed at embellishing the neo-Gramscian framework in the IR discipline.

According to Gill, “History is always in the making, in a complex and dialectical interplay between agency, structure, consciousness, and action” (Gill 1993a, pp. 8-9). This relies on the perspective of Worth (2011) on “the complex and contradictory relationship between structure and agency” (Worth 2011, p. 384). Bieler (2005) also emphasises the strength of neo-Gramscianism for its “dialectical understanding of structure and agency” (Bieler 2005, p. 517). With regard to the rise and decline of hegemonies and balances of power in the inter-state system, historical materialists argue that this structure is a particular configuration of states and social forces. Cox (1987) argues that a neo-Gramscian perspective on structure is flexible as “Structures are not ‘givens’ (data), they are ‘mades’ (facts) – made by collective human action and transformable by collective human action” (Cox 1987, p. 395).

From this theoretical viewpoint, hegemony is exercised within a wider social constellation of forces, or “historic bloc”, which refers to a historical congruence between material forces, institutions and ideologies (Cox 1981). “Historic bloc” is one of the important key concepts of neo-Gramscianism. In neo-Gramscian terms, historic bloc is “a dialectical concept in the sense that its interacting elements create a larger entity” (Cox 1993, p. 56). It is the organic linkage between political and civil society, a fusion of material, institutional, inter-subjective, theoretical and ideological capacities (Gramsci 1971; Gill & Law 1993). The concept of an international historic bloc implies that when elements of more than one class are

involved, its basis is more organic and rooted in material and normative structures of society (Gill & Law 1993). Cox (1987) explains that the state itself and the forms of state action are themselves differentially constituted in complex ways by blocs of socio-economic and political forces which operate within the limits of a given historical necessity.

Gill defines hegemony as “not a relation of coercive force as such (as it is viewed in realist theory), but rather primarily one of consent gained through ‘intellectual and moral leadership’” (Gill 1990, p. 42) For instance, the Trilateral Commission can be seen as an example of forming a historic bloc. Gill (1990) closely investigates the Trilateral Commission, which is seen as the construction of international networks of identity, interest and ideas, and similar US-sponsored private international relations councils are seen as indicative of the internationalism of civil society or “transnationalisation of the state” which correlates with a changing landscape of global political economy. Gill (1990) argues that alliance is crucial in the ongoing process of dependency bound up with a dialectical conflict between transnational capital and socialist forces or *trasformismo* (co-optation of elites) in Gramsci’s terms. Focusing on the role of political elites, he elaborates that “Intellectuals are not simply producers of ideology, they are also the ‘organisers of hegemony’, that is, they theorise the ways in which hegemony can be developed or maintained” (Gill 1990, p. 52). Regarding the consensual aspect of hegemony, some claims that “If hegemony is understood as an ‘opinion-moulding activity’, rather than brute force or dominance, then consideration has to turn to how a hegemonic social or world order is based on values and understandings that permeate the nature of that order” (Cox 1992/1996, p. 151; Morton 2003; Bieler & Morton 2004, p. 87).

Coercion and consent can be examined in the context of alliances through the lenses of neo-Gramscianism. Gramsci took over Niccolò Machiavelli's image of power as a centaur: half man, half beast which is a necessary combination of consent and coercion (Cox 1993). Gramsci also reconstructed Marx's radicalised social ontology and developed a dual perspective on social politics encompassing coercive and consensual forms of power (Rupert 1993). Rupert (1998) also indicates that "as directing us toward the relations of coercion/consent at play in various historical social forms, none of which are wholly understandable in abstraction from their relation to capitalism and its peculiar forms of social organization" (Rupert 1998, p. 433). A neo-Gramscian notion of the "coercion and consent" dimensions of hegemony is able to explain the consolidating relationship of allies.

The transformation from coercion to consent is considered in the neo-Gramscian framework. Gill (1993b) discusses the British Commonwealth as an example of hegemonic formation that is embedded in the history of British imperialism and colonialism yet currently represents the transformation from coercion into consent and an informal regulation of inter-state relations at the international level. Gill and Law (1988) clarify that with time, the coercive use of power may become less necessary as consensus builds up on the basis of shared values, ideas and material interests. Throughout this process, a hegemonic structure of thought and action emerges (Gill & Law 1988). They also argue that the developed countries today do not necessarily need to exert military and diplomatic pressure on these developing countries to ensure that they will supply primary products (Gill & Law 1988).²²

²² It is also worth noting that Gramsci's concept of the "integral State" is closely related to the idea of hegemony. That is, he regards the integral state as a "dialectical unity of the moments of civil society and political society" (Thomas 2009, p. 137), viewing the interaction of "political society" and "civil society" within a unified state-form.

What is important in this process is that such ideas become implanted in the frameworks of thought of the politically and economically significant parts of the population (Gill & Law 1988). Considering the consensual aspect of hegemony, Cox (1987) argues that consensus formation is important for internationalising the state. He explains that “It was a power structure in which the components sought to maintain consensus through bargaining and one in which the bargaining units were bureaucratic fragments of states” (Cox 1987, p. 256). He also indicates that international institutions are particularly important in defining the ideological basis of consensus, the principles and goals (Cox 1987).

Neo-Gramscianism and Alliance Theory

Neo-Gramscian Theory of Alliance

Since most of the studies of alliance are based on neo-realist or game theorists’ ideas, this research project intends to refine alliance theory in order to explain the continuing relationship of the allies with the application of the neo-Gramscian theory of hegemony. While existing alliance theories might help to understand alliances in traditional terms, it is difficult to say that these analyses are sufficient to comprehend the contemporary era. Walt (1997) argues that “Like Oscar Wilde’s picture of Dorian Gray, an ageing alliance may appear robust and healthy so long as its formal institutions continue to operate, even if the basic rationale for the arrangement is crumbling” (Walt 1997, p. 167). While Walt (1997) is aware of the hegemonic role of the US in the Asia-Pacific region, he focuses on the US role; thus close investigations in hegemon and non-hegemon can be conducted by taking the neo-Gramscian approach. The redefinition of the alliance should be made with regard to the contemporary world by not simply interpreting it as a military compact or mutual

defence cooperation, but understanding how the alliance has been transformed and developed throughout the different historical periods.

The neo-Gramscian approach to hegemony is appropriate in investigating strengthening ties of the allies not only in tactical terms but in organic terms. The mechanism of the alliance is not merely about alliance game or alliance dilemma but also the consolidating relationships between the allies. The neo-Gramscian account of hegemony allows exploring the linkage between alliance and hegemony. As was pointed out in Morrow's (1991) research, alliances can be treated as the tool of extending hegemonic power from the viewpoint of hegemon states. The continuity of the alliance itself also poses questions about its current functions and its relevance in the post-Cold War period. Gill (1993) mentions that world order is likely to undergo a triple crisis in economic, political and socio-cultural terms (Gill 1993a; 1993b). According to him, "what may be the most important aspect of the current epoch is the fact that social relations and social structure are in a period of the extended and deep-seated transformation or crisis, on a global scale" (Gill 1993b, p.34). The changing nature of alliances can be a part of this process as well. Applying the neo-Gramscian theory of hegemony to alliance theory may clearly explain the existing alliance systems including those led by the US. The neo-Gramscian theory of alliance is fully developed in Chapter Two.

The U.S.-Japan Alliance as a Case Study

The neo-Gramscian theory of alliance is important for the scholarship of the U.S.-Japan alliance by shedding light on the features of US hegemony in the postwar era, The post-war hegemony, or *Pax Americana*, is more rigidly institutionalised than the *Pax Britannica*, taking the form of alliances created for the containment of the Soviet

Union (Cox 1981). Cox (1987) argues that the neoliberal state sought its security as a member of a stable alliance system and its economic growth as a participant of an open world economy. According to him, the Marshall Plan²³ and extensive military expenditures abroad are seen as US hegemonic actions as exemplified in the case of the conflicts in Korea and the Persian Gulf (Cox 1987). Cox (1987) also emphasises that “U.S. initiatives, based on that country’s economic and military preponderance, thus led the Western European countries and Japan toward a world economy with free access to raw materials; free movement of goods, capital, and technology; and the elimination of discrimination in economic relations” (Cox 1987, p. 216).

Gill and Law (1993) explain that the key international factors in a new “international historic bloc” of social forces are a US-centred economic, security and political structure for the non-communist world and a forum for the congruence of ideas, institutions and policies among the leading capitalist nations. According to them, this international historic bloc became the centre of the post-war organic alliance in the West by internationalising New Deal and Fordist capital-intensive policies, mass-consumption accumulation, and the extension for exports and/or foreign direct investment (FDI) (Gill & Law 1993). According to Rupert (2000), Fordism is “a set of institutionalized relationships between the social organization of production on the one hand, and social self-understandings and political organizations on the other” (Rupert 2000, p. 24) in terms of a socio-political regime. Gramsci (1971) defines it as “an ultra-modern form of production and of working methods - such as is offered by the most advanced American variety, the industry of Henry Ford” (Gramsci, 1971, pp. 280-1). Rupert (2003) explains that US world-

²³ The Marshall Plan was the major policy initiative of the US, which was designed to foster capitalist prosperity within the “free world” for its political stability, unity, and integration into the capitalist world order (Rupert 2000)

order policy or market-oriented liberal vision is seen as the product of the global assertion of unilateral US power, especially its military power.

It is important to note that neo-Gramscian theorists have stressed the organic nature of the alliances after the Second World War. Gill and Law (1988) explain that since 1945 the development of capitalist democracies in Japan and Western Europe have become more “organic” than tactical allies of the US. They observe that “it was significant that, at a time of rising Western and Japanese military expenditures after 1979...some Japanese leaders increasingly began to portray the issues of international security in Cold War terms, aligning Japan more closely with American position” (Gill & Law 1988, p. 351). Gill (1990) further argues that the metaphor of an “organic alliance” helps to capture the quality of US relations with Western Europe and Japan. In this regard, this neo-Gramscian viewpoint of the organic nature of the alliances can be used to characterise the post-1945 regime of *Pax Americana* including the U.S.-Japan alliance. In addition, based on the example of the British Commonwealth, the transformation from coercion to consent can be examined in the case of the U.S.-Japan alliance by looking into the strengthening liberal features of this alliance. The following chapters, which adopt the neo-Gramscian framework to the U.S.-Japan alliance, illustrate how US foreign policies have influenced Japanese foreign policies and how Japan has contributed to play its consensual role in strengthening US hegemony.

Conclusion

While the nature of the alliances has been broadened and redefined in accordance with the current security environment, this chapter has discussed the duration and changing features of alliances which can be understood with the adoption of the neo-

Gramscian theory of hegemony by taking into consideration the non-hegemonic policymaking of states. The neo-Gramscian's "consensus and coercion" dimensions of hegemony are useful for studying the U.S.-Japan alliance to encapsulate not only the perception of the US, but also Japan. As a theoretical framework of consent and coercion has not been used for alliance theory and the U.S.-Japan alliance, it is worth adopting this theory of hegemony by developing the neo-Gramscian theory of alliance in order to understand the consolidation of US hegemony in the Asia-Pacific region. As has been exemplified in the earlier sections, alliance theory and the theory of hegemony have been dominated by a reductionistic or mechanical understanding of power so it is important to reinvestigate the US-led alliance system and hegemony with a focus on the consensual aspect of hegemony to comprehend the US role in the Asia-Pacific region and future regional arrangements.

Furthermore, the transforming nature of alliance systems in the post-Cold War period shall be examined not only in material but also in ideological terms. In order to articulate the nature of the US-led hegemony, or historic bloc, and its role in the U.S.-Japan alliance, the relationship between the U.S.-Japan alliance and liberal ideology should be closely scrutinised. It has become difficult to characterise the alliance system with a sole focus on the balance of power since the role of liberal ideology has increasingly come into play. It is observable that, as the characteristics of alliance are gradually transforming with a more emphasis on liberal ideology and the flexibility of liberal notions, this has enabled the U.S.-Japan alliance to become stronger. Therefore, the ideological aspects of the U.S.-Japan alliance and other US-led alliances need to be examined in neo-Gramscian terms providing a better understanding of the features of hegemony in the contemporary period. The next chapter is intended to clarify in what terms the neo-Gramscian framework can be

applicable to the context of the U.S.-Japan alliance on its key concepts and crystallising the interaction of material, institutional and ideational components in bolstering hegemony. It not only looks into neo-Gramscianism in a general sense but also highlights the insights which may be relevant for Japanese foreign security policies in the context of the U.S.-Japan alliance.

Chapter Two: Neo-Gramscianism (Theory and Research Method)

Introduction

While Chapter One presents the literature review of the U.S.-Japan alliance and theories of alliance and hegemony, Chapter Two exemplifies neo-Gramscianism as a research method in order to adopt it for to alliance theory and the case of the U.S.-Japan alliance. As is exemplified in the previous chapter, there is a gulf among IR theories (realism, liberalism and constructivism) in the scholarship of the U.S.-Japan alliance. The power relationship between the US and Japan in alliance contexts has inadequately been examined within the IR theoretical frameworks. Whilst alternative research methods including analytical eclecticism are proposed as the means to fill the gaps among these IR theories, the power relationship in the alliance contexts has not been taken into account, which is explainable by using the neo-Gramscian concept of hegemony. As is exemplified in Chapter One, the presence of US hegemony cannot be entirely ignored in the discussions of the U.S.-Japan alliance taking into consideration the trajectory of alliance formations and development, and US engagements in the Asia-Pacific region, which have also influenced Japanese foreign policymaking. Regarding this historical background, neo-Gramscianism would be a useful IR paradigm to scrutinise recent trends in the U.S.-Japan alliance in reflection of its historical development and transformations in the face of emerging security challenges.

In this chapter, neo-Gramscianism is anatomised and developed as a research method for alliance theory and the U.S.-Japan alliance. The neo-Gramscian concept of hegemony is closely examined taking into consideration the postwar era period constituting the Cold Wars. One of the aims of adopting neo-Gramscianism is to

channel it between theory and practice. In doing so, the neo-Gramscian concepts are internalised to alliance theory, which can be regarded as the neo-Gramscian theory of alliance. Alongside this, the U.S.-Japan alliance is used as a case study by incorporating Japanese concepts such as *gaiatsu* (which means “external pressures”, or “US pressure”, in Japanese) to apprehend this theoretical standpoint of the U.S.-Japan alliance relationship. Since this theoretical framework has not been used in the scholarship of the U.S.-Japan alliance, the existing literature of neo-Gramscianism is rigorously scrutinised. In this regard, the neo-Gramscian notions comprising “historic bloc”, “coercion/consensus”, “common sense” and “organic intellectuals” are taken into account.

Indeed, it is also important to note that operationalising the neo-Gramscian framework has been challenging in the field of IR. Worth (2011) argues that the deployment of Gramsci within IR is underdeveloped since 1) it has largely been shaped by the principles of *World Order* and the transnational capitalist class, and 2) neo-Gramscian accounts have generally been rooted within IPE.²⁴ However, although it is often claimed that it is hardly operationalised (Cerny 2006; Russett 2011), the usefulness of this IR framework is recognised. Russett (2011) indicates the significance of Gramsci’s insight, saying that “they should not be dismissed” (Russett 2011, p. 64). It is remarked that “The plural emphasis on neo-Gramscian perspectives provides the chance to intersect with similar as well as diverse forms of thought and action across different disciplines, whilst engaging with concrete agents and sites of change” (Bieler & Morton, 2001a; Bieler and Morton 2001b, p. 27). In

²⁴ It is also worthwhile to remark that “one of the problems with the many neo-Gramscians is their reluctance to engage with some of the more complex areas of the superstructure” (Worth 2011). The similar argument regarding neo-Gramscian’s less engagement with actual Gramsci’s thinking is also pointed out by Germain and Kenny (1998). Yet, in response to their critiques of neo-Gramscianism, Rupert (1998) stresses the importance of both using the neo-Gramscian theory with continuing engagement with reading and re-reading Gramsci (Rupert 1998, p. 434).

this regard, although operationalising neo-Gramscianism can be a difficult task, the chapter elucidates the relevant concepts within this theoretical framework. This paper aims to develop neo-Gramscianism as a research method, which may be one of the original contributions to scholarship. To fulfil the purpose of Chapter Two to embellish this IR theory as a research method, it is intended to overcome the challenges that have been faced.

This chapter is structured as follows: first, the concept of hegemony is examined in consideration of the neo-Gramscian perspective of hegemony that is at the centre of understanding the U.S.-Japan alliance relationship. In this section, differentiating empire from hegemony, the section introduces the neo-Gramscian theory of alliance by comprehending its features. Second, its key concepts are closely examined. Additionally, as a research method, neo-Gramscianism is exemplified by taking into account Robert W. Cox's "social forces analysis", and discourse analysis considering the neo-Gramscian notions of "common sense" and "organic intellectuals". These methods are prominently adopted in analysing the U.S.-Japan alliance in the post-Cold War era especially in Chapters Four, Five and Six. Third, prior to the conclusion section in order to exhibit the applicability in the case of the U.S.-Japan alliance, the neo-Gramscian concepts are adopted to Japanese foreign security policies by highlighting the roles of involving actors, institutions and ideas.

The (Re)conceptualisation of Hegemony

This section examines the concept of hegemony in relation to *Pax Americana* that has been crafted after the Second World War from the neo-Gramscian perspectives. In fact, there have been ongoing discussions whether *Pax Americana* should be regarded as "hegemony" or "empire". In the light of this, after differentiating the

notion of hegemony from that of empire, the neo-Gramscian concept of hegemony is explored by underscoring its key concepts. Thereafter, this theoretical framework is closely scrutinised as a research method and adopted to alliance theory and the case of the U.S.-Japan alliance. As is clarified in Chapter One, neo-Gramscianism has not yet been applied to the case of the U.S.-Japan alliance. As the aim of this research project is to present not only the US but also the Japanese perspectives, such notions as *gaiatsu* (external pressures) are considered in the neo-Gramscian framework.

Hegemony²⁵ or Empire?

It has been discussed whether US power or *Pax Americana* should be considered hegemonic or imperialist. Particularly, the idea of US empire may prominently be reflected by US actions during the George W. Bush Jr. administration which was seen as exhibiting imperialist behaviours by the international community²⁶ while a large amount of literature has discussed whether the US is in “decline” (Strange 1998) or “revivalist”.²⁷ Alternatively, some scholars argue that the US should be viewed as a hegemon rather than an empire. Beeson (2004) explains that US power

²⁵ While there are various types of hegemony such as “benevolent hegemony”, “coalitional hegemony” (Clark 2011), “cooperative hegemony” (Pedersen 2002), “infrastructural hegemony” (Cerny 2006), “network hegemony” (Tsuchiya 2011) and “integrative concept of hegemony” (Prys & Robel 2011), this research primarily focuses on the neo-Gramscian insights of hegemony since its key elements are important for analysing the U.S.-Japan alliance and US hegemony in the Asia-Pacific region. This is clarified in the later sections of this chapter.

²⁶ For instance, the Iraq War in 2003 is one example where the US can be viewed as imperialistic with its initiatives towards the invasion of Iraq in the face of the opposition from other countries including France and Germany. It is worth identifying two types of US foreign policymaking: “internationalism” and “isolationism”. The former one is closely related to multilateralism under the Clinton administration and Nye’s “multilateralist-civil power model”, while the latter one is associated with neo-conservatism under the Bush administration especially in the post-9.11 era. The difference is the means rather than ends (Cox 2001, p. 44; Anderson 2003).

²⁷ The “revivalists”, which predicted the renewal of US power in the 1990s, is the concept used against declinist theories which predict the US decline. Cox (2001) analyses the features of “new American hegemony” and contends that US hegemony seems secure in the post-Cold War era. He also poses relevant questions which are “can this hegemony continue, and, if it does, what then are the implications for the future” (Cox 2001, p. 333).

has been hegemonic rather than imperialistic since it has empowered itself “through the more diffuse mechanisms of the international political economy and a system of strategic alliances and security relations that vest formal authority and autonomy in sovereign states” (Beeson 2004, p. 6). Intricate power dynamism has been aware by differentiating powers that can be military, economic or ideational. Agnew (2003) also underscores the difference between hegemony and empire, explaining that, with regard to the concept of hegemony, “its reliance, to some degree, on persuading or rewarding subordinates rather than immediately coercing them” (Agnew 2003, p. 876). While he also contends that a pure coercive measure is not sufficient, the consensual aspects are relevant in forming hegemony (Agnew 2003). Indeed, the difference between empire and hegemony may not be clear yet it is observable that the concept of empire tends to focus on the element of coercion rather than consensus. The explanation about the US as empire does not adequately focus on the role of consensus which can possibly be explained with regard to hegemony.²⁸

By the same token, rather than the notion of empire, that of hegemony is useful in understanding states relations and their binding relationships. Haugaard (2006) argues that “hegemony as an alliance and as integral hegemony is a consensual view of hegemony” (Haugaard 2006, p.10) where conflict and consensus are combined. He also notes that “The Classical and Gramscian views of hegemony suggest that power should not be perceived as purely coercive” (Haugaard 2006, p. 9).²⁹ Prys and

²⁸ Interestingly, Lentner (2005) develops the notion of “consensual empire”, arguing that US power can be characterised as “consensual empire”. According to him, “Both the Roman empire and the cold war system of alliances headed by the United States have been characterized... as consensual empires” (Lentner 2005, pp. 737-738).

²⁹ He categorises into four types of “hegemony”: 1) classical imperial/negative, 2) classical hegemonic/positive, 3) Gramscian hegemonic/negative and 4) Gramscian hegemony/positive (Haugaard 2006, pp. 8-9). Especially for the third type, consensus does not represent true interest and/or it constitutes an affirmation of discourse which is essentially alien to their social practices (Haugaard 2006, p. 8).

Robel (2011) emphasise the usefulness of treating US power as hegemonic in order to investigate its role in the international system. According to them, “the concept of hegemony...is suggested as the more useful and analytically valuable alternative for the description of the US’ role in the international system” (Prys & Robel 2011, pp. 248-249). In their accounts, “Its appropriateness for application in both academic and policy discourses depends...on a clear understanding of what we mean by hegemony and its constitutive elements” (Prys & Robel 2011, pp. 248-249). They also focus on the significance of understanding hegemony and its elements. Beeson (2009) also clarifies that the nature of hegemonic competition and transition is more uncertain and complex than other influential theoretical understandings of hegemony. While “hegemony” is seen as an appropriate concept to be examined to comprehend the contemporary era, he argues that the neo-Gramscian account of hegemony is applicable for such discussions as whether the US is in decline or not, and whether China is on the rise or not (Beeson 2009). Compared with hegemonic stability theory that has already been examined in Chapter One, the neo-Gramscian account of hegemony is able to comprehend the power dynamism and intricate nature of hegemony.

The Neo-Gramscian Concept of Hegemony

While it is briefly introduced in Chapter One, the neo-Gramscian view of hegemony is exemplified in this section. Neo-Gramscianism has been formulated by Robert W. Cox, Stephen R. Gill and Mark Rupert on the foundation of the ideas of an Italian Marxist linguist, Antonio Gramsci and his written books including *Prison*

*Notebooks*³⁰ have been the groundwork for both Gramscianism³¹ and neo-Gramscianism.³² Femia (1975) explains that “For Gramsci, ideas had consequences which could not be dismissed or reduced to a more ‘real’ world of social and economic phenomena. Herein lies the fundamental assumption behind his elusive and remarkably underanalysed concept of hegemony (*egemonia*), the unifying idea of his mature writings (Femia 1975, p. 29). It is also remarked by Burnham (1991) that, within the neo-Gramscian framework, the focus is shifted to the question of how a ruling class fraction can articulate an ideology to win the hearts and minds of other capital fractions, the working class and key state personnel (Burnham 1991, p. 50). It is evident that neo-Gramscianism has been used for understanding the dynamism of the power relationship among actors not only in material but also economic and ideational terms.

In neo-Gramscian terms, hegemony is understood not only as rule in the interest of the ruled, but also as a system of alliances, of groups or of states. According to Fontana (2000), “the construction of a structured network of alliances founded upon the consent of the constituent members presupposes a universality, or at least a potential mutuality, of interests and values” (Fontana 2000, p. 320). It is more than a simple political alliance between social forces represented by classes or fractions of classes. It is indicated that the combination of a variety of different class interests

³⁰ In fact, these books are “a work not carried to completion in any of its segments” (Thomas 2009, p. 116). Yet, it is argued that the book is “the reconstruction of the ‘internal history’ of Gramsci’s ‘discourse’” (Thomas 2009, p. 116). As Thomas (2009) argues, the fragmentary nature of the notebooks enables its principle to embody “living philology” using Gramsci’s word (Thomas 2009, p. 126).

³¹ It is understood that Mouffe created the shift to Gramscianism in response to the Althusserianism in the 1970s (Thomas 2009, p. 11). Also, Laclau and Mouffe establish a post-Marxist image of Gramsci centring on a discursive aspect of hegemony (Laclau & Mouffe 1985; Thomas 2009).

³² Neo-Gramscianism is different from Gramscianism due to its consideration of the transnational sphere. Acknowledging the underdevelopment of neo-Gramscianism as a theoretical framework, this thesis attempts to enrich this theory by comprehending Gramsci’s core ideas of hegemony.

that are propagated throughout society “bringing about not only a unison of economic and political aims, but also intellectual and moral unity...on a ‘universal’ plane” (Gramsci 1971, pp. 181-2; Morton 2003, p. 157).

Indeed, neo-Gramscianism and neoliberal institutionalism share the similar insights toward the role of institutions in the realm of materials and ideas although the latter theory heavily focuses on the perspectives of hegemonic rather than non-hegemonic states. Gill (1998) acknowledges that, like liberals, neo-Gramscianism recognises that institutions have in ‘locking-in’ particular ideas and practices as part of a constitutionalised world order. Beeson (2009) also argues that “Neo-Gramscian scholars have usefully drawn attention to the intersection of material power and ideas, and their crystallisation in formal and informal institutions” (Beeson 2009, p. 99). Not only comprehending institutions but also other element including ideas, neo-Gramscianism is competent in exhibiting the interactions of material, institutional and ideational components of power.

Historic Bloc

Hegemony is exercised within a wider social constellation of forces, or “historic bloc” which refers to a historical congruence between material forces, institutions and ideologies (Cox 1981). Historic bloc is an embodiment of the organic linkage between political and civil society, a fusion of material, institutional, inter-subjective, theoretical and ideological capacities (Gramsci 1971; Gill & Law 1993). It is regarded as an congregation of various actors and factors which establish hegemony this can be similar to the image of the Leviathan from the Hobbes viewpoint (Litowitz 2000) except for the fact that historic bloc is not rigidly structured in the way Hobbes regarded the state and society relationship. Unlike a deterministic

causality of structure and superstructure of Marx and Lenin,³³ Gramsci introduced the historic bloc to designate a situation where elements of the base and superstructure are united in a single way of life and where the elements reflect and build off each other (Litowitz 2000, p. 528). It is a more complicated entity grounded on the power relationship which is developed into a firmer one through the interaction among state and society and material and ideational factors. In Saull's (2012) account, "Historical bloc...is a relational concept where hegemony is most clearly evident and realized during those moments of complementarity. Simply put, when the socioeconomic, political, ideational, and institutional arrangements of the historical bloc are synchronized with and embedded within the logic of (uneven) capitalist accumulation at that particular historical moment" (Saull 2012, p. 330).

Clearly, historic bloc has been one of the important concepts in neo-Gramscianism. This notion has not discriminated any certain actors in order to examine the power dynamism, which is also one of the strengths to be used in the IR field. The postwar historic bloc that developed under US leadership after 1945 considers the incorporation of allied states and societies, centred on Western Europe, including the working classes into an anti-communist bloc organised around a Fordist or mass-production mode of capital accumulation (Rupert 1995; 2000). While US strategic power was an important factor in securing US hegemony through security guarantees it has provided to Western European and other states, it was the ideological glue of anti-communism and the co-opting and support of dominant social forces alongside the realisation of some not insignificant socioeconomic gains for the majority of people within these states that realised US hegemony.

³³ This is also pointed out by Worth (2011), arguing that hegemony should be seen as "a concept that is more-open and less rigid in its understanding of the relationship between capital and production and the highly complex issues of culture, identity and class that are played out at different levels within international society" (Worth 2011, p. 381).

Furthermore, the driving force in determining the shape and direction of the international capitalist economy derived from the production methods sponsored by the US capitalist class and the externalisation of these techniques into the domestic societies of other capitalist states especially in the postwar era (Rupert 1995; Panitch and Gindin 2003). Zahran and Ramos (2010) explains that the global historic bloc emerged in the 1970s when a series of economic crisis accumulated with the end of the Bretton Woods system which can also be seen as a reformulation of the global capitalist order. They also indicated that “The universalization of liberal ideas and values, deeply embedded in the US society, is in fact one of the characteristics of the globalist historic bloc’s hegemony” (Zahran & Ramos 2010, p. 28).

Neo-Gramscian Theory of Alliance

In consideration of these key characteristics, the neo-Gramscian theory of alliance is developed with the purpose of adopting it for the case of the U.S.-Japan alliance. In line with the neo-Gramscian notion of alliance and hegemony, the aim of doing so is to further elaborate the theory of alliance, which concerns not only military but also economic and ideational aspects of alliances. This theoretical framework enables alliance theory to crystallise all facets of alliances, which other existing theories are not able to demonstrate. Within this theoretical framework, it is based upon the assumption that alliance is part of hegemony have been recognised by some scholars (Walt 1987; Morrow 1991). The neo-Gramscian theory of alliance focuses on the roles of social forces and common sense which are used as the research method. In particular, the elements of material capabilities, institutions and ideas are considered in social forces analysis whereas the role of organic intellectuals is taken into account in investigating “common sense”.

a) Dual Sides of Hegemony: Coercion and Consensus

The two facets of hegemony: coercion and consensus is an important element of the neo-Gramscian idea of hegemony.³⁴ Coercion consists of domination, command, or physical force whereas consensus entails intellectual leadership that can be internalised through schools, churches, institutions, scholarly exchanges, and popular culture.³⁵ Especially for the latter concept, it “involves subduing and co-opting dissenting voices through subtle dissemination of the dominant group’s perspective as universal and natural, to the point where the dominant beliefs and practices become an intractable component of common sense which are more insidious and complicated processes” (Litowitz 2000, p. 519). It is also significant to note that coercion is not necessarily physical. Litowitz (2000) explains that coercion is not merely physical but also symbolic through art, media, and communication (Litowitz 2000, p. 523). The mechanisms of universalisation, naturalisation, and rationalisation can be regarded as a means to establish a ruling viewpoint.³⁶

As is indicated earlier, the notions of coercion and consensus are based on Machiavelli’s perception of power as a centaur that is regarded as the combination of consent and coercion (Gramsci 1971; Cox 1993). It is also explicated that “A socio-cultural order – what Gramsci calls the ‘integral State’ – is characterised by a hegemonic equilibrium based on a combination of force and consent, which are

³⁴ While there are studies about “coercion and consensus” theories in sociological discipline, this paper would develop in a different way from these theories although it is worth taking into account some aspects of the viewpoints on coercion and consensus at societal level.

³⁵ In the realm of popular culture, Gramsci’s idea of hegemony has influenced cultural studies, which involves the analysis of popular codes and symbol-systems such as advertising, clothes, and movies.

³⁶ This aspect is similar to Althusser’s (1971) concept of the “ideological state apparatuses” which is distinguishable from “repressive state apparatus” which also has common with Gramsci’s ideas of force and hegemony as the two poles of domination. Indeed, it is also noted that, while Althusser criticises Gramsci’s analysis, he also saluted Gramsci’s notion of hegemony. Further investigations of Althusser’s critiques on Gramsci are elaborated in Thomas’ (2009) book (Chapter One).

balanced in varying proportions, without force prevailing too greatly over consent (Gramsci 1971; Fontana 1993, p. 141). According to Cunningham (2004), “One of the key aspects of the neo-Gramscian theory of hegemony is the idea that leading groups engender consent by a combination of some level of incorporation of subordinate interests and the promotion of particular or sectional interests as universal or general” (Cunningham 2004, p. 559). The language of consensus is a language of common interest which is expressed in universalistic terms, although the structure of power underlying it is skewed in favour of the dominant groups (Cox 1977, p. 387; Beyer 2009, p. 34). In this regard, both coercive and consensual aspects of hegemony in the neo-Gramscian terms can be illustrated in the U.S.-Japan alliance relationship in the postwar era which is explored in Chapter Three.

The consensual aspect of hegemony has been recognised within the neo-Gramscian framework. Maier (1977) indicates that “Perhaps the best term for the postwar Western economy would be that of consensual American hegemony. ‘Consensual’ can be used because European leaders accepted Washington’s leadership in view of their needs for economic and security assistance” (Maier 1977, p. 25). With regard to US postwar hegemony, Beeson and Higgott (2005) point out that “Despite the arguments of critics who claim the PWIO [post-war international order] that the USA created was designed primarily to further the interests of US capital, it was widely accepted as functionally necessary and ideologically legitimate” (Beeson & Higgott 2005, p. 1175). Moreover, Fontana (1993) explicates that “Hegemony is...conceived as the vehicle whereby the dominant social groups establish a system of ‘permanent consent’ that legitimates a prevailing social order by encompassing a complex network of mutually reinforcing and interwoven ideas affirmed and articulated by intellectuals” (Fontana 1993, p. 141). This illustrates an

imperative role of consensus in formulating hegemony, or historic bloc, from the neo-Gramscian standpoint.

We can see the role of consensus is significant in creating hegemony within the influx of material and ideational components of power. As Fiori (1970) notes,

Gramsci's originality as a Marxist lay...in his argument that the system's real strength does not lie in the violence of the ruling class or the coercive power of its state apparatus, but in the acceptance by the ruled of a conception of the world which belongs to the rulers. The philosophy of the ruling class passes through a whole tissue of complex vulgarizations to emerge as common sense: that is, the philosophy of the masses, who accept the morality, the customs, the institutionalized rules of behaviour of the society they live in" (Fiori 1970, p. 238; Litowitz 2000, p. 527).

Haugaard (2006) also elaborates that "If we consider hegemony as only conflictual and coercive we are claiming that the key resources are solely material. However, if we take a Gramscian view, we are arguing for social resources as a basis for power and, in combination, these two types of resources set up a dynamic which is inverse and affects autonomy" (Haugaard 2006, pp. 10-11). Taylor (1994) discusses the relationship between "emulation" and "consensus", saying that "The hegemonic state is successful to the degree that other states emulate it. Emulation is the basis of the consent that lies at the heart of the hegemonic project. Given the territorial form of this hegemony, emulation has two dimensions: inter-state economic relations and intra-state political relations" (Taylor 1994, p. 364).

In this vein, the aspect of "a strategy of co-optation" can be considered in the context of hegemony. According to Gill (1998), "as neo-liberalism has both coercive and consensual dimensions, it can also be identified with the necessity, in a more formally democratic world order in which the pressure for recognition and representation is significant, with a strategy of cooptation of opposition—particularly

in nations where an external model of change is imposed by the state before the bourgeois classes have formed a hegemonic ruling bloc” (Gill 1998, p. 27). Bieler and Morton (2004) also notes that neo-Gramscian hegemony appears as an, “expression of broadly based consent, manifested in the acceptance of ideas and supported by material resources and institutions, which is initially established by social forces occupying a leading role within a state, but then projected outwards on a world scale” (Bieler & Morton 2004, p. 87).

Indeed, “an integrative concept of hegemony”, which was developed by Prys and Robel (2011), possesses the similar insights towards hegemony in regard to the two dimensions of hegemony: coercion and consensus. They argue that hegemony is the concept consisting of the two conceptual negative poles of domination, or even empire, on the one hand and a lack of control on the other hand. In their account, “Hegemony is therefore seen as a point in a continuum between these two extremes. Hegemony is thus a difficult role to assume for a state, as it requires the constant maintenance of a balance between benevolence and force” (Prys & Robel 2011, p.258). This is similar to the way Gramsci’s view on coercive and consensual aspects of hegemony, which also exhibits the relevance of using coercive and consensual dimensions of hegemony through the neo-Gramscian lenses. This theoretical viewpoint of hegemony is developed by highlighting the interplay of coercion and consensus.

b) *Common Sense*³⁷

“Common sense” is produced in the limited intellectual community in the neo-Gramscian terms. According to Gramsci (1971), “every philosophy has a tendency to become the common sense of a fairly limited environment (that of all the intellectuals)” (Gramsci 1971, p. 330). It is also remarked that common sense is produced through everyday living. Dodge (2009) explicates that “Common Sense is the structure of everyday thinking through which the majority of any population live the greater part of their lives. It is within Common Sense that the hegemonic ideology exists in symbiotic dominance with its vanquished predecessor, securing its own influence by assimilating the more salient parts of the other (Dodge 2009, p. 258). Nonetheless, it is also crucial to point out that “Common sense is antithetical to ‘critical elaboration’ since only critique enables coherency and, ultimately, unity” (Gramsci 1971, p. 324; Howson & Smith 2008, p. 4). Arguably, the concept of common sense is distinguished from “good sense” which is based on critical investigation.³⁸

In the light of common sense, it is important to underscore the difference between “rhetorical strategies” and “rhetorically marginalised”. Rupert (1997) scrutinises “the hegemony of liberal individualism” by looking into the role of a broad middle class industrial workers in the postwar era in the way of being “brought into an historic bloc which promoted the transnational hegemony of liberal capitalism while seeking

³⁷ It is also indicated that “there is hardly any the idea of the philosophy of consciousness that has so thoroughly entered into *senso commune* as a ‘matter of fact’ than the idea of an ‘inner’ to which corresponds an ‘outer’” (Thomas 2009, p. 303)

³⁸ According to Howson and Smith (2008), “subalternity as an identity and practice has inherently the potential to critical elaboration and, therefore, the progression from common sense to good sense, from disunity to unity, and from hegemony marked in the final analysis by dogma and coercion to hegemony marked in the final analysis by openness and consensus” (Howson & Smith 2008, pp. 4-5). Presumably, this can be applicable to the different discourses between the mainland Japan and Okinawa.

to contain the putative menace of expansionist communism” (Rupert 1997, p. 105). His study on the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) illustrates how NAFTA pro and con sides differ by categorising them “rhetorical strategies” and “rhetorically marginalised” (Rupert 1995; 2000). According to him, “In the months and days before the final Congressional votes, academic, corporate, political and media supporters of the treaty used a number of rhetorical strategies to bolster their own position and to marginalize the treaty [NAFTA]’s opponents” (Rupert 1995, p.682; Rupert 2000, p. 58). He also notes that “common sense was understood to be a syncretic historical residue, fragmentary and contradictory, open to multiple interpretations and potentially supportive of very different kinds of social visions and political projects” (Rupert 2000, p. 11).

Furthermore, Dodge (2009) examines “liberal common sense”, which has increasingly been influential from the 1980s onwards in the realm of US foreign policymaking. He argues that the “Bush doctrine”, which marked the prominent role of liberal values, was not a watershed in international relations but rather there were already influential dynamics within the post-Cold War system. According to him, “The Bush doctrine’s aim was to recognize, institutionalize and expand the political effects of attacks on economic sovereignty that had taken place under the Washington Consensus of the 1980s and demands for Liberal good governance in the 1990s” (Dodge 2009, p. 255). He also exemplifies that “organic ideology” is “a synthesis of differing interests and concepts within society, cemented together or given coherence by the dominant class and their ideological aims and objectives. So the consciousness of individuals within society is not given but constructed by the dominant ideological system the individual exists within” (Dodge 2009, p. 257). In

this sense, it is important to closely investigate the discourses in relation to liberal values, which is explored in Chapter Six in the context of the U.S.-Japan alliance.

*c) Organic Intellectuals*³⁹

In the light of the consensual aspect of hegemony, the role of intellectuals cannot be dismissed. Morton (2003) explains that “the function of intellectual activity across state/civil society relations and the role of consent as a necessary form of hegemony should not be overlooked” (Morton 2003, p. 168). Hegemony is regarded as consensus gained through “intellectual and moral leadership” (Gill 1990, p. 42). In the neo-Gramscian account, intellectual and moral leadership (*direzione*), whose principal constituting elements, are consent and persuasion (Gramsci 1971). Gramsci called these actors “organic intellectuals” who are not simply producers of ideology but also the “organisers of hegemony” (Gramsci 1971; Gill 1990, p. 52). According to Zahran and Ramos (2010), “[O]rganic intellectuals provide cohesion and guidance to hegemony” (Zahran & Ramos 2010, p. 28). Fontana (1993) also explains that “A social group or class can be said to assume a hegemonic role to the extent that it articulates and proliferates throughout society cultural and ideological belief systems whose teachings are accepted as universally valid by the general population” (Fontana 1993, p. 140). When using the concept of “organic intellectuals” in this research project, such actors as policymakers, scholars and policy intellectuals will be closely examined.

³⁹ The concept of “organic intellectuals” can be similar to Kreps’s (2010) notion of elite consensus yet, while Kreps (2010) considers the absence of a coherent opposition to the government’s basic foreign policy, the existence of organic intellectuals does not indicate the absence of counter-hegemonic forces.

Indeed, defining intellectuals is not as precise as it seems. It should be noted here that “Gramsci defines ‘intellectual’ in a broad sense to include all those who exercise directive or high level technical capacities in society, ‘whether in the field of production, in that of culture or in that of politics administration....’ Within this group he distinguishes between ‘organic’ and ‘traditional’ intellectuals” (Gramsci 1971; Femia 1987, pp. 38-39). The capacity of the “organic intellectual” to be entrepreneurial in character and politically organise the masses provides them with the ability to reproduce and transmit particular conceptions of the world (D’Atomma 2011). Furthermore, in consideration of “organic intellectuals”, it should be borne in mind that policymakers craft new policies in order to improve the existing unsolved issues or to bolster current policies. This innovative nature of these intellectuals and outcomes of their actions shall not be ignored to measure the pervasiveness of its policymaking in regard to democratic states.

Conversely, unlike organic intellectuals, “traditional intellectual” is regarded as the intellectuals that have pre-existent structural ties to the dominant group. They are essentially the social glue, which holds together the ideological worldview of the dominant class with the “common sense” of the subordinate class. In this regard, it can be argued that particularly policymakers are “traditional intellectuals” if they maintain its power yet that is not true since their maintenance of its influence depends on the responses of the people in the public. It is also remarked that traditional intellectuals “could be ‘immanent’ to the life of the people only by means of the institutions of a transcendent state, which claimed to organise society from within, but only on condition of being above it” (Thomas 2009, p. 346).⁴⁰

⁴⁰ Thomas (2009) also remarks that the concept of “immanence” is important for Gramsci’s thinking.

It is noted that the internationalisation of the state and the role of transnational elites, or a *nebuleuse*, in forging consensus within this process remains to be fully deciphered and needs much more study (Cox 1992, pp. 30-1; 2002, p. 33; Bieler & Morton 2004, p. 102). This is similar to Nye's (2011) idea of "contextual intelligence". According to Nye (2011), contextual intelligence ability is becoming a crucial skill for leaders to conceal power resources into successful strategies by comprehending evolving environments. He also argues that, with regard to US foreign policymaking, contextual intelligence is needed and also has to recognise the relevance of other's supports which are required to achieve its aims (Nye 2011). This is the similar logic to Gramsci's understanding of the formation of hegemony which needs not only the coercive but consensual facets of power. It is worth examining the role of intellectuals particularly in the realm of ideas when analysing the changing nature of the U.S.-Japan alliance. According to Bieler (2001), "Only those ideas, which are disseminated through or rooted in such structures, linked to a particular constellation of social forces engaged in an ideological struggle for hegemony are considered to be 'organic ideas'" (Bieler 2001, p. 98). In Gramsci's own words, only those ideas can be regarded as "organic" that "organise human masses, and create the terrain on which men move, acquire consciousness of their position, struggle, etc. These are contrasted with ideas that are merely 'arbitrary, rationalistic, or "willed", based on extemporary polemics" (Gramsci 1971, pp. 376-7; Bieler & Morton 2004, p. 101).

Zahran and Ramos (2010) argues that Joseph S. Nye can be regarded as an example of organic intellectuals through neo-Gramscian lenses, playing his role in creating of ideas and mental images that give support and conscience to the US historic bloc. In their account, "For Gramscian organic intellectuals provide cohesion

and guidance to hegemony...we would all agree that Nye is an exemplar intellectual and that his work was passionately devoted to provide good, genuine and cautious advice to US foreign policy” (Zahran & Ramos 2010, p. 28). Zahran and Ramos’ (2010) work closely examines Nye’s contribution to US foreign policymaking by promoting soft power. They also remark that “As long as one believes in the righteousness of his principles and values, being an organic intellectual turns out to be quite a noble job” (Zahran & Ramos 2010, p. 28). In this regard, it is crucial to take into account the role of organic intellectuals in order to understand the formation of historic bloc in neo-Gramscian terms.

Research Method

While the neo-Gramscian key concepts are presented in the earlier section, this section elaborates neo-Gramscianism as a research method that can be applied to the U.S.-Japan alliance in the post-Cold War period. Prior to explaining how the methods are used in the case of the alliance, the research method itself is exemplified by underscoring the elements of neo-Gramscianism. Within this theoretical framework, the two main methods, social forces analysis and discourse analysis, are deployed to the U.S.-Japan alliance relationship. Whilst Robert W. Cox’s “social forces analysis” is used to explore the development of the U.S.-Japan alliance in both Chapter Four and Chapter Five in regard to discourse analysis, the neo-Gramscian concept, “common sense”, is adopted in the U.S.-Japan alliance context which will be fully explored in Chapter Six.

a) Social Forces Analysis: Exploring the Interaction between Coercion and Consensus

By comprehending consensus and coercion dimensions of hegemony, social forces analysis, which is developed by Robert W. Cox,⁴¹ is used that considers material, institutional and ideological aspects of power. Bieler and Morton (2004) explicate that “it is specifically critical in the sense of asking how existing social or world orders have come into being, how norms, institutions or practices therefore emerge, and what forces may have the emancipatory potential to change or transform the prevailing order” (Bieler & Morton 2004, p. 87). However, when using this analysis, it may be important to understand that material and ideational factors are not necessarily separate. Beyer (2009) indicates that “The opposition between the ‘material’ and the ‘ideational’, however, is a false one: human affairs are structured by both; each is ‘real’, ‘true’ and ‘important’. One can regard the material and the ideational as quite distinct; they are, however, closely interrelated and partly interdependent” (Beyer 2009, p. 30). In this regard, in the case of the transforming nature of the U.S.-Japan alliance, we should focus not only on either the material or ideational facet but interrelated relationships among material, institutional and ideational factors.

Social forces analysis is an important method in investigating the formulation of hegemonic liberal discourse of the alliance in Japanese foreign policymaking. As Cox (1977) states, he used Gramsci’s ideas to describe the leading role of the US in both material and ideational dimensions, saying that “Antonio Gramsci used the concept of hegemony to express a unity between objective material forces and ethico-political ideas – in Marxian terms, a unity of structure and superstructure – in

⁴¹ It is worth remarking that Cox was influenced by Vico’s ideas (Lima, Nunes & Brincat 2012). Also, he does not locate himself within any particular school (Germain & Kenny 1998, p. 4).

which power based on dominance over production is rationalized through an ideology incorporating compromise or consensus between dominant and subordinate groups” (Cox 1977, p. 387; Beyer 2009, p. 34). Moreover, Beyer (2009) understands the complexity of power in both material and ideational sense may be likely to strengthen hegemony. Since both material and ideological dimension of powers are considered, it is worth apprehending multiple dimensions of power.

b) Discourse Analysis: Common Sense and Organic Intellectuals

Discourse analysis is another research method to be used in analysing the U.S.-Japan alliance with a particular focus on common sense in neo-Gramscian terms. In Ives’s (2005) account, it is acknowledged that language lies at the centre of Gramsci’s understanding of the relationship between coercion and consensus. From this theoretical standpoint, discourse analysis focuses on the constitution and transformation of social meanings and identity which is able to capture the complex features of all social relations and practices (Howarth 2010). With regard to the notion of hegemony, Ives (2005) explicates that “language is central to Gramsci’s historical materialism and that he does not oppose it to materiality. It argues that Gramsci adopted the very term hegemony substantially from his university studies in linguistics” (Ives 2005, p. 455). He also exemplifies that Gramsci pays a great attention to language as a political issue such as government policy around language, educational language curricula and everyday language practices (Gramsci 1971; Ives 2004). He clarifies that “Gramsci combines with the rich metaphorical power of linguistic concepts as tools to help analyse political circumstances, specifically the

role of culture in shaping people's beliefs, behaviours and even their voting patterns” (Ives 2004, p. 5).⁴²

In the light of the relationship between discourse analysis and neo-Gramscianism, discourse analysis is an appropriate research tool when investigating the transforming meanings and functions of alliances taking into account changing discourses within the neo-Gramscian framework. According to Ives (2005), “One of many reasons why Gramsci’s writings are still very relevant for us now is that they help us rethink the often presumed opposition between language and the economy, or ‘matter’ more generally” (Ives 2005, p. 458). Howarth (2010) also explicates that “Institutions like states, markets or governance networks can be conceptualized as more or less sedimented systems of discourse, that is, partially fixed systems of rules, norms, resources, practices and subjectivities that are linked together in particular ways” (Howarth 2010, p. 312). Fontana (1993) also remarks that “Gramsci’s political theory...is a discourse on the genesis and formation of the historical subject. It is precisely this view of ‘political agents’ who posit themselves and create themselves in and through historical action that led Gramsci to reject contemporary interpretations of Marxism, which he criticized as mechanistic and deterministic” (Fontana 1993, p. 1).

Underscoring the linkage between language and hegemony, discourse analysis in neo-Gramscian terms is used by closely examining the discourse of governmental documents, policy papers and the media that are created in the hand of organic intellectuals, who have contributed to the formulation of a historic bloc. Specifically, while the role of these actors is explored in Chapter Three, their roles are taken into

⁴² Ives (2004) also notes that institutional resources including the existence of grammar books and dictionaries, government-sponsored training of teachers and many other policies that affect language use are clearly influential.

account in the construction of the U.S.-Japan security alliance as “common sense” which is rigorously explored in Chapter Six with a closer examination of the discursive transformation of the alliance. In the following sections, the neo-Gramscian concepts and research method are adopted to the case of the U.S.-Japan alliance.

The U.S.-Japan Alliance through the Neo-Gramscian Lenses

On the foundation of neo-Gramscianism, Cox’s social forces analysis and discourse analysis are adopted in investigating the U.S.-Japan alliance after the Cold War. Whilst the research focuses on the post-Cold War era, it also considers the historical developments of the U.S.-Japan alliance and its transforming features in the postwar period that are closely examined in Chapter Three. The subsequent sections illustrate coercion and consensus dimensions of hegemony in the context of Japanese foreign policymaking and the U.S.-Japan alliance. Specifically, it is crucial to recognise the Japanese perspective in order to demonstrate the consensual aspect of US hegemony in the Asia Pacific region. Additionally, as is elaborated in the next section, the distinction between coercion and consensus may not be clear-cut but rather overlapping. In consideration of the Japanese political climate, the following sections exhibit how the research method that is illustrated earlier is used from Chapter Three to Chapter Six.

Gaiatsu (External Pressures) and its Internalisation

As is explicated in the previous section, separating coercion from consensus can be challenging. Nonetheless, in the case of the U.S.-Japan alliance relationship, US pressure is regarded as the coercive aspect of hegemony while Japan’s consent to US

offers is seen as the consensual aspect of hegemony. In terms of the Japanese context, *gaiatsu* is considered which has been acknowledged by Calder (1988) and also elaborated by Schoppa (1997) in the case of US-Japan trade negotiations during the George W. Bush, Jr. and the William Clinton administrations. These scholars base their arguments on Putnam's (1988) "two-level game" analysis which examines the dynamics of bargaining between governments. Putnam (1988) explains that "the two level conceptual framework could in principle be married to such diverse perspectives as Marxism, interest group pluralism, bureaucratic politics, and neo-corporatism" (Putnam 1988, p. 442). Schoppa (1997) argues that "*gaiatsu* indeed has the power to influence Japanese policy outcomes and that its influence is greatest when the Japanese domestic political arena offers opportunities for employing synergistic strategies⁴³ that take advantage of divisions of opinion and interest on the Japanese side" (Schoppa 1997, pp. 6-7).

Gaiatsu can be regarded as part of coercion in neo-Gramscian terms which is understood as the beneficial influence of outside pressure that goes beyond the central government in order to push through reforms that would have been impossible under its consensus system. Pyle (1992) defines *gaiatsu* as "another dimension of Japan's reactive stance in international affairs. One of the greatest handicaps to the new internationalism is that Japan has usually not been able to respond institutionally, even in its own best interest, without the intervention of forces outside its system. *Gaiatsu* has become a dynamic of the change, reform, and liberalisation that is essential to the agenda of the new internationalism" (Pyle 1992, p. 111). Inoguchi (1987) exemplifies the necessity for foreign pressure, specifically US pressure, to "transcend the framework of Diet operations, strike down the vested

⁴³ This consists of synergistic linkage, reverberation, participation expansion and alternative specification (Schoppa 1997).

interests syndicate, and remodel Japan into a country committed to a fair society and eager to contribute to the international community” (Inoguchi 1987, p. 58).⁴⁴


However, an excessive focus on *gaiatsu*, or the coercive aspect of hegemony, may fail to notice the Japanese intentions in its foreign policymaking. Some argue that the forms of coercion were reluctantly used during the George W. Bush, Jr. administration. The early statements made by the economic policy expert under this administration, Larry Lindsey, who criticised the Clinton administration’s usage of *gaiatsu*, suggested that *gaiatsu* now plays a minimal role in policy discussions between the US and Japan (Lindsey 2000). Moreover, although such expressions as “show the flag” and “boots on the ground” by Richard L. Armitage, who was also called “Mr. Gaiatsu”, raised so many controversies in the Japanese media as a form of *gaiatsu*, it is argued that the etymology of “show the flag” deviates from any traditional idea of *gaiatsu* (Kliman 2006).

Arase (2007) further notes that “In contrast to earlier periods...in the new circumstances it is conceivable that Japan’s security role may expand even without U.S. pressure” (Arase 2007, p. 561). While the role of *gaiatsu* shall not be wholly ignored which may be still be in effect in policymaking between the US and Japan, it is worthwhile to explore a consensual aspect of hegemony which strengthens hegemony from the neo-Gramscian viewpoint. Additionally, rather it is also argued that *gaiatsu* can be possibly internalised by the Japanese side. Kliman (2006) notes that during the Koizumi administrations, *gaiatsu* was internalised in order to legislate some laws which were unlikely to be enacted without US pressures. As is

⁴⁴ In addition, policy recommendations such as the “Higuchi Report”, which was relatively formulated without the government intervention, had an influence on the US sides (Fukuda 2006). Later on, Patrick Cronin and Michael Green who were involved in the U.S.-Japan alliance management, criticised the report and claimed a need to redefine the U.S.-Japan alliance. Green argued that the criticism in the Higuchi Report was due to the use of *gaiatsu* (Akiyama 2002).

noted earlier, it can be a blurry distinction between coercion and consensus although this can be seen also as part of consensus. Hence, the two dimensions of hegemony can be overlapped as follows.

Diagram 1: Neo-Gramscian Dimensions of Hegemony



Source: Gramsci (1971); Author

The internalisation of *gaiatsu* can fit into the intersecting part of the diagram.⁴⁵ A diminishing usage of *gaiatsu* may signify that the consensual role of the U.S.-Japan alliance has become more important to establish US hegemony in the Asia-Pacific region.⁴⁶ The consensual aspect of hegemony may have become more prevalent in the discussions of the alliance. For example, due to the Iraq War in 2003 and the “war of terrorism”, the two Japanese Diet bills, “Special Anti-Terrorism Measures Law” and “Amendment to the Self-Defence Forces (SDF) Law” were enacted on 29th Oct 2001 under the Junichiro Koizumi premiership. The Anti-Terrorism Special

⁴⁵ It is also noted that “*gaiatsu*” can be a tool for some bureaus depending on the context. One example is the U.S.-Japan trade deal for rice in the 1980s (Interview with Akitoshi Miyashita, 14th December 2012).

⁴⁶ It is remarked that the US decreasingly uses *gaiatsu* unlike during the Gulf War in 1991 (Interview with Shotaro Yachi, 22nd April 2013).

Measures Law strengthened the U.S.-Japan alliance with its SDF's expanded operational capabilities, which enables SDF to become an integral part of US strategic planning (Southgate 2003). Furthermore, such legislations as Armed Attack Contingency Law in 2004 are based on Japan's willingness to widen the scope of SDF activities in support of US troops. Kliman (2006) also elaborates the internalisation of *gaiatsu* in the case of Japan's support for the minesweeping in the Indian Ocean due to its lesson of failing to respond to US pressure which can be seen as a form of consensus.

Consensus formulation is seen as pervasive in Japanese politics. Yeo (2011) notes that "The use of consensus as an analytical concept is most appropriate in Japan because security politics are often dictated by the dominant consensus held by powerful political elites" (Yeo 2011, p. 70). In his account, the postwar consensus takes into account Japan's comprehensive approach to security, encompassing economic and political dimensions of security and reflects Japan's staunch support of the U.S.-Japan alliance in its national defence strategy. This is applicable to the so-called "Yoshida Doctrine" which has existed since the postwar era that has been supported by Japanese elites and is further exemplified in Chapter Three. Yeo (2011) also argues that "an elite consensus is shaped not only by material-based threat perceptions but by existing ideology, norms and institutions (Yeo 2011, p. 9). In this regard, the neo-Gramscian framework is able to comprehend the way elites formulate the consensus through a combination of material, institutional and ideational factors.

Social Forces Analysis in the U.S.-Japan Alliance

Comprehending this power dynamism, with regard to the U.S.-Japan alliance, these three elements can interact as the following table displays.

Table 1: Cox's Social Forces Analysis in the Context of the U.S.-Japan Alliance

Material capabilities	Military capabilities (e.g., military transformation, Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA)), trade (e.g. Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP)), Official Development Assistance (ODA)
Institutions	Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), Ministry of Defence (MOD), Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI), <i>Keidanren</i> , US government (e.g., US State of Department), US-Japan Business Council (USJBC)
Ideas	Universal values, democracy, market economy, rules of law, freedom and prosperity, liberalism

Source: Cox (1987); Author

a) Material Capabilities

Since the focus of this research is not only on the coercive but consensual aspects of US hegemony with regard to US-Japan relationship, the Japanese perspective will be closely examined to underline the consensual facet of hegemony which has been hardly comprehended. Also, US foreign policymaking is investigated to examine how US strategic planning has influenced Japanese policymaking. Such relevant reports as the East Asia Strategy Report (EASR), or the Nye Report, are scrutinised to see how the discourse of the US government has changed and also exerted an influence on Japanese foreign policymaking. With regard to material capabilities,

both the US and Japanese foreign policymaking relating to the alliance are closely examined such as the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) and military transformation. There have been improvements in joint operations between the US and Japan. Additionally, based on the preservation of “global commons”, such issues as maritime security, space policies, and cyber security have raised the importance of the cooperation between the US and Japan. Not only the military dimension but also economic aspects including the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) are scrutinised as the capitalist economy is one of the factors that has been considered in the U.S.-Japan alliance.

b) Institutions

With regard to institutions, it is worth paying attention to the following ministries in Japan since they have different interests in the different issues. It is also important to note the features of bureaucracy in Japan, which have been studied previously. Najita (1974) clarified the characteristics of Japan’s “bureaucratism”⁴⁷ and Campbell (1989) characterises the features of Japanese bureaucracy as “bureaucratic primacy”. While the influential role of Japanese bureaucracy was put into question during the Hatoyama administration in 2009,⁴⁸ bureaucrats in Japan have influenced Japanese foreign policymaking. Hence, it is crucial to look into the roles of these actors in the context of the U.S.-Japan alliance.

⁴⁷ Johnson (1982) examines the influential role of the MITI in economic policy in Japan.

⁴⁸ It is pointed out that the difference between the LDP and DPJ is the role of bureaucrats (Interview with Tetsuya Kotani, 8th March 2013).

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA)

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) is one of the oldest ministries in Japan. In the postwar era, the MOFA has played a dominant role in shaping Japan's security policy rather than the Japan Defence Agency (JDA), which was upgraded to the Ministry of Defence (MOD) in 2007. More particularly, the North American Affairs Bureau has played an important role in alliance management with the US with its two divisions in the Bureau: the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty Division and the Status of U.S. Forces Agreement (SOFA) Division. Miyashita (1999) exemplifies that "Although governmental agencies and private sectors had their own organisational interests, Tokyo was largely unified under the leadership of the MOFA. It appears that the high costs of foregoing the bilateral relations stemming from the asymmetric dependence made Japan reluctant to pursue a defiant policy vis-à-vis the United States" (Miyashita 1999; Miyashita 2003, p. 180). Mochizuki's (1998) analysis illustrates how the primacy of the US in the MOFA's overall policy priorities can influence defence and security policies.⁴⁹ For instance, it is observed that "the decision to withdraw the original AMF [Asian Monetary Fund] proposal may have been due to the MOFA's objections that it worked too explicitly towards excluding the US" (Hook, Gilson, Hughes & Dobson 2002, p. 190).

However, after the Cold War, some changes occurred regarding its influence. Firstly, as is noted earlier, after the MOD was newly founded, the MOFA has faced a challenge to deal with Japanese security issues primarily. Secondly, the Foreign Policy Bureau (*Sogo Gaiko Seisaku Kyoku*) was established in 1993 that changed the

⁴⁹ Routine bilateral security consultations, the stationing of US forces in Japan, bilateral technology transfers, and development programs are among the areas that ultimately have their justification in the security treaty and therefore also justify the MOFA's lead role in discussion (Mochizuki 1998).

dynamics within the MOFA. It is noted that “the dominance of bilateralism in the MOFA has also been challenged by the increasing influence of Asianist norms and the China and ASEAN ‘factions’ of the Asian and Oceanian Affairs Bureau” (Hook, Gilson, Hughes & Dobson 2002, p. 190). Whenever the MOFA discussed reorganisation to enhance its policymaking capability, the enhancement of the Foreign Policy Bureau was included and the National Security Policy Division in the Foreign Policy Bureau was seen as the lead division in creating Japan’s national security policy which took effect in August 2004. For instance, the National Security Policy Division played a primary role in the process leading up to Japan’s dispatch of JSDF vessels to the Indian Ocean in support of Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) in 2001, and its dispatch of JSDF ground troops to Iraq in 2004 (Oros & Tatsumi 2010, p. 30).⁵⁰ This gradual change shows the importance of looking into different actors especially in a changing international security environment.

Ministry of Defence (MOD)

The Ministry of Defence (MOD) has a history that has played very little role in shaping Japan’s national security policy since July 1954 because of strict civilian controls as a means of preempting military officers from garnering undue influence over Japanese foreign policymaking. It was confined to the management of the Japanese SDF and coordination with the local governments that host US forces in Japan and the SDF facilities on issues arising from hosting these forces. The JDA has been called as a “management agency” (*kanri kancho*) in this regard or, in

⁵⁰ According to Oros and Tatsumi (2010), the role of the NPA in Japan’s security policymaking has played a bigger role in the future since law enforcement issues such as smuggling of illegal materials and terrorism are increasingly regarded as national security problems in especially in the post-9.11 world.

Keddell's (1993) words, "the JDA Director was viewed more as the person managing the affairs of the SDF than national security affairs" (Keddell 1993, p. 19). Cooney (2007) also notes that "The JDA is one of the politically weakest agencies in the Japanese bureaucracy because of the sensitivity of military affairs...Because of Article Nine and the overall sensitivity in Japan to the overall existence of the SDF, the JDA tends to keep a lower profile when it comes to policy advocacy" (Cooney 2007, p. 93). It is observable that the influence of the JDA was less in the realm of Japanese foreign policymaking.

Conversely, the changes came with the end of the Cold War with an expected growing JDA role in Japan's national security policymaking. In particular, the JSDF's participation in international activities including UN peacekeeping operations (PKO) prompted such a trend. Furthermore, the role of JDA rose as an institutional counterpart in U.S.-Japan alliance discussions such as Defence Policy Review Initiative (DPRI), which are discussed in depth in Chapter Four. Within the MOD, the Internal Bureau manages Japanese SDF operations, planning, acquisition, and personnel, tasked with managing the relations with U.S.-forces in Japan including the local communities that host US forces. The Defence Policy Bureau's primary task is to improve a defence strategy that considers Japan's broader national security policy goals. The Operational Policy Bureau managed issues related to the management of information and communication within the MOD and the JSDF. At the operational level, the JSDF role is considered in relation to US-Japan interoperability which is seen as the significant component of the alliance relationship. However, it is important to remark that the functions among ground, air and maritime personnel operate differently which shows the difficulty in making joint operations (Asahi Shimbun 2005). Still, in consideration of this factor, the

paper investigates the interoperability both among the SDF and between US arms forces and the JSDF.

Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI)

In the realm of military-industrial issues or defence productions, the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) which is known for playing its role in Japan's economic development in the postwar period (Johnson 1982), is important .

Chinworth (1992) explicates that “it is likely that the MITI [Ministry of International Trade and Industries, former METI]’s role will strengthen over the coming years because of the security-economic linkage evident in Japanese policy-making and the growing importance of dual-use technologies to overall defence production”

(Chinworth 1992, p. 17). It is also worth paying attention to the role of the METI in consideration of liberalisation in Japan with an attempt to restructure its economy.

Regarding the use of *gaiatsu*, Chinworth (1992) explains that “Japanese officials have justified their bolder steps and new policy initiatives in the defense area in part because of ‘American pressure’. Whenever Japan has adopted a particular policy – official explanations often boil down to a simple reason. It is essentially that ‘the Americans made us do it’” (Chinworth 1992, p. 9). He argues that US pressure is a theme that is evident throughout Japan's defence and security policy considerations, particularly throughout postwar U.S.-Japan relations.

*Keidanren and Japanese Companies*⁵¹

In a similar vein, close business-government ties and the influence of business communities should be taken into account as well. Japanese Business Federation, which is referred as *Keidanren*⁵², has been actively engaged in involving defence productions and economic liberalisation. Babbs (2001) maintains that “Key business players have been political throughout Japanese history” (Babbs 2001, p. 19).⁵³ As is described in Johnson’s (1982) *MITI and the Japanese Miracle*, “the state had the tools to force business compliance; but there were also businesses with interests which met with the goals of the bureaucracy” (Babb 2001, p. 24). Yoshimatsu (1998) also notes that, unlike US business community, *Keidanren* has shaped government policy by submitting formal recommendations to relevant ministries and agencies and delivering through its membership on “advisory councils” (or *shingikai* in Japanese).⁵⁴ He remarks that “it still maintains close relationships with politicians through unofficial gatherings between its senior members and leading politicians and through the exchange of opinions between its secretariat and the deliberative organs of the political parties” (Yoshimatsu 1998, p. 330).

⁵¹ Babbs (2001) explores the political role of the major business organisations in Japan taking into account the political influence of each particularly sectors and industries (Babbs 2001, p. 13).

⁵² The *Keidanren* was founded in 1946 which began to represent the authoritative voice of Japanese business in politics under Kogoro Uemura who was Chair between 1968 and 1974. The federation has transformed into “a political force” which is more organised and effective (Babbs 2001, p. 27). It is also noted that the political contribution was reconsidered to end its dependence on the Liberal Democracy Party (LDP) due to continuous scandals. The *Keidanren* announced that it would not act as a conduit for campaign contributions to political parties from its member corporations since 1994.

⁵³ Such scandals in Japan as the “Recruit Scandal” in 1989 and the “Sagawa Scandal” in 1992 represent the relationship between politics and business in Japan, while the issues about the U.S.-Japan alliance give the different influence on involving actors.

⁵⁴ One example of the *Keidanren*’s request merged into government policies is given that “The 1983 amendments included the acceptance of foreign inspection data with respect to 17 laws; 11 of those had been taken up in the *Keidanren*’s March 1983 proposal” (Yoshimatsu 1998, p.332). It is also remarked that “a five-year actions programme” for deregulation in 1994 was the result of *Keidanren* persistence (Yoshimatsu 1998).

The *Keidanren* has released countless reports including the issue on Arms Export Control which has limited Japan's involvement in defence cooperation with other countries, and its call for liberalisation of the Japanese economy including the recent Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) issues. The *Keidanren* has been less eager to regulate the Three Principles of Arms Exports which was controversial until the recent changes in this policy. This is further exemplified in Chapter Four. By the same token, Japanese business companies including Mitsubishi Heavy Industries (MHI)⁵⁵ which were involved in defence productions are considered since it also affected the transformation of Japanese defence policies such as the arms export policy. These companies can be called the *keiretsu* (which means "enterprise groupings" in Japanese) that include MHI, Kawasaki Heavy Industries (KHI), NEC and Sumitomo Heavy Industries.⁵⁶ These companies are seen as "an integral part of a highly successful and competitive economy" (Hanami 1993, p. 601).

Others

Other institutions are considered as well. Since 1990s, the Cabinet Secretariat has been tasked with shaping the policies that are important for the Prime Minister and the cabinet, and playing an intermediary role among the ministries as necessary by collecting intelligence on important policy issues as the establishment of the National Security Council (NSC) in 2013 shows. The role of the Assistant Chief Cabinet Secretary for National Security and Crisis Management and related staff has been increasing in Japan's national security policymaking in recent years (Oros &

⁵⁵ Although possessing different interests, Mitsui and Mitsubishi were the main sponsors of the large political parties in prewar Japan which were too corrupt due to their dependence on big business (Babbs 2001).

⁵⁶ Hanami (1993) describes these companies as "military *keiretsu*".

Tatsumi 2010).⁵⁷ In addition to these actors, not limited to the Japanese contexts but also the US State Departments and other relevant actors are also taken into account which may have influenced Japanese foreign policymaking.

c) Ideology

From the neo-Gramscian viewpoint, the ideological influence is crucial for hegemony. Cox (2004) points out that “Once widely admired, if not emulated, they have become more contested and more ambiguous. The terms ‘democracy’ and ‘liberation’ have become transformed to mean open markets and military occupation” (Cox 2004, pp. 311-312). The focus on the role of ideas as part of a hegemonic project implies that the definition of globalisation as the transnationalisation of production and finance has to be amended with neoliberalism as its ideological component (Cox 1993, pp. 266–267; Rupert 2000, p. 54; Bieler 2005, p. 516). Rupert (2000) conducts the work investigating the contestation of the dominant liberal narrative of globalisation within the US, taking into account the formulation of the hegemonic ideology of postwar liberal anti-communism. In light of the ideational role of hegemony, Nye (2011) explicates the role of values in foreign policymaking, saying that “When values are widely shared, they can provide a basis for soft power that works in multiple directions, both to and from the United States (Nye 2011, p. 87). Some scholars indicate about the relationship between soft power and consensus, saying that “consensus...is based on ‘soft power’ and what has been called ‘sticky power’, or the application of ideological influence and economic capability” (Beyer 2009, p. 35).

⁵⁷ Following the 9/11 terrorist attacks in 2001, for instance, they played a central role in drafting the Anti-Terror Special Measures Law, which enabled Japan to dispatch the Japanese SDF for a refuelling mission in the Indian Ocean (Oros & Tatsumi 2010).

As for the recent U.S.-Japan alliance relationship, Green (2006) points out that “the convergence of Japanese and U.S. interests in universal norms is...based on Japan’s increased realization that the promotion of democracy, good governance, and rule of law provide stability across Asia” (Green 2006, pp. 107-108). Presumably, the transforming nature of the U.S.-Japan alliance is also due to the reflection of the Japanese people’s willingness for international contributions such as HA/DR. US liberal values such as human rights aspect can be one example in relation to HA/DR and peacekeeping. Considering these trends, the role of ideas is rigorously investigated in Chapters Four and Five when discussing the importance of common or shared values in the context of the U.S.-Japan alliance since the alliance has embellished itself by incorporating liberal values which can be more acceptable to the Japanese people, which are further explored in the remaining chapters.

Discourse Analysis: Common Sense and the Role of Organic Intellectuals in the U.S.-Japan Alliance Context

“Common sense” and “organic intellectuals” are the major concepts in conducting discourse analysis in the context of the U.S.-Japan alliance. As is already indicated earlier, with regard to common sense, Rupert’s (1995; 2000) “rhetorical strategies” and “rhetorically marginalised” are respectively examined. In order to analyse the altering nature of the U.S.-Japan alliance, not only the transforming features of the alliance in a practical sense but also the discursive change of “the U.S.-Japan alliance” shall be examined by closely looking into the role of organic intellectuals⁵⁸ who play a major role in formulating the pro-U.S.-Japan alliance

⁵⁸ From the neo-Gramscian perspective, these actors have exerted tremendous influence on the ideas about the U.S.-Japan alliance due to their previous careers which are closely related to alliance managements.

discourses considering Gramsci's focus on language. Discourse analysis is an appropriate method in understanding the transforming discourses of the alliance. In doing so, the recent trends of the U.S.-Japan alliance are examined by looking into policy recommendations by the experts and/or politicians, speeches and governmental documents and existing literature written in both English and Japanese. It is worth scrutinising the rhetoric of "the U.S.-Japan alliance" since it is still controversial whether the alliance is strengthening or not. It remains under scrutiny whether the U.S.-Japan alliance is intrinsically "alliance" due to its asymmetrical nature, and whether the US and Japan can become a "partnership" (Institute for National Strategic Studies 2000).

Discourse analysis is mainly conducted based on two types of materials: a) official documents and b) interviews. a) Regarding official documents, official archival materials and publications of intergovernmental organisations and think-tanks such as Japanese Institute of International Affairs (JIIA), the Sasakawa Peace Foundations (SPF), the Tokyo Foundation, the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) and the Center for a New American Security (CNAS) are mainly examined which have published numerous reports relating to the U.S.-Japan alliance. In particular, such emerging concepts as "international public goods", "global commons" and "smart power" are investigated to see the salience of the U.S.-Japan alliance and how these concepts have been embedded as "common sense," which is closely examined in Chapter Six. b) Interviews with the experts of the U.S.-Japan alliance such as academics, journalists, bureaucrats and politicians which are sixty in total are taken into account to comprehend the understanding of the U.S.-Japan alliance. Although discourse analysis is not the only means for using interviews as research materials, this research method is helpful in investigating changing

perceptions of these specialists towards the U.S.-Japan alliance who have also influenced the ideas of the alliance. These interviews are mainly considered in Chapters Four, Five and Six.

The roles of organic intellectuals are particularly closely examined in Chapters Three and Six while their roles may be referred to in Chapters Four and Five if necessary. With regard to Chapter Three, organic intellectuals are taken into account especially in the process of crafting the “Yoshida Doctrine,” which has been the pillar of Japanese foreign policymaking by distinguishing them from “traditional intellectuals”. In the context of Japanese foreign security policymaking, it is probable to observe that those who support the “Yoshida Doctrine” can be viewed as “traditional intellectuals” in the neo-Gramscian sense which is elaborated further in Chapter Three. As for Chapter Six, the following actors are regarded as “organic intellectuals” in the context of the U.S.-Japan alliance who have played roles in developing either “rhetorical strategies” or “rhetorically marginalised”; a) politicians, b) ministries, c) *Keidanren*, d) think tanks, e) academics, f) media, and g) local citizens. These actors can be collaborated in various ways. Furthermore, there can be the difference between “rhetorical strategies” and “rhetorically marginalised” with regard to the interactions among actors. As for the former one, there may be more roles of politicians, academics, think tanks and *Keidanren* whereas academics, local citizens and think tanks may play a bigger role in the latter one.

From the neo-Gramscian viewpoint, who have made the US-led historic bloc firmer by means of the U.S.-Japan alliance is the presence of “organic intellectuals”. As is exemplified in the earlier sections of this chapter, the role of organic intellectuals is crucial in formulating the historic bloc. In the case of the U.S.-Japan alliance, it is important to identify these actors both in the US and Japan. Regarding

the US side, the prominent examples are Richard L. Armitage and Joseph S. Nye, who are already referred to in Chapter One and have been heavily involved in the issues of the U.S.-Japan relationship by attending the U.S.-Japan alliance related events. They have published numerous reports as the guidance to improve the U.S.-Japan alliance. The study of Sunohara (2006) of the “Japan hand”, or “Japan handler”, that are composed of US experts in the U.S.-Japan alliance can be useful in understanding the roles of intellectuals in developing the alliance.⁵⁹

Organic intellectuals can be seen not only from the US but also from Japanese sides. For instance, Shotaro Yachi, who involved in establishing “values-oriented diplomacy” and “Arc of Freedom and Prosperity” during the first Abe administration, have put emphasis on the role of soft power and made effort to strengthen the US-Japan alliance. He exemplifies that “Based on the consensus that Japan have come to feel an obligation to contribute to the peace and prosperity of the rest of the world, Japan has steadily expanded its ODA to developing countries” (Yachi 2009, p. 6). Underscoring the role of soft power in diplomacy, he further argues that “I believe that we can contribute to the peace and stability of the world through our ‘soft power’ – representing our economic, scientific, technological, and cultural assets - and the dedicated ethos of the Japanese people toward work (Yachi 2009, p. 6). Other former bureaucrats such as Nobukatsu Kanehara and Hideaki Kaneda, who proposes the idea “influential power” which is similar to soft power, puts importance on values (Akita, Kaneda, Taniguchi & Yachi 2011) . Indeed, there may be a growing role of Japanese scholars who emphasise the relevance of the U.S.-Japan alliance. Recently, there is a growing number of study groups of the U.S.-Japan alliance, viewing the alliance as the cornerstone for the Asia-Pacific stability. It is worthwhile to examine

⁵⁹ He also argues that, instead of Japan’s hands, “Northeast Asia hands” is needed to improve the Sino-Japan-Korea relationship (Interview with Tsuyoshi Sunohara, 19th April 2013).

how the U.S.-Japan alliance has been value-added with new emerging ideas stemming from the thinking of these organic intellectuals.

Conclusion

This chapter mainly exemplifies neo-Gramscianism as a research tool for understanding the U.S.-Japan alliance relationship considering the concept of hegemony. After explaining the relevance of using the concept of hegemony, instead of empire, the neo-Gramscian concept of hegemony was exemplified by underscoring its key concepts in order to show the appropriateness of neo-Gramscianism to fill the gap among the existing theories by taking into account material, institutional and ideational factors of hegemony. Additionally, to understand a power relationship between the US and Japan, the neo-Gramscian concept of hegemony, which considers both the coercive and consensual aspects of hegemony, is useful in comprehending the nature of the U.S.-Japan alliance in the postwar era. This chapter also shows the applicability of neo-Gramscianism to the U.S.-Japan alliance and Japanese foreign security policies by adopting its insights to the U.S.-Japan relationship. Specifically, the Japanese concepts such as *gaiatsu* are presented to have a clearer idea about the neo-Gramscian account on hegemony.

Within this theoretical approach, social forces analysis and discourse analysis, by using the concepts of “common sense” and “organic intellectuals”, are exemplified in this chapter which further elaborated in Chapter Four, Five and Six. Social forces analysis is intended to examine the development of the U.S.-Japan alliance relationship by looking into material, institutional and ideational aspects looking into not only at governmental but also at practical level. With regard to common sense, it uses discourse analysis to examine the trends of the alliance relationship with a focus

on the role of organic intellectuals. Furthermore, organic intellectuals are not limited to either the US or Japan but both so it is important to examine those who specialise in relating issues of the U.S.-Japan alliance. As is indicated, investigating the ideational aspect of hegemony might be challenging, yet it has been highly attentive by foreign policymakers in the US and Japan regarding liberal values such as democracy and free market. The roles of smart power or soft power are closely examined in Chapter Six.

In this regard, it is worth operationalising this theoretical framework to clarify its concepts and evolved it as a research method on the foundation of its key elements. Before deploying neo-Gramscianism to the case of the U.S.-Japan alliance, Chapter Three lays out the history of the U.S.-Japan alliance by highlighting the alliance relationship between the two countries since the postwar period. Unlike other alliances in Europe, US-led alliances after 1945 constitute not only symmetrical but also asymmetrical relationships. The U.S.-Japan alliance can be viewed one of the examples. Through the neo-Gramscian lenses, the coercive and consensual dimensions of hegemony and the role of organic intellectuals during those periods exemplified to provide a better understanding of the background of the U.S.-Japan alliance relationship.

Chapter Three: The Rise and Fall of the U.S.-Japan Alliance

Introduction


Chapter Three illustrates the trajectory of the U.S.-Japan alliance from the postwar era to the early post-Cold War period, looking through the neo-Gramscian lenses in order to describe the way the alliance has altered in the face of changing international and domestic security environments. It is important to note that the “U.S.-Japan alliance” was not pervasively acknowledged in at the societal level in Japan until former Prime Minister Zenko Suzuki used this term in the public during his meeting with the then US President Ronald Reagan in 1981.⁶⁰ Since then, the “U.S.-Japan alliance” has increasingly become more accepted in society as the pillar of Japanese foreign policymaking although some scholars have described the U.S.-Japan relationship as the “U.S.-Japan Security Treaty System” (Toyoshita 1999; Kitaoka 2010). It is crucial to note that the U.S.-Japan alliance is one of the elements that have made *Pax Americana*, or the US-led “historic bloc”, sustainable in the Asia-Pacific region.

This chapter exemplifies the history of the alliance after the Second World War to demonstrate how the U.S.-Japan alliance has become more acceptable in Japanese society although not the whole population in Japan has a cohesive consensus on the relationship between the US and Japan. In this realm, the neo-Gramscian concepts of a) the coercive and consensual aspects of hegemony, b) organic intellectuals and c) historic bloc are adopted in this chapter to show the further cohesiveness of the two

⁶⁰ In fact, then Prime Minister Masayoshi Ohira described the U.S.-Japan relationship as an “alliance” and also generated the concept “comprehensive security” although, for some, especially the US government, it appeared as an attempt to weaken the U.S.-Japan relationship which became more pervasive in the society. However, it is said that Ohira’s intention was rather to strengthen the alliance relationship, at least from the MOFA perspective (Kuriyama 2008, p. 154).

countries. Within this theoretical framework, the two dimensions of hegemony are deployed to the case of the U.S.-Japan alliance which may have harnessed the US-led historic bloc in the Asia-Pacific region while organic intellectuals played their roles in harnessing the alliance. Chapter Three is also intended to underscore the fact that although Japan did not fully accept coercive offers from the US side, Japan did consent to US offers which would not contradict with its existing laws and policies in consideration of domestic and international situations. This aspect illustrates that the coercive nature of hegemony is not sufficient to strengthen hegemony. Although the coercion/consent division is not clear as is indicated in Chapter Two, it is a viable concept in understanding the sustainability of the alliance. In order to comprehend the blurriness of the borderline between coercion and consensus, Kliman's (2006) concept of "internalisation of *gaiatsu*" is taken into account in order to understand the history of the U.S.-Japan alliance. The following diagram that appears in Chapter Two can be helpful in capturing coercive and consensual aspects of the U.S.-Japan alliance.

Diagram 1



Source: Gramsci (1971); Author

Moreover, whilst it has not been widely discussed, the U.S.-Japan alliance can be viewed as an asymmetric alliance. It is worth emphasising that, increasingly, the asymmetrical nature of the alliance relationship may have become more acceptable in Japanese society, not merely as a symbol of anti-Americanism despite its past controversies including the Bikini accident, the 1960 protest, and the 1995 rape incident in Okinawa.⁶¹ Hence, it is worthwhile to look into the issues relating to the U.S.-Japan alliance to apprehend how the alliance has become embedded in Japanese foreign policymaking. When unbundling the historical formulation of the alliance, Chapter Three considers the features of *Pax Americana* and the role of Japanese conservative politicians which may have contributed to the US-led historic bloc in the region.

The chapter is structured as the follows: first, the enactment of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty and institutionalisation of Japanese foreign policies based upon this treaty is exemplified including such periods as the San Francisco Treaty in 1951 and its revision in 1960. This section elucidates the characteristics of the U.S.-Japan alliance relationship that stirred controversies. Additionally, the Korean War in 1950 is also examined when the US put pressure on Japan for remilitarisation whereas Japan maintained its low posture in regard to military nonetheless. Furthermore, anti-protests in Japan of the U.S.-Japan alliance and US bases is explored to demonstrate active protests in the mainland Japan in the past that can rarely be witnessed nowadays. Second, the “Yoshida Doctrine” is examined in consideration of the role of Japanese conservative politicians, who can be regarded as “organic intellectuals”

⁶¹ It is noted that Tadashi Yamamoto, the founder of the Japan Center of Intellectual Exchange (JCIE), contributed to soothe anti-Americanism through increasing U.S.-Japan exchange (Interview with Ryo Sahashi, 11th January 2013). However, it is also important to note that anti-American sentiments remain persist. It is remarked that Sunohara has been telling Armitage and Nye about this circumstance that should be acknowledged (Interview with Tsuyoshi Sunohara, 19th April 2013).

in neo-Gramscian terms, during that period. Some studies undertaken by Winkler (2012) are taken into account which scrutinises the nature of conservatism in Japan and its role in establishing its strategy within the centre of the U.S.-Japan alliance which is important to be considered. Third, the period during the Vietnam War and the establishment of the Nixon Doctrine is investigated since the changes in US policies during its decline is also one of the leading factors in the Japanese foreign policymaking. Having said that, it does not mean Japan fully accepted US offers but rather adjusted its posture with the Yoshida Doctrine. Fourth, the 1981 US-Japan meeting is investigated while looking into the issue of “burden sharing” in the context of the U.S.-Japan alliance relationship when Japan was criticised as a “free rider”, or “cheap rider”, from the US perspective. In this section, the role of the Nakasone administration is worth being examining due to its attempt to shift away from the “Yoshida Doctrine” to a more aggressive defence posture. Fifth, the period immediately after the Cold War is explained to show the influx of the meaning of the U.S.-Japan alliance that is crafted for the Cold War context. Lastly, the nature of the U.S.-Japan alliance as an “asymmetric alliance” is revisited in which the neo-Gramscian view of hegemony can be applied and the question of the durability of the Yoshida Doctrine is investigated. Moreover, the neo-Gramscian concept of historic bloc is adopted to show how the U.S.-Japan alliance may have strengthened as part of the US-led historic bloc.

The “U.S.-Japan Security Treaty”

The San Francisco Treaty: Emerging Consensual Role of Hegemony

Based upon the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, the U.S.-Japan alliance was formed by the signing of the “Security Treaty Between the United States and Japan” on the

8th September 1951 in San Francisco. Due to disarmament under the allied occupation, Japan would “not have the effective means to exercise its inherent right of self-defence”⁶² after regaining independence and would require US military protection. It goes without saying that the US-Japan security system was established in reflection of the Cold War context that was the result of the shared perception that such a treaty was necessary both for Japan and the US. This was clearly stated by Japan’s first postwar Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida, who served from 1946 to 1947 and from 1948 to 1954. According to his memoir, the U.S.-Japan security treaty was neither imposed by the US nor requested by Japan but rather they “had the same perception of objective conditions and the prospects for Japan’s defense and the defense of the free world,”⁶³ and we decided there was no better policy to fill the vacuum in Japan’s defense that would result from the withdrawal of the occupation army after the peace treaty” (Yoshida 1961; Terashima 2010). Yoshida also added that the security treaty was a provisional measure. Hence, if Japan has become competent enough to defend itself, the treaty could be terminated at any time (Yoshida 1961; Terashima 2010). This exhibits that, initially, the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty was not intended to be last in the long term from Yoshida’s viewpoint. As is indicated in the Introduction Chapter, this puts under scrutiny the sustainability of the alliance regardless of the condition that it can be terminated one year later after the agreement between allies, which has not happened in the case of the U.S.-Japan alliance.

It is also known that the San Francisco Treaty, which also led to the enactment of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, was created through negotiations between the

⁶² “The World and Japan” Database Project, <http://www.ioc.u-tokyo.ac.jp/~worldjpn/documents/texts/docs/19510908.T2E.html>

⁶³ It is important to note that the “free world” was the core idea of the Cold War. This is further exemplified in Chapter Five in explaining the role of ideas.

Japanese Prime Minister Yoshida and Dulles called the “Yoshida-Dulles meeting”. According to Dulles (1951), “[The 1951 version of the] Security Treaty between the United States and Japan contains a clause which assimilates ‘large-scale internal riots and disturbances in Japan, caused through instigation or intervention by an outside Power or Powers’ to ‘armed attack from without’. The United States forces in Japan are authorized - but not required - at the express request of the Japanese Government to assist to meet such indirect aggression” (Dulles 1951, p. 184). He also noted that “Japan should be given the opportunity to earn her living in the free world by means of what the Potsdam Surrender Terms promised, namely, ‘access to raw materials’ and ‘participation in world trade relations’” (Dulles 1951, p. 184). Tokyo’s “residual sovereignty” over the Ryukyu Islands which are part of the current Okinawa prefecture was confirmed, yet it had to surrender administrative control over these and several other small islands to the US. In a private ceremony that same day, Acheson, Dulles, two U.S. senators, and Yoshida signed a security treaty along with a subsidiary agreement that authorised U.S. forces to use bases in Japan for the Korean War (Schaller 1997).

From the neo-Gramscian perspective, it is evident that not only the coercive but also consensual aspects of hegemony played a role in establishing the U.S.-Japan alliance relationship in consideration of the process of the San Francisco Treaty. The consensual side of hegemony influenced the creation of the San Francisco Treaty chiefly due to Japan’s attempt to restore its international status in the context of the “free world”.⁶⁴ This treaty restored to the Japanese people full sovereignty over Japan and its territorial waters. It further recognised that, Japan possessed the

⁶⁴ It is also noted that, as Makoto Iokibe remarks, the U.S.-Japan alliance was important for enhancing Japan’s international status in the postwar era (Interview with Ryo Sahashi, 11th January 2013).

inherent right of individual and collective self-defence as a sovereign nation, so that she could participate in collective security arrangements. Japan entered into a security treaty with the US on the same day that the Treaty of Peace was signed (Reed 1983, p. 6). Schaller (1997) observes that “The peace treaty served as a sweetener for the less equitable security treaty. The security treaty, in turn, screened criticism of the still more controversial administrative agreement that Yoshida planned to ratify by executive agreement” (Schaller 1997, p. 41). It is also noted that Japan became embedded in the US-dominated security structure by means of the Yoshida Doctrine (Inoguchi & Bacon 2006; Hook & Son 2013). We can form the view that this treaty has become the basis of the alliance relationship between the US and Japan with both coercive and consensual aspects of the US-led historic bloc.

US Pressures yet Japan’s Benefits: Japan’s Internalisation of Gaiatsu?

Owing to the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950, US pressure on Japan to participate more actively militarily within the alliance framework was resumed shortly after signing the peace and security treaties, which can be seen as the coercive role of hegemony in neo-Gramscian terms,. The US Secretary of State Dulles offered economic and military assistance under the Mutual Security Assistance (MSA) Act in October 1951 for Japan’s rearmament, which was designed “to consolidate the American alliance system through the supply of weapons and equipment, participation of allied officers in training programs in the United States, and the overall coordination of military strategies” (Welfield 1988, pp. 97-98; Pyle 1992, p. 29). It is noticeable that this Act reflects the US intention to extend its control over its allies in the midst of the Cold Wars. In 1954, the US and Japan concluded a Mutual Defence Assistance (MDA) Agreement, which was intended to

establish a legal basis for the furnishing of military equipment and technology to Japan. Within this agreement, Japan committed itself to fulfil the military obligations under the security treaty.

However, through neo-Gramscian lenses, it can be argued that not only US coercion but also Japan's consensus came into play in the context of Japan's remilitarisation. Shortly thereafter, in partial fulfilment of these obligations, Japan enacted the Defence Agency Establishment Law and the Self-Defence Forces (SDF) Law creating the Japanese SDF and their civilian control agency with a mission of defending Japan against direct and indirect aggression (Reed 1983, p. 7). In fact, Yoshida, who had remained as Japanese Prime Minister, was instinctively hostile to participate in the arrangement in the beginning. Nevertheless, whereas he relied on the Socialists who defended the Constitution, he succumbed to Dulles to some extent by agreeing to the bill, which authorised the establishment of the SDF (Kataoka & Myer 1989).⁶⁵ In a similar vein, Yoshida also sought the possibility for economic benefits in the wake of the Second World War. As Pyle (1992) notes, Yoshida made attempt to contain US pressure for military obligations by making use of MSA aid for economic reconstruction and development (Pyle 1992, p. 29).

Additionally, in response to strong objections based on Article Nine of the Japanese Constitution, the Japanese government argued that this article permitted the SDF because it was not being created to wage war, which is banned by the first paragraph of Article Nine, and it was exclusively for the purpose of "self-defence". More particularly, according to the Japan's Cabinet Legislative Bureau (CLB), "exclusive defence" means no SDF use except for the defence of Japan; no collective

⁶⁵ It is also noted that this was due to his political isolation during that time (Kataoka & Myer 1989)

defence; no possession of offensive weaponry; and no overseas dispatch of troops. This would prevent using the SDF for anything but solely the defence of Japanese territory (Arase 2007, pp. 563-564). Furthermore, the “Basic Policy for National Defence” in 1957 states that Japan would “[d]eal with foreign invasions of Japan based on security arrangements formed with the United States until the United Nations becomes able to effectively prevent the said threat,” while progressively developing “national defence capabilities to the necessary limit for self-defence in accordance with national power and circumstances” (Ministry of Defence 2011, pp. 139-140). It confirms exclusively defence-oriented policy (EDOP), or *senshu boei* in Japanese.⁶⁶ Prior to the revision of the US-Japan security treaty, this official document implied upgrading Japanese defence which highlights the U.S.-Japan security treaty system as being at the centre of the Japanese diplomacy.

It is worth remarking that it was not only the Japanese government which intentionally took advantages from US pressures, but also business communities in Japan. This can be regarded as the consensual aspect of the U.S.-Japan alliance for Japan remilitarisation in the neo-Gramscian sense. When the Korean War was coming to an end, they were considerably interested in further economic aid for reconstruction, acquisition of advanced technology and enhanced industrial competitiveness (Welfield 1988). The defence committee (*boei seisan iinkai*) of the *Keidanren* hoped to build up Japan’s weapons industry with US support in order to promote exports and acquire the spinoff effect of advanced technologies with a support from the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI),⁶⁷ which is the

⁶⁶ This doctrine is further exemplified in Chapter Four.

⁶⁷ It is noted that the “MITI routinely nurtured entire industrial sectors – steel and autos in the 1950s and 1960s, aerospace and semiconductors in the currency, direct funding through its Japan Development Bank, licenses for the importation of technology, tax benefits, and the authorization of cartels that would regulate competition and coordinate investment with the state’s blessing” (Samuels 2003, p.193).

current Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) (Pyle 1992, p. 29; Samuels 1994; Samuels 2003).⁶⁸ According to Samuels (1994), the U.S.-Japan Economic Cooperation Discussion Group (*Nichibei Keizai Teikei Kondankai*) was formed on the 9th February 1951, recognising that “Japanese economic recovery depended upon U.S. aid, defense, and trade policy – and that the United States was prepared to be extremely indulgent in supporting the industrial redevelopment of its new ally” (Samuels 1994, p.136). Interestingly, the defence committee of the *Keidanren*⁶⁹ was keen on contributing military technology for economic growth during the Korean War.

Furthermore, it was not only the military but also in economic and ideational dimensions that Japan benefited, which can be regarded as consensus formation of the US-led historic bloc. According to Sakamoto (2011), “Not only did Japan profit from both direct and indirect aid immediately after the war, but it also benefited from: (1) the economic and political support it received when it joined the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in 1955; (2) the financial assistance it received in order to participate in the free trading agreements; (3) the technical support it received to develop its economy and to improve its production ability; and (4) the opportunity for Japanese study at U.S. universities through the Fulbright and other programs” (Sakamoto 2011, p. 55). Matsuda (2009) also explicates that this was due to US efforts for improving cultural ties with Japan in the early postwar

⁶⁸ According to Samuels (2003), “For years Yoshida had argued that arms production would slow overall economic growth, but now with two years of ‘special procurement’ by the U.S. military, Japanese industry knew better. The so-called divine wind (*kamikaze*) of the Korean War boom was over; industry was facing its first postwar recession and demanded investments in arms production...Yoshida had sown the seeds of his own political destruction” (Samuels 2003, p. 210).

⁶⁹ The *Keidanren* Defence Production Committee came to be known as “Japan’s private defence ministry” and as *Keidanren*’s “civil-military bureau” (*minkan gunmu kyoku*) (Samuels 1994).

period with the use of cultural diplomacy for democratisation in Japan.⁷⁰ He further argues that the legacy of American Occupation was “permanent dependency and ‘subordinate independence’ in relationship with the United States” (Matsuda 2009, p. 2). These interactions between the US and Japan and within Japanese institutions show that not merely US preferences can be reflected in Japanese foreign policymaking.

In this regard, in the context of the “Free World”, it is evident to see that the U.S.-Japan alliance was consolidated from the neo-Gramscian standpoint by internalising *gaiatsu* into consensus. Pyle (1992) observes that “Yoshida’s manipulation for both domestic politics and U.S. pressure was both shrewd and cynical” (Pyle 1992, p. 26). While the US sought Japan to remilitarise in the Cold War contexts, Japan firmly maintained its “self-defence” posture while creating its own SDFs. Even though Japan has modified its laws accommodating to US foreign policymaking, renovating itself as the nation-state in terms of economy was the top priority for Japan. Japan consensually accepted US offers with its support for the Free World by joining such institutions as GATT and other free trade agreements.

Anti-Base Protests and the Revision in 1960: Emerging Counter-Hegemonic Forces?

However, the periods up to the revision of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty in 1960 can be regarded as a difficult time to adopt the neo-Gramscian framework since it is not simply the coercive and consensus dimensions of the U.S.-Japan alliance being operated but also the counter-hegemonic forces. The security relationship between

⁷⁰ Caprio and Sugita (2007) closely examined democratisation processes during the US Occupation period in Japan.

the US and Japan had been understood as “the cooperation between people and things”, meaning “Japan provides the facilities, while the US provides the armed forces to defend Japan” (Nishimura 1997; Sakamoto 2000). This relationship was described by Kumao Nishimura, former Director-General of the Treaties Bureau in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), who was closely involved in negotiations for the original U.S.-Japan Security Treaty. Sakamoto (2000) regards this as the alliance as an asymmetric reciprocity of “material/personnel cooperation”.

At the governmental level, the treaty was intended to serve as the trigger for the evolution of the alliance from a one-sided relationship of dependence toward a more balanced and mature relationship of shared responsibility (Nishimura 1997). Since Nobusuke Kishi, Japanese Prime Minister from February 1957 to June 1960, witnessed the negotiations between Dulles and Mamoru Shigemitsu⁷¹, he already knew the difficulty of negotiating with the US government which forced him to think of revising the treaty (Kitaoka 2004).⁷² The two governments officially started the negotiations on revising the security treaty in October 1958. The “Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the United States and Japan”, or the revised U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, was signed in January 1960, and came into effect in June in the same year. Including a sentence that stipulates the US obligation to defend Japan, the “internal disturbances clause” was removed, the time limit of the treaty was specified and the system of “prior consultation (*jizen-kyogi*)⁷³” regarding the US

⁷¹ He served as Foreign Minister under the Hatoyama administrations from 1954 to 1956.

⁷² According to Kitaoka (2004), Kishi knew how to deal with the US according to his experiences before becoming the Prime Minister which contributed to the relationship not only with the US but also with Asia (Kitaoka 2004, p. 29).

⁷³ During the Sato administration, MOFA officials attempted to make use of the mechanism of “prior consultation” by highlighting Clause Eight of the U.S.-Japan Joint Statement in the context of the “re-entry” of nuclear weapons (Kuriyama 2008). In the 1969 U.S.-Japan Joint Statement, “The President expressed his deep understanding and assured the Prime Minister that, without prejudice to the position of the United States Government with respect to the prior consultation system under the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security, the reversion of

usage of bases in Japan was introduced. Gabe (2002) presumes that the inserting the clause of prior consultation was not effective which may have been ignored eventually. It is also noted that, according to John Emmerson, a former US diplomat, “the prior consultation clause had been considered within the U.S. government as a Japanese ‘veto’ on U.S. requests, at least until the Sato-Nixon meeting of 1969” (Tsuchiyama 2004).

However, it is worth indicating that the U.S.-Japan alliance was not widely accepted in the Japanese society. Prior to the revision of the treaty, massive protests spurred in the name of “*Ampo Toso* (or, the struggle over the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty)”.⁷⁴ After the enactment of the treaty in 1951 and US attempt for Japan’s remilitarisation, anti-US base protests prevailed as the following accidents occurred. For example, the *Lucky Dragon* incident, or the “Bikini incident”, happened in 1954 where the twenty-three crew members of a Japanese fishing vessel were exposed to radioactivity due to nuclear testing of a US hydrogen bomb in the Pacific. It was seen as “the most serious strain on Japanese-American relations since 1945” (Dingman 1990, p. 188; Swenson-Wright 2005, p. 150).⁷⁵ A series of anti-base protests also emerged at Tachikawa Air Force base in Tokyo between 1955 and 1957

Okinawa would be carried out in a manner consistent with the policy of the Japanese Government as described by the Prime Minister”. More details are explained (Kuriyama 2008, pp. 42- 44, 59, 74-76, 235-236).

⁷⁴ According to Kaplan (2012), “The struggle over the U.S.-Japan Security, or *Ampo Toso*, was led by a united leftist front known as the People’s Council which was comprised of an unlikely and unstable coalition of unionists (under Sohyo), socialists (the JSP - Japanese Socialist Party,) communists (the JCP - the Japan Communist Party) and a radical Marxist student organization known as Zengakuren” (Kaplan 2012, p. 53). Also, Michiko Kaba, a student of the University of Tokyo, committed suicide to protest against the treaty which had a great impact on the Japanese society and also led to the cancellation of Eisenhower’s visit to Japan (Iokibe 2013).

⁷⁵ This led to Japanese public anger at the US government and also inspired the original sci-fi horror movie “Godzilla,” which was released in November 1954.

with a lot of calamity which further stirred anti-American sentiments in Japanese society.⁷⁶

Some may argue that, from the neo-Gramscian perspective, this can be seen as the counter-hegemonic movements against the U.S.-Japan alliance. However, that is not the whole story. According to Miller (2013), the resistance at Sunagawa existed not merely due to the continued presence of US forces but the ways in which they disrupted Japanese lives. She argues that “these protests were also about the principle of protecting an active and representative Japanese democracy” (Miller 2013, p.17).⁷⁷ Moreover, on Kaplan’s (2012) account, the activities under *Zengakuren*⁷⁸, a communist and anarchist league of student in Japan founded in 1948, were not aimed at the US government but rather the Japanese government. He exemplifies that “Although the *Zengakuren* mainstream under *Bunto*⁷⁹ [an organised protest against Kishi,] would surely have criticized America in the same ways that they would have criticized any other major power of the time, their primary target was Japan, and they focused on domestic issues, targeting the Japanese Government in order to pursue their goals” (Kaplan 2012, p. 70). Hence, *Bunto*’s participation in *Ampo Toso* was not significantly an anti-American protest but rather the demonstrations against the Japanese government. This shows the vagueness of defining the counter-hegemonic movements against the U.S.-Japan alliance although there were various factors that had triggered social movements.

⁷⁶ Between 1955 and 1956, Kamei Fumio who was a documentary filmmaker released three films which portrayed the conflict at Sunagawa. Furthermore, in the same year, a choral work entitled “Sunagawa” was composed with the words written by a labour organiser (Miller 2013, p. 16).

⁷⁷ She also notes that “the U.S.-Japanese relationship reminds us that the Cold War was not simply a story of global conflict and containment: a profound impact of the Cold War—and perhaps its strongest legacy—was a global commitment to alliance-building” (Miller 2013, p.33).

⁷⁸ It stands for “*Zen Nihon Gakusei Jichikai Sō Rengō*” which means “All-Japan League of Student Self-Government” in English.

⁷⁹ The name is originated from “the Bund” in German that indicates Communist league.

Furthermore, it is argued that, although the asymmetrical relationship was to be improved in 1960 during the Kishi administration by including “prior consultation” regarding the use of bases, the nature of the US-Japan alliance did not change (Sakamoto 2000). Packard (2010) notes that “Although the revised treaty improved Japan's leverage, Japanese left-wingers, among others, used the ratification process to express their disapproval of the entire U.S.-Japanese alliance system. Kishi battled his left-wing critics for months, melees broke out in the Diet, and thousands of Japanese protested in massive street demonstrations” (Packard 2010, p. 94). In the late 1950s and 1960s, it was observable there was complicated dynamism regarding the U.S.-Japan alliance. At official level, there was the attempt to upgrade the alliance relationship with the US whereas, at societal level, there was anger against US bases. Yet, Sakamoto (2011) maintains that “Although the revisions to the security treaty were mostly cosmetic in nature, they did have a major impact politically. Through these changes, the security treaty became more acceptable to the Japanese people” (Sakamoto 2011, p. 76). In this regard, in the face of the counter-hegemonic forces, the revision of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty can be seen as the consensual form of the U.S.-Japan alliance in the midst of the Cold War.

The “Yoshida Doctrine” as Postwar Consensus?

In the subsequent sections, the “Yoshida Doctrine” is closely examined, which has been the centre of Japanese foreign policymaking and also influenced the U.S.-Japan alliance relationship. As is exemplified later, this doctrine can be regarded as the element of the consensual aspect of the U.S.-Japan alliance in neo-Gramscian terms. It also takes into account the role of “organic intellectuals,” who may have

contributed to develop the doctrine that became embedded in the Japanese foreign policymaking.

Emergence of the Yoshida Doctrine

During the Cold War, Japan followed what became known as the “Yoshida Doctrine,” which has shaped Japanese foreign policymaking. Under this doctrine, Japan chose to remain dependent upon the US security guarantee, while continuing to develop economically. Yoshida believed Japan needed to protect the new security arrangement through a formal pact.⁸⁰ As Pyle (1992) notes, “He [Yoshida] reasoned that Japan could make minimal concessions of passive cooperation, a long-term guarantee of its national security, and the opportunity to concentrate on all-out economic recovery” (Pyle 1992, p. 23).⁸¹ According to Nagai (1968), Yoshida established a bargaining position by making light of Japan’s security problems and vaguely insisting that Japan could protect itself through its own devices by being democratic and peaceful and by relying on the protection of world opinion (Nagai 1968; Pyle 1992). After independence in 1951, Japan was able to focus on economic development. In the international security environment of the Cold War, Japan was granted access to markets of the US and other countries of the West. By entering a security treaty with the US, it was able to minimise the economic burden of

⁸⁰ In his memoir, it is noted that “I cannot entirely agree that [the] postwar constitution was forced upon us...There was nothing that properly be termed coercive or overbearing the Occupation authorities toward us” (Yoshida 1961, p.143; Samuels 2003, p. 202). While the Occupation’s reform can be regarded “coercive”, Yoshida established the idea that “the values of the ‘new’ Japan were consistent with the values of ‘traditional’ Japan” along the lines of democracy and pacifism which is seen as part of the tradition of Japan (Samuels 2003, p.202).

⁸¹ Yoshida opposed to Dulles’ offer of a conciliatory peace by freeing Japan of restrictions set up by Article 9. It is noted that “I opposed [Dulles’ suggestions] outright, because my country had not completed its economic recovery” (Samuels 2003, p. 205).

remilitarisation. Kusunoki (2006) explicates that, with Yoshida's security policy, the element of non-military contribution in the U.S.-Japan alliance was underlined.

From the neo-Gramscian standpoint, we may regard the Yoshida Doctrine as "organic" considering the way it got institutionalised. It is also important to understand that this doctrine was established "inductively", which formulated later on as an apparent strategy (Yamamoto, Noya, Inoue, Kamiya & Kaneko 2012, pp. 26-27).⁸² Pyle (1992) argues that "In sum, while determined to root out the sources of militarism in Japan and to democratize the social order, the drafters did not intend that the new constitutional order should deprive Japan of the capacity for self-defence or normal participation in the newly contemplated UN peace-keeping forces" (Pyle 1992, p. 11). According to him, "this constitutional interpretation became a convenient pretext for a national purpose that was subsequently formulated by Prime Minister Yoshida to avoid all collective security involvements, to abstain from international politics, to avoid intense domestic political conflict, and to concentrate exclusively on economic rehabilitation" (Pyle 1992, p. 11). Yoshida's alternative was to defeat the Socialist, which was pro-Constitution, against the revisionists, which was pro-alliance, to keep both the constitution and the alliance (Kataoka & Myer 1989). These circumstances continued for several decades, and, according to Iriye (1991), it is doubtful whether Japan has more than a fundamental notion of what its military strategy is or ought to be (Iriye 1991, p. 31). The Yoshida Doctrine also came to represent a balancing of bureaucratic conflicts among Ministry of Finance (MOF), MITI, MOFA and MOD (Igarashi 1985). In regard to Japanese

⁸² In fact, their book discusses Japan's grand strategy which is criticised by Michael Green that Japan does not have a grand strategy. However, it is clarified that the perception on "grand strategy" is different that composes not only expansionism, which is from the US perspective, but in defensive manner (Interview with Heigo Sato, 6th December 2012).

Defence Agency (JDA), it was tremendously circumscribed, controlled, and regulated by different branches of government (Kataoka & Myer 1989).

Institutionalisation of the “Yoshida Doctrine” and the Role of Conservative-minded Japanese Politicians

In order to understand the degree of embeddedness of the Yoshida doctrine in Japanese foreign policymaking and the U.S.-Japan alliance, the neo-Gramscian concept of “organic intellectuals” is crucial to be considered due to its role in shaping Japanese foreign policy. Kan (2006) describes Yoshida as a “co-operator”, which can be similar to the neo-Gramscian concept of “organic intellectuals”, of creating the pro-US regime in Japan. He explicates that US’ means of using its hegemonic power, either hard power or soft power, is reliant on whether its co-operator was either cooperative or reactionary (Kan 2006, p. 220). As Dower (1979) exemplifies, “the reconsolidation and recentralization of conservative authority during the Yoshida era was inseparable from the strategic settlement reached between the United States and Japan” (Dower 1979, p. 369). Yoshida and his group, who can be known as pragmatists, supported Article 9 of the Peace Constitution to deflect US pressure on Japan to acquire military capabilities that were regarded as inimical to Japan’s strategic interests and to resist US pressure for Japanese participation in international military missions (Boyd & Samuels 2005, p. 26). According to Samuels (2007), Yoshida and his successors were “liberal internationalists” making use of a “non-military invisible hand...to guide a non-aggressive, low-cost postwar Japanese security policy” (Samuels 2007, p. 29; p. 31). Moreover, it is important to note that, under the Yoshida administration, anti-Communist public and press opinion was increasingly encouraged with an active

support by Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP). During this period, a “red purge” was launched in August 1950 and led to the suppression of the “Red Flag (*Akahata*)”, the Communists (newspapers, and the removal of Communist Party member and its sympathisers (Swenson-Wright 2005, p. 161).

After the revision of the original security treaty with the resignation of Kishi, Hayato Ikeda (1960-1964) and Eisaku Sato (1964-1972) became the next prime ministers who were both intimately associated with Yoshida and the members of the so-called the “Yoshida School”. Pyle observes that, during these administrations, “the Yoshida Doctrine was institutionalized and consolidated into a national consensus” (Pyle 1992, p. 32). For example, Ikeda advocated the “income-doubling plan” and “politics of patience and reconciliation,” which put emphasis on the economic development of Japan that is in line with the Yoshida Doctrine. Ikeda distanced himself from the military alliance, security affairs, and foreign relations. He quietly assured that the LDP would follow a species of “conservative pacifist policies” which consisted of “the Three Principles of Nuclear Disarmament, weapons export, and spending no more than one per cent of Gross National Product (GNP) on defence. The LDP chose to “respect the Socialists’ hypersensitivity on security issues” (Kataoka & Myer 1989, p. 19). In a slightly different manner, the features of Sato’s diplomacy were the focus of the U.S.-Japan relationship and economic development. Nakajima (2008) argues that Okinawa bases gave importance for the security for the “Free World”. His study shows that the negotiation of Okinawa’s return was based on the continuity of Article Nine and the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty for maintaining the “Free World”.

From the neo-Gramscian viewpoint, the evolution of the Yoshida doctrine exhibits the crucial roles of organic intellectuals, which also led to a firmer U.S.-

Japan alliance. According to Winkler (2012), the rationale of those conservative-minded of Japanese politicians is reliant upon “situational conservatism”, which seems to be a better fit.⁸³ In Winkler’s (2012) account, “the mainstream’s conservatism has indeed evolved. While upholding the principles of the Yoshida Doctrine, they opted to break away from his authoritarian style of politics, instead affirmatively embracing the liberal democratic postwar regime” (Winkler 2012, p. 70). That is, initially the norm of liberal democracy was not embraced by Yoshida due to his belief in the Emperor and nationalism whereas his followers including Ikeda and Sato gradually embraced this ideology. Some argues that “despite the fact that the Yoshida Doctrine – which advocated primarily a recovery of the domestic economy rather than the enlargement of military power – was deployed in the Japanese domestic context, Yoshida did not rule out remilitarisation for a future liberal-democratic Japan” (Hughes 2004, pp. 21-22; Moses & Iwami 2009, p. 74). That this role has changed only incrementally reflects the continuing US interest in sustaining limited and complementary roles for Japanese military forces and the continuing importance of the essence of the Yoshida Doctrine to the conservatives’ ability to rule Japan (Green 1998, p. 11).

The 1970s: the Tensions between Coercion and Consensus

The following sections are vital to be examined since the features of US pressures got alternated as a result of the changes in both domestic and international contexts with the Vietnam War and US’ financial difficulties during Japan’s rapid economic development. The examples during this period are worthwhile to be analysed not only from the US but also Japanese perspectives taking into consideration the

⁸³ This concept is influenced by Samuel Huntington’s idea that the key element of conservatism was its situational, temporary nature, whereas the conservative mainstream had blossomed for several decades (Winkler 2013).

features of the U.S.-Japan alliance and the Yoshida Doctrine. In contrast to the 1950s and 1960s, the 1970s displays a different dynamic of the U.S.-Japan alliance relationship in light of the balance between coercion and consensus in neo-Gramscian terms.

The Vietnam War, US Decline and the Nixon Doctrine: Stronger US Pressures

Although the Yoshida Doctrine has largely played its role in Japanese foreign policymaking and the U.S.-Japan alliance, a different form of US pressure was involved due to the changing circumstances of the US. A trade balance turned out to be unfavourable circumstances for the US, which also led to the disengagement from the Vietnam War. It is noted that “by 1968 the U.S. deficit had quadrupled the deficit of 1967” (Lafeber 1989, p. 98). Lafeber (1989) also notes about the coincidence of Japanese rapid economic growth and aggravating US balance of payments, saying that “The United States, therefore, while keeping Japan’s unique circumstances in mind, encouraged Japanese efforts to achieve a greater sense of independence, and began to look to Japan to implement its new position in the Free World by assuming duties and responsibilities commensurate with its strength” (Lafeber 1989, p. 98).⁸⁴ Under the Johnson administration, it was declared that the “general concept of [U.S.] disengagement in this area” is nothing more than “beautiful dreams” (Lafeber 1989, pp. 99-100). From the standpoints of Nixon and Kissinger, Johnson’s Vietnam policies were acknowledged as a failure which led to plans for the removal of U.S. ground troops although it did not necessarily mean the abandonment of US commitments in Asia.

⁸⁴ Moreover, the U.S. commitment in Vietnam was escalated with an intention to contain China. US Secretary of State Dean Rusk has refused “to move one inch on China policy” (Lafeber 1989, p. 99).

After the US lost the Vietnam War, the US started to scale down its military capabilities in the Asia-Pacific region. US President Richard Nixon made a speech on the 25th July 1969, declaring that “each U.S. ally should hold primary responsibility for its national defense and that a military alliance with the United States should be seen only as supplementary”.⁸⁵ As for the 1969 Guam Doctrine, which later became the Nixon Doctrine, Nixon declared that there was no intention of involvement in any regional conflict in Asia again, although it would remain supporting allies and friends with military assistance and diplomatic assistance.⁸⁶ Goh (2008) notes that the doctrine “was interpreted by Asian states as signalling the potential abandonment of American regional leadership all together” (Goh 2008, p. 364). With the Nixon Doctrine, the US underscored its desire for US allies to do more for their own defence; this applied especially to Japan.

In return for the impending reversion of Okinawa to Japan, the US convinced Japan to acknowledge in the 1969 Nixon-Sato Communiqué that stability in the Korean Peninsula was a Japanese security concern. US involvement in the Vietnam War also aroused controversy, generating opposition party demands for establishment of defence controversy, generating opposition party demands for establishment of defence constraints such as the April 1967 Ban on Arms Exports, the December 1967 Three Non-Nuclear Principles, the October 1976 National Defence, and the November 1976 One Percent of GNP Ceiling on defence burden,” (Keddell 1993, p. 9) which reflects the features of the Yoshida doctrine. It was indicated that “Sato is a high-posture man, ready to lead Japan toward a long-term UK-type dependability as a US ally” (Lafeber 1989, p. 99). Prime Minister Sato sought to accede with his call for an “autonomous defence” (*jishu boei*) which

⁸⁵ The American Presidency Project, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=2140>

⁸⁶ Ibid.

departed significantly from the 1957 Basic Policy by requiring Japan to provide the means for its primary defence and give only a supplementary role to the US (Arase 2007). With the Nixon Doctrine, Japan adopted Yokosuka homeporting which was seen as a model of the U.S.-Japan relationship (Kotani 2011). The original Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defence Cooperation were also approved in 1978 by the U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee (SCC), or the “two-plus-two” meeting, which spelled out the division of responsibilities and forms of cooperation between the SDF and the US military under the bilateral security arrangements with the aim of ensuring smooth and effective collaboration.

Burden-Sharing Issues⁸⁷ and Japan’s Responses: the Coercive Role of Hegemony?

The problems of “burden-sharing”, or “free riding”, emerged from the US side, which can also be regarded as *gaiatsu* for Japan to remilitarise itself. By the 1970s and 1980s, as a result of US decline in power and the Nixon Doctrine, Japan’s situation in relation to the US had changed considerably. In addition to becoming a major economic power, Japan was also responsible for financing much of US debt and benefited from a large surplus in US-Japan trade relations. Relations were even further strained due to the inability of US businesses to access the Japanese market. Many in the US concerned with the concept of what Kennedy (1987) called “imperial overstretch,” began to feel that Japan was exploiting the relationship by “free-riding” on US security guarantees. According to Grunberg (1990), “there are good reasons for cultivating both a belief in America’s weakness and what Calleo

⁸⁷ The “dollar system” is another example of burden-sharing in this period which can be viewed as one of the security issues that is acknowledged in US documents. However, Japan attempted to separate the issues of Okinawa’s return from the dollar system (Interview with Kazuhiro Takahashi, 11th March 2013).

calls the ‘rhetoric of free-riding allies’ (Calleo 1987, p. 217; Grunberg 1990, p. 448). A US proposal for negotiating a detailed understanding of actual defence cooperation produced the 1978 U.S.-Japan Defence Guidelines.⁸⁸ The US focus was on wider regional contingencies while Japan focused on national defence contingencies. The final result was a disappointment to the US.

In response to Japan’s “free-riding” problem, Japan initiated the “Host Nations Support (HNS) programme” as an exception to this principle in 1978 which can also be regarded as one factor of the consensual aspect of hegemony from the neo-Gramscian view. The purpose of the HNS was to increase Japan’s burden-sharing within the U.S.-Japan alliance by paying the part of United States Forces Japan (USFJ) operational expenses that the US had to pay in yen, such as the salaries of Japanese working at US bases and the cost of facilities construction. Such an agreement could also provide for the shared use of SDF bases, and for emergency use of commercial airports and port facilities, transportation systems, and medical facilities. This type of agreement would provide the US with avoidance costs in peacetime and significant savings in the event of crisis, at a relatively low cost to Japan (Reed 1983, p. 42). In 1978, Japanese Defence Cabinet Secretary Shin Kanemaru called this allocation *omoiyari yosan* (sympathy budget), saying it should be part of Japan’s defence budget to support the alliance. He used the non-legal term *omoiyari* to refer to “sympathy” for the US and its soldiers in Japan tasked with protecting the Japanese people from military aggression: there is no legal obligation for Tokyo to pay the salaries of Japanese workers under the SOFA (Yoda 2006).

⁸⁸ Takuya Kubo, from the MOD, generated the idea of the “Basic Defence Force Concept” which was included into the revised defence guideline with the initiative of the MOD and the Nixon Doctrine although it is said that revising guideline in general was seen important from the MOFA’s perspective. Article 5 was the focus for the MOFA, while Article Six was for the MOD. As a result, Article 5 was taken as a priority to be revised whilst Article Six got amended later in 1996 (Kuriyama 2008, p. 157).

This demonstrates that although US pressures for Japan with the “free-rider” discourse was a trigger, providing HNS has become one element of Japan’s consensus to harness the U.S.-Japan alliance. HNS has become a means to strengthen the U.S.-Japan alliance relationship (Yoda 2006). Also, as the strategy of containment, the two countries concluded bilateral defence guidelines in 1978 that paved the way for Japan to play a greater role in defence of the sea lanes.

It is also important to note that, the “Basic Defence Capability Concept (*kiban-teki boueiryoku kousou*)” was introduced in 1976, which reflected the Cold War security environment in East Asia. This called for Japan’s armed forces to maintain capabilities for repelling a small-scale aggression on its own and hold off a large-scale aggression (i.e., a Soviet Union invasion), but to then rely on US reinforcements and military support (Kubo 1974). The Basic Defence Capability Concept emerged from Japan’s attempt to adjust to the change in US global strategy. This concept is based upon the idea that Japan’s defence capability should be at a level where it would not create a power vacuum in East Asia, yet restrained enough to be considered exclusively defence-oriented. The National Defence Programme Outline (NDPO) reflected the Basic Defence Capability Concept that envisioned a further enhancement of the capabilities of the JSDF which laid the foundations for it to become one of the most advance militaries in the world by the mid-1980s. The core idea of this concept was not based upon the idea of threat-based defence force (requirement-based defence force), which means the size of the Japanese defence forces is determined by those of neighbouring countries. While the aspects of this concept persisted in the earlier NDPGs, however, the concept got eventually replaced by other concepts. These are exemplified in Chapter Four.

Packard (2010) notes that “In 1971, angered by Japan’s huge export surplus with the US and by what he considered a betrayal by Prime Minister Eisaku Sato... – [over returning control of] Okinawa to the Japanese-President Richard Nixon delivered three blows to Japan” (Packard 2010, pp. 94-95).⁸⁹ Then Japan Defence Agency (JDA) Director Nakasone Yasuhiro, who also became the Prime Minister later on, took the lead in promoting this change in 1970 with the hope that *jishu boei* (autonomous defence) would displace the limited defence principle, *senshu boei*. The 4th Five Year Defence Plan (1972–77) called for a force that could defeat any likely invasion. However, when the scale of the desired build-up became known, it was widely criticised (Arase 2007). Although some may perceive the 1976 NDPO as a step forward in Japan’s militarisation, at the time it was seen as a defeat for the defence hawks led by Nakasone. The NDPO stopped SDF growth well short of autonomous defence. At the same time, Prime Minister Miki Takeo declared a limit on military spending of 1% of gross domestic product (GDP) and banned all weapons exports in 1976 to satisfy advocates of limited defence (Arase 2007).

With the 1986 MDBP [Midterm defence build-up programme],” the US demanded Japan introduce AWACS [Airborne Warning and Control System] and tanker planes to further increase defence capability for the security of sea-lines of communications (Sebata 2010). Under the MDBP, the JDA emphasised the defence of sea-lines of communication; regarding the concept of this, the US and Japan had different visions. Sebata (2010) exemplifies that “This concept became important since the United States Navy and Maritime SDF increased joint operations such as the RIMPAC in the 1980s” (Sebata 2010, p. 249). The US had requested as early as September 1984 that enhancement of interoperability be the next theme of joint

⁸⁹ Sato promised to curb the flood of Japanese textiles into the US market in exchange for the return of US-controlled Okinawa to the Japanese (Packard 2010).

study between the two countries, and since the study on the “Sea Lane Defence” had been concluded, the US renewed their request. US officials promoted the study of interoperability partly to justify their demand that Japan buy US military equipment (Kohno 1989, p. 464). Unlike the Carter administration’s policy of urging increased Japanese spending on defence, the Reagan administration’s approach to defence burden sharing with Japan with an emphasis of “roles and missions”. Through the neo-Gramscian lenses, it is observable that consensus formation was made with further Japanese remilitarisation under the Nakasone administration, which differed from other Japanese administrations that supported the Yoshida doctrine.

Becoming the “U.S.-Japan Alliance”

The previous section demonstrates the influence of US’ burden-sharing issues on Japan’s security policymaking when Japan did not merely followed US’ offers but responded in its own ways. This section explores the prevailing view of the U.S.-Japan alliance, which can be seen as a consensus of the alliance relationship from the Japanese perspective. As is mentioned earlier, the term, the “U.S.-Japan alliance”⁹⁰, has increasingly been used after Japanese Prime Minister Suzuki’s official usage in the public in 1981 after then Prime Minister Masayoshi Ohira described the U.S.-Japan relationship as an “alliance” in 1979. The subsequent sections are intended to elucidate the consensual dimension of the U.S.-Japan alliance in the neo-Gramscian sense. It also examines the features of policymaking under the Nakasone administration which attempted to shift away from the Yoshida doctrine by changing the characteristics of the U.S.-Japan alliance.

⁹⁰ According to Miller (2006), “few Japanese were conscious of being ‘allies’ of the United States and the term was rarely used in the 1980s” (Miller 2006, p. 31).

“The U.S.-Japan Alliance”: the Consensual Role of the U.S.-Japan Alliance

In the context of the US-Japan relations, the term “alliance” was employed for the first time as the joint statement “recognize[d] that the alliance between [them] is built upon their shared values of democracy and liberty, [and] affirmed their solidarity, friendship and mutual trust” (American Presidency Project 1981; Murata 2011). In fact, however, this further stirred some controversies between the US and Japan when Suzuki also indicated that the alliance does not have military implications after signing up for the declaration (Furumori 2011).⁹¹ His argument may have the implication that due to the experiences of the Second World War and anti-militarism in the Japanese society, it was still hard to underscore the military dimension of the alliance. Nishihara (1983) notes that the media in Japan had a liberal tendency that openly criticised Japan’s remilitarisation. According to Buckley (1995), “He [Suzuki] apparently reckoned that Japan could continue to have it both ways and promises made in Washington might be reinterpreted in Tokyo to reassure domestic audiences that nothing had changed” (Buckley 1995, p. 142). Nonetheless, after his announcement, “Suzuki’s attempt to straddle between constant US pressure for extensive rearmament and the wariness of much of Japanese public opinion was best illustrated in his comprehensive security concept” (Buckley 1995, p. 143). This ultimately led to the resignation of the foreign minister of the Suzuki administration, Masayoshi Ito, for “use of the explosive ‘alliance’ to describe the US-Japan relationship” (New York Times 1981).

⁹¹ It is worth remarking that there was a gap perception between then Prime Minister Suzuki and MOFA officials regarding the usage of the U.S.-Japan alliance. Especially from the MOFA perspective, there was a willingness to include the term “the U.S.-Japan alliance” to improve the relationship between the US although it led to the dismissal of two MOFA officials (Fujimoto 1998)

During that period, the US had been encouraging Japan to take a greater naval role in terms of the Seventh Fleet to the Gulf and Indian Ocean because of the Iranian Crisis and the Soviet invasion in Afghanistan in 1979. In a joint communique issued during the summit between US President Reagan and Japanese Prime Minister Suzuki in 1981, Suzuki, after referring to the “alliance” between the US and Japan, and acknowledging “the desirability of an appropriate division of roles” between the two countries, stated that “Japan, on its own initiative and in accordance with its constitution and basic defense policy, will seek to make even greater efforts for improving its defense capabilities in Japanese territories and in its surrounding air and sea space, and for further alleviating the financial burden of US forces in Japan” (New York Times 1981). In a later speech at the Washington Press Club, Suzuki elaborated this commitment, stating that as a matter of policy Japan would defend the sea space around Japan out to several hundred miles from the shoreline, and the sea lanes out to thousand nautical miles. Nakanishi (2011) analyses that “the treaty was increasingly seen as serving the purpose of reassurance” (Nakanishi 2011, p. 120).

We can consider that, despite vibrant *Ampo Toso* and the reluctance of permitting the alliance relationship between the US and Japan, the term of “the U.S.-Japan alliance” has trickled down from governmental to societal level gradually especially in the post-Cold War era. Likewise, Japan’s acceptance of playing a larger role in naval security exhibits Japan’s consent of US offers although coercion from the US side might have played a role in this context concerning its controversies toward Suzuki’s less emphasis on the military component of the alliance. It is observable that publicly accepting the relationship as an “alliance” in the public can be seen as a form of Japan’s consent to the structure at the centre of the U.S.-Japan Security

Treaty. It is worth remarking that, although the system with the treaty is underpinned by the Yoshida Doctrine that has been institutionalised by organic intellectuals in Japan, those who support the Yoshida doctrine can be seen as “traditional intellectuals” in neo-Gramscian terms in the later periods, facing with new challenging notions against this doctrine which is discussed in the next section. The following section touches upon the emergence of the revisionist posture under the Nakasone administration, which might have contrasted with the Yoshida doctrine and challenged the postwar order.

Remoulding the Yoshida Doctrine: Re-examining Postwar Consensus and Internalisation of Gaiatsu

The administration under Yasuhiro Nakasone, who was previously a director of the JDA, made an attempt to shift away from the Yoshida Doctrine. Nakasone derided Yoshida as “MacArthur’s entertainer”, failing to embed the self-defence notion in the Japanese people’s minds which is “a loss for Japan” (Samuels 2003, p. 203). According to Kataoka and Myer (1989), “Although this strategy [focused on economic development while enjoying a ‘free-ride’] worked successfully until the mid-1970s, continued Soviet military expansion and that country’s invasion of Afghanistan in the late 1970s forced the United States to begin building up its arms and to demand that its allies do the same” (Kataoka & Myer 1989, p. 4).⁹² In consideration of the fiercer Cold War, the US put more pressure on Japan to remilitarise which was previously neglected by Yoshida and his supporters. In the

⁹² They also remark that “Late in the Carter administration, as well as during the Reagan administration, American officials strongly pressed the Japanese government to accelerate defence spending and cooperate more closely with the United States in the Northeast Pacific. Because of these external pressures on expansion, the Yoshida strategy was modified, and Japan began to moderate arms expansion” (Kataoka & Myer 1989, p. 4).

early 1980s, the US started to urge Japan to expand its SDF to cooperate more closely with US air and naval forces for sea-lanes within a thousand nautical miles of Japan. The result of reassessment of the U.S.-Japan security alliance was not an increase in Japan's "share of the burden" but a greater defence spending. In the end, the US asked Japan to increase spending for foreign aid to the Third World countries and to underwrite more of the costs of maintaining US military bases in Japan. They question why the U.S.-Japan security alliance was re-examined and what strategy was adopted by the mid-1980s (Kataoka & Myer 1989).

It is said that, in order to soothe US frustrations, the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) replaced Suzuki with Yasuhiro Nakasone who was "called Japan an '[unsinkable] aircraft carrier' for the US" (Arase & Akaha 2010, p. 39). Perhaps, it may be more precise to say that the Nakasone administration was more responsive to US offers which can be seen as one factor of consensus formation based on US requests and can be different from other earlier Japanese administrations which supported the Yoshida Doctrine. Nakasone built up a close relationship with the then US President Ronald Reagan, commonly known as the "Ron-Yasu" relationship.⁹³ He was more receptive to US pressure to expand Japanese defence efforts. In January 1987, the Nakasone administration lifted the cap on Japanese defence spending, which was set at one per cent of GNP in the 1970s. By approving transfers of some military technology to the US, the administration attempted to sidestep the Three Principles on Arms Exports, which were established in 1967 and prohibit the export of military products to communist countries, nations confronting UN sanctions, or any state that is either involved in or appears to have the potential to be involved in activities relating to war (DiFilippo 2002, p. 62). Nakasone promised the

⁹³ The relationship between Junichiro Koizumi and George W. Bush, Jr. was also portrayed in a similar manner.

US to support its Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI) technology in 1987 although there was a possible violation of the arms export rule and the rule of the one per cent of GDP defence ceiling. Unlike Suzuki, Nakasone contributed to develop the military aspect of the U.S.-Japan alliance mostly in favour of the US. Tadokoro observes that “For Japan to call the much more powerful United States an ‘equal partner’ was not a true reflection of reality, of course. It was, however, an expression of American interest in changing the bilateral relationship from one of ‘victor’ and ‘vanquished’ or ‘occupier’ and ‘occupied’ to a healthier diplomatic relationship between two independent countries” (Tadokoro 2011, p. 91).

It is observable that, unlike other administrations which followed the Yoshida Doctrine, the Nakasone administration rather became closer to the US by enhancing military capabilities and loosening the restrictions on remilitarisation. From the neo-Gramscian standpoint, this can be regarded as a further consensual aspect of the U.S.-Japan alliance in addition to the internalisation of *gaiatsu*. The US decline after the Vietnam War influenced their alliance relationship with Japan, which may be different from previously. Whilst the Suzuki government might have triggered to accept the presence of “the U.S.-Japan alliance” despite the criticism by the media and the public, the Nakasone administration made efforts to become a more equal ally for the US by crafting new legislations and enabling Japan to contribute militarily. Nonetheless, as DiFilippo (2002) remarks, the culture of pacifism, which is deeply rooted in the Yoshida doctrine, has preserved its self-defence doctrine such as “exclusively defence-oriented policy” so it cannot be said that the Yoshida Doctrine has been entirely shelved.

The Cold War Alliance: Adrift, or on Course?

As the U.S.-Japan alliance was indeed functioned for ideological conflicts during the Cold War, it seemed that the original meaning of the U.S.-Japan alliance was lost with the end of the Cold War. However, immediately after the Cold War, several incidents persuaded the Japanese government to rethink their defence posture and the features of its alliance relationship with the US. In this realm, through the neo-Gramscian lenses, it is noticeable in what ways the U.S.-Japan alliance has changed not only looking into the coercion and consensus aspects of hegemony in a respective manner, but through their interactions. This thesis maintains that these interactions have led to a firmer alliance that also contributes to the consolidation of the US-led historic bloc. Not only US pressures, but the pressures from Japan can be observed from the US perspective, which are elaborated in the subsequent section.

The Gulf War in 1991: Facing the Coercion and Further Internalisation of Gaiatsu

While there is an unclear distinction between coercive and consensual aspects of hegemony, it is apparent that *gaiatsu* has been internalised into consensus to enable the Japanese SDF to be dispatched abroad from the neo-Gramscian perspective. One example is the 1990–91 conflict in the Persian Gulf that was the moment which forced Japan to confront their diminished strategic importance. Japan responded to the crisis in the Gulf by contributing thirteen billion dollars to the multinational effort but was criticised for its “chequebook diplomacy”. When the Kuwaiti government issued a statement through the US media in March 1991 thanking all the countries that had worked for Kuwait’s liberation, it did not include Japan on the list of contributing countries whereas Nakanishi (2011) notes that “Whether the

omission of Japan's name from Kuwait's official expression of thanks was deliberate or accidental is not known". This is the threshold for Japanese foreign policymakers to rethink about Japan's defence capability as a tool for international peacekeeping and peacebuilding efforts, as well as national self-defence. In 1991, immediately after the Gulf War, the Japanese government sent a unit of the Marine SDF to the Persian Gulf on a minesweeping mission after the war (Nakanishi 2011).

With regard to this crisis, we can interpret it in the following ways. First, the function of the alliance has been reinterpreted by entrenching the realm of non-territorial security issues including peacekeeping, which further underscores the political elements of the alliance. Although alliances tend to be confined to the military, this incident exhibited that while it is not merely about the U.S.-Japan alliance relationship, Japan's behaviours may have inflicted the alliance relationship with the US, which also influenced the later Japanese foreign policymaking.⁹⁴ Second, this incident might have "internalised" *gaiatsu* to legislate the JSDF's involvements in peacekeeping operations. Consequently, the overseas mission paved the way for the 1992 deployment of SDF troops to Cambodia to participate for the first time ever in a UN peacekeeping operation. Criticism from the US and a wider international community led Japan to acknowledge its need to work shoulder-to-shoulder with other nations to maintain peace and stability. Japan responded with the International Peace Cooperation Law in 1992, which allowed the SDF to join other nations in UN peacekeeping by reconciling with Article Nine. According to Arase (2007), "This broke the psychological and normative barrier against the overseas dispatch of the SDF in a way that limited the Article Nine commitment to a non-

⁹⁴ Interview with a senior official of the Ministry of Defence (MOD); Also, according to Kuriyama (2008), the Gulf War influenced Japanese foreign policy despite the fact that it occurred out of the framework of the U.S.-Japan alliance.

military role” (Arase 2007, p.566). We will witness the further expansion of non-traditional forms of security such as peacekeeping and disaster relief in the later chapters.

The Influence of the “Higuchi Report”: Japan’s Pressures on the US

The post-Cold War period was a turning point for Japanese foreign policymaking in the case of the U.S.-Japan alliance, which was clearly evident with the release of the so-called “Higuchi report”. Due to the North Korean nuclear attacks in 1993 and 1994, the report was released in 1994. Yet, this report confused US foreign policymakers about Japan’s idea of its alliance relationship with the US. Even though the report was not intended to diminish the importance of the alliance, the term of “multilateralism”, which came prior to the “U.S.-Japan alliance”, made US foreign policymakers, particularly those who specialise in Japan, concerned that Japan may have undervalued the alliance with the US. Sebata (2010) explains that US experts on Japan, such as Michael Green and Patrick Cronin, have contributed to “pressure” Japan to change their attitudes by publishing their criticism of the “Higuchi report”.⁹⁵ Regarding the influence and the role of the Higuchi Report, it is argued that “it was the Higuchi Report that forced the United States – which was about to reconsider the United States-Japan relations in the face of trade friction in the post-Cold War era – to take up the issue of redefining the Security Treaty” (Watanabe & Ina 1998; Sebata 2010, p.270). He also exemplifies how urgently the Higuchi report imposed on the US side the need to reconsider its alliance

⁹⁵ This can be regarded as the moment when a further coercive role of hegemony came into play indeed.

relationship with Japan for fear of losing the alliance in the midst of searching the meaning for the alliance in the post-Cold War.⁹⁶

Consequently, East Asia Strategic Guidelines (EASG), formulated by Nye and also influenced the outcome of the Japan-U.S. summit meeting in 1996 entitled “Japan-U.S. Joint Declaration on Security: Alliance for the 21st Century,” redefined and laid the basis for the future posture towards the U.S. -Japan alliance. Besides, after the Taiwan Strait Crisis in 1996, Japan and the US further revised the Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defence Cooperation in 1997⁹⁷ to build up a solid basis for more effective and credible U.S.-Japan cooperation under normal circumstances, an armed attack against Japan, and contingencies in the areas surrounding Japan, which have a significant influence on Japan’s peace and security.

Article Nine was reinterpreted to allow the SDF to respond to regional “contingencies” by supporting US forces exclusively in non-combat roles such as rear area naval patrols, logistics, search and rescue, medical services, and information sharing. New guidelines were developed through extensive consultations and submitted to the SCC on September 1997. In addition, the prevailing feeling of peril in Japan facilitated Diet authorisation of Japan’s new international partnership role, the Law Ensuring Peace and Security in Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan, in August 1999. Thus, by the end of the decade Japan had agreed to wider roles for the SDF in supporting US interventions to stabilise the East Asian region as the price of retaining US protection against nearby threats that Japan was ill-prepared to deal with (Arase 2007).

⁹⁶ Interview with Akio Watanabe; he also talked about a private meeting with them immediately after the release of the report.

⁹⁷ The 1997 guidelines provided for three basic categories of security cooperation: (1) “cooperation under normal circumstances,” (2) “actions in response to an armed attack against Japan,” and (3) “cooperation in situations in areas surrounding Japan that will have an important influence on Japan’s peace and security” (Yamaguchi 2012).

The Endurance of *Pax Americana* and an Asymmetric Alliance: The Nature of the US-led Historic Bloc

Since the enactment of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, the relationship between the US and Japan has not been entirely stable. However, the continuity of *Pax Americana* at the centre of the U.S.-Japan alliance, which can be regarded as the US-led historic bloc, is quite visible. Although the 1960 revision of the security treaty was aimed to overcome the asymmetrical nature of the alliance, it seems that this asymmetry still exists which remains to be debatable especially in Japan. Simultaneously, this asymmetrical feature of the alliance pertains to the system of *Pax Americana* since the end of the Second World War. Pyle (1992) claims that “The *Pax Americana* after 1945 provided a liberal international economic order in which a defeated and outcasts nation could take refuge, focus its sights on economic growth, and seek to rise again in such a new form” (Pyle 1992, p. 42). He also notes that “Relying on the U.S.’s preoccupation with the cold war to provide Japan with security and an open market, Japan intensified its bureaucratic controls and strengthened its mercantilist policies” (Pyle 1992, p. 42).

As Sakamoto (2011) indicates, Japan was able to receive the economic and political support by joining GATT in 1955, participating in free trade agreements to receive the financial assistance, and developing its economy by improving its production ability with technical supports. With regard to the asymmetrical nature of alliances after the Second World War, Morrow (1991) elucidates that “Asymmetric alliances are one of the tools hegemons use to extend their control over the international system. The hegemon provides its allies with security from their neighbours and receives both some control over the allies’ policies and strategic locations to advance its interests further” (Morrow 1991, pp. 929-930). According to

him, the US has used this strategy to extend hegemony through the network of asymmetric alliances which both protected US allies and provided the US with bases for the projection of power and the position to intervene on behalf of ‘friendly’ governments (Morrow 1991).

Although it is been argued differently from Pyle (1992) and Morrow (1991), similar insights on the U.S.-Japan relationship after the Second World War are made. Sekishita (2009) makes an argument that US dependence on Japan and Japan’s dependency on the US demonstrate the nature of the postwar system. According to him, the U.S.-Japan alliance emerged as the cornerstone for the Asia-Pacific region to support the US hegemonic system. As the Japanese economy got recovered under the US nuclear umbrella and open capital market system, Japan became dependent on the US while the US got reliant on Japan. This relationship is reciprocal and integrated, which led Japan to become one of the US “systemic dependent countries” overarching the elements of politics, military, economy and culture in a comprehensive manner (Sekishita 2009, p. 16). This viewpoint is similar to Gramsci’s notion of hegemony, or historic bloc, in consideration of not only military but also economic and cultural aspects of power dynamism.

Watanabe (2011) also argues that the postwar Japan was the period when the U.S.-Japan Security System was adopted and, as long as this system persists, the era of “postwar” has not ended. In other words, the system was established and managed as a part of the international system at the centre of US hegemony which has been sustained since the mid-20th century (Watanabe 2011, p. 16). Moreover, while the Yoshida Doctrine⁹⁸ is generally regarded as the mainstream’s lasting legacy, this

⁹⁸ Yasutomo (2014) analyses that Yoichi Funabashi made an attempt to “reinforces democratic values domestically, advocating greater human rights for Koreans and minorities to shore up

doctrine is viewed as a “permanent strategy” of Japan in the post-Cold War era (Pyle 2007; Samuels 2007). It is worth noting that, throughout all the permutations of political realignment since the LDP lost control of the government in 1993, all major coalitions and parties have been hewn to the original formula outlined by Yoshida (Green 1998, p. 11). It is observable how the organic intellectuals have played their roles in shaping Japanese foreign policymaking as part of the U.S.-Japan alliance.

Conclusion

Chapter Three describes how the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, which is the basis of the U.S.-Japan alliance, was moulded from the neo-Gramscian perspective and how the U.S.-Japan alliance has become more acceptable in the society, particularly after Japanese Prime Minister’s usage of the “alliance” in an official manner. The alliance with the US has provided not only the nuclear umbrella but also technology transfers, economic assistance, and markets for those conservatives and business groups which were focused primarily on economic recovery particularly after the Korean War in 1950. With the security environment after the postwar era, the Yoshida Doctrine evolved at the centre of the U.S.-Japan alliance with the support of conservative politicians in Japan who can be seen as “organic intellectuals” during that period. During the US decline in 1970s and 1980s, Japan did not passively accepted US offer. Rather, Japan adjusted its attitudes while upholding its Yoshida Doctrine with its HNS and other measurements.

The issues of burden sharing emerged, criticising Japan as a “free rider” or “cheap rider” from the US perspective. Yet, the Nakasone administration tried to

Japan’s liberal political credentials as a means of making Japan ‘more compatible with like-minded democracies’” (Funabashi 1991, p. 65; Yasutomo 2014, p. 19).

advance a more aggressive defence posture with an attempt to shift away from the Yoshida Doctrine. Although it may not have been Suzuki's intention to make the alliance more acceptable for Japanese society by using the term for his speech with the US, it may have become easier after the launch of the Nakasone administration to enhance the military dimension of the alliance. However, since the end of the Cold War, the significance of "the U.S.-Japan alliance" seemed to become less significant and Japan's experiences during the Gulf War unveiled how restrictive Japan can militarily contribute to the international community. In addition, after the release of the "Higuchi report", US foreign policymakers got confused with Japan's emphasis on multilateralism rather than the U.S.-Japan relationship, which gave them the impression that Japan had lost interest in developing its alliance relationship with the US. Although it was not Japan's purpose to shift away from its alliance with the US, it encouraged the US to put more efforts into involve in redefining the alliance in the post-Cold War context.

As has been illustrated in this chapter, the U.S.-Japan alliance has been one of the elements that have sustained *Pax Americana*, or the US-led historic bloc in the neo-Gramscian terms, in the Asia-Pacific region with the presence of the U.S.-Japan alliance since the postwar era. The chapter demonstrates how Japan did not fully accept coercive offers from the US side in consideration of domestic and international security situations. However, it also shows that Japan also agreed to US offers that were favourable for its conditions. This indicates the significance of the consensual aspect of hegemony in harnessing the US historic bloc from the neo-Gramscian perspective on hegemony. Furthermore, considering the features of *Pax Americana* and the development of the Yoshida doctrine, the asymmetric nature of the U.S.-Japan alliance remains at the centre of the Japanese diplomacy regardless of

the attempts of the Nakasone administration to change the Japanese posture by moving away from the Yoshida Doctrine.⁹⁹ In this respect, Chapter Six examines how the U.S.-Japan alliance has become more “common sense” in neo-Gramscian terms in the post-Cold War era. While taking into consideration of the role of organic intellectuals who possess the enterprising nature, Chapter Six also scrutinises whether the U.S.-Japan alliance is regarded as an asymmetric alliance or not.

⁹⁹ The asymmetrical nature of the U.S.-Japan alliance remains a central topic. “The Challenges of Asymmetrical Alliance” was held at the Wilson Center on June 2014.

Chapter Four: The U.S.-Japan Bilateral Alliance

Introduction

While Chapter Three traces the historical development of the U.S.-Japan alliance through neo-Gramscian lenses, Chapters Four and Five adopt Cox's social forces analysis considering the material, institutional and ideational elements of the alliance. Chapter Four focuses on a deepening bilateral alliance relationship between the US and Japan while Chapter Five looks into a closer linkage between the U.S.-Japan alliance and regional security architecture in the Asia-Pacific, which is worth examining since bilateralism and multilateralism have overlapped considering the developments of regionalisation with the US presence. The purpose of these chapters is to elucidate the closeness of the U.S.-Japan alliance relationship and its alliance management that may have led to a firmer US-led historic bloc in the neo-Gramscian sense. More particularly, Chapter Four and Five look into the transformation of Japanese foreign policymaking in response to US foreign policymaking in the post-Cold War, the post-9.11 and the post-3.11 contexts, with a particular focus on organic intellectuals in neo-Gramscian terms.

In this regard, Chapter Four closely examines whether the nature of Japanese foreign policymaking, which has been underpinned by the Yoshida Doctrine, is alternating or not in the face of changing US policies. Deploying social forces analysis, Chapter Four examines material, institutional and ideational aspects of the US-led historic bloc in the Asia-Pacific region in the context of the U.S.-Japan bilateral alliance management. It aims to illustrate alliance managements between the US and Japan by looking into the roles of the Japanese institutions since the end of the Cold War. This chapter relies on the argument that, through the constellation

of material capabilities, institutional and ideational aspects of historic bloc in this context, forces interoperability and military-industrial relationship between the US and Japan may have developed. That is, especially among the involving actors not only governments but also business communities and bureaucrats, the US-Japan bilateral alliance has been deepened through various aspects encompassing military, economy and ideas that have harnessed the US historic bloc in the neo-Gramscian terms.


Chapter Four explores the following sections: a) force interoperability, and b) military-industrial relationship. As for force interoperability, it examines the influence of US strategic planning on Japan's strategic planning by exemplifying the characteristics of Japan's defence posture. This section further explores how the US and Japan have deepened their alliance relationship by increasing joint exercises and broadening their cooperation in the post-Cold War and post-9.11 environments. In terms of the military-industrial relationship, an increasing cooperation between the US and Japan in the realm of military-industry such as Ballistic Missiles Defence (BMD) and Japan's changing arms export policy is scrutinised. More precisely, before investigating closer US-Japan military-industrial cooperation, the section elucidates the features of Japan's defence industry and its past controversies with the US. Thereafter, their increasing cooperation is scrutinised considering Japan's changing approaches towards defence industries in the context of globalisation. Specifically, as is explained in Chapter Two, the roles of not only ministries but also the business federation in Japan should be taken into account. Lastly, the chapter summarises the recent trends of the U.S.-Japan alliance relationship regarding force interoperability and the military-industrial relationship by taking into account the

significance of the Yoshida Doctrine which has underpinned not only Japanese defence policies but also its general foreign policies.

Force Interoperability and Military-Industrial Relationship

In the following sections, force interoperability and military-industrial relationship are closely examined by means of social forces analysis. In terms of force interoperability, it is worthwhile to recognise the increasing relevance of HA/DR. while looking into the roles of not only the US and Japanese governments but also the Japanese MOD and the *Keidanren*, who regard the enhancement of force interoperability important especially after Japan's experiences of the 3.11 Earthquake and Tsunami. The section for military-industrial relationship between the US and Japan demonstrates the influences of US ideas on Japan's policymaking including the BMD cooperation and dual-use technology (DUT) while examining not only governments but also the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI), the *Keidanren* and Japanese companies involved in arms industries have contributed to transform the Japanese policymaking in the face of a changing international environment. As is indicated in Chapter Two, demarcating material, institutional and ideational elements can be difficult yet the three factors can be interrelated as the following diagram displays.

Diagram 2: Social Forces Analysis



Source: Cox (1987); Author

When these three elements interact, it can be seen as the emergence of new factors to underpin the U.S.-led historic bloc in the neo-Gramscian sense, while other overlapping areas can be also regarded as the aspects of strengthening the U.S.-Japan alliance. Although such concepts as transformation and dynamic deterrence can be regarded as ideas that also influenced the US-led historic bloc, this chapter closely examines the ideas which are intimately associated with ideology such as liberalism.

a) Force Interoperability

After the Postwar Era

Japan's Exclusively Defence Oriented Policy (EDOP)

It is worth noting that Japan has developed the Exclusively Defence Oriented Policy (EDOP) in the postwar era. The Japanese government has consistently maintained its posture that the overseas deployment of the Self-Defence Forces (SDF) is unconstitutional, which was first confirmed in a 1954 Diet resolution and the SDF force structure has been established exclusively for national territorial defence. The issue of overseas deployment is intimately related to the constitutional

issue of the limits of self-defence since the government has also imposed a ban on exercising the right of collective self-defence.¹⁰⁰ In particular, the EDOP not only constrains the SDF from participating in overseas operations, but also precludes the SDF from having the capability to strike another country's territory.¹⁰¹ The Japanese Diet has referred the EDOP as the prohibition of the SDF from acquiring "exclusively" offensive capabilities, such as aircraft carriers including US' supercarriers, long-range strategic bombers and ballistic missiles (Takahashi 2008, p. 110).¹⁰² The government has long been on record as asserting that Japan's right of self-defence can only be exercised after an attack on Japanese territory, and that an attack by Japan on enemy bases could only be undertaken in the limited circumstance where the destruction of Japan was certain and no alternative means of defence was available. The Japanese government also justifies the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty on the ground that the treaty has no requirement for Japan to come to the defence of the US or its forces except in response to attacks within "the territories under the administration of Japan" (Reed 1983).¹⁰³

In fact, the Japanese government modified this prohibition to forbid only the dispatch "of armed troops to a foreign country for the purpose of using armed force". The Japanese Maritime Self-Defence Force (MSDF)¹⁰⁴ had staged training exercises with US forces in 1955 with antisubmarine and minesweeping (Reed 1983). While

¹⁰⁰ The issue of collective self-defence, which is exemplified in this chapter, has been controversial in the Japanese politics especially after the second Abe administration that accepted "collective self-defence" on the 1st July 2014 in spite of the opposition to this (Asahi Shimbun 2014).

¹⁰¹ Ministry of Defence, http://www.mod.go.jp/e/d_act/d_policy/dp02.html.

¹⁰² According to Takahashi (2008), "This defence posture means that a transformation of the SDF along the lines of US-style stand-off precision strikes would not suit Japan. Transformation of SDF equipment must be consistent with the EDOP" (Takahashi 2008, p.111).

¹⁰³ As a result, for instance, the Japanese Air Self-Defence Force (SDF) is limited in its ability to mirror the approach taken by the Royal Air Force (RAF) in developing improved interoperability with the United States Air Force (USAF).

¹⁰⁴ Agawa's (2002) *Friendship of the Sea* illustrates the cumulated trust between the US and Japan (Interview with Masato Nagai, 25th December 2012).

Reed (1983) remarks that there was very little consideration given to joint operations or joint planning prior to 1978 despite the long-term security arrangement between the US and Japan, the foundation for greater defence cooperation between the two countries was established in the centre of the 1978 Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defence Cooperation calling for joint planning and cooperation in areas such as command and control, intelligence exchange, and logistics support (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1978). Owing to the adoption of these guidelines, Japan has participated in Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) joint naval exercises with such countries as the US, New Zealand, and Australia which has played a bigger role in the post-Cold War era. Specifically, the Japanese Ground Self-Defence Forces (GSDF) engaged in RIMPAC throughout the 1980s. In addition, joint air exercises, anti-submarine warfare (ASW) training, and communications drills have been conducted. Still, it is argued that “joint planning and operations are in their infancy; much more needs to be done in this area if significant results are to be achieved” (Reed 1983, p. 54).

Prior to the Cold War era, the joint interoperability between the US and Japan was less visible because of Japan’s EDOP doctrine which has also limited cooperation for collective self-defence. Japan did not actively cooperate with the US in the military terms although more joint cooperation was conducted in the 1980s that may have influenced by the Cold War contexts. Furthermore, each Air SDF, Marine SDF and Ground SDF has the different experiences; Marine SDF training for minesweeping from the 1950s and the Ground SDF joint cooperation from the 1980s. Their activities were constrained by the EDOP doctrine and the Japanese Constitution, and it seems that there were only subtle influences of US foreign policymaking on Japanese foreign policymaking. In this regard, in the subsequent

section, the situations of the post-Cold War period are illustrated by underscoring the changes in the security environment and the influence of US foreign policy on Japanese foreign policymaking. Even though the Cold War came to an end, new security challenges have led to a deeper bilateral U.S.-Japan alliance relationship.

Post-Cold War

At first glance, it seemed that the significance of the U.S.-Japan alliance has diminished in the wake of the Cold War since the alliance was originally aimed at preventing the spread of Communism in an international scale. However, the relevance of the alliance persisted and the features of the U.S.-Japan alliance have gradually been altered by adjusting its policies to US foreign policymaking. In this regard, this section underlines the integration of both foreign policymaking of the US and Japan in the realm of force interoperability.

Transformation

In the 1990s, “transformation” emerged as new US strategic planning which has also influenced Japan’s defence posture. The William J. Clinton administration started to use this concept for defence posture by indicating in its *Joint Vision 2010*, underlining the necessity to transform doctrines and military trainings to enhance capabilities to carry out joint operations (Joint Chiefs of Staff 1996).¹⁰⁵

Transformation is intended to involve fundamental change in the form of military

¹⁰⁵ The QDR 1997 also urged the importance of the transformation by accelerating the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA), improvement of mobility, and the strengthening of precision strike capabilities. The purpose of transformation is to maintain or improve U.S. military preeminence in the face of potential disproportionate discontinuous changes in the strategic environment (U.S. Department of Defence 1997).

operations for responding new threats. It was understood that “transformation must therefore be focused on emerging strategic and operational challenges and the opportunities created by these challenges” (Fukuda 2006, p. 30). Subsequently, during the George W. Bush, Jr. administration, “transformation” was perceived in a broader sense. According to Krepinevich (2002), “Transformation is not solely based on introducing new technologies into the force, [but] also requires changes in the way the force is employed through major changes in doctrine and force structure” (Krepinevich 2002, p. 2). The 2001 Quadrennial Defence Review (QDR) also notes that “Transformation results from the exploitation of new approaches to operational concepts and capabilities, the use of old and new technologies, and new forms of organization that more effectively anticipate new or still emerging strategic and operational challenges and opportunities and that render previous methods of conducting war obsolete or subordinate” (U.S. Department of Defence 2001, p. 29).¹⁰⁶

As a result, US transformation exerted influences on the Japanese SDF structure. Japan’s SDF has transformed into three dimensions: organisation, alliance, and equipment (National Institute for Defence Studies 2007). Among these elements, the most significant transformation is organisational change. Furthermore, the Japanese Ministry of Defence’s (MOD) report (2000) also acknowledges that the info-RMA should not only be in accordance with Japan’s own defence policy, but also ensure the interoperability of the SDF and US forces. Their study on the RMA in the realm of information recognises that the innovation of information technology (IT) is a

¹⁰⁶ The keywords of the transformation are high mobility, rapid response, expeditionary abilities, precise strikes and joint operations (U.S. Department of Defence 2001).

crucial component of the RMA.¹⁰⁷ In the following sections, the transformation of Japanese foreign security policies is examined taking into consideration the US transformation project that entails multiples processes. Exhibiting the purposes of the changes in Japanese strategic planning that are closely related to the US ones, the sections displays how it has become integrated with US strategic planning. While Japan crafted new doctrines in regard to a changing strategic environment, the section crystallises a deepening U.S.-Japan alliance with increasing joint operations at a bilateral level.

Defence Policy Review Initiative (DPRI), Global Posture Review (GPR) and Japan's National Defence Programme Guidelines (NDPG)

Due to the US transformation project, the December 2002 meeting of the U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee (SCC), or the “2+2” meeting, set into motion the Defence Policy Review Initiative (DPRI), a series of consultations between Japan and the US on transforming their alliance, especially with regard to US Forces Japan (USFJ) realignment with the principles of maintaining deterrence and reducing the burdens on local communities (National Institute for Defence Studies 2008). In fact, it is crucial to note that it was the first time that the Japanese MOD was involved in the negotiations with the US side which differs from the period when the MOFA played a bigger role in the U.S.-Japan alliance management. In this sense, it can be observed with Gramsci's view of institutions. This initiative resulted in a series of agreements that dealt with issues such as “common strategic objectives, roles and

¹⁰⁷ The MOD's report (2000) also indicates that “the United States actively promotes various programs related to the RMA by making use of its possession of the most advanced information technologies in the world. Taking this into consideration, Japan should promote studies on [the] RMA as an ally of the United States” (MOD 2000, p. 5).

missions (CRM)”, shared basing, cooperation on BMD, and base and troop realignments that have become part of the components of the U.S.-Japan alliance (National Bureau of Asian Research 2010). Along these processes at governmental level, the DPRI process led to the formulation of “US-Japan Alliance: Transformation and Realignment for the Future,” a joint statement released at the October 2005 SCC meeting, and culminated with the 5/1 Joint Document at the May 2006 SCC meeting (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2005; 2006) that are exemplified in the subsequent sections.

In addition, the US’ Global Posture Review (GPR) was another important part of the US transformation that reviews the posture and improves the ability in order to respond to emergencies by projecting its forces from remote areas or putting the ships on the sea. The then US President Bush started negotiating over the GPR with its allies in a statement dated November 2003. The main objective of the GPR is not only realigning of forces and bases but increasing mobility, deployability, and the flexibility of U.S. forces (U.S. Department of Defence 2001). The 2001 QDR report also indicates that “The most important aspect of GPR...has the potential to bring about a revolutionary change in the relationships and ways of cooperation between the U.S. and its allies, that is, Transformation of alliances...GPR is a great attempt to re-create the framework of the U.S. alliance (U.S. Department of Defence 2001, p. 39).

As a consequence of the US transformation project, the Japanese government renewed its new National Defence Programme Guidelines (NDPG) in 2004 by emphasising a new concept of defence capability based on a “multifunctional, flexible, and effective force”. The 2004 NDPG provides a clear direction for Japan’s own defence transformation, stating that “Japan will develop multi-functional,

flexible, and effective forces that are highly ready, mobile, adaptable and multi-purpose, and are equipped with state-of-the-art technologies and intelligence capabilities measuring up to the Military-Technological level of other major countries” (Ministry of Defence 2004). It spells out a future vision for the SDF’s security and defence capabilities by citing various threats, such as ballistic missile and nuclear proliferation, international terrorism, and instability of the Korean peninsula, to demonstrate the need for new capabilities and justify the call for continued strategic dialogue with the US.¹⁰⁸ Additionally, in order to achieve the aforementioned key objectives, the Japanese government has enacted laws for coping with a national emergency, such as the Armed Attack Situation Response Law and Civil Protection Law.

Realignment 2005

The joint statement issued on February 2005 notes the importance of realigning the U.S. force posture in Japan to meet the demands of the post-9.11 security environment and to reduce the burden on local Japanese communities, which has been one of the serious problems in the context of the U.S.-Japan alliance.¹⁰⁹ According to the report, “the need to continue examining the roles, missions, and capabilities of Japan’s SDF and the U.S. Armed Forces required to respond effectively to diverse challenges in a well-coordinated manner” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2005). Additionally, the October 2005 report “Transformation and

¹⁰⁸ “The document also spelled out a concept of Japan’s defence capabilities for the post-9.11 world...In pursuing this, Japan has learned from the US experience in its defence transformation, to improve interoperability between the US and Japanese forces and ensure connectivity between command and control systems of the two forces in particular, and seek its uniqueness in designing various systems of the SDF in order to make the SDF as complementary to US forces as possible” (Yamaguchi 2006, p. 64).

¹⁰⁹ Chapter Six explores this aspect of the U.S.-Japan alliance.

Realignment for the Future” describes not only the realignment plan but also “roles, missions, and capabilities” (RMC),¹¹⁰ of the future U.S.-Japan alliance. In order to bolster bilateral security cooperation, it puts emphasis on the significance of “close and continuous policy and operational coordination”, “information sharing and intelligence cooperation”, “improving interoperability”, “opportunities for bilateral training and exercises”, and “share-use of facilities between U.S. forces and the SDF” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2005). The report lists examples of operations in bilateral security and defence cooperation to be improved, including BMD; counter-proliferation operations such as the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI); counterterrorism; intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; humanitarian relief; reconstruction assistance; and peacekeeping (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2005). Szechenyi (2006) argues that these examples reflect the MOD’s interest in developing new SDF capabilities as described in the NDPG that presents a wide range of potential roles and missions (Szechenyi 2006, pp. 141-142).

The “agreed realignment plan” constitutes not only the relocation of the U.S. bases and the reduction of the burden of local communities,¹¹¹ but also comments on strengthening the alliance by reinforcing capabilities and flexibility of US forces in Japan and developing closer military cooperation between the SDF and US forces. The most remarkable one is a plan for Camp Zama in Kanagawa which the US has insisted for the move from Washington. The mission of the headquarters of the 1st Corps is to command augmentation forces from the US homeland in emergencies in the Asia-Pacific region and it is linked to the reduction of the U.S. ground forces in

¹¹⁰ It is noted that the RMC was adopted for efficiency (Interview with Kazuyoshi Umemoto, 7th March 2013).

¹¹¹ It is important to note that the US has been engaged in the issue of base closure and realignment especially at domestic level. The commission for the “Base Closure and Realignment” (or “Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC)”) report was issued on the 13th May 2005 which has been developed since the QDR 2001.

South Korea (Fukuda 2006, p. 42). The report indicates that with this realignment, “capabilities of the U.S. Army Japan command structure in Camp Zama will be modernized to be a deployable, joint task force-capable operational headquarters element” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2006). On the contrary, however, the Japanese government hesitated to accept this proposal since there was a concern in the Japanese public that the missions of the headquarters do not harmonise with the principles of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, particularly the Article 6 which prescribes that the US can use the bases in Japan only for the maintenance of international peace and security in the Far East (Fukuda 2006).

QDR 2006 & Roadmap 2006

The 2006 QDR underlines the transformational shift of joint forces “from de-conflicting joint operations to integrated and even interdependent operations - all while massing the cumulative power of joint forces to achieve synergistic effects” (U.S. Department of Defence 2006). In response, Japan took a drastic first step towards a better operational posture to unify capabilities of different services. According to Japan’s 2005 Defence White Paper, the SDF operations in early 2005 for rescuing people from the Tsunami in Indonesia and Thailand became a benchmark of joint operations where the SDF’s three services worked together as a team for the same mission (Ministry of Defence 2005). The Joint Co-ordination Centre, dispatched by the Joint Staff Office with augmentation from Service staffs deployed in Thailand, was responsible for harmonising activities of Japan’s three Services and coordinating with militaries, government and nongovernment organisations from various countries. In July 2005, the SDF Law and the JDA

Establishment Law were amended to enhance the joint operations posture.¹¹² Based on the amended law, the Joint Chief of Staff was formed instead of the Chairman of the Joint Staff Council at the end of March 2006. Until then, the Chiefs of Staff of the Ground SDF, Marine SDF, and Air SDF were in charge of most operations. The Central Readiness Force Command of the Ground SDF has been operational since then at Camp Zama which is a high readiness unit consisting of airborne troops, a helicopter unit, special forces, and an anti-biological and chemical unit which aims at reinforcing the ties between the U.S. Army and the Ground SDF (Yamaguchi 2006).

In 2006, as a part of the DPRI, the US and Japan reached an agreement, including the relocation of 8,000 Marines and their approximately 9,000 dependents to Guam, but only after Futenma had been moved to Henoko.¹¹³ An interconnected set of US and Japanese force posture realignments, often referred to as the “Road Map for Realignment,” constitutes a comprehensive package of force-posture changes. The secretaries of state and defence and their Japanese counterparts finalised the agreed road map on May 2006 (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2006). US President George W. Bush, Jr. and Japanese Prime Ministers Junichiro Koizumi, Shinzo Abe, and Yasuo Fukuda have all endorsed these realignments. Despite delays, some advances were attained in realigning, consolidating, and reducing USFJ facilities in Okinawa in accordance with the final report of the Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO), which was established in response to the 1995 rape of an Okinawan schoolgirl by US marines (National Institute for Defense Studies 2007).

However, the relocation of Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS) Futenma, which was the biggest step in that process, has failed to move forward and achieve the

¹¹² MOD, http://www.mod.go.jp/e/d_act/d_policy/pdf/english.pdf.

¹¹³ In fact, Hiroshi Kawauchi, a member of the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ), criticised the number of Marine Corps not being precisely given (Kawauchi 2013).

planned easing of the burden on local communities. The relocation of MCAS Futenma is of extreme importance since it forms a lynchpin for the overall process of USFJ realignment (Fukuda 2006). The transformation centres on harnessing the U.S.-Japan security arrangement based upon three pillars: commitment to common strategic objectives; updating the roles, missions and capabilities of both partner-nations' militaries, and a realignment of both militaries to better enable an enduring presence of U.S. military partner forces in Japan. Other significant changes across mainland Japan include: collocating selected Japanese ground and air units with complementary U.S. forces on U.S. bases; facilitating civilian aircraft movement through airspace over the Yokota Air Base; and relocating most Carrier Air Wing Five fixed-wing squadrons from Atsugi Air Facility, near Tokyo, to Iwakuni Marine Corp Air Station in a less densely populated area in Japan. Prior to finalising the road map, the two governments also agreed to replace the USS Kitty Hawk aircraft carrier with the nuclear-powered USS George Washington in 2008 (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2006).

Opposition to Transformation: the Counter-Hegemonic Force

While this section displays the closeness of the US and Japan, it is important to note that, as already mentioned, the US transformation project has sparked controversies at the local level in Japan. Opponents of the plan have not only organised protests, but also mounted legal challenges to the landfill construction on the grounds that it has harmed the ecosystem and endangered protected marine animals, especially in the context of Okinawa (Pettyjohn 2014). In response to this persistent oppositions, the U.S.-Japan “2+2” meeting have recognised the necessity

to reduce the burden on local communities in Japan by stressing the importance of enhancing positive relations between local communities and US forces. For instance, the “realignment subsidy” (*saihen kofukin*), which is granted to base-hosting municipalities including Nago city (Okinawa prefecture) and Iwakuni city (Yamaguchi prefecture), emerged in order to soothe the anxieties of local communities in Japan towards hosting US bases. However, some notes that the logic of creating this type of subsidy is similar to the subsidies for nuclear facilities (Miyamoto & Kawase 2010). This can be viewed as a strategy to ease the unsatisfactory feeling of “not in my backyard (NIMBY)”. According to Maeda (2013), these subsidies have underscored the nature of discriminatory policy from central government in Japan. In this regard, in 2010, Nago city in Okinawa had a problem in not being able to receive subsidies due to its opposition against US bases’ move to Henoko located in the city. Furthermore, with local support, Susumu Inamine, a mayor of Nago city, remains committed to creating a city that does not rely on subsidies or the US military (Ryukyu Shimpo 2010).

It is also noted that, according to Katsusuke Ihara, former Mayor in Iwakuni, Yamaguchi prefecture, people’s attitudes toward the bases changed after the Agreement on the Realignment of US Forces in Japan on October 2005 and the referendum in Iwakuni was held on March 2006 while many members of the Iwakuni Assembly were against the referendum (Jin 2014). It is possible that initially they only raised their voices against the realignment in the hope of gaining leverage when it came to discussing compensation. However, Ihara (2009) explains that the chair of the Assembly and some of its members were pressured by the central government of Japan and perhaps negotiated some sort of compensation as a condition for acceptance (Ihara 2009; Jin 2014). According to him, “In the context of

the Realignment of US Forces, the connection between Iwakuni and Okinawa has grown, and the opposition movement gathered momentum in exchanges between civil society organizations in Okinawa and Iwakuni. After the announcement of the Realignment, many organizations appeared in Iwakuni that were willing to work with Okinawa. The authorities called this Realignment a ‘package deal,’ which means all of us have interests at stake” (Jin 2014).

Dynamic Deterrence, Japan’s Dynamic Defence and Dynamic “Joint” Defence Force

While the project of US transformation caused controversies at local level, nonetheless, the Japanese government gradually further transformed its defence policy. The US brought up a new concept “dynamic deterrence” defined by Charles T. Allen, Gary L. Guertner, and Robert P. Haffa, Jr., as conventional military deterrence that combines efforts “to dissuade, capabilities to neutralize or capture, credible threats to retaliate, and the ability to defend” coupled with “an explicit embrace of the use of force” to effectively communicate a deterrent threat or compel an enemy to change its behaviour (Ministry of Defence 2012). The shared awareness present in Japan’s current NDPG and the US QDR 2010 was an integral part of the background of these common strategic objectives. As is noted above, one of the goals of Japan’s NDPG is to create a dynamic defence force not bound by the traditional dichotomy between peace and war. In a similar vein, the QDR 2010¹¹⁴ states, “The future strategic landscape will increasingly feature challenges in the ambiguous gray area that is neither fully war nor fully peace” (U.S. Department of

¹¹⁴ It is remarked that the 2010 QDR and the 2010 NPR were created after checking with Japan which may indicate the matureness of the U.S.-Japan alliance (Interview with an MOD official, 26th March, 2013)

Defence 2010). It also spells out agreement on the importance of bilateral dynamic deterrence, committing to ongoing regular deterrence operations.

Japan developed this concept without relying on the “Basic Defence Force Concept” that lasted for a long time. The report entitled “Japan’s Vision Future Security and Defense Capabilities in the New Era: Toward a Peace-Creating Nation” indicates that “With the non-combat role of the military capabilities becoming diversified and increased, the ‘Basic Defense Force’ concept, which has limited Japan’s defense capabilities only for the purpose of denial of limited-scale external invasion, is no longer valid” (Kantei 2010). With a growing need for regular international coordination or cooperation, the role of military forces is becoming increasingly diverse, and it is becoming normal to use military forces regularly and continuously for peacetime mission including humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, and counter-piracy initiatives. In addition, according to the MOD official document, “Under the current trend in the region, it is important to develop not only so-called ‘static deterrence’ that ensures deterrence through the existence of defence forces per se, but also so-called ‘dynamic deterrence’ that ensures deterrence by showing Japan’s will and high-performance defence capabilities through timely and appropriate conduct of various activities” (Ministry of Defence 2011, p. 1).¹¹⁵

Furthermore, Japan’s East Asian Strategic Review 2012 notes that “US-Japan cooperation can be expected to develop through synergy between US and joint US-Japan efforts regarding high-end contingencies and Japan’s efforts toward dynamic deterrence” (National Institute for Defense Studies 2012, pp. 252-253). It is

¹¹⁵ It is also noted that “it has become more important to ensure Japan’s sovereignty, peace and security, and prosperity through various activities that can effectively fulfil the three roles of the defence force defined in the 2010 NDPG. For this purpose, the 2010 NDPG provide that Japan is aimed at developing a ‘dynamic defence force’ that focuses on ‘operation’ of defence forces, and the Guidelines aim at increasing SDF activities as well as ensuring the quantity and quality of equipment” (Ministry of Defence 2010).

remarked that “dynamic defence” in the 2010 Guidelines places importance especially the principle of the SDF’s activities particularly on to 1) to strengthen preparation against military activities of neighbouring countries through reinforcing regular intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance activities which is called “ISR,”¹¹⁶ 2) to quickly and seamlessly respond to various contingencies, and 3) multi-layered promotion of cooperative activities with foreign countries (Ministry of Defence 2011).

Moreover, under the second Abe administration, the 2013 NDPG¹¹⁷ was issued with the concept of “dynamic joint defence force” which places “emphasis on developing advanced technology and information, command and communications capabilities and achieving readiness, mobility, flexibility, sustainability, robustness and connectivity in terms of both tangible and intangible resources while giving consideration to the establishment of broad infrastructure for logistical support” (Kantei 2013). Nonetheless, some argues that “There is little difference between the newly introduced ‘Dynamic Joint Defense Force’, and the ‘Dynamic Defense Force Concept’” with the efforts toward strengthening joint operations on a regular basis which were visible at the time of the Great East Japan Earthquake (Democratic Party of Japan 2013). However, perhaps an inclusion of “joint” may signify a more emphasis of both integrated operations among Japanese SDF, and the US and Japan.

¹¹⁶ A U.S. – Japan Defense ISR Working Group was created on October 3rd to investigate how to integrate the two nations’ ISR capabilities. There has been a project on the “Integrated Japanese-American ISR Network” in order to develop a plan for an integrated Japanese-America ISR network. See *Way Forward for the U.S.-Japanese Alliance* <http://www.americansecurityproject.org/way-forward-for-the-u-s-japanese-alliance/>.

¹¹⁷ This was the first NDPG developed under the “National Security Strategy (NSS)” which “ensure that they are in consonance with all other aspects of the GOJ’s security strategy such as those on diplomacy, commerce and trade, while fitting precisely into a broader picture of national security strategy” (Yamaguchi 2014). The 2013 NDPG also contains several key phrases such as a “proactive contribution to peace”.

At the Operational Level

The U.S.-Japan alliance has been enhanced at the operational level by developing its joint exercises leading to a further integration between the US and Japan, which may be harnessing US-led historic bloc in a neo-Gramscian sense. At the military level, Japan has made attempts to upgrade its capabilities in order to cooperate with the US military. With regard to Joint Staff Council (JSC), Hajime Massaki, former Chairman of the JSC, who indicated that “US forces are organized as a joint force. When we look at bilateral Cooperation, separate service channels of the GSDF, MSDF and ASDF, as opposed to a unified channel, may have made co-ordination with the US joint channel process more complex. In this context, more joint structures of the SDF will make a single and unified point of contact and make co-ordination smoother” (Asagumo Shinbun 2005; Yamaguchi 2006). It is also important to remark that the U.S. Embassy and Headquarters, U.S. Forces Japan “Country Team,” led by Ambassador Schieffer, has worked closely with Japanese ministry and military leaders to coordinate in-Japan implementation of the road map (Uchikura 2010).

Transformation and Dynamic Defence

As can be seen from the previous section, Japan has adjusted its defence posture to the US’ transformation project. According to Takahashi (2008), US transformation led the Japanese government to engage in an organisational transformation of the SDF so as to make more effective use of resources. In pursuing such “cheap transformation, the GOJ [Japanese government] has enacted the National Emergency Act strengthened SDF joint operation capabilities by

establishing the Joint Staff Office, upgraded the JDA to the MOD, and designated international cooperation activities as one of the SDF's primary missions"

(Takahashi 2008, p.109). Toshikatsu Yamaguchi, former JDA director of operations, praised the use of computer simulation for the exercise. According to him, "The Japan self-defence forces [SDF] generally were not familiar with conducting command post exercises using computer simulations...However, the U.S. forces provided us a good opportunity to learn" (U.S. Department of Defence 1996).

Further integrated operations between the US and Japan shows Japan's efforts to transform its defence posture in reflection of the US transformation project.

Moreover, in regard to "dynamic defence", Takahashi (2008) argues that the SDF naturally follows that pursuing bilateral cooperation in dynamic defence while building Japan's dynamic defence force is a key factor in deepening the future U.S.-Japan alliance. He argues that, by focusing on proactive operations of the Japan SDF and US military in regions that fall into this gray area in furthering bilateral cooperation, synergies with the dynamic defence force can be achieved. In each of the three roles of defensive force indicated in Japan's 2010 NDPG, there is much to be gained through cooperation between the JSDF and the US military as they actively conduct their missions.¹¹⁸


Ballistic Missile Defences (BMD)

Japan and the US agreed the plan in 2006 and then completed the construction in 2012 of the colocation of an Air SDF and USAF Bilateral and Joint Operations

¹¹⁸ For example, we can hope for the promotion of effective deterrence and response from the hardening of bases, increased troop readiness and operational capacity through the joint use of facilities, joint training and exercises, and surveillance, as well as increased interoperability, clear deterrence and response capacity, and dynamic deterrence through constant surveillance.

Coordination Centre, essentially a joint air defence control headquarters, at USAF Yokota in Japan. In addition, the US deployed X-Band radar at the ASDF's Kashiri base in Aomori Prefecture since 2006, and reached agreement with Japan in 2012 for the deployment of second X-Band radar. According to Hughes (2013), this further integrated Japan within the architecture of the US missile defence. Garren Mulloy, a former British Army officer who has worked with special forces units from several countries, indicates that "Though well-trained and well-equipped, the CRF troops are geared primarily for fighting a conventional war, on Japanese home soil. That's far different from, say, rescuing hostages in the Algerian desert or defending a compound in downtown Mogadishu" (Spitzer 2013). Mulloy also remarked that "One of the things that politicians don't understand — and many military leaders, as well — is the extraordinary complexity of any hostage-type situation, and the constrained, inter-agency environment in which (Japanese) forces would be required to operate. It requires different skills and a very different mind set" (Spitzer 2013). Through a close cooperation with the SDF, the US military's BMD is expected to play a significant role in the defence of Japan. The following graph shows the joint exercises at ground, marine and air levels that have been staged approximately 18 times on average per year since 2005. From 2010, joint exercises with the use of BMD have been conducted.

Graph 1: US-Japan Joint Exercises (since 2005)¹¹⁹



Source: Japanese Ministry of Defence

RIMPAC and Other Exercises

Under Japan's restrictive peacekeeping and anti-terrorism laws, Japanese troops in most cases are not permitted to command, or come under the command of, foreign forces. The US-Japan Security Treaty provides an exception for exercises like RIMPAC 2012, which is hosted by US Pacific Command. The RIMPAC 2012 has become the largest naval training exercise in years, with ships, planes and troops from 22 countries, including Japan. The forces have conducted anti-submarine, missile-defence, live-fire, counter-piracy and other drills over vast stretches of the Pacific through early August and non-US officers served as command major components of the fleet for the first time. A Japanese rear admiral, Fumiyuki Kitagawa, has been named vice commander of the Combined Task Force which

¹¹⁹ It is remarked that, despite the difficulties of alliance management at policy levels, confidential-building has been persistently established at military-to-military relationship (Interview with an official of the US embassy in Japan, 18th March 2013). However, it is noted that, due to structural difference, it is hard to establish the U.S.-Japan joint exercises unless Japan jointly operated among air, sea and ground (Interview with Tetsuya Kotani, 8th March 2013).

makes him second in command of a force that includes 48 ships and submarines, more than 200 warplanes and 25,000 troops (Spitzer 2012). Yoji Koda, former head of the Joint Staff for Japan's Marine SDF and also took part in RIMPAC exercises, indicated that "It's more about safety, coordination, interoperability...But the opportunity itself has significance for the JSDF" (Spitzer 2012).

Additionally, Japanese participation in Dawn Blitz was fast-tracked under the second Abe administration. One of the goals of the exercise, called Dawn Blitz 2013, is to learn how to berth large numbers of ground troops and store weapons, ammunition, equipment and supplies aboard ship for extended periods of time (Spitzer 2013). For the first time in the postwar era, Japanese ground troops operated from Japanese warships far from home. According to Spitzer (2013), "Learning how to live, train and fight from warships over extended periods of time and great stretches of ocean – and learning how to adapt those ships to accommodate hundreds of ground troops and their weapons and equipment — will be a key goal of the exercise" (Spitzer 2013). The aforementioned examples of the U.S.-Japan joint exercises show the closeness of the interoperability of the two countries.

Peacekeeping

In relation to peacekeeping, the capability for rapid deployment has been developed. Smith (1999) describes "Japan's selective participation in U.N.-sponsored peacekeeping efforts has opened up the possibility of using the SDF for roles that can conform to the continued desire by the Japanese public that its military not engage in combat" (Smith 1999, p. 87). Peacekeeping activities have been accepted by the government and general public as legitimate and important

contributions by Japan to global and regional security as the enactment of the UN Peacekeeping Law shows. These activities have maintained justification for mobile forces that can be dispatched across the world (Leitenberg 1996). On November 2009, Japan-co-hosted the “US-Japan Global Peace Operations Initiative Senior Mission Leaders Course (GPOI SML)”¹²⁰ which was one of the action programmes launched by the Global Peace Operations Initiative led by the US contribution to the Broader G8 Action Plan for Expanding Capability for Peace Support Operations, adopted at the 2004 G8 Sea Island Summit. This was part of the U.S.-Japan cooperation and plays a role as the U.S.-Japan alliance for the stability in the Asia-Pacific.¹²¹ The second course was conducted in September 2011 in Tokyo, keeping with the broader engagement with peacekeeping. The then Japanese Prime Minister, Naoto Kan, announced that the government was seeking for new ways to increase the number of the SDF’s peacekeeping contributions (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2011).

Moreover, Yasutomo’s (2014) work illustrates the new diplomatic dynamic of the integration of Official Development Assistance (ODA) and the SDF into “a particular Japanese-type civil-military diplomatic configuration” in the cases of Iraq and Afghanistan.¹²² He explains that “rather than a militarization of ODA, the SDF ‘civilianized’ by adopting the traditional ODA philosophy and implementation

¹²⁰ According to Toru Namatame, who participated in the SML programme once, he learnt the features of PKO which is aimed at nation-building (or institutional building). He also pointed that, in line with ODA, the SDF considered the activities for PKO in South Sudan, not the MOFA (Interview with Toru Namatame, 17th April 2013). This shows the multiple roles of institutions involved in certain tasks dynamically in the way that Gramsci may have viewed them. However, it is also pointed that there is some legal problems remain (Interview with Chiyuki Aoi, 8th April 2013).

¹²¹ Interview with Masatoshi Sugiura, 12th April 2013. He also remarks that it is part of “capacity building” but the civilian element is stronger than the military one.

¹²² He further exemplifies that “The securitization of ODA began to take shape in Afghanistan and Iraq with the tying of aid and human security to peacekeeping, peace-building, nation-building, counter-terrorism and other policy prescriptions now found in the ODA Charter” (Yasutomo 2014, p. 49).

procedures. So, ironically, thanks to the two wheels of the cart, oil and water do mix after all” (Yasutomo 2014, p. 99). In particular, in the case of Iraq, the SDF started following the ODA philosophy and implementation methods¹²³ in requesting the Iraqis to identify their immediate needs so that the projects could be moulded jointly with the local officials (Yasutomo 2014). Miyagi (2008) also recognises that the ODA has become an important tool for the Japanese SDF, explicating that “Japanese military participation became in this war, a new instrument in Japan’s policy toolbox, in tandem with financial and economic assistance” (Miyagi 2008, p. 136). In addition, while Yasutomo (2014) refers this form of Japanese activities as “Japanese-style CIMIC [civil-military co-operation]”, Schoff and Travayiakis (2009) uses the term “CMCoord [civil-military coordination]” to “paint[s] a far more neutral image than the oft-used U.S. military acronym CMO (or civil-military operation)” (Schoff & Travayiakis 2009, p. 1).

Furthermore, the linkage between peacekeeping and the U.S.-Japan alliance cannot be ignored. Ashizawa (2014) notes that when Afghanistan was a top priority for the US national security and foreign policy in the post-9.11 period, the Japanese government clearly recognised the need to get involved in Afghanistan in order to serve as a responsible ally. According to her, the Japanese government has viewed its active involvement in the stabilisation and reconstruction of Afghanistan in terms of three separate yet interrelated goals which are 1) Japan’s high-profile engagement was expected to help manage and strengthen the U.S.-Japan alliance¹²⁴, 2) its long-standing desire to demonstrate Japan’s capacity to contribute to a major international peace and security operation and 3) forging a good relationship with a newly reborn

¹²³ Two of the most traditional operational and formative ODA policy concepts are request-based aid (*yosei-shugi*) and self-help (*jijo doryoku*)

¹²⁴ It is remarked that the relevance of the PKO got weakened when the US solved the Afghan problem (Interview with anonymous, 5th April 2013).

Afghanistan (Ashizawa 2014). This describes the factor of Japan's contribution for PKO cannot be ignored in the alliance context.

Humanitarian Assistance/ Disaster Relief (HA/DR)

It is one of the features of Japan's strategic culture to position domestic disaster relief operations¹²⁵ as the SDF mission. In domestic natural disasters, the fire department and the police are the main responders, while the SDF's operations are anticipated primarily for major disasters. The disaster relief missions of the SDF are based on rigorous principles, which are in line with the Oslo Guidelines with the concept that disaster relief by the military is a last resort. Furthermore, disaster relief missions are considered as assistance for local HA/DR operations. This basic policy holds true also when the SDF are deployed as members of the Japan Disaster Relief Team, in which the SDF do not provide assistance to civil authorities (Yoshizaki 2012, pp. 77-78). Both the US military and the Japanese SDF demonstrated their advanced disaster relief capabilities following the 2004 earthquake and tsunami in Sumatra and the 2011 Great East Japan Earthquake. Cooperation in regional disaster relief centred on this bilateral strength is also an important way of promoting stability in the Asia-Pacific region. In this way, enhanced and dynamic U.S.-Japan cooperation in the area of dynamic defence is extremely significant in fulfilling the role of the alliance in the security of the region (Takahashi 2008).

¹²⁵ "Pacific Partnership" is another example of evolving SDF activities in cooperation with the NGO. It is remarked that the non-traditional component of security including PKO, HADR and maritime security should be considered (Interview with a MOD official, 6th March 2013). It is also noted that this can be seen as "military diplomacy" (Interview with Takeshi Ishikawa, 5th December 2012).

Operation Tomodachi was regarded as the largest joint and combined operation in the history of the alliance, and the rapid surge of forces from both sides was noted in the region. 100,000 personnel of the Japanese SDF were dispatched for search-and-rescue operations, relief supplies and rehabilitation of the infrastructure and the U.S. government acted swiftly to support Japanese counterparts which became the largest bilateral mission of the alliance. “One of the most impressive aspects in the aftermath of March 11 was the conduct of Japan and U.S. forces in Humanitarian Assistance/ Disaster Relief (HA/DR) operations in the Tohoku region” (CSIS & Keidanren 2011).¹²⁶ “Approximately three hours after the earthquake USFJ and the JJS under the MOD both worked to implement the Bilateral Coordination Mechanism (BCM) and bilateral coordination liaison cells (Bilateral Crisis Action Teams at Yokota, Ichigaya, and Sendai) developed under the guidelines in 1997.”¹²⁷ Moreover, the restoration of operations at Sendai Airport demonstrated the agility of the alliance in missions that bear a close resemblance to battle damage recovery from ballistic missiles (CSIS & Keidanren 2011).¹²⁸ Samuels (2013) notes that “the [3.11] disaster stimulated a rhetoric of crisis; a vigorous national debate about the past and future of national security policy and its institutions ensued in which political entrepreneurs from all sides jostled for advantage” (Samuels 2013, p. 108).

¹²⁶ It is also noted that the mayor of Shizuoka prefecture in Japan noted its need of US bases considering their activities in the post-3.11 period (Interview with Fumiaki Kubo, 10th April 2013).

¹²⁷ According to the CSIS and the *Keidanren* (2011), the SDF and bilateral HA/DR operations not only saved lives, but also sent an important signal of alliance solidarity to the region in the wake of political difficulties in 2009-2010 over plans for the relocation of MCAS Futenma.

¹²⁸ The report also notes that “Overall, the HA/DR operations went a long way toward erasing any doubts in the Asia-Pacific region about the solidarity, resolve, and capabilities of the U.S.-Japan alliance that may have emerged in recent years” (CSIS & Keidanren 2011, p. 33).

Towards “Collective Self-Defence”¹²⁹

Another issue that should be considered in the context of joint interoperability is collective self-defence. The Japanese Cabinet made the decision on the 1st July 2014 in order to exercise the right to collective self-defence by changing the government's interpretation of the war-renouncing Constitution. In fact, the advisory panel during was established during the first Abe administration, and focuses on four specific cases.¹³⁰ The latest report provides detailed recommendations in each of these areas and suggests that in an increasingly complex regional and global security environment it is in Japan's interests to assume a greater role in security by exercising the right of collective self-defence. This reinterpretation would allow Japan to exercise the right of collective self-defence and exercise military action if one of its allies were to be attacked. In this regard, the Japanese government is also making an attempt to revise the SDF Act¹³¹ to ease provisions in order to exercise the rights to collective self-defence (Mainichi Japan 2014). The government is aiming to clarify in the provisions of this act that newly permitted SDF activities are not for the “defence of other countries”.

¹²⁹ According to Iwama who served government committees including the Council on Reconstruction of a Legal Basis for Security (2006-7, 2013-), a reinterpretation of the Constitution is sufficient enough instead of revising Article 96 of the Constitution although it may become more evident if Article 9 is revised (Interview with Yoko Iwama, 10th April 2013). Also, it is pointed out that, it is not merely because of US pressures but the expansion of the Japanese SDF (Interview with Isao Miyaoka, 10th January 2013). Kubo also indicated that the US Council is strongly willing to pass the legislation about Japan's collective self-defence at the Senate level (Interview with the Fumiaki Kubo, 10th April 2013).

¹³⁰ This report was submitted in 2008 but shelved until last year when the panel reconvened to examine six additional cases, the potential to reinterpret the constitution, and the legal requirements for Japan's SDF to assume new roles and missions if constraints on defence policy are relaxed.

¹³¹ Under the current SDF Act, the prime minister is allowed to order the SDF to mobilise troops only when Japan has come under armed attack or when there is a clear and imminent danger of Japan coming under armed attack.


The US has welcomed efforts to examine the legal basis for Japan exercising the right of collective self-defence, most recently in a joint statement issued during President Obama's state visit to Japan last month. Admiral Jonathan Greenert, U.S. chief of naval operations, noted in a recent address at the CSIS that Japan taking this step would facilitate information sharing and interoperability between the two militaries (CSIS 2014). The timing is also seen as important as the two governments are currently reviewing bilateral guidelines for defence cooperation and could reflect changes in Japanese defence policy in an update due at the end of this year. Bilateral defence ties are strong, but outdated legal interpretations of the constitution in Japan are considered an obstacle to enhance cooperation on missile defence and other priorities currently informing bilateral defence planning. Additionally, the Asia-Pacific region generally welcomes Japan assuming a greater role in security. The Philippines, which intends to acquire ten patrol boats for its Coast Guard through a loan from the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), and Vietnam, are open to maritime cooperation with Japan amid Chinese assertiveness over territorial sovereignty claims. India and Australia have each signed joint security declarations with Japan, and a decision to exercise collective self-defence would likely bolster bilateral security ties with those countries and facilitate multilateral coordination with the US and other like-minded partners (Szechenyi 2014). It is noted by one of the officials at the MOFA that "with collective self-defence and loosening the arms export policy, the proportion of burden –sharing may change and there will be more burden on Japan".¹³²

¹³² Interview with Noriaki Abe (19th March 2014); It is also noted that "in the context of the U.S.-Japan alliance, Japan needs to become more active unlike the Cold War period" (Interview with Yoko Iwama, 10th April 2014).

Neo-Gramscian Analysis of the U.S.-Japan Force Interoperability

This sections show the interaction of material, institutional and ideational elements in the realm of the forces interoperability in the context of the U.S.-Japan alliance. Especially, it is observable that the increasing relevance of HA/DR and Japanese-style CIMIC/CMCoord can be seen as an example of the flux of material, institutional and ideational (e.g., universal values) components. As for U.S.-Japan joint exercises which have been conducted consistently, while the ideational element may not be as important but material and institutional elements have strengthened the U.S.-Japan alliance especially at the operational level. In addition, not necessarily the major ones but such ideas as “dynamic defence” and other ideas that were generated from the US side can be seen as the ideational element coming into play to harness the U.S.-Japan alliance in the field of force interoperability in a neo-Gramscian sense. As for the institutional aspects of the U.S.-Japan alliance, not only the US and Japanese governments but also the Japanese MOD and *Keidanren* have viewed the importance of enhancing force interoperability especially after Japan’s experiences of the 3.11 Earthquake and Tsunami that exhibited the significance of Operation Tomodachi.

Diagram 3: Neo-Gramscian Analysis of the U.S.-Japan Force Interoperability



Source: Author

b) Military-industrial Relationship

After the Postwar Era

Under the U.S.-Japan bilateral treaty, Japan's domestic defence industry was sustained with military equipment from the US which has been the US' trade-off for retaining Japan as a military ally (Chinworth 2000, p. 372). As soon as the Korean War started, the US Military Supply Agency in Japan began contracting with Japanese firms for the production of firearms, grenades, ammunition, and vehicles. Thereafter, the Law for the Production of Weapons (*bukito seizoho*) was passed on August 1953 to permit the legal production of arms, ammunition, and military equipment in Japan. Indeed, "When Japan's defense industry is viewed in historical perspective, the spending for weapons has been minuscule in comparison to their importance for the economy in the pre-World War Second period" (Kataoka & Myer 1989, p. 58). By the early 1950s, Japan had resumed production of war materiel, first

for the US forces in Korea and then its own security services. By 1952 more than 850 industrial plants had been returned to private control for defence-related production (Gray 2011). Since the end of the Second World War, Japan has introduced, as licensed by the US, major defence systems such as fighter airplanes (F-86, F-104, F-4, and F-15), SAMs (Nike, Hawk, and Patriot), and missiles (Sparrow and Sidewinder). As a result, not only defence technology and defence end-use items but also US defence production methods were brought to Japan through a one-way transfer from the US.

Kokusanka (Japan's Indigenous Production)

Under the treaty, the Japanese defence posture has been maintained the basic capability for collective self-defence. The Japanese government's formulation of this pattern of continuity is encapsulated in its statements of the basic principles of security policy in successive Japan MOD White Papers which keeps its EDOP doctrine which was also indicated in the previous section on joint operations (Ministry of Defence 2011, pp. 107-108). Japanese policymakers have cited strict continuing adherence to the prohibitions on the use of force derived from Article Nine and a range of other anti-militaristic principles developed from the spirit of this article, as evidence of essential continuities and constraints in national defence policy and the management of the U.S.-Japan alliance. The government has also allocated each year nearly the same portion of the gross domestic product (GDP) for the defence budget which allows the government to replace the obsolete systems with new ones within the expected budget. In other words, the defence procurement practice has provided stable prospects for the seller and the buyer in terms of demand

and supply (Kubota 2010). Green (1995) argues that Japan's post Second World War defence industry is isolated from global defence trade and has limited dependence on defence revenue and relies heavily on licensed production of US platforms and systems. Due to this characteristic, Japan's defence industry has been characterised by isolationism, less dependency on defence revenue and *kokusanka* (indigenous production) orientation with dependence on the US defence industry (Green 1995). The defence industries in general are vulnerable to changes in the international situation, as was observed in the merger and acquisition (M&A) and restructuring of the European and US defence industries after the end of the Cold War.

Three Principles on Arms Exports

The structure of the Japanese defence industry has remained unchanged because of the country's self-imposed ban on arms exports or the Three Principles on Arms Exports (Kubota 2010), while there is a further attempt to loosen this policy which is exemplified in the later section. In the hands of the METI, Japan's Three Principles on Arms Exports were announced at the Japanese National Diet in 1967 by Prime Minister Eisaku Sato in reflection of the US-led Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls (CoCom) regime¹³³ commencing in 1949. They are (1) no exports of arms to communist countries, (2) no exports of arms to those countries sanctioned by a United Nations resolution, and (3) no exports of arms to those countries that are engaging or may engage in international conflicts. In 1976, Prime Minister Takeo Miki added arms-related facilities and technologies, to be treated in the same way as arms are. He also stated that Japan should be "prudent" in exporting

¹³³ In June 1987, it is known that the Toshiba Corporation violated the CoCom rules by selling eight computer-guided multiaxis milling machines to the Soviet Union which enabled the Soviets to mass produce a more silent propeller for their submarines.

arms to any other countries, thereby confirming the country's general ban on arms exports. While these principles in effect remain unchanged, the government has made some exceptions for exports of arms for specific defence programmes (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2013).

A 1983 agreement specified that transfers of military technologies to the US and commercial technologies with defence applications, or dual-use technologies (DUT), would be exempt from Japan's ban on arms exports. Influenced by US reform on procurement policy, the Japanese government under the Nakasone administration approved the export of defence technologies to the US, Japan's ally, which was an exception to the Three Principles. This first exception paved the way for joint U.S.-Japan defence technological research, in which the two countries have carried out nearly twenty programmes. The reason is that exporting defence technology to the US might conflict with the philosophy of the Three Principles, which stipulates that as a peace-loving nation, Japan does not take part in any international conflicts, in that, if the US became involved in, Japan, too, might be considered to be part of the conflicts (Masuda 2009). Hughes (2011) argues that "Japan's arms export ban means that for the development of ever more costly weapons systems it cannot tap the economies of scale provided by international joint development and export markets. Japan's opportunities for licensed production are increasingly limited and may actually increase external technological dependency, especially on the United States" (Hughes 2011, p. 475).

It is important to remark that not only politicians and bureaucrats but also business people have a stronger willingness that the "Three Principles on Arms Exports" should be less regulated in the context of the U.S.-Japan alliance

(Keidanren 2004; Ibata 2008). According to Nishiyama¹³⁴ (2009), “From the industry’s perspective, this capability should prove useful for international cooperation. Whether it is, however, depends on the Japanese government’s arms export control policy. Maintaining the Three Principles on Arms Exports would deprive Japan of a valuable opportunity to participate in international cooperation” (Nishiyama 2009, p. 2). He also indicates the example that the US asked Japan to manufacture components for the Patriot missile system to be exported to the United Arab Emirates, it had to procure them from the Netherlands and Greece because Japan was not able to decide in time whether it would manufacture them (Nishiyama 2009).

The FSX Controversy: Conflicted Interests between the US and Japan

The JDA initiated a series of domestic research and development programmes in the late 1970s to build the basis for a domestic aircraft development and production programme. It began developing performance requirements for the new aircraft as early as 1981 (Chinworth 2000, p. 385). In 1983, the Japanese government decided to allow the export of defence technologies to the US. The FSX was to have been Japan’s second “completely indigenous” aircraft developed by domestic industry to replace its aging F-1 aircraft, which officially is the country’s first entirely domestic product (Kohno 1989). Despite the repeated official claim that the FSX selection should be free from foreign intervention, it was apparent by the time the final decision was made in October 1987 that the selection process involved both Japanese and US actors, including the JDA, the US Department of Defence, Japanese and US

¹³⁴ He works for MHI, one of the major Japanese companies that have a specialised sector for defences.

military industries, as well as some individual political leaders (Kohno 1989, p. 457). In early May 1985, the JDA published a progress report by its Technical Research and Development Institute suggesting that Japanese military technology was fully capable of producing all of the FSX except its engines (Kohno 1989, p. 457). The FSX selection became a formal topic of discussion at a cabinet meeting when Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone in September approved the new Mid-term Defence Programme (*Shin Chuki Boeiryoku Seibi Keikaku*) for the 1986-1990 fiscal years (Kohno 1989, p. 457). In March, the JDA shifted its official position, saying that the final selection might be delayed and that it was investigating the possibility of joint development with the US. Although the idea of joint development was not in the original three options, the shift was officially confirmed by Seiki Nishihiro, Director of the Defence Policy Bureau, who stated in the Diet that U.S.-Japan joint development could be regarded as one form of domestic production, and that the JDA would not place a time limit on the FSX selection (Kohno 1989, pp. 461-462).

The Kurihara-Weinberger Meeting

US pressure on Japan tends to be based on bipartisan support within the US. Since the US view that Japan still has a “cheap” or “free” ride in security affairs, the US can easily define their national interest in security relations with Japan. As for the FSX selection, some US politicians represented the perspectives of military industries by demanding the introduction of a non-Japanese FSX, and performed the role of “enlightening” other political leaders by leading them to unite (Kohno 1989, p. 474). It was at the Kurihara-Weinberger meeting in September 1984 that the US first requested that interoperability, or operational-level cooperation, to be the next

theme of joint study between the two countries (Kohno 1989, p. 475). The controversy in the US over technology transfers to Japan was so severe that the US Congress almost made the FSX the first joint programme between the two countries to fall victim to legally required approval processes. The programme moved ahead, but behind schedule and over budget (Chinworth 1992; Lorell 1996). Despite the controversy of the earlier development programme, the two countries completed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) on joint production that went through official approval channels with little notice. As a result of the meeting between the US and Japan at official levels, the FSX issue was settled while it did not meet the initial plan of the JDA. This example also shows the important role of the actors from the neo-Gramscian perspective.

Post-Cold War: A Closer US-Japan Cooperation¹³⁵

Notwithstanding Japan's dissatisfaction about cooperation on the development of the FSX fighter, Japan was seen as the potential collaborator in high-technology R&D from the US viewpoint. In relation to the coercive aspect of hegemony, Hanami (1993) notes that "Since at least the 1985 Plaza Accords, American pressures have mounted and have had the effect of expanding Japan's military" (Hanami 1993, p. 598). Japanese and US industries initiated a major missile defence system study under the SDI initiative entitled the Western Pacific Missile Defence Architecture Study (WESTPAC) started in 1989, with private corporations in Japan, such as MHI. The WESTPAC continued until 1993 when collaboration between

¹³⁵ Indeed, Hanami (1993) puts into question "whether Japan's military expansion is more a political than security achievement designed to appease American policymakers" (Hanami 1993, p. 594) which can be a crucial question to be considered from the neo-Gramscian perspective with regard to coercion-consensus dimensions of hegemony,

Japan and the US became more official. The Japanese government kept its role to a minimum in in this four-year study to avoid sensitive political issues including the weaponisation of space and nuclear weapons related research associated with the so-called “Star Wars” programme of the Reagan administration.

BMD, a Japan’s RMA: RMA Influence on Japanese Industry

The Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA), which relates to surveillance, command and control, systems integration and joint-force doctrine, is the subject of varying interpretations. On the one hand, it is seen as marking a fundamental break with all previous methods of waging war. On the other hand,, it emphasises the evolutionary nature of the RMA, which stemmed from a number of separate improvements in intelligence and surveillance sensors, communications and the integration of complex software systems. US Admiral William A. Owens defines the RMA as being essentially a “system of systems,” where main components are intelligence collection, surveillance and reconnaissance; technologies and systems that provide command, control, communications and computer processing; the integration of complex information systems in real time; and the development of the doctrine, strategies, tactics and military organisations that can take advantage of this technological potential (Dibb 1997). Murayama (1996) indicates that the US has tried to expand the RMA not only within the US but also with its allies. From the neo-Gramscian standpoint, this can be seen as an attempt to create the US historic bloc on the basis of US strategic posture.

In fact, Japanese interest in US missile defence programmes can be traced back to the mid-1980s with the Reagan administration’s SDI. Japan has been engaged in a

BMD dialogue with the US since the early 1980s.¹³⁶ The discussions were formalised in 1987 when the two countries signed an “Agreement Concerning Japanese Participation in Research for the Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI)” (Jimbo 2002). Japan declined to participate but did partly relax its post-World War II arms export ban to open the way for sharing military and dual use technology with the US. Subsequently, Japan shared technology with the US for several weapons systems, including portable surface-air missile (SAM) systems, naval ship construction, a ducted rocket engine, and the controversial FS-X, next-generation fighter programme.

In May 1993, US Secretary of Defence Les Aspin announced the decision to reorganise the BMD programme, and came up with the Theatre Missile Defence (TMD) initiative.¹³⁷ Following this, the BMD Study Office was established in 1995 within the JDA in coordination with the US BMDO and the US Pacific Command, and Japan’s activities and R&D spending began to increase steadily.¹³⁸ The JDA’s inclination towards the Navy Theatre Wide¹³⁹ and PAC-3 option was due to the influence of US pressures but, at the same time, it was also a path that could serve as a delaying tactic. It had to remain cautious throughout 1997 in an attempt to make a consensus within its own bureaucracy and then the government as a whole. By late

¹³⁶ Peoples’ (2010) work analyses the legitimization of missile defence by deploying the Gramscian concept of common sense. He argues that missile defence advocates “legitimate BMD itself...but which favours sectional political and industrial interests in the short term and helps to sustain America’s immense defence infrastructure in the post-Cold War era” (Peoples 2010, p. 5).

¹³⁷ Gordon R. Mitchell explains that “U.S. corporations and defense officials lobbied heavily for Japan to endorse the TMD concept and pursue collaborative missile defense projects” (Mitchell 2001, p. 86).

¹³⁸ It is remarked that BMD has been promoted under Ken Sato, Takeuchi, Kazuyoshi Umemoto, Takamizawa, Campbell and Deming (Interview with anonymous, 12th March 2013). These actors can be regarded as organic intellectuals in encouraging the BMD.

¹³⁹ The Navy Theatre Wide was the newest and most sophisticated among the four major TMD programmes, including the PAC-3, the Theatre High Altitude Area Defence, and the Navy Area Defence.

spring of 1998, the JDA got ready, and began to consider when and how to announce its decision to intensify BMD cooperation with the US (Ishikawa 2005, p. 641).¹⁴⁰ Less than a year later, in August 1999, the US and Japanese governments signed a MOU covering a five-year programme of joint research and development on the then US Navy Theatre Wide BMD programme and started cooperative research with the US through its Navy Theatre Wide Defence programme in 1999.¹⁴¹ According to Nishiyama (2009), “In this way, Japan has gradually started to participate in international defense programs” (Nishiyama 2009).

After the Bush’s administration in 2001, Japanese officials have avoided addressing the collective-defence issue arising out of the changed US missile defence strategy and have concentrated on protecting Japan’s option to acquire a BMD capability whereas the Bush administration and the US Navy have consistently viewed Japanese participation in the US missile defence programme as a potentially significant “alliance builder” and force capability enhancement. In response to the alleged lack of support for joint development in the then BMDO, US Deputy Secretary of Defence Paul Wolfowitz reportedly issued a programme budget decision (PDB) on December 2001, directing the organisation to continue the cooperative effort and include funding as a separate line item in the FY2003 budget. Japan was sceptical of US’ Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (AMB) Treaty abandonment and collective defence. The U.S.-Japan Security Treaty is deemed

¹⁴⁰ It is noted that Japan is dependent on the US in order to their joint BMD cooperation (Interview with Kenichi Takahashi, 19th April 2013).

¹⁴¹ However, at that time, Japan made no decision about acquisition of a missile defence capability and current constitutional interpretations appear to rule out the integration of any such Japanese capability with that of the U.S. Navy. Furthermore, according to Ishikawa (2005), “Suddenly, the term TMD, used especially in the Japanese media, became almost equivalent to Navy Theater Wide. Thus, the onset of bilateral joint research on the Navy Theater Wide in the following year contributed to covering up the fact that Tokyo would have to make a decision to introduce the PAC-3 sooner or later, probably before the joint research entered the development phase” (Ishikawa 2005, p. 641).

constitutional under this interpretation because Japan's responsibilities relate only to the defence of Japan itself. Japan is not obligated under the U.S.-Japan Defence Treaty to participate in the defence of the US or US forces, let alone participates in security cooperation involving third countries (Ministry of Defence 2000). Japanese officials appeared to agree with the view of Japanese defence analysts who complained that supporting the US initiative would link Japan to US global nuclear strategy in a way that was incompatible with Japan's non-nuclear principles (Chanlett-Avery, Manyin & Cooper 2008).¹⁴²

It is worth indicating that one of the key working level organisations in bilateral technology programmes, the Systems and Technology Forum (S&TF), is in various stages of examining and implementing several joint projects. At a higher level within the US Department of Defence, officials are explaining long-term options that range from expanded use of contract research programmes joint production of common components and even expanded purchases of Japanese components to further the objectives of gaining access to Japanese technologies, maintaining common systems and controlling weapon systems costs (Chinworth & Rubinstein 1996). It is not an exaggeration to assert that Department of Defence is more committed to mutually beneficial cooperation with Japan than at any point in the postwar relationship (U.S. Department of Defence 1995). The report, which was released in 1998 by the U.S.-Japan Industry Forum for Security Cooperation (IFSEC), was founded in 1996 to promote dialogue between the two countries' defence industries and provide advice

¹⁴² "Many sceptics and critics considered that the removal of the distinction between 'theatre' and 'national' would increase the possibility for Japan's BMD to be more integrated into the US system, thereby increasing the danger of 'entrapment'. They also renewed a concern that Japan's participation in the American MD programme might conflict with the Constitution, which banned the exercise of the right to collective self-defence according to the present official interpretation, or lead to the violation of the three principles on arms export, which virtually prohibit any arms delivery" (Ishikawa 2005, p. 642).

to their governments on matters that affect defence industrial cooperation, concluded that closer defence industrial cooperation would benefit the manufacturing/technology bases of both the US and Japan, support interoperability, and thus strengthen alliance cooperation. The 2003 revised report recommended 1) an expanded dialogue on equipment and technology cooperation; 2) adopting more positive attitudes toward technology transfer; 3) a more flexible application of Japanese arms export control policies; 4) a clear statement of guidelines for intellectual property protection and 5) a better understanding of the impact of “Buy America” provisions (Keidanren 2003).

As a consequence, the Japanese Cabinet made a decision in 2003 to commit to the acquisition of BMD programmes consisting of the completed deployment by 2010 of Air SDF Patriot Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3) system, and the upgrading and testing from 2007 onwards of the Japanese MSDF Aegis destroyer Standard Missile-3 (SM-3) BLK-IIA system has posed major challenges for the ban on the exercise of collective self-defence as perhaps the key component of Japan’s constrained militarised posture in the post-war era (Hughes 2013). The US had begun deployment of the PAC-3, and in the Iraq War of 2003, this weapon was used for the first time. Almost as a matter of course, US pressure on Japan to introduce this system increased. Shigeru Ishiba, the then Minister of Defence began to suggest fielding the PAC-3, which had been almost forgotten in the missile defence discourse in Japan as described above (Japan Times 2003). At the same time the government announced that the three arms export principles would not be applied to possible joint development and production of BMD systems with the US.¹⁴³ On the

¹⁴³ A few days later, Tokyo and Washington exchanged diplomatic notes, and then signed a MOU, calling for a framework of comprehensive cooperation on BMD. Japan and the US had agreed to license production of PAC-3 by Mitsubishi Heavy Industries (Japan Times 2005).

19th December 2003, the report “On Introduction of Ballistic Missile Defense System and Other Measures” was released at the Security Council and the Cabinet Council that shows the thinking behind the introduction of BMD system and the direction of Japan’s defence force review taking into account the introduction of BMD system and the new security environment (Kantei 2003) leading to the formulation of the National Defence Programme Outline (NDPO) and Mid-Term Defence Programme in 2004.¹⁴⁴ The Koizumi cabinet approved a bill to revise laws concerning the operation of a BMD system in February 2005.

The joint development and production with the US of the missile defence system began in 2006. It is noted that “In a May 2007 meeting with US Secretary of Defence Robert Gates, Minister of Defence Fumio Kyuma requested that the United States cooperate as far as possible in supplying Japan with information on the F-22A and other fighters it was studying...Further discussion between Japan and the United States resulted in a decision to jointly conduct a comprehensive study on air warfare capabilities in the region surrounding Japan, and then pursue talks based on analysis of the sort of air warfare capabilities that both countries should possess within the context of the future security environment” (National Institute for Defense Studies 2008, p. 213).¹⁴⁵ A vital element of network centric warfare (NCW) was the possession of an airborne warning and control system (AWACS), which is an airborne platform that monitors air activity using high-performance radar and acts as

¹⁴⁴ In terms of the issue of “collective self-defence”, the report states that “the BMD system that the Government of Japan is introducing aims at defending Japan. It will be operated based on Japan’s independent judgment, and will not be used for the purpose of defending third countries. Therefore, it does not raise any problems with regard to the issue of the right of collective self-defence” (Ministry of Defence 2004).

¹⁴⁵ It further notes that “The challenge in assessing those candidates [of a next-generation fighter], however, is not simply a matter of comparing their capabilities as combat aircraft; it also involves determining which one can provide the best strategic benefit for Japan in today’s security environment” (National Institute for Defense Studies 2008, p. 213).

a network hub to control operations under its watch. Currently, Japan and the US are the only countries that operate full-scale AWACS capabilities in Northeast Asia, and the qualitative strategic superiority enjoyed by both nations largely derives from those capabilities.¹⁴⁶

According to Takahashi (2008), these characteristics could change through participation with US companies in the joint development of a BMD system which is the main focus of Japan's version of the RMA and, more speculatively, through Japanese procurement of the next generation of fighter aircraft yet the extent of any such change is difficult to predict at this stage. The RMA is likely to change the characteristics of Japanese defence industry significantly but not sufficiently to constitute a fundamental transformation of that industry. However, if relaxation of the current structural restraints on Japanese defence industry continues, then Japanese defence industry's characteristic isolationism, minimal exposure to defence business and *kokusanka* gradually adjust in response. At present, it is impossible to predict whether such a change will eventuate and, if it does, how far reaching it could be (Takahashi 2008, p. 115). He also notes that "the NDPG explicitly posits the code of Japan BMD system within the determined architecture in a consistent way with the American strategic deterrence" (Takahashi 2012 p. 23).

It has been announced by US Secretary of Defence Chuck Hagel on the 6th April 2013, saying that "A key focus for our talks today was the threat posed by North Korea" (Pellerin 2014). Currently, while Japan has four Kongo Class Destroyers which have been upgraded with BMD operational capabilities, SM-3 Cooperative

¹⁴⁶ However, some security experts hold that it is only a matter of time before China puts full-fledged AWACS capabilities into operation. Japan and the US concluded the General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA) in May 2007 to promote information exchange for missile defence and other security related projects.

Development Programme which is the joint U.S.-Japan development aims at defeating longer range ballistic missiles with deployment to begin in 2018.¹⁴⁷ The Japanese MOFA also remarks that “Japan has been making steady efforts to develop the BMD system in continued cooperation with the U.S. bilateral cooperation in BMD” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2012) which has deepened the alliance significantly. In relation to the concept of “dynamic defence”, the dynamic defence force to be developed should possess readiness, mobility, flexibility, sustainability and versatility, and these features may have been reinforced by advanced technologies based on the trends of levels of military technology and intelligence capabilities. In this respect, as well as distributing appropriate resources to the function/capability to be developed with higher priority, the essential foundation for operation of the defence forces through efforts including effective and efficient maintenance of equipment, maintenance of a high level of operations tempo, and improvement of the skills of personnel are enhanced.

Dual-Use Technology (DUT)

In the context of the U.S.-Japan alliance, dual-use technology (DUT) is considered which can be used interchangeably for both peaceful and military aims. In the 1980s, Japanese companies began taking advantage of this loophole by making inroads mainly into the US defence market, providing semiconductor chips for guided missiles and camera lenses used in reconnaissance systems. Since then Japanese components have found their way into a large number of security and defence products across the globe, such as silicon sensors, which are at the core of

¹⁴⁷ U.S Department of Defense, http://www.mda.mil/system/aegis_bmd.html

BAE Systems Inertial Measurement Units used for missile guidance systems, or the Sony Exwave-HAD 800 Line TV camera incorporated in the Denel military and paramilitary turrets (Ballantyne 2005). According to Yamazaki (2009), the 1980s was the beginning of US dependence on other markets including the Japanese one. However, Mitsubishi Electric Corporation (MELCO) had a desire to escape from dependency on US satellites and satellite components by handling primarily on its own information gathering satellites (IGS) system which can be used for supporting disaster relief. These became more difficult to obtain after the Cox Committee hearings, which resulted in an even more convoluted and confused US export control system than the merely ambiguous and non-transparent system of the past (Johnson-Freese & Gatling 2004).

Space industries can be seen as another prominent example of DUT. It is important to note that it is in line with the RMA that underscores the importance of space assets and technologies for national defence. According to Pekkanen and Kallender-Umezu (2010), “Japan’s commitment to the space industry long predates the very recent formulation of anything like a coherent national strategy, which came with the passage of Japan’s first ever Basic Space Law 2008, and the subsequent Basic Space Plan in 2009” (Pekkanen and Kallender-Umezu 2010, p. 1).¹⁴⁸ With regard to the U.S.-Japan alliance, they also remark that the development of space industries can be seen as the form of not only Japan’s normalisation or remilitarisation, but also Japan’s persistent dependence on the alliance with the US which may be possibly eroding the anti-militaristic culture of Japan (Pekkanen and Kallender-Umezu 2010). This example exhibits a further development in the realm

¹⁴⁸ It is worthwhile noting that the *Keidanren* has a “Space Activities Promotion Committee”.

of DUT which may be harnessing both the U.S.-Japan alliance and the US-historic bloc.

In addition, Hideaki Watanabe, Director General of the MOD's Technical Research and Development Institute, explicates that the Japanese Cabinet is planning to adopt research development style similar to Defence Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) by involving not only corporate companies but also other institutions such as Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency (JAXA) and National Institute of Information and Communications Technology (NICT). However, he also remarks that, due to the militaristic image of DUT, some actors including universities have been hesitant to cooperate with the MOD (Watanabe 2014). In fact, while Japanese universities intend to participate in the DARPA Robotics Challenge (DRC), a US Department of Defence's Defence Advanced Research Projects Agency's robotics competition, in June 2015, this case exhibits the uneasiness from the Japanese universities' viewpoints. According to the US Department of Defence, the aim of the DRC is to develop "robots capable of assisting humans in responding to natural and man-made disasters," (Mainichi Japan 2014) but also indicates that the technology could be adapted for military purposes. Although Japan's METI has encouraged Japanese institutions to participate in the DARPA challenge with the July 2013 agreement to jointly develop robots to help for HA/DR, a representative for the University of Tokyo remarked that "We understand that the DRC is a NEDO [New Energy and Industrial Technology Development Organisation] project, and its goal is clearly written as the research and development of robots for disaster response. There is no mention of the project being used for military purposes" (Mainichi Japan 2014).

Increasing “Exceptional Cases” for Arms Export and Further Loosening the Three Principles

As is indicated earlier, Japan’s indigenous production has been vulnerable.¹⁴⁹ The Japanese government determined in 2004 that the Three Principles on Arms Exports would not be applied to the bilateral joint development and production of missile defence system. It was a crucial decision in that the exception allowing defence technology to be exported to the US was extended to joint development and production as well. The third exception was related to the Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA), which was concluded in 1996 and revised in 1998 and again in 2004. In order to maintain U.S.-Japan security relations and contribute to international peacekeeping efforts, this agreement stipulates that Japan’s SDF and US troops have access to each other’s materials and services in peacekeeping operations, emergencies in the surrounding area of Japan, and disaster relief. Such materials and services include arms-related items such as subsystems and components, as well as the maintenance of military aircraft, vehicles, and vessels, some of which are included in the Three Principles on Arms Exports and thus cannot be provided without this exception. According to Kubota (2013), although Japan’s Three Principles on Arms Exports reflect Japan’s obedience to the US CoCom regime¹⁵⁰ which also had supported the U.S.-Japan alliance, it is not realistic with the trend of increasing international joint development and production.

¹⁴⁹ As the solution, loosening arms export policy has been suggested which is contributable to the U.S.-Japan alliance (Interview with Takashi Shiraishi, 22nd March 2013). Also, this can be seen as a form of “burden-sharing” (Interview with Ryo Sahashi, 11th January 2013).

¹⁵⁰ It is said that ministries in the realm of industry, trade, commerce, and defence, along with customs agencies, other than foreign affairs had direct or indirect influence on COCOM decisions (Cupitt & Grillot 1997). In fact, there are some discussions about the continuity of the CoCom regime such as Lipson (1999).

The Japanese government also released a policy statement on the 27th December 2011 entitled “The Guidelines for Overseas Transfer of Defence Equipment, etc.” which permits the overseas transfer of defence equipment under certain conditions by allowing comprehensive exemption measures under the Three Principles on Arms Exports. Japan’s 2010 NDPG were directed to respond to the challenges of improving performance and controlling rising costs by focusing on international joint development and production. The new guidelines allow defence industrial cooperation, which had previously been limited to joint research of defence technologies and development and production of BMD systems with the US to be expanded to international joint development and production of defence equipment.

In late 2011, representatives of the Japanese and US defence business groups in Japan, the Defence Production Committee of the *Keidanren* and the Aerospace and Defence (A&D) Committee of the American Chamber of Commerce in Japan (ACCJ) initiated a dialogue on strengthening and enhancing U.S.-Japan defence cooperation. Moreover, under the second Abe administration, with the aim of abandoning the principles to open new markets for Japanese defence companies, Abe had finally decided to carry out the long-discussed change to achieve the following objective: augmenting Japan’s regional influence by offering its technologically sophisticated defence hardware to other countries locked in territorial disputes with an increasingly assertive China (Fackler 2014).

Towards “Three Principles on Defence Equipment Transfers”

Furthermore, Japan decided to ease its self-imposed arms export ban for the first time in almost 50 years on the 1st April 2014 which is described as “the first major

overhaul in nearly half a century of its arms embargo policy” (Japan Times 2014). The attempt to loosen arms export policy has been made especially under the second Abe administration. According to draft principles to control arms exports presented to the ruling coalition on the 5th December 2013, the Japanese government would permit exports as long as they “contribute to Japan’s national security” or meet other conditions (Asahi Shimbun 2013). The loosely defined principles could allow for broad interpretation and substantially expand the range of weapons to be exported and their destinations. Yoshihide Suga, Chief Cabinet Secretary in the second Abe administration remarked that “Under the new principles, we have made the procedure for transfer of defence equipment more transparent... That will contribute to peace and international co-operation from the standpoint of proactive pacifism” (BBC 2014).¹⁵¹ Japan further set to approve its first arms export following the relaxation of Japan’s self-imposed ban. As a result, MHI came up with the plan to export a high-performance sensor to the US for using the Patriot Advanced Capability-2 (PAC-2) missile defence system in order to export to Qatar.


Neo-Gramscian Analysis of the U.S.-Japan Military-Industrial Relationship

This section illustrates how material, institutional and ideational elements may have interacted in the field of the military-industrial relationship in the context of the U.S.-Japan alliance. With regard to the ideational element, US ideas have influenced Japan’s policymaking on arms industries which have further developed the BMD cooperation between the US and Japan. The examples of DUT can be regarded as another factor which has bolstered the alliance. Considering the institutional aspects

¹⁵¹ It is important to note that “proactive pacifism” is one of the major concepts of Japanese foreign policymaking under the second Abe administration which is also listed in NDPG 2013.

of the U.S.-Japan alliance, it is not only governments but also the METI, the *Keidanren* and Japanese companies involved in arms industries that have contributed to transform the Japanese policymaking in the face of a changing international environment. Especially considering the arms control policy in Japan which has influenced the arms trade of Japan has been remoulded in the hands of governments and other relevant actors including the *Keidanren* which may recall their role in the postwar period as is exemplified in Chapter Three.

Diagram 4: Neo-Gramscian Analysis of the U.S.-Japan Military-Industrial Relationship



Source: Author

The Deepening U.S.-Japan Bilateral Alliance

The US Historic Bloc: A Further Integrated U.S.-Japan Cooperation?

In neo-Gramscian terms, the historic bloc that supports the U.S.-Japan alliance and the US presence in the Asia-Pacific region has become firmer particularly in the

post-Cold War period. The features of the alliance management have been transformed in response to the post-Cold War and post-9.11 security environment. Rubinstein (2007) explains the “sword and shield” concept of defence cooperation with the US. Initial “roles and missions” planning between the US and Japanese defence officials in the early 1980s envisaged a US “sword”, or power projection forces, working with a Japanese “shield”, or defence of Japanese territory, and support through US bases and other facilities in Japan. Current defence planning emphasises a Japanese shield both less static and more closely coordinated with US forces.

These trends revisit the question whether Japan is shifting away from the Yoshida Doctrine which has mainly been discussed in Chapter Three. Apparently, Japan’s strategic posture has been altered in response to US’ strategic planning. However, on the other hand, this trend does not necessarily display that Japan has become a complete ally for the US due to its constraints in the constitutions and laws. While Rubinstein (2007) indicates about the shift away from the “sword and shield” concept that is intimately associated with the Yoshida Doctrine, it is questionable whether Japan can be regarded as an equal partner of the US or not. Still, as described above, Japan has gradually expanded its role as a US ally.

Shifting Away from “the Yoshida Doctrine”¹⁵²?

While some argues that Japanese defence policies have been based upon the Yoshida Doctrine as is exemplified in Chapter Three, one of the remaining important questions is whether the “Yoshida Doctrine” will be supplanted by other doctrines or

¹⁵² It is noted that the Yoshida Doctrine remains persistent. Among 300 politicians, 200 are presumably liberal conservative (Interview with Tsuyoshi Yamaguchi, 9th April 2013).

not. The Yoshida Doctrine has been viewed as a “permanent strategy” of Japan in the post-Cold War era (Pyle 2007; Samuels 2007). Hughes and Krauss (2007) argue that “No coherent new foreign policy doctrine has replaced Yoshida’s, only a new inclination to follow the demands of public opinion or the United States when expedient, or to stand up to China and the two Koreas over history, or to rail against perceived subordination to US strategy” (Hughes & Krauss 2007, pp. 172-173).

According to Bloom (2009), Japan’s defence industrial policy was, and still is, driven by the Yoshida Doctrine, which states that Japan’s postwar strategy should concentrate on rebuilding and developing its economy while accepting US security guarantees. As a result, the Japanese government has emphasised maintaining a wide range of platforms and military equipment, with *kokusanka* at the core of the country’s defence industrial policy. Production licensed by the US and Japan has worked in that Japan now has an effective defence industrial base. However, he also argues that the *kokusanka* policy has not worked in that the Japanese defence industry is a generation behind the development of new defence technologies. Considering deepening force interoperability and military-industrial relationship, the U.S.-Japan alliance has been bolstered in material terms. Japan has expanded the SDF operations abroad in cooperation with the US and also increased their military-industrial cooperation. Not only at the governmental level but at operational and business levels, the U.S.-Japan alliance is viewed as indispensable.¹⁵³

Conclusion

Chapter Four explores the U.S.-Japan alliance with a focus on force interoperability and the military-industrial relationship. The section on force

¹⁵³ It is pointed out that Japan is becoming integrated to the US regarding US relative decline (Interview with Motohiro Ono, 16th April 2013).

interoperability illustrated the influences of US strategic planning including transformation and dynamic deterrence which has altered Japan's strategic planning with its progress on transforming its alliance management with such concepts as "dynamic defence". This section also showed how the US and Japan have deepened their alliance relationship at the operational level with increasing joint exercises by widening its cooperation in consideration of the post-Cold War and post-9.11 environments. The Japanese SDF has also expanded its non-traditional security realm such as humanitarian assistance and peacekeeping operations. In terms of the military-industrial relationship, the section described the developments on BMD cooperation between the US and Japan with Japan's transforming postures on arms exports. Whilst the US and Japan had controversies on FSX for instance, in the post-Cold War era, Japan has been considering globalising defence industries. Additionally, Japan has loosened its policy on arms exports in response to its BMD cooperation with the US. Not only has the ministries of Japan but also the *Keidanren* have been taken into account which have been more willing to work towards a closer US-Japan cooperation.

This chapter also illustrates how the U.S.-Japan alliance has deepened bilaterally not only based on the agreement of the US government but also the Japanese government and others actors such as the SDF and the *Keidanren*. As Murayama (1996) indicates that US' RMA has intended to exert its influence on its allies, we can see that US strategic planning has effects on Japan's defence posture. However, it is important to note that it is not merely US pressure that has transformed Japan's attitudes as such cases as the FSX controversy showed, but particularly after the Cold War, Japan has made efforts to expand its role as a US ally. The discussion in Chapter Five goes beyond the U.S.-Japan bilateral alliance in regard to the US-led

regional security architecture in the Asia-Pacific region which focuses more on the economic and ideational aspects of the US-led historic bloc, which have strengthened the U.S.-Japan alliance in the Asia-Pacific region.

Chapter Five: The U.S.-Japan Alliance and Regionalism in the Asia-Pacific

Introduction

Chapter Five examines economic and ideational aspects of the U.S.-Japan alliance in relation to regionalism in the Asia-Pacific, which have become an important elements of the alliance. Indeed, it is crucial to note that linking alliances to regionalism is not novel. The Cold Wars were represents the period when a US-led “hub-and-spokes” system played a significant role in the “Free World” discourse. Considering these historical contexts, this chapter discusses the notion of regionalism taking into account the Asia-Pacific circumstances and its relationship with US hegemony, or the US-led historic bloc. This chapter argues that the scope of regionalism is being altered since the US presence has been influential in shaping the region although there are some critiques that the US has inhibited regionalisation in the Asia-Pacific and no consensus about the idea on “Asian regionalism” exists. In the neo-Gramscian sense, the consensual aspect of the states is seen as inevitable to sustain hegemony so the perspectives of other Asian states are important to be taken into consideration. With the use of social forces analysis, economic and ideational components of the U.S.-Japan alliance are examined by looking into various actors not only in the realm of military but also economy and ideology. In particular, in the context of Japan, the roles of Japanese politicians, ministries and the *Keidanren* are important to be considered.

Investigating the role of the US-led alliance system in the Asia-Pacific region, this chapter closely looks into an increasing salience of the U.S.-Japan alliance in the context of regionalism. While closely examining economic and ideational aspects of the U.S.-Japan alliance, the interaction of material capabilities, institutional and

ideational aspects of hegemonic bloc are explored. This chapter argues that the U.S.-Japan alliance has further functioned as a regional stabiliser by means of economic and ideational components. As Cox notes, a nascent form of historic bloc is consisted of “the most powerful corporate economic forces, their allies in government, and the variety of networks that evolve policy guidelines and propagate the ideology of globalisation” (Cox 1999, p. 12). This aspect of the U.S.-Japan alliance is explored by focusing on the role of business communities and experts on U.S.-Japan relations. Furthermore, the chapter examines the features of regionalism in the Asia-Pacific linked to the US-led historic bloc.

This chapter is structured as follows; first, the features of an alliance system and the U.S.-Japan alliance are briefly explicated with regard to regionalism by underlining the political elements of the U.S.-Japan alliance. Then, the economic and ideational aspects of the U.S.-Japan alliance are investigated by focusing on the role of institutions and actors such as the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) and the *Keidanren* using Cox’s social forces analysis. Second, in consideration of the previous section, the chapter discusses the features of regionalism in the Asia-Pacific, which is still debatable. The concept of regionalism is important to be considered to understand the US presence in the Asia-Pacific. Lastly, by taking into account the features of the U.S.-Japan alliance and the US-led alliance system in the Asia-Pacific region, this section attempts to characterise the nature of US hegemony in the region within the neo-Gramscian framework. The US “pivot”, or rebalance, to Asia strategy is also taken into account not only analysing the US perspectives but also the viewpoints of US allies in the region.

The U.S.-Japan Alliance and its Role in Regionalism

While the U.S.-Japan alliance can be seen as a military one by some security experts, the alliance can be viewed as political by constituting not only military but also economic and ideational components. It is acknowledged in the official Japanese documents that “The reality of postwar pacifism was provided by the country’s ‘economism,’ that is, its single-minded concentration on economic affairs...Participation in the international economic summits among the United States, Europe, and Japan that were inaugurated in 1975 was the embodiment of Japan’s global role as a country that had redeveloped as an economic state in the postwar period” (Kantei 2000). Furthermore, according to Inoguchi, Ikenberry and Sato (2011), “alliance politics is the policy of different perspectives often shaped by different positions and circumstances placed in world politics” (Inoguchi, Ikenberry & Sato 2011, p. 6).¹⁵⁴ Yasuhiro Nakasone, a former Japanese Prime Minister, also acknowledged that the U.S.-Japan alliance is a political alliance (Sotooka, Miura & Honda 2001). In this sense, it is visible that alliance politics is not necessarily confined to the military. Additionally, one of the MOFA officials also points out that “the U.S.-Japan alliance is like ‘baumkuchen’; the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty at the core, economic aspect as the second layer and ideational aspect as the third layer”.¹⁵⁵ This understanding of the U.S.-Japan alliance exhibits that it possesses not only military but also economic and ideational implications for foreign policymaking.

¹⁵⁴ In the context of the U.S.-Japan alliance, they also indicate that “The U.S.-Japan alliance has been intensely bilateral in its origins and operations. Yet Japan has long been trying to get more global in terms of its own self-appointed role as a supporter of the U.S.-led system” (Inoguchi, Ikenberry & Sato 2011, p. 4).

¹⁵⁵ Interview with Noriaki Abe (MOFA official)

Hub-and-Spoke System in the Asia-Pacific

The bilateral alliances in the Asia Pacific were built in the “hub-and-spoke” pattern with the US as the centre following World War II.¹⁵⁶ Gerson (1997) explicates that Dulles was the principal architect of the structures of US hegemony in the Asia-Pacific. He further notes that “As the U.S. consolidated its Asian-Pacific conquests, Dulles opted for a ‘hub and spokes’ system connecting Washington to its regional allies and clients through a series of bilateral treaties. Cooperation and collaboration among the Asian-Pacific allies and clients (spokes) was thus minimized, while their dependence on the U.S. (hub) was maximized” (Gerson 1997, p.110). This alliance system is also called the “San Francisco System”¹⁵⁷ which emerged from a US regional bilateral network during the Japan peace conference convened in San Francisco on September 1951.

In addition, Aggarwal and Koo (2008) underscore the economic aspect of this system, indicating that the San Francisco system offered US allies in the region access to its market in return for bilateral security agreements.¹⁵⁸ In this regard, we can view that the US-led alliance system is generated not merely for military but also for economic purposes. In the current discourse, the alliance system has been

¹⁵⁶ While quite a few Asian countries were transformed into newly emerging nations after decolonisation, the distrust toward Japan in the region still persisted that made it difficult to create a multilateral alliance including Japan. According to Sahashi (2011), “because a number of countries had a strong desire to change the status quo—e.g., South Korea, which became a ‘divided nation’ during the Cold War; the Republic of China after its relocation to Taiwan; and South Vietnam—for the United States to be able to constrain its allies, bilateral alliances were preferred” (Sahashi 2011, p. 7).

¹⁵⁷ The prominent features of the system are summarised as follows: 1) a dense network of bilateral alliances; 2) an absence of multilateral security structures; 3) strong asymmetry in alliance relations, both in security and economics; 4) special precedence to Japan; and 5) liberal trade access to American markets, coupled with relatively limited development assistance (Calder 2004, pp. 135–157).

¹⁵⁸ They also remark that “At the same time, U.S. allies were strongly encouraged to participate in broad-based, multilateral forums in institutions such as the United Nations (UN) in security and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in trade and finance. Aside from informal networks based on corporate and ethnic ties, the San Francisco system created few incentives for Asian countries to develop exclusive regional arrangements” (Aggarwal & Koo 2008, p. 2).

regarded as a “Pacific alliance” which signifies the intention to go beyond bilateral relations and establish the order of the Asia-Pacific region under US hegemony. The following sections underscore economic and ideational aspects of the U.S.-Japan alliance by using social forces analysis. Within the neo-Gramscian framework, the interactions of material capabilities, institutions and ideas are examined to elucidate how the alliance may have further strengthened in the economic and ideational terms. As social forces analysis is employed to the U.S.-Japan bilateral alliance in Chapter Four, this chapter uses this analysis in exploring the economic and ideational aspects of the alliance. Yet, the composition of respective elements can be different from that of Chapter Four. For instance, as for institutions, the roles of the MOFA, the METI and the *Keidanren* are more focused than the MOD.

Economic Dimension of the U.S.-Japan Alliance

This section explores in what ways the U.S.-Japan alliance has enhanced its relevance in the economic sphere. Some may disagree about a linkage between economic liberalisation and the U.S.-Japan alliance¹⁵⁹ yet it is observable that the alliance has become a dominant factor for regionalism considering the historical past of the economic relationship between the US and Japan.¹⁶⁰ Although the METI¹⁶¹ has enhanced its interest in multilateralisation particularly in the post-Cold War period, not only the MOFA but also the METI have increasingly acknowledged that the alliance is “the pillar of the Japanese diplomacy”.¹⁶² As is elaborated in Chapter

¹⁵⁹ For example, Koichi Kato, a LDP member, argues that TPP cannot be justified with the purpose of strengthening the U.S.-Japan alliance (Kato 2913).

¹⁶⁰ The Asahi book *the U.S.-Japan Alliance Economy (Nichibei Domei Keizai)*” (2005) argues that the US and Japan have shifted away from the period of “competition” to “calmness (*nagi*)”.

¹⁶¹ The METI was one of the agencies which were still “lukewarm” about liberalisation (Searight 1999, p. 6)

¹⁶² Yet, while this idea persists in the MOFA document whereas slight amendments were made in the METI ones by combining both bilateral and multilateral components.

Three, Japan benefited from large amounts of US aid during the Cold War as one of the US' allies. Japanese foreign economic policy was based upon the bilateral relationship with the US with "an implicit bargain" (Krauss 2003) that illustrates how Japan might have benefited from US pressures during the Korean War. As is highlighted, while Japan would support the US in the Cold War with the backbone of the US-Japan Security Treaty, "the US would provide Japan's military security, access to US markets from its economic growth and a dismantlement of non-liberal or anti-liberal formal and informal barriers to foreign access to the home market, particularly in manufactured goods" (Krauss 2003, p. 310). This can be seen as part of liberal globalisation in the way Rupert (2000) sees it. He regards liberal globalisation as "a confluence of two related historical processes" (Rupert 2000, p. 16). On the one hand, it is the product of capitalism's expansion with limitless accumulation; on the other hand, it is the constellation of dominant social forces by facilitating the transnational expansion of capitalism (Rupert 2000)

This logic has become institutionalised in both the MOFA and the METI. Indeed, it is evident that the *Keidanren*'s ideas have shifted away from multilateral regionalism to the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) which also supplements the relevance of the U.S.-Japan alliance which is discussed in this chapter. In the following analysis, while it displays some contestation about the ideas about bilateralism and multilateralism especially in the realm of liberalisation, this section displays the gradual comprehension of such policies as the TPP with increasing supporters from both the US and Japan's sides especially in regard to the *Keidanren*'s shifting focus on policies with a more attention to the U.S.-Japan alliance.

Trade Conflicts between the US and Japan, and the Search for Multilateralism

With Japan's rapid economic growth, trade conflicts between the US and Japan became more intense in the 1980s. Although it is acknowledged that U.S.-Japan trade conflicts have existed since the late 1950s, the ones of the 1980s have the different features since it that was a decade of the liberalisation of Japanese markets (Ito 1993). The US government continuously attempted to open up Japanese markets to deflect protectionist sentiments in Congress for closing off its market (Krauss 2003, pp. 310-311).¹⁶³ According to Krauss (2003), "Japan's trade with Asia was increasing but those countries were still dependent on the US market for exports and their sensitivity about the past seemed to preclude Japan taking any overt role to coordinate an Asian response to this crisis" (Krauss 2003, pp. 311-312).¹⁶⁴ Furthermore, with the emerging trend of regional multilateralism, Japan has begun to craft the different strategies during its trade conflict with the US. In 1988, the Trade Policy Bureau of the MITI, the current METI, began to study various options for easing the trade friction with the US, including broader cooperative arrangements in the Asia-Pacific (Funabashi 1995, pp.58 - 66; Yamamoto & Kikuchi 1998, pp. 193–7; Krauss 2003).

As a result of the release of the report based upon these studies, this encouraged Australia to initiate the founding meeting of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) on the 31st January 1989 which can be seen as the beginning process of Japan's shift towards "bilateralism *plus* regional multilateralism" (Krauss 2003). Although there was discordance between the MITI and the MOFA, it became

¹⁶³ This is a pattern of "export politics" and the "bicycle theory" of trade negotiations (Destler 1995, pp. 17–18; Krauss 2003, pp. 310-311)

¹⁶⁴ She also exemplifies that "A likely future scenario was that unstoppable protectionist sentiment in the US would lead it to close its markets, not only to Japan, but to other Asian exporters, and then cause a breakdown of the entire liberal trading system under which Japan had prospered in the post-war era" (Krauss 2003, pp. 311-312).

alleviated towards 1993. After 1993, Japan embarked upon several regional initiatives that involved the MOFA as the preparation to shift toward “regionalism”. One was the proposal for an unprecedented multilateral regional forum connected to ASEAN to deal with security issues the Ministry of Finance (MOF) was dedicated to trying to “internationalise” the yen by regional efforts and the Miyazawa, Asian Monetary Fund (AMF), and Chiang Mai initiatives after the 1997 Asian financial crisis as the commitment to Japan’s active regional role. The METI puts a priority on World Trade Organisation (WTO) and regional involvement while there were some who also were sceptical about bilateral Free Trade Agreements (FTA) arrangements (Krauss 2003).

Counter-Hegemonic Movements in the Asia-Pacific

Conversely, a potential counterweight to US hegemony, or the US-led historic bloc in the neo-Gramscian sense, did exist. Throughout the 1990s, the then Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamed and other Asian officials opposed to US-led liberalisation, which led Mahathir to propose an East Asian Economic Group (EAEG) in 1990, renamed the East Asian Economic Caucus (EAEC) later on, which would include only APEC’s eleven Asian members. Mahathir “has consistently railed against American hegemony and what he sees as attempts by the North to ‘subject us to imperial pressures’” (Higgott & Stubbs 1995, p. 524). APEC is seen as a vehicle for the US and other non-Asian states to “hitch a ride” with the more dynamic Asian economies (Chandra 1993; Higgott & Stubbs 1995, p. 525). Mahathir proposed grouping the EAEG, which was renamed the EAEC in response to concerns that the original name made it sound too much like an attempt to form a regional trade bloc (Stubbs 2002, p. 441). The then Singaporean Senior Minister Lee

Kuan Yew referred to the growing unease among East Asians about the emergence of the NAFTA and the EU and the need for East Asia to develop an organisational response. Some analyses that the US used coercive means equally significantly.¹⁶⁵

In fact, the *Keidanren* also favoured the EAEC in the late 1994 which demonstrated Japan's willingness to get closely tied with Asia rather than to the US that was seen as a power "in decline" (Higgott & Stubbs 1995, p. 531). This exhibits a growing awareness of the significance of multilateralism in the Asia-Pacific region, where bilateralism itself would not be sustainable. However, whilst such actors in Japan as the *Keidanren* favoured a more multilateralism, Japan did not wish to endanger the US commitment to the region by supporting the expansion of the EAEC (Rapkin 1994; Higgott & Stubbs 1995). This may have influenced the values of the *Keidanren* regarding economic liberalisation including the TPP, which is examined in the later section. While the US has responded directly to the East Asian regionalism movement using APEC as an alternative regional integration framework, it has also sought to introduce a rules-based, reciprocal, and discriminatory integration norm into APEC to emulate East Asian regional integration.

The 1997 Asian financial crisis also represents a critical discontinuity in the region with the suspicions of the US. Initially, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) was criticised for aggravating the crisis with its demands for economic restructuring and financial reform. At the same time, the exclusion of the US from Asian security disrupted the "delicately calibrated understanding of balance in the Asia-Pacific" (Jones & Smith 2007, p. 179). The Japan-led AMF proposal was

¹⁶⁵ The US and Australia had toned down their opposition to a regional grouping. At the July 1996 ASEAN ministers' meeting, Joan E. Spero, on behalf of the U.S. administration, stated that the U.S. would not oppose the EAEC so long as it did not split the Pacific Rim down the middle (Stubbs 2002, pp. 442-443).

generated after this crisis which was rejected both by the US and China. While China was afraid of Japan's expanding power in the region, the US was opposed to this idea due to its possible exclusion from the region. Following this crisis, ASEAN sought to establish a dialogue partnership with Northeast Asia through the new mechanism of an East Asian Summit (EAS).¹⁶⁶ Stubbs (2002) argues that there are a number of commonalities including the experience of warfare, "Asian values", common institutions, a distinctive brand of capitalism, and deeper economic integration which provide the APT with a potential basis for regional identity and consolidation. At the 6th ASEAN summit in Hanoi in December 1998, they agreed to formalise these meetings into the arrangement of ASEAN+3.¹⁶⁷ Out of the Chiang Mai Initiative, the ASEAN+3 developed three tracks (Stubbs 2002).

However, US officials were suspicious of the Asian-only summit when the Malaysian government first announced its establishment of the EAS in 2004. Singaporean Foreign Minister George Yeo revealed after a meeting with the then Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice that the US had "some concerns that the East Asia Summit will be inward looking and exclusive".¹⁶⁸ Another key aspect of the US approach has been its 2010 decision to join the EAS, eventually including the US and Russia and other regional major powers. According to Beeson (2003), "the impact of strategic considerations is itself potentially contradictory and will ultimately depend on a number of imponderable strategic developments— especially

¹⁶⁶ At the first EAS summit that was held in Kuala Lumpur in December 1997, the leaders of ASEAN discussed regional possibilities with China, Japan and South Korea as ASEAN Plus Three (APT), or 'ASEAN+3', has continued to develop momentum despite the fact that it is essentially Mahathir's vision in another guise (Beeson 2003, p. 262).

¹⁶⁷ It reflected both a Chinese effort to exercise leadership and collective Asian weariness of APEC and the ARF.

¹⁶⁸ "US Concerned Over Exclusive Nature of EAS," Agence France Presse, Feb. 25, 2005.

those revolving around American foreign policy—and the region’s capacity to develop collective responses to them” (Beeson 2003, p. 259).

Bilateralism Plus Multilateralism

In consideration of these environments, US opposition and a directly consequential Japanese ambivalence led to Japan’s orientation towards “bilateralism *plus* multilateralism”, the shift from an exclusive U.S.-Japan bilateralism to the addition to regional multilateralism. Some scholars examine Japan’s shift from dependence on and friction with the US to an additional force of global “multilateral liberalisation” (Schoppa 1999; Searight 1999; Pekkanen 2001; Krauss 2003). Krauss (2003) examines the role of US policy changes and their influence on its relationship with Japan, stating that these transitions were part of the consistent pattern of preferences and goals through the postwar era with its adaptation to the transforming environment which can be exemplified within a “strategic interaction” framework (Krauss 2003, p. 309).¹⁶⁹ Each crisis in the global and regional trading system has led to new forms of first regional multilateral and now bilateral trade policy relations, which have further opened up new policy options, each taking Japan a bit further away from its previous heavy bilateral economic and political dependence on the US, without in any way sundering that relationship or moving toward a complete antagonist leadership role (Krauss 2003, p. 325). Some observes that Japan has expanded both its “security shield” with the US and its “economic sword” in the region (Heginbotham & Samuels 2002), which means economic liberalisation has been promoted at the pillar of the U.S.-Japan alliance.

¹⁶⁹ According to Krauss (2003), “It is clear that Japan’s foreign economic policy has become much more tied to the region and diversified in the sources and targets of its strategies, and that Japan itself, more specifically the MITI, has been an important agent in intentionally widening those options” (Krauss 2003, p. 325).

Free Trade Area of the Asia-Pacific (FTAAP) and Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP)

The US has an interest in promoting the Free Trade Area of the Asia-Pacific (FTAAP) idea, using the APEC framework to form a regional FTA which is an idea that has been adopted by the Obama administration. The 2006 Hanoi Leaders' Declaration states that "We instructed Officials to undertake further studies on ways and means to promote regional economic integration, including a FTAAP as a long term prospect, and report to the 2007 APEC Economic Leaders' Meeting in Australia," (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2007) in which the FTAAP was put as one of the agenda for the first time. Furthermore, the US began to use the FTAAP concept to change the discourse, or at least to change the expectation of where the politics of regional trade would be headed in the future (Terada 2011).¹⁷⁰ According to Aggarwal and Koo (2012), traditional confidence in bilateral alliances and multilateral globalism has been eroded visibly by manifesting itself in the burgeoning interest in free trade agreements (FTAs), regional financial institutions and cooperative security dialogues.

The TPP¹⁷¹ has been a recent evolving regional FTA, which also influences the regional dynamism in the Asia-Pacific. It was originally formed as the Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic Partnership, forming among Singapore, New Zealand, Chile, and Brunei, or the so-called "P-4". On November 2009, US President Obama committed

¹⁷⁰ It is also noted that it was the "Nikai shock," an ASEAN+6 FTA proposal - excluding the US - made in April 2006 by Toshihiro Nikai, then head of Japan's Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry (METI), that compelled the United States to push for the FTAAP idea (Terada 2011)

¹⁷¹ These activities include market access for goods and services; government procurement; foreign investment; technical barriers to trade; trade remedies; sanitary and phytosanitary measures; intellectual property rights; worker rights; and environmental protection. The TPP countries also agreed to pursue cross-cutting issues such as regulatory coherence, competitiveness, and business facilitation, also known as transnational supply and production chains; the participation of small and medium-sized companies; economic development; and potential disciplines on the state-owned enterprises (SOEs) (White House 2009).

the US to engage with the TPP countries to transform the original P-4 pact into a regional arrangement with a broader basis of membership. The TPP agreement is envisioned as “a comprehensive, next-generation regional agreement that liberalizes trade and investment and addresses new and traditional trade issues and 21st century challenges” (Office of the United State Trade Representative 2011). It also notes that “As the second-largest economy in Asia, the third-largest economy in the world, and a key link in global supply/production chains, Japan’s participation would be pivotal to enhancing the credibility and viability of the TPP as a regional free trade arrangement” (Office of the United State Trade Representative 2011).

A large segment of the US community has expressed support for Japanese participation in the TPP, if Japan can resolve long-standing issues on access to its markets for U.S. goods and services” (Fergusson, Cooper, Jurenas and Williams 2012, p. 6). This tendency may relate to what Higgott (2004) calls the “securitisation”¹⁷² of US foreign economic policymaking.¹⁷³ In the case of recent discourse on the TPP, it can be regarded as “the securitisation of the TPP”. According to Capling and Ravenhill (2012), “The ‘securitization’ of the TPP is consistent with a recent trend in US trade policy to use PTAs [preferential trade agreements] to reinforce strategic relationships” (Capling & Ravenhill 2012, p. 292). They argue that “the US agenda is not solely about the pursuit of business interests:

¹⁷² “Securitisation” is seen as a socially constructed, contextual speech act and a process in which “an issue is framed as a security problem” (Waever, 1995, p. 75; Buzan et al., 1998; Higgott 2004).

¹⁷³ Also, under the Bush administration, the importance of APEC was underscored with the element of terrorism which was seen as an important factor to be taken into account as a mechanism for combating terrorism following the 9.11 terrorist attacks (Morrison 2009)

foreign policy and geopolitical considerations are also powerful motivating forces for Washington's interest in the TPP" (Capling & Ravenhill 2012, p. 291).¹⁷⁴

Japan's announcement followed an initial expression of interest in November 2011 by the then Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda. In his opening statement at a November 2011 press conference to discuss Japan's decision to explore joining the TPP talks, Noda said that "as a trading nation, in order to pass down the affluence we have cultivated to our future generations and to develop our society into one with vigor, we must incorporate the economic growth of the Asia-Pacific region".¹⁷⁵ It is worthwhile to note that Noda is graduated from Matsushita Institute of Government and Management (commonly known as *Matsushita Seikei Juku*)¹⁷⁶, a school to provide young people with business values and management training for government.¹⁷⁷ By 2000, the politicians who graduated from this institute "cement the DPJ's status as a neoliberal alternative to the LDP on economic policy" (Schoppa 2011, p. 35). In addition, in his March 2013 statement, Prime Minister Abe acknowledged the interests and sensitivities of the agricultural groups, but he also insisted that Japan needed to take advantage of "this last window of opportunity" to enter the negotiations. He reiterated that "the meaning of the TPP is not only limited to national economic development, but also to create an economic zone with the ally, the US" (Kantei 2013). According to Hagiwara (2013), this statement reiterates the purpose of strengthening U.S.-Japan alliance by means of the TPP (Hagiwara 2013,

¹⁷⁴ They also note that "In particular, the Obama Administration is using the TPP to promote traditional security concerns including the strengthening of bilateral military alliances in the Asia-Pacific, the projection of US power as a counter to China, and the promotion of democracy, human rights and the rule of law" (Capling & Ravenhill 2012, p. 291).

¹⁷⁵ "The World and Japan" Database Project", <http://www.ioc.u-tokyo.ac.jp/~worldjpn/documents/texts/PI/20111111.O1E.html>

¹⁷⁶ Another observation to be made is that one of the core ideas of Matsushita is a proactive foreign policy to enhance Japan's role as a global leader.

¹⁷⁷ This institute was founded by Konosuke Matsushita, the founder of Matsushita Electric Corporation (the current Panasonic) (Schoppa 2011)

p. 50). Japan increases the economic importance of the TPP from the US perspective.¹⁷⁸ Japan's participation in the TPP could affect US political and foreign policy interests. The US entry into the TPP negotiations is part of the Obama Administration's foreign policy and military "rebalancing" to the Asia-Pacific, which is often referred to as the "pivot" to the Pacific, announced in 2011. The Japanese MOFA also recognised that "[the] TPP is for the order based upon free trade and the adjustment for this order which is contributable for the U.S.-Japan trade and regionally and globally".¹⁷⁹

However, in fact, it is also crucial to note that the TPP has been intrinsically controversial at the domestic level. According to Naoi and Urata (2013), "the coalition opposing Japan's participation in the TPP has been much broader and powerful" (Naoi & Urata 2013, p. 334). They exemplify that "a broader protectionist coalition can emerge given the presence of two interrelated conditions in domestic politics: (i) uncertainty [of negotiation outcome and politics] regarding the forthcoming distributional effects of the agreement, which generates the bulk of "uncertain losers" – that is, voters and interest groups that are unclear about their losses from the agreement; and (ii) the presence of the biggest potential losers of the agreement, who are well-organized and resourceful, allowing them to build a protectionist coalition with uncertain losers through persuasion and policy campaigns" (Naoi & Urata 2013, p. 334). Additionally, it is also taken into account that the popular anti-TPP campaign slogans have been "the TPP is not just a trade agreement" (Mitsuhashi 2011). Furthermore, in this article, the role of a "policy

¹⁷⁸ It is noted that "It increases the amount of U.S merchandise trade that the TPP covers from 34% (the original 11 countries) to 39% based on 2011 data, and increases trade in services and foreign investment activity within the TPP. Japan increases the share of the world economy accounted for by TPP countries (including Canada and Mexico), from around about 30% to about 38%" (Fergusson, Cooper, Jurenas and Williams 2012, p. 11).

¹⁷⁹ Interview with Noriaki Abe, 19th March 2014

campaign” by the elites which consist not only of politicians, bureaucracies and economists, but also of the media is highlighted which can be seen as the roles of “organic intellectuals” in the neo-Gramscian sense. Naoi and Urata’s (2013) study exhibits that “it is not media’s reporting on the TPP’s effect on the national economy (such as unemployment and exporting industries), but rather, the media’s reporting on the partisan politics regarding the TPP that substantially shape citizens’ attitudes toward the TPP” (Naoi & Urata 2013, p. 338).¹⁸⁰

From the perspectives of some actors, joining the TPP would complement Japan’s moves in recent years to augment the U.S.-Japan alliance by strengthening Japan’s relationships with middle powers in and around the Asian region.¹⁸¹ Since economic liberalisation has been a core interest of this business group, the *Keidanren* also emphasises the significance of the alliance in consideration of potential economic growth with the expansion of economic liberalisation. The report on Joint Study for a Japan - U.S. Economic Partnership in 2006 notes that “The character of the alliance relationship between Japan and the U.S., based on the Japan - U.S. Security Treaty, has changed since the collapse of the Soviet Union and China’s transformation, but the role of the alliance as the pivot of the two countries’ political and national security will remain immutable. From the same general perspective, the creation of a framework for a systematic partnership in the economic field will also be essential for maintaining that pivot” (Keidanren 2006).

¹⁸⁰ Based upon the idea of “socio-tropic” formation of public opinion, it is argued that “the mass media reporting on the national economy (e.g. the unemployment rate and the stock market) shapes citizens’ socio-tropic trade preferences” (Naoi & Urata 2013, p. 337).

¹⁸¹ It is noted that although the U.S.-Japan alliance seems to be in militaristic terms, it is a prerequisite for the economic relationship with the US (Interview with Shujiro Urata, 9th April 2013). It is also remarked that the TPP is an element to improve the U.S.-Japan alliance (Interview with Kazuhiro Takahashi, 11th March 2013).

It is also crucial to underscore the transformed nature of the *Keidanren* with regard to ideology. In 2002, the *Nikkeiren* (Japan Federation of Employers' Associations) got integrated into the *Keidanren*. According to Sasaki (2007), the relationship between the US and Japan has become much more intimate since this amalgamation due to transnational nature of participating companies that are inclined to support liberalisation. Furthermore, in regard to Japan's attempt to join the TPP, Hagiwara (2013) characterises the movement for promoting the TPP as "the third reform". In particular, he categorises into the three periods of liberalisation; the Hashimoto's reform, the Koizumi reform and the reform for the TPP. Hagiwara (2013) analyses that the report about the TPP which was released under the Kan administration and almost the same content with the one previously published by the *Keidanren*. Not only that the neoliberal ideology of the *Keidanren* became strengthened, but also their policy influences got more visible which can be seen as the ideas got translated into practices.

Furthermore, some politicians have said that Japan's participation in the TPP would strengthen the U.S.-Japan alliance. For instance, Seiji Maehara has emphasised that joining the TPP would bolster the U.S.-Japan alliance.¹⁸² Yachi (2013) also remarks that "[the] TPP should be considered strategically for Japanese diplomacy and economic power" (Yachi 2013, p. 32). It is also indicated that "Japan's entry into the TPP is largely viewed, on the one hand, as an important step in forming a wider Asia-Pacific regional trade arrangement. On the other hand, the absence of Japan could undermine the credibility of the TPP as a viable regional trade arrangement and a setback for Asia-Pacific economic integration" (Fergusson,

¹⁸² At the symposium sponsored by Nikkei, one of the major newspaper companies, and the CSIS, in the late 2012, he emphasised that "in order to deepen the alliance, not only the diplomacy based on the security treaty but economic and trade relationships between the US and Japan are crucial. The TPP is a valid means in that regard" (Nikkei 2012).

Cooper, Jurenas and Williams 2012, p. 19). Kazuhito Yamashita, a researcher at The Canon Institute for Global Studies, also argues that “If Japan is not going to participate proactively in trade liberalization negotiations like the TPP that do away with trading partners' tariffs, Japanese agriculture will simply proceed with its assisted suicide” (Yamashita 2013).

The U.S. Chamber of Commerce and the U.S.-Japan Business Council (USJBC)¹⁸³, in separate submissions, also expressed support for Japan’s participation in the TPP negotiations. According to the chairman of the USJBC, “It is very encouraging to see that Prime Minister Abe has taken this bold step, which will help revitalize the Japanese economy and solidify the U.S.-Japan alliance” (U.S. Chamber of Commerce 2013). The USJBC also released the joint statement entitled “Pacific Partners: Opportunities for Collaboration and Growth in the 21st Century,” remarking that “the increasingly close and cooperative economic ties between our countries and the many opportunities to expand the commercial dimensions of our bilateral relationship in ways that will strengthen the overall U.S.-Japan alliance and contribute to sustained growth in both countries” (USJBC 2014, p. 1).

It is said that behind this push is a concern that China’s rise is diminishing Japan’s influence and jeopardising its security and economic interests. Fergusson, Cooper, Jurenas and Williams (2012) remark that “U.S. and Japanese participation in the same free trade agreement could arguably be viewed as a means to reaffirm their alliance. The long-running bilateral relationship at times over the years has been overshadowed by U.S. and Japanese interests and concerns elsewhere in Asia, for

¹⁸³ John C. Lechleiter, the chairman of the USJBC and also chairman, president and CEO of Eli Lilly & Co., a global pharmaceutical company, also indicates that “The TPP is a great opportunity for Japan to expand its exports of high-value specialty agricultural products” (Nikkei Asian Review 2014)


example, China and the Korean Peninsula, and in other parts of the world” (Fergusson, Cooper, Jurenas and Williams 2012, p. 13). The aforementioned discourse of pro-TPP is similar to the way Rupert displays in his work on the development of Fordism (Rupert 1995; Rupert 2000), the NAFTA and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) with the roles of business communities, scholars and politicians (Rupert 2000). As this section exhibits, while there are mixed ideas about economic regionalisation in consideration of the US presence in the region and domestic concerns, there is an increasing connection between the U.S.-Japan alliance and economic elements of the U.S.-Japan relationship which are closely linked relating to regionalism in the Asia-Pacific considering the institutions in Japan and the U.S.-Japan relationship. This can be seen as the way what Gramsci (1971) called the “long process” of socio-political change as a Fordist capitalism achieved some measure of institutional stability (Rupert 2000).

Neo-Gramscian Analysis of Economic Dimension of the U.S.-Japan Alliance

The previous section explores the economic facet of the U.S.-Japan alliance using social forces analysis in the neo-Gramscian sense. It displays some contestation about the ideas about bilateralism and multilateralism especially in the realm of liberalisation. However, especially in regard to the *Keidanren*’s shifting focus on policies with a more attention to the U.S.-Japan alliance, this section displays the gradual comprehension of such policies as the TPP with increasing supporters from both the US and Japan’s sides. Additionally, considering the ideational component of the U.S.-Japan alliance in the economic sense, the capitalist economy is the central notion of liberalisation particularly in the case of the TPP. When we consider the diagram that is presented at the beginning of this chapter, the TPP can be spotted in

the overlapping zone of material, institutional (i.e., the *Keidanren* and the USJBC) and the ideational aspects of the alliance. While opposing voices against the TPP remain, the section also explores in what ways policy campaigns via the media may have shaped the ideas about the relevance of the TPP and discourse on enhancing the U.S.-Japan alliance.

Diagram 5: Neo-Gramscian Analysis of Economic Dimension of the U.S.-Japan Alliance



Source: Author

Ideational Dimension of the U.S.-Japan Alliance

This section explores the ideational facet of the U.S.-Japan alliance by looking into the roles of shared values entailing democracy, capitalist economy, the rule of laws and human rights which have been weighed in political discourse. These ideas have played a larger role in the hands of MOFA officials with the particular focus on

such ideas as democracy and the rule of law. If we consider the roles of “organic intellectuals”, it can be said that these actors have contributed to create the discourse on important democratic norms in the U.S.-Japan alliance, which have also influenced Japanese foreign policymaking. It also further developed in other nations such as Australia and India in the realm of military activities on the basis of these shared values, which display the tremendous role of ideas in harnessing the U.S.-Japan alliance. In this sense, such joint military activities as the RIMPAC can be regarded as one example that falls into the category of the overlapping area of material, institutional and ideational components of the U.S.-Japan alliance.

Moses (2009) argues that the U.S.-Japan alliance has been founded upon the shared liberal-democratic values, which were seeded by the US, at least in a rhetorical sense. “According to him, “The contemporary articulation of these values was, of course, implanted and fostered by the United States following the defeat of Imperial Japan in WWII and the subsequent occupation under General McArthur, during which the Japanese Constitution was formulated” (Moses 2009, p. 4). As is indicated earlier, it is important to note that, during the Cold War era, the “Free World” discourse put emphasis on the relevance of the shared values which was the US’ attempt to challenge the Soviet system. Even in the Japanese official documents note that “In line with postwar Japan’s choice to rebuild itself as a trading nation, it acceded to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in 1955, and in the 1960s it joined the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) as one of the ‘three pillars’ of the free world” (Kantei 2000). In addition, the focus of the diplomacy of former Japanese Prime Minister Eisuke Sato was the U.S.-Japan relationship and economic development. Nakajima (2008) argues that the negotiation of Okinawa’s return was

based upon the continuity of Article Nine and the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty for maintaining the “Free World”.

It is observable that ideas have played a key role in strengthening the significance of the alliance. The theme of shared values has been persistently expressed since the end of the Cold War. Müllerson (2008) notes that “The end of the Cold War did not end the attempts to use concepts, such as democracy and human rights, as ideological tools to undermine other States” (Müllerson 2008, p. 1). He also indicates that the end of the Cold War was the indication of a triumph of the Western style democracy and market economy over the Soviet version of communism (Müllerson 2008). It is also worth noting that, throughout the 1990s, the Clinton administration focused on democracy promotion as a central pillar of American foreign policy seeking Japan’s support for liberal reform in Asia.¹⁸⁴ In addition, during the 2000 presidential campaign, Bush promised to build “strong democratic alliances” in Asia that would leave China “unthreatened, but not unchecked” (FAS 1999). While these two administrations made use of values in foreign policymaking in different ways, the role of values has been important in US foreign policymaking.¹⁸⁵

Although the term, “values”, is not used, the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty indicates that “Japan and the United States of America, Desiring to strengthen the bonds of peace and friendship traditionally existing between them, and to uphold the principles of democracy, individual liberty, and the rule of law” (Ministry of Defence 2013). In fact, the principles of democracy, the individual, and the rule of

¹⁸⁴ This also reflects Japanese policies at that time that China remained the largest recipient of Japanese overseas development assistance, and Tokyo was Myanmar’s largest aid donor despite brutal misrule by the military junta in Yangon.

¹⁸⁵ Interview with Fumiaki Kubo, 10th April 2013.

law are regarded as “fundamental values (*kihonteki kachi*)” in the Japanese version while it has not been directly translated into the English version. It is also noted in the Mainichi news article that “The Japan-U.S. alliance is not a mere defense alliance but one based on common values shared by advanced democracies such as human rights awareness and cultural maturity, which has formed an asset for Japanese diplomacy” (Mainichi Japan 2014). This exhibits that the ideational components of the U.S.-Japan alliance are considered important.

Values-based Diplomacy and the U.S.-Japan Alliance

In a diplomatic sense, increasingly, Japan, particularly under Prime Ministers Koizumi, Abe and Aso, has become enthusiastic in promoting a values-based security arrangement with the US and worked as the core driver of the values-based security community in the Asia-Pacific region (Moses 2009). In fact, the roles of Prime Minister may imply a defining factor of the U.S.-Japan alliance. Bush and Koizumi highlighted the theme of shared values in the June 2001 joint statement at Camp David and the Koizumi administration has emphasised democracy and universal values in subsequent meetings. Koizumi subsequently gave clear voice to the democratic norms underpinning Japan’s role in Asia in his speech to the 50th anniversary of the Bandung Asia-Africa summit on 22 April 2005 in which he argued, “[W]e should all play an active role ... in disseminating universal values such as the rule of law, freedom, and democracy” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2005).

In the alliance context, on June 2006, the then Prime Minister Koizumi had a summit meeting with President Bush at the White House, in Washington, D.C. The joint statement was released that contained the subheading “The US-Japan Alliance Based on Universal Values and Common Interests”. This section of the joint

statement contained a clear example of the values-security linkage that is the subject of this paper, claiming that “The United States and Japan stand together not only against mutual threats but also for the advancement of core universal values such as freedom, human dignity and human rights, democracy, the market economy, and the rule of law” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2006).¹⁸⁶ Furthermore, this statement of shared values and interests was followed by the claim that the Asian continent as a whole was now undergoing a transformation in line with these universal values. During the discussion, the two leaders agreed that “the United States and Japan stand together not only against mutual threats but also for the advancement of core universal values such as freedom, human dignity and human rights, democracy, the market economy, and the rule of law” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2006). It was also clearly stated that these common values and common interests “form the basis of U.S.-Japan regional and global cooperation”. According to Hosoya (2011), “the Japanese Government focused on sharing these “universal values” between the US and Japan mainly to strengthen the alliance further, as this would strengthen the alliance in the twenty-first century” (Hosoya 2011, p. 16).

“Values-Oriented” Diplomacy and “Arc of Freedom and Prosperity”

The discourse on liberal change and democracy promotion in the alliance between the US and Japan handed over to the leadership of Shinzo Abe during his first administration. On November 2006, in a similar line to Koizumi, Abe remarked that “Japan and U.S. share an alliance which is based on fundamental values, such as

¹⁸⁶ It is also noted that “These values are deeply rooted in the long historic traditions of both countries. The United States and Japan share interests in: winning the war on terrorism; maintaining regional stability and prosperity; promoting free market ideals and institutions; upholding human rights; securing freedom of navigation and commerce, including sea lanes; and enhancing global energy security”.

freedom, democracy, basic human rights and the rule of law. And we agreed with each other that strengthening our alliance would be a good in maintaining peace and security of not just Japan and the region surrounding Japan, but the entire world” (U.S. Department of State 2006). Universal values provided the ideational glue for a series of speeches and joint statements by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe in 2006 and 2007 initiating new strategic relationships for Japan with the NATO, Australia and India.

Under this administration, Foreign Minister Taro Aso emphasised the relevance of this theme in a 2005 speech entitled “Japan as the Thought Leader of Asia”, in which he argued that Japan stands as a model for Asia based on its success through adherence to the principles of market economics and democracy. In 2006 and 2007, the Japanese MOFA organised a major foreign policy initiative around the concept of an “Arc of Freedom and Prosperity”¹⁸⁷ with a series of speeches that emphasised Japan’s commitment to advancing democracy, human rights and rule of law from the Baltic States to Southeast Asia. According to Aso (2007),

On November 30 I delivered a speech in which I established a fourth pillar of Japanese diplomacy, adding to the three pillars, namely the Japan-US alliance, international cooperation, and an emphasis on neighboring Asian nations. Under the title of ‘Arc of Freedom and Prosperity,’ I set forth a policy of working to create this Arc, a region that would be prosperous and stable with a foundation in universal values, stretching from Southeast Asia to South Asia, Central Asia, the Middle East, Central and Eastern Europe, and the Baltic states (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2007).

MOFA officials basically focused much more on the strengthening of the U.S.-Japan alliance, and also on the importance of cooperation with democratic countries

¹⁸⁷ It was remarked by Karen Makishima, a member of the LDP, that the promotion of Japanese technology in developing countries can be seen as an activity of the “Arc of Freedom and Prosperity + α ” where Japan’s “soft power” is able to play a tremendous role by strengthening the Japan’s presence in the context of the U.S.-Japan alliance (Interview with Karen Makishima, 25th April 2013).

(Hosoya 2011). Its Diplomatic Bluebook features an explanation of the concept of this Arc of Freedom and Prosperity, indicating that this vision “adds another pillar of Japanese diplomacy to the existing pillars of reinforcement of the Japan-US alliance, international cooperation, most notably under the auspices of the United Nations, and enhancing relationships with neighboring countries such as China, the Republic of Korea (ROK), and Russia” (MOFA 2007, p. 2). It further remarks that “This new pillar of Japanese diplomacy involves placing emphasis on universal values such as freedom, democracy, fundamental human rights, the rule of law, and the market economy and creating an Arc of Freedom and Prosperity” (MOFA 2007, p. 2).¹⁸⁸ Hosoya (2011) also argues that “Such values as freedom and democracy, not purely economic interests in East Asia, should be the central principle of Japan’s foreign policy” (Hosoya 2011, p.17).

Senior Japanese MOFA officials¹⁸⁹, who can be regarded as organic intellectuals in a neo-Gramscian sense, contributed to Japan’s shift toward a values-based foreign policy under the first Abe administration.¹⁹⁰ For instance, Shotaro Yachi¹⁹¹, Special Advisor to the Abe cabinet and also director of the National Security Council (NSC) of Japan under the second Abe administration, first suggested the idea of the “Arc of Freedom and Prosperity” to then Foreign Minister Aso in 2006. In addition,

¹⁸⁸ It further notes that “In concrete terms, Japan will be acting in partnership with other nations that share our fundamental values to jointly bring about a society characterized by both freedom and prosperity by cooperating in the areas of trade and investment as well as by making use of official development assistance to provide support for basic human needs such as health care and education, support to enable democracy to take root, and support to enhance infrastructure and legal frameworks. This will be one of the critical building blocks of the Arc of Freedom and Prosperity and will furthermore contribute to the realization of “human security” that Japan has been advocating” (MOFA 2007, pp. 2-3).

¹⁸⁹ As it is indicated in Chapter Two, the MOFA has had influences on foreign policymaking particularly in the field of the U.S.-Japan alliance.

¹⁹⁰ It is remarked that these actors have been monopolised by politicians including Abe in the realm of “values-oriented diplomacy” (Interview with Yoshihide Soeya, 4th April 2013).

¹⁹¹ He served as Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs from 2005 to 2008 and was a foreign policy advisor to Shinzo Abe in during the first Abe administration. When Abe became Prime Minister again in late 2012, he selected Yachi to be a Special Advisor to his cabinet.

Nobukatsu Kanehara¹⁹², Assistant Chief Cabinet Secretary and Vice Director of the NSC, has also persistently supported for creating foreign policies that advance universal values (Akita, Kaneda, Taniguchi & Yachi 2011, p. 391). Kanehara (2011) argues that Japan's strategic agenda should entail engaging with a rising China in a manner that will induce it to become a responsible power. According to him, values-based diplomacy is a means to achieve this goal and thus necessary for Japan's security and prosperity (Kanehara 2011, pp. 80-88). Moreover, considerable support among Japanese politicians for a foreign policy built on democratic values and principles has emerged. For instance, the Association for the Promotion of Values-Based Diplomacy (*kachikan gaiko wo suishin suru giin no kai*) was created on May 2007.

Enhancing Relationships with Other US Allies

Regarding the important role of the values in the U.S.-Japan alliance, Japan has developed its relationships with US allies. The US exhorts intra-allied cooperation and encourages bilateral or trilateral dialogues: "Australia-Japan-US," "Japan-India-US," "Australia-South-Korea," "Australia-Japan" or "India-Japan". With regard to Australia, values discourse is evident at the heart of the security relationship between Australia and Japan. In a joint statement to the press following the meeting of Prime Ministers Howard and Koizumi in 2002, the "long-standing close ties and cooperation between Australia and Japan were recognised as being 'based on their shared values of democracy, freedom, the rule of law and market-based economies'" (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2002). It was in the context of these cordial relations that increased military cooperation rapidly developed, reaching a peak with the

¹⁹² He served Yachi at the Directorate of Policy Planning and is known for shrewd strategic thinking,

signing of the formal Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation in March 2007. Australia and Japan also signed a joint declaration on security cooperation and entered into the Australia – Japan - U.S. Trilateral Strategic Dialogue (TSD) in 2007 with skilful internal political shaping and external diplomacy including Japanese support of Australia's participation in ASEAN and other regional forums, and Australian support of Japan's efforts to become a permanent member of the UN Security Council. Common strategic goals include countering the often unilateral approach of the US in the region, especially toward China; supporting the US and regional efforts to improve security and capacity development; and engaging China in multilateral forums, such as the ARF, to convince it to become a more transparent and responsible regional partner. An example of the success of the TSD is Australia's participation in annual Proliferation Security Initiative maritime interception exercises with its U.S. and Japanese naval partners aimed at the illegal trade of weapons and weapons of mass destruction (WMD) technology.

In terms of Japan's relationship with India, reciprocal visits between Prime Ministers Singh and Abe in December 2006 and August 2007 advanced the fledgling partnership. In addition to a series of economic cooperation agreements, including a feasibility study for an FTA, the leaders looked to enhance the military-to-military relationship. For instance, all three SDF chiefs visited India in 2006-2007, and Indian vessels visited Yokosuka Naval Base outside of Tokyo (Chanlett-Avery 2008). Other defence initiatives include sea-lane security cooperation, military exchanges, and regular meetings of both navies. Although support for bilateral ties remains, Abe has stepped down and Singh has struggled politically, leaving some questions as to whether the leadership in both Tokyo and New Delhi intends to maintain the momentum of the signed agreements. The Malabar exercises

have traditionally been U.S.-India bilateral exercises, which began in 1994. The April 2007 exercises featured the US, India, and Japan, and were held off the coast of Okinawa. A second round of exercises held in September was expanded to include the navies of Australia and Singapore (U.S. Department of the Navy 2007). The navies together practiced maritime interdiction, surface and antisubmarine warfare, and air combat exercises. Military officials leading the exercises emphasised the value of practicing interoperability, for use in both high-level warfighting and future humanitarian responses. Japan's "normalisation" within the framework of a broader community of like-minded nations, will reassure the region that Japan does not intend to seek hegemony (Blumenthal 2005, p.6). Japan has developed its relationship not only with the US but also with US allies while the alliance relationship is seen as the cornerstone for Japanese diplomacy.

Japan's Democracy Promotion

Japan's intention to bolster democracy abroad can be seen in the realm of Japanese foreign aid policy which exhibits a greater ideational role in the U.S.-Japan alliance in a neo-Gramscian sense. The 2012 ODA white paper, which was released in March 2013, states that "expanding support for countries that share strategic interests and the universal values of freedom and democracy with Japan is crucial in attaining a free, prosperous, and stable international community with the goal of securing peace and stability in developing countries," the white paper enshrined democracy support as the first and foremost principle of the country's foreign engagement.¹⁹³ Its approach to foreign aid in various countries with the ASEAN Plus Three framework demonstrates Japan's democratic support in practice. Japan's calls

¹⁹³ It is noted that the relevance of these values has been listed in Japan's ODA three principles before 1995 (Interview with Tomohiko Taniguchi, 14th March 2013).

for democratisation in Myanmar began several years ago. During an October 2009 summit between Japan and the states of the Mekong River region, consisting of Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, Thailand, and Vietnam, Japan insisted that the chair's statement following the meeting of foreign ministers include language calling for democratisation in Myanmar despite firm opposition from the Myanmar government (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2009). Since Myanmar's democratisation, Japan has begun investing a substantial amount of the ODA in rebuilding Myanmar's economic infrastructure. After the liberalisation process began in 2011, Japan started assisting Myanmar on the rule of law and economic reform through a series of seminars.

Yet, it is also remarked that Japan's support for democracy in the region is not sufficient. Ichihara (2014) indicates that the Japanese government did not release a statement when Nguyen Dan Que, a well-known prodemocracy activist, was detained by the Vietnamese government after calling for a democratisation movement and Japan has refrained from support for Chinese civil society¹⁹⁴ in the midst of struggling for democracy. Another interesting remark by Ichihara (2014) is that "the absence of foundations such as the U.S. National Endowment for Democracy, which is administered as a private organization but funded primarily by the U.S. government, makes it difficult for Japan to assist civil society actors through quasi-private channels" (Ichihara 2014). It is important to remark that the Japanese support for democracy can be thin in terms of substance while the tone of its policy is significant. Ichihara (2014) argues that their assistance to new and emerging

¹⁹⁴ It is crucial to remark that "Japan has been reluctant to provide direct support to civil society actors in general. A report from the Japan International Cooperation Agency states that providing direct support for NGOs entails bypassing state institutions, which could weaken citizens' trust in, and the accountability of, the government and is therefore not desirable" (Ichihara 2014)

democracies remained somewhat marginal, while Japan saw democracy support as a useful tool for counterbalancing China's influence.

Additionally, recently, in the Japanese political arena, the emergence of nationalism has become another component in understanding political circumstances in Japan,¹⁹⁵ and its relationship with other neighbouring countries, particularly South Korea. Japan-South Korea defence cooperation remains extremely limited due to long-standing historical animosities. It is remarked that "In July 2012, South Korea and Japan came to the brink of signing a military information-sharing agreement, but domestic political considerations led the government of South Korea's President at the time, Lee Myung-bak, to abort the agreement at the last minute. The proposed agreement, known as a General Sharing of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA), would have enabled more robust bilateral cooperation (and trilateral cooperation with the U.S. military) on BMD, as well as disaster relief, counter-piracy, and other operations" (Rinehart, Lawrence and Hildreth 2013, p. 11). This reflects the recent trilateral meeting on the sidelines of the Hague Nuclear Security Summit between the US, Japan and South Korea in order to ameliorate the tensions between Japan and South Korea, while the issue of comfort women was not discussed but instead the North Korean issue was the main focus (Fackler 2014).

Nonetheless, the role of values with a particular focus on democracy and the rule of law has been increasing by harnessing the relevance of the U.S.-Japan alliance. Recently, the component of "the rule of law" that belongs to the common values of the US and Japan has played an important role although it has stirred controversies about their attitudes toward China. At the opening dinner of the Shangri-La Dialogue

¹⁹⁵ It is noted that there can be a danger of weakening Japan's soft power and being abandoned by the United States due to historical problems including the comfort women issue and the Yasukuni shrine (Interview with anonymous, 5th April 2013).

on 2014, Prime Minister Abe delivered a strong message to uphold the rule of law under his new “Proactive Contribution to Peace”, or proactive pacifism, while US Secretary of Defence Hagel pointed out several security priorities: settling disputes through peaceful means, following international rules, and strengthening the defence capabilities of the allies. Abe remarked that “the rule of law at sea becomes a matter of common sense” (Abe 2014) which shows how norms are translated into power.¹⁹⁶ Hagel also reused George Marshall’s words that “the strength of a nation does not depend alone on its armies, ships and planes...[but] is also measured by...the strength of its friends and [its] allies” (International Institute for Strategic Studies 2014) that shows US reapplication of a Cold War strategy by creating alliances and partners.

According to Green and Twining (2008), “The United States’ greatest source of soft power in Asia is the Asian embrace of democracy. Modernity today is defined by democratic capitalism and a culture of opportunity...America’s Asia strategy is premised not only on the projection of US military power but on the promotion of democracy, and strategic cooperation among militarily capable regional democracies (Green & Twining 2008, p. 23). The U.S.-Japan alliance has increasingly developed its role to promote universal values. In consideration of the roles of values and ideas in the postwar period, it was seen as relevant presumably due to ideological struggles between the US and USSR. Still, in the post-Cold War era, the shared or common values entailing democracy, capitalism and the rule of law are seen as important in the context of the U.S.-Japan alliance.

¹⁹⁶ However, it is noted that there can be a security dilemma not only in the realm of the military sphere but also the “values” realms (Interview with Taku Ishikawa, 5th March 2013).

“Panoramic Perspective of the World Map” Diplomacy

Under the second Abe administration, the role of values has become more important, which is observable in its foreign policymaking. While it is said that the basic strategy of values-oriented diplomacy still remains as the basis of foreign policy under this administration, the emphasis on the alliance has strengthened indeed. Yachi (2014) argues that the second Abe administration’s focus on the U.S.-Japan alliance is the centre of Japanese foreign policy by learning from the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ)’s mistakes. According to him,

“The DPJ administration of Hatoyama Yukio gave the impression that it wanted to shift the axis of Japan’s foreign policy from the Japan-US alliance to Asia, but the Abe cabinet has made it clear that its Asian diplomatic initiative is premised on the centrality of the Japan-US alliance” (Nippon.com 2014).

Abe’s foreign policy has upgraded from a values-oriented to a “panoramic perspective of the world map”, or “bird’s-eye view of global affairs” although “the underlying concept is still operative” (Nippon.com 2014).¹⁹⁷ This also shows the second Abe administration’s aim at developing its relationship with countries in the Asia-Pacific region with a particular focus on Southeast Asia that may possibly enhance a US-led alliance network.


Neo-Gramscian Analysis of Ideational Dimension of the U.S.-Japan Alliance

The ideational aspect of the U.S.-Japan alliance is explored by means of social forces analysis in the neo-Gramscian sense. Particularly, in the realm of ideas, it has played a larger role in the hands of MOFA officials with the particular focus on such ideas as democracy and the rule of law. If we consider the roles of “organic

¹⁹⁷ It is also noted that Abe developed his diplomacy reflecting the strategy of Kishi, who was his grandfather, by visiting Southeast Asia.

intellectuals”, it can be said that these actors have contributed to create the discourse on important liberal democratic norms of the U.S.-Japan alliance which have also influenced the Japanese foreign policymaking including the ODA as the case of Myanmar exhibited, while it can be said that democratic promotion cannot be fully implemented in the way other scholars acknowledge. It has also been further developed in other nations such as Australia and India in the realm of military activities on the basis of the shared values which display a tremendous role of ideas in harnessing the U.S.-Japan alliance. In this sense, such joint military activities as RIMPAC can be regarded as one example that falls into the category of the overlapping area of material, institutional and ideational components of the U.S.-Japan alliance.

Diagram 6: Neo-Gramscian Analysis of Ideational Dimension of the U.S.-Japan Alliance



Source: Author

Regionalism in the Asia-Pacific

From Hub-and-Spokes System to “Alliance Network”

The US “hub-and-spoke system” has been developed into an “alliance network” with a different mechanism especially with the transforming roles of the US and its allies.¹⁹⁸ According to Sahashi (2011), “The United States and its allies have included many non-traditional security issues among the global security threats they are addressing, and the same trend is evident in cooperation among the ‘spoke’ countries” (Sahashi 2011, p. 9).¹⁹⁹ Tow and Archarya (2007) argue that “Cold War alliances in Asia are now being supplanted by new types of US bilateral security relationships, both within those original alliances and beyond them” (Tow & Archarya 2007, p. 17).²⁰⁰ A more flexible nature of alliance and security relationships has diluted the hierarchical characteristics of US power in the realm of alliance politics in the Asia-Pacific (Tow & Archarya 2007). They also exemplify that “The so-called San Francisco System (SFS) is clearly transforming from a hub and spokes arrangement of exclusive bilateralism, exclusively supported by the US

¹⁹⁸ However, it is argued that in substance, the hub-and-spokes system has not changed but rather the alliance network is based upon this system. In this sense, it is integrated into US strategic planning (Interview with Tomohiko Satake, 25th March 2013). The similar view that the nature of the hub-and-spokes system remains is acknowledged (Interview with Chiyuki Aoi, 8th April 2013).

¹⁹⁹ He also notes that “The US alliance network has been building on the existing alliances and further strengthening itself by increasing cooperation with non-allied countries as well...there is an awareness that the United States and its alliance network will remain predominant in the region for the foreseeable future. There is little rationale for any country in the region to accept China’s political influence to the extent that it entails relinquishing its own autonomy” (Sahashi 2011, p. 2).

²⁰⁰ They identify the following factors engendering such supplantation: (1) a broadening of the purview of existing bilateral alliances, essentially replacing them with ‘coalitions of the willing’ (India, Singapore); (2) regional/global disjunctures; (3) domestic politics; and (4) linkage of bilateral security with transnational issues (Tow & Archarya 2007, p. 12).

power, into a more fluid set of dyadic alliances in which what occurs in each alliance has a clear impact upon the others (Tow & Archarya 2007, p. 38).²⁰¹

Le Mière (2013) indicates that “the system is being transformed into a more diffuse and distributed alliance structure that has been labelled a ‘spoke-to-spoke’ system” (Le Mière 2013, p. 35). Nair (2009) observes that “A closer look at America’s interests and hegemonic preferences discloses the complex nature of US power in Asia” (Nair 2009, p. 129). It is also remarked that “America’s preference for bilateral alliances over any multilateral or regional project is not only an outcome of the unstable security politics of the region, but also because of the advantages it presents for its grand strategy” (Nair 2009, p. 129; Beeson 2009, pp. 550–554). The role of the U.S.-Japan alliance has become more important in regard to the context of regionalism in the Asia-Pacific not only militarily but also economically and ideationally and also has become more prominent particularly with the US’ return to Asia strategy.

Regionalism as a Contested Concept

Defining regionalism in the Asia-Pacific can be debatable due to its complicated political dynamism. Regionalisation in the Asia-Pacific in the 1970s and 1980s appeared to be different from the one in the post-Cold War period not only with the presence of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), but with the US presence. ASEAN was formed in 1967 in the aftermath of the decolonisation process and the Cold War influenced multilateralism in the Asia-Pacific (Beeson 2003).

Quite a few analysts of regional processes distinguish between those processes that

²⁰¹ It is remarked that the hub-and-spokes system has transformed into alliance networking with the focus on 1) US bases, 2) preposition and 3) rotation which are dynamic (Interview with Motohiro Ono, 16th April 2013).

are largely the uncoordinated consequence of private sector-led economic integration, regionalisation, on the one hand, and those processes of regionally based co-operation and co-ordination that are the self-consciously driven consequences of political activities, regionalism, on the other (Breslin & Higgott 2000, pp. 333-52). Considering the conditions in the Asia-Pacific region unlike Europe, some scholars have attempted to characterise the features of the Asia-Pacific regionalism. Nair (2009) identifies the regionalism in the Asia-Pacific as “frustrated regionalism” which is “a state where regional projects in Asia are unable to realize the stated end goals of the regional project that are articulated in state discourse: a holistic conception of regionalism embodied in the persistent calls for ‘peace, security, prosperity and progress’ and a regional community invested with shared identities and aspirations among people and governments” (Nair 2009, p. 113).

Bae and Moon (2005) generate the idea called “regional complex” where “a security complex can be reinterpreted as the combination of physical arrangements of component parts and underlying ideas and impulses affecting interactions among those parts (Bae and Moon 2005, p. 10).²⁰² In a different approach, He (2012) examines “hybrid regionalism” by revisiting Hugh White’s notion of “a concert of powers” in Asia. In his account, “The advantage of hybrid regionalism is that both the US and China are a part of the process and play certain leadership roles” (He 2012, p. 684). He explicates that “The US-led model of Asia-Pacific regionalism clashes with China’s model of so-called harmonious Asian regional cooperation. Each of these models on its own is problematic and unworkable as the regional suspicion of regionalism on the part of these great powers has become stronger” (He

²⁰² They also argue that not only military power but new security concerns such as economic prosperity, ecological integrity, communal harmony, and societal stability have become equally significant, blurring the conventional hierarchy of security values that exhibits a wider range of issues to be considered (Bae & Moon 2005).

2012, p. 679). This may lead to make regionalism more confused with the presence of the US, which means the lack of ideological foundations is the issue in the region” (CSIS 2011, p. 35).

Inclusive Regionalism with the US as US-led Historic Bloc in the Asia-Pacific?

US Rebalance Strategy to Asia and the Responses

The US “Pivot to Asia” has been seen as a strategy for the US to retain its power in East Asia materially, economically and ideationally. Secretary of State Clinton’s foreign policy article “America’s Pacific Century” (2011) reaffirmed the US role as a Pacific power by stressing the importance of Asia policy. Her article outlined the six pillars which are: 1) strengthening bilateral security alliances; 2) deepening cooperative relations with China and other emerging powers; 3) engaging in the region’s multilateral institutions (e.g. East Asian Summit (EAS)); 4) expanding trade and investment (e.g. the TPP); 5) pursuing a broad-based military presence; and 6) strengthening democracy and human rights (Clinton 2011). All military, economic and ideational perspectives on strategy are considered and the US-led alliance system remains to be a crucial component in US grand strategy. The article has been to date the most comprehensive and well-developed elaboration of the US pivot to Asia, stressing US leadership in building regional institutions to tackle challenges, and expounding on “forward-deployed diplomacy” (Ling 2013, pp. 149-150).

While some criticisms against the US pivot to Asia²⁰³ exist, others point out that “Asian countries have expectations about the deterrence posture and public goods

²⁰³ Ling (2013) points out three problems occurred with the US “pivot to Asia”: 1) creating a “Georgia Scenario”, 2) fuelling the suspicion of US containment and increased U.S.-China distrust, and 3) disrupting ongoing regional processes in Asia with its own regional architecture (e.g. East Asia Summit (EAS), the TPP).

that the United States will provide, and the process through which the United States and small and medium-sized states have mutually reconfirmed the Obama administration's 'return to Asia' has offered a certain level of satisfaction in that respect" (Sahashi 2011, p. 2). Park (2012) indicates that "Asia's pivot to the US" exists which illustrates not only from the US perspective but also from Asian perspectives. In his account, most countries in the region had been repeatedly calling for a more active US presence throughout Asia, pivoting towards the US long before the announced US pivot to Asia. Most countries in the region want peace, stability and economic prosperity, and most understand that these goals are better guaranteed with an active US regional presence (Park 2012). Park (2012) argues that the crucial aspect of the US pivot to Asia, or rebalance to Asia, is its continuous engagement in the region with renewed vitality.

According to Le Mière (2013), "A more accurate phrase would have been a 'rebalance of burdens in Asia'. since the strategy contains, beyond the oft-discussed military, economic and diplomatic elements, a burden-sharing (or burden-shifting) component that aims to rebalance responsibility for security in Asia from the United States to its allies" (Le Mière 2013, p. 31).²⁰⁴ It is also noted that "The TPP is the leading U.S. trade policy initiative of the Obama Administration and a core component of Administration efforts to 'rebalance' U.S. foreign policy priorities toward the Asia-Pacific region by playing a more active role in shaping the region's rules and norms" (Fergusson, Cooper, Jurenas and Williams 2012, p. 6).²⁰⁵ The Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)'s (2011) report on foreign

²⁰⁴ It is also noted that the US needs the "reciprocal substantiated" role of its allies due to its financial difficulty (Interview with Fumiaki Kubo, 10th April 2013).

²⁰⁵ It is remarked that "The United States and Japan share some common objectives, including strong intellectual property rights protection; protection of foreign investment; clear rules of origin to facilitate trade; and market access for services" (Fergusson, Cooper, Jurenas and Williams 2012, p. 6)..

assessments of US power indicated that “Most see the United States in decline relative to rising powers like China but do not see a fundamentally new order emerging in the next decade” (CSIS 2011, p.2).

It is unsurprising that US allies including Japan and South Korea see the necessity of the US role in East Asia. Being embedded in the postwar liberal order, Japan has been a close ally. Japan has seen the alliance as a pillar of its diplomacy. The new concept of U.S.-Japan “Dynamic Defence Cooperation” is based on both a rebalancing of the US military strategy and Japan’s dynamic defence force concept that focuses upon operation of the SDF (Satake 2012). Not only militarily but economically, Japan has supported the TPP which may contribute to the free market that is desired by the US. In regard to the South Korean viewpoint, “The United States and Korea will forever be tied together as two prominent liberal democracies in Asia...Koreans view themselves as a model example of the U.S. Cold War experiment—emergence from a war-torn society into a global economic power with an open political system” (CSIS 2011, p. 36). It is also remarked that “Koreans and Asians are watching very closely the fate of the KORUS FTA and the Trans-Pacific Partnership. U.S. support for free trade is a public good in Asia” (CSIS 2011, p.43). Whilst its power is relatively declining, the US presence is seen as important in East Asia which can be seen as the consensual aspect of US hegemony, or the US-led historic bloc in the Asia-Pacific in the neo-Gramscian sense.

Neo-Gramscian View of Regionalism in the Asia-Pacific

From the neo-Gramscian viewpoint, it is observable that, with the application of US pressure, the coercive and consensual aspects of hegemony were operated in the context of the U.S.-Japan alliance and regionalism in the Asia-Pacific. In the early

1990s, the US pressured Japan, South Korea, and other nations to reject the EAEG proposal, which threatened to stunt APEC's development and impede US efforts at "open" trans-Pacific liberalisation. Nair (2009) explains that regionalism has been developed with the US presence. According to him, "its inherent concept[ual] constrains in fully accounting for the complex structures of security in Asia, and the regions profound dependence on extra-regional actors. This specifically refers to the continued importance of the United States and the hub-and-spoke arrangement of bilateral alliances it underwrites in the region" (Nair 2009, p. 124). Bobrow (1999) indicates that "Hegemony management in the Asia-Pacific for now has come down to an alliance of political factions and ideological sympathizers each of which looks to the other for help" (Bobrow 1999, p. 194). As is illustrated in the previous sections, the U.S.-Japan alliance has been relevant not only in the military but also in the economic and ideational sense. From Japanese perspectives, economic and ideational aspects of the alliance are taken into account not only in ministries but also business communities, prominently led by the *Keidanren*. In this regard, the U.S.-Japan alliance has strengthened which may have also bolstered US hegemony, or the US-led historic bloc, in the region. In neo-Gramscian terms, not only the coercive but consensual aspect of hegemony has enabled the US hegemony to remain and may have harnessed the US-led historic bloc in the region.

Conclusion

This chapter scrutinises the economic and ideational aspects of the U.S.-Japan alliance by using social forces analysis by focusing on the role of institutions or actors such as the MOFA and the *Keidanren*. It appears the increasing economic and ideational roles of the U.S.-Japan alliance have strengthened for regional stability in

the Asia-Pacific. This chapter also investigates the role of the US-led alliance system in this region while reconfiguring the concept of regionalism. Since this notion remains contestable in the Asia-Pacific, the chapter illustrates regional processes in regard to US presence and conceptual discussions about regionalism. With an increasing significance of the US-led alliance system in the Asia-Pacific which has been a component of regionalism, the U.S.-Japan alliance has increased its relevance in the context of regional stability. The concept of “bilateralism *plus* multilateralism” was also exemplified to underline Japan’s attempt to balance between bilateralism and multilateralism. The former is based upon the traditional style of Japanese security foreign policies where the latter was a new attempt especially for the METI. Taking into account the current characteristics of the U.S.-Japan alliance and the US-led alliance system in the Asia-Pacific, the nature of US hegemony in the region can be interpreted in a neo-Gramscian sense. Regarding US’ “pivot to Asia” or “rebalance to Asia”, it is not only the US but also US allies and other Asian countries that view the US presence as crucial for regional stability in the Asia-Pacific.

With the idea of “inclusive regionalism with the US”, this chapter highlights the role of the US-led alliances including the U.S.-Japan alliance which exhibit consensual aspects of hegemony from the neo-Gramscian perspective. This may lay out the possibility of adopting the neo-Gramscian account of hegemony to regionalism in order to investigate the interplay of coercion and consensus in the formation of the US-led historic bloc. While it can be difficult to make a clear-cut distinction between coercion and consensus, focusing not merely on hegemonic but also non-hegemonic states which provide opportunities to explore the role of consensus in strengthening hegemony in the region. In the context of the U.S.-Japan alliance, this chapter attempts to clarify the transformation of Japanese foreign

policymaking not only in regard to the influence of US policies but also international environmental changes such as the emergence of multilateralism. At the same time, it is observable that Japan has preferred to keep the essence of bilateralism instead of shifting completely away from bilateralism.

Chapter Six: “The U.S.-Japan Alliance” as Common Sense²⁰⁶?

Introduction

Chapter Six examines whether the U.S.-Japan alliance, which has been regarded as the pillar of the Japanese foreign security policy since the postwar period, is “common sense” or not from the neo-Gramscian perspective. While Chapter Four and Chapter Five closely scrutinise the practices within the alliance mechanism, this chapter illustrates the way the “U.S.-Japan alliance” is perceived by looking into the rhetoric of the “U.S.-Japan alliance”. Considering the recent trends of the alliance such as “Operation Tomodachi”, the perception toward the alliance relationship may have become more acceptable in Japanese society. One noticeable change is its increasing usage of the term of the “U.S.-Japan alliance” in the media, academia and the public in Japan, which demonstrates an increasing acceptance of the alliance relationship. As is clarified in Chapter Three, it was not been officially used in the public until the official speech by the then Japanese Prime Minister Zenko Suzuki who referred to the U.S.-Japan relationship as an “alliance” in 1981. Although it does not necessarily mean that this relationship as an alliance was widely accepted in Japanese society, the term of the “U.S.-Japan alliance” was increasingly used more often than the “U.S.-Japan Security Treaty” particularly after the end of the Cold War.

In this respect, it is important to examine the pervasiveness of using the term “U.S.-Japan alliance” in political, academic and public discourse that used to be seen as taboo in the postwar era. In order to explore a widespread recognition of the U.S.-

²⁰⁶ As Rupert (1998) notes, “common sense was understood to be a syncretic historical residue, fragmentary and contradictory, open to multiple interpretations and potentially supportive of very different kinds of social visions and political projects” (Rupert 1998, p. 428).

Japan alliance, its features as “common sense” shall be studied using the neo-Gramscian framework. Although “alliance adrift” may have occurred due to such factors as the end of the Cold War and the Okinawa rape incident in 1995, it seems that the alliance relationship between the US and Japan has deepened nonetheless. It is crucial to explore the transformation of the discourse of the U.S.-Japan alliance whilst it is also important to take into account counter-hegemonic discourse regarding unsolved issues including US bases. This chapter aims to exhibit the way the U.S.-Japan alliance may have become “common sense” in the face of counter-hegemonic forces in a neo-Gramscian sense. As is explicated in Chapter Two, this chapter adopts the neo-Gramscian discourse analysis in order to underscore the relationship between language and hegemony using such resources as the Japanese Diet Record, news media and policy recommendations by think tanks. Japanese, policy intellectuals, scholars and other relevant actors who can be regarded as “organic intellectuals” in the neo-Gramscian sense, have played influential roles in producing the discourse on the U.S.-Japan alliance.

This chapter is structured as follows: first, the approach is exemplified by utilising Rupert’s (1995) notions of “rhetorical strategies” and the “rhetorically marginalised” that describe the conditions of hegemonic discourse. Considering “rhetorical strategies”, such concepts as “global commons” and “smart power” are discussed which emerged from the ideas of US foreign policymakers and influenced the meanings of the U.S.-Japan alliance. More particularly, the Japanese side also incorporates some concepts generated from US strategic planners. While these concepts are analysed, the role of organic intellectuals including policymakers, policy intellectuals and scholars are explored. Secondly, the “rhetorically marginalised” that can be regarded as the counter-hegemonic forces against the U.S.-

Japan alliance are examined. The arguments that relate to “anti-U.S.-Japan alliance” discourse by such political parties as the Japanese Communist Party (JCP), the Social Democratic Party (SDP) and the local media are closely examined. Yet, the paper also argues that their influence is not as much powerful as the supporters of the U.S.-Japan alliance due to diverse discourse about the alliance where each actor’s interests may be diverging and incoherent. Moreover, the U.S.-Japan alliance as common sense has been further enhanced by taking into account these opposing arguments that may signify the sustainability of the alliance. Third, prior to the conclusion section, the U.S.-Japan alliance as common sense is discussed by taking into account “rhetorical strategies” and the “rhetorically marginalised”. Since it is also recognised that the U.S.-Japan alliance, which is viewed more as oxygen, can be problematic, the chapter discusses the analysis that are provided in the earlier sections.


Neo-Gramscian “Common Sense” in the U.S.-Japan Alliance

In this section, “rhetorical strategies” are mainly investigated while, in the context of the U.S.-Japan alliance, arguably the voices of local citizens living near to US bases in Japan can be seen as “rhetorically marginalised”. Indeed, it is worth noting that there is increasing literature dealing with the “Okinawa²⁰⁷ problem”, which can be represented as “rhetorically marginalised”. Nevertheless, the significance of the U.S.-Japan alliance is increasing due to a wide range of security concerns including the rise of China, North Korean nuclear threats and the aftermath of the 3.11 Tohoku

²⁰⁷ A large proportion of the US troops are located in this prefecture, hosting more than 70 percent of US bases in Japan.

Earthquake and Tsunami.²⁰⁸ According to a public poll conducted by the Japanese Cabinet, it is observable that there is a steady increase in the respondents who views the alliance as “useful especially after the end of the Cold War whereas there are a decreasing percentage of the respondents regarding the alliance as “not useful”.²⁰⁹

Graph 2: Public Poll of “Whether the U.S.-Japan Security Alliance is Useful or Not”



Source: Japanese Cabinet

²⁰⁸ It is noted that, at a seminar organised by the MOD in Tohoku, the perception of the U.S.-Japan alliance and “Operation Tomodachi” were completely different from the Okinawa case according to the questionnaires (Interview with an official of the US embassy in Japan, 18th March 2013).

²⁰⁹ It is remarked that the presence of the U.S.-Japan alliance is justified even by Komeito and the Social Democratic Party (SDP) which may have been influenced by the changing perception in Japanese society (Interview with Akitoshi Miyashita, 14th December 2012). It is also noted that “brain freeze (*shiko teishi*)” about the U.S.-Japan alliance is generated from the idea that “we should not think” (Interview with Takashi Oshimura, 15th April 2013).

In addition to this public poll, there have been further efforts made by the MOD Public Affairs with the aim of disseminating the knowledge of defence. This division has enhanced the cooperation with the media companies and some prominent authors (e.g., Hiro Arikawa who writes defence-related love stories including “Library War”) with the release of TV dramas and films which are different from decades ago. It is also remarked that the Japanese public’s image of the SDF has changed after the 3.11 Earthquake and Tsunami.²¹⁰

Considering these changing perspectives of the alliance, in this section, the development of the strategic rhetoric is closely investigated by analysing emerging factors, which may have enhanced the relevance of the U.S.-Japan alliance after the Cold War. In the subsequent section, the key concepts, which have strengthened the significance of the U.S.-Japan alliance, are explored as follows: a) the U.S.-Japan alliance as the pillar of Japanese diplomacy, b) the U.S.-Japan alliance as a provider of the international public goods or assets, c) the U.S.-Japan alliance as preserving “global commons”, d) the U.S.-Japan alliance as seapower, e) the U.S.-Japan alliance as smart power, and f) the U.S.-Japan alliance as an asymmetric yet reciprocal alliance. These elements are intended to underscore the growing significance of the U.S.-Japan alliance, especially in the Japanese domain considering its role in Japanese diplomacy. As is exemplified in Chapter Two, the discourse of a) politicians, b) ministries, c) the *Keidanren*, d) think tanks, e) academics, f) media, and g) local citizens is closely examined.

²¹⁰ Interview with Takao Kinoshita, 18th April 2013.

a) *The U.S.-Japan Alliance as “the Pillar (Kijiku) of Diplomacy”*

In Japanese, “*kijiku*” means the backbone of certain things. In this regard, the idea of the U.S.-Japan alliance as “the pillar of Japanese diplomacy” has been clearly stated in some Japanese official documents. According to the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), the U.S.-Japan alliance is regarded as the pillar of Japanese diplomacy (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2013). This acknowledgement has not been drastically transformed after the enactment of the San Francisco Treaty in 1951 that allowed Japan to return as an international member. Also, the 1957 Basic Policy for National Defence cites the need to “support the activities of the United Nations and promote international cooperation,” along with developing the capabilities for self-defence and maintaining the U.S.-Japan Alliance (Ministry of Defence 2011). The framework for security policy has substantially been altered under the 1995 revision of the National Defence Programme Outline (NDPO). Each of the three pillars has been subsequently strengthened. In addition, a fundamental framework for the U.S.-Japan alliance has been amended such as the Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defence Cooperation in 1997.²¹¹ Since the alliance has been officially regarded as the pillar of Japanese diplomacy according to these policies, it is also taken for granted by those who involved in politics.

Among Japanese politicians, those who support the U.S.-Japan alliance described the significance of the alliance as “the pillar of Japanese diplomacy”. Yoshiro Mori, serving as the Japanese Prime Minister from 2000 to 2001, stressed that “the U.S.-Japan alliance relationship is the pillar (*kijiku*) of our diplomacy and for peace and

²¹¹ According to the guidelines, “The aim of these Guidelines is to create a solid basis for more effective and credible U.S.-Japan cooperation under normal circumstances, in case of an armed attack against Japan, and in situations in areas surrounding Japan” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1997).

prosperity in the Asia-Pacific region” (25th September 2000, Japanese Diet Record). In addition, during his premiership, other Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) members such as Yohei Kono and Toru Umino emphasised that the U.S.-Japan alliance is the pillar (*kijiku*) of Japanese diplomacy (16th November 2000, Japanese Diet Record). Subsequently, this phrase was frequently used by Junichiro Koizumi, a long-standing Prime Minister in Japan from 2000 to 2006. He argued that “the U.S.-Japan alliance relationship has been the pillar (*kijiku*) of our country’s diplomacy” (20th March 2003, Japanese Diet Record). He also used this phrase to convince other Diet members for furthering U.S.-Japan defence cooperation not only in bilateral but also regional and global terms, reiterating that he “will develop the relationship with China, South Korea and Russia on the basis of the U.S.-Japan alliance relationship” (10th May 2001, Japanese Diet Record).

Moreover, Makiko Tanaka and Yoriko Kawaguchi²¹², who both served as the Minister of Foreign Affairs under the Koizumi administration, underscored the significance of the alliance as the pillar of Japanese diplomacy which was the similar discourse to Koizumi’s. Kawaguchi made a diplomatic speech that “the U.S.-Japan alliance relationship is the pillar (*kijiku*) of Japanese diplomacy” (27th February 2002, Japanese Diet Record). She indicated that, relating to the Iraq War in 2003, “the [U.S.-Japan] alliance relationship can sustain for the shared values including democracy, freedom, free market, capitalism, and human rights” with an emphasis on the relevance to tackle against weapons of mass destruction (WMD) in Iraq (12th February 2003, Japanese Diet Record). Kawaguchi also underscored that the U.S.-Japan alliance relationship is not solely about the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty which has been the pillar (*kijiku*) of U.S.-Japan relations but the shared values or

²¹² She is a former economist at the World Bank and also served as Minister at the Embassy of Japan to the US in 1990.

perspectives on such issues as weapons of mass destruction (WMD) (26th March 2003, National Diet Record). Recently, other political parties in Japan including Shinto Daichi and Kokumin Shinto also include this phrase as part of their political manifestos (Shinto Daichi 2013; Kokumin Shinto 2013). Furthermore, it is also important to note that the Japanese media such as the Yomiuri Newspaper reported its opinion paper entitled “the U.S.-Japan alliance is the pillar [of Japanese diplomacy]” in 2008 (Yomiuri Shimbun 2008).

Alongside Japanese official documents of the MOFA and the MOD, the rhetoric of the U.S.-Japan alliance as the pillar of Japanese diplomacy has been highlighted by politicians. Particularly, during the Koizumi administration, not only Prime Minister but also Ministers of Foreign Affairs have declared that the U.S.-Japan alliance relationship to be the pillar of Japanese diplomacy. There seems to be an increasing acknowledgement that the alliance is regarded as the “pillar” of Japanese diplomacy, which has been persisted since the enactment of the San Francisco Treaty and widely recognised by politicians in Japan regardless of political parties except for the JCP and the SDP. These trends illustrate how the U.S.-Japan alliance is regarded as the pillar of Japanese diplomacy and has become more embedded in the understanding of Japanese foreign policymaking. It is particularly surprising to see a difference between the reactions toward the 1981 Suzuki’s statement of the alliance and the current media discourse on the U.S.-Japan alliance.

b) The U.S.-Japan Alliance as “International Public Goods (Kokyozaï)”

The concept of “public goods/assets”, or “international public goods/assets”, is similar to “the U.S.-Japan alliance as the pillar of Japanese diplomacy”. However,

the former notion was initially used in the context of the U.S.-Japan alliance in the Higuchi report that redefined the role of the Japan-US Security regime as that of an “international public asset”.²¹³ The alliance was understood as the product of the Cold War so the roles of the alliance were put under scrutiny. The report brought up the issues such as how the transformation of the post-Cold War international security environment should be addressed and how the role of the U.S.-Japan alliance within that environment should be perceived. As a result, at the Hashimoto-Clinton meeting in 1996, they eventually redefined the U.S.-Japan alliance relationship as the “public goods” for stability in the Asia-Pacific from the Soviet Union’s threat.²¹⁴ Indeed, according to Masahiro Akiyama²¹⁵, who is current President of the Japanese think-tank Tokyo Foundation, he was the first person to describe the U.S.-Japan alliance as the international public goods which later used by Hisahiko Okazaki,²¹⁶ a Japanese strategist, at the Japanese Diet.²¹⁷

Not merely in the early 1990s but even afterwards, the U.S.-Japan alliance has been characterised as “international public goods”²¹⁸ in political discourse.

Fukushiro Nukaga, who served as the Minister of Defence Agency (the current

²¹³ The idea of “security as public goods” which is considered as a factor of the alliance is explicated in Inoguchi’s (1997) book (Inoguchi 1997, p. 90).

²¹⁴ In fact, it was not explicitly stated in the meeting that the alliance is “public goods” although quite a few Japanese politicians and scholars have interpreted that the 1996 U.S.-Japan meeting was the moment when the alliance became “public goods”. It is also noted that the purpose of the alliance has shifted from threat perception of the Soviet Union to stabilising force for Asia (Interview with Hitoshi Tanaka, 1st April 2013).

²¹⁵ After numerous positions in key and senior positions in government, he moved to the Japanese Defence Agency (current MOD) in 1991 serving as director general of the Defence Policy Bureau and administrative vice-minister of defence. He was also chairman of the Ocean Policy Research Foundation between 2011 and June 2012.

²¹⁶ In 1978 – 1981, he served as Director General for Foreign Relations at the Japanese Defence Agency (current MOD) and also served other positions including Minister at the Japanese Embassy in Washington D.C. and Ambassador to Thailand. He has been the Director of the Okazaki Institute and also served as a personal adviser to several Japanese Prime Ministers including Shinzo Abe.

²¹⁷ Interview with Masahiro Akiyama, 28th March 2013

²¹⁸ It is recognised that the notion of “public goods” has been entrenched since 1996 (Interview with Kazuyoshi Umemoto, 7th March 2013).

MOD), explained that “the U.S.-Japan alliance relationship will play a role of international public goods in the global arena” (27th February 2006; 24th March 2006, National Diet Record). Seiji Maehara,²¹⁹ a Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) politician, elucidated that “the U.S.-Japan alliance was redefined at the 1996 Clinton – Hashimoto meeting, to move from the Cold War structure to the international public goods for stabilising the Asia-Pacific region” (26th October 2004, National Diet Record). He persistently insists that the alliance is “a provider of international public goods”. For instance, on the 21st January 2011, he made a speech at the Diet that the purpose of Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO) is the public goods for the Asia-Pacific region (21st January 2011, National Diet Record). In a similar vein, Akihisa Nagashima²²⁰ from DPJ said that “the U.S. forward-deployed presence is the international public assets for peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific which has the strategic values for our diplomacy” (23rd March 2007, National Diet Record). Additionally, Katsuhisa Okada from the DPJ claimed that “the U.S.-Japan alliance is the pillar of the Japanese diplomacy and contributes as an international public asset to peace and prosperity for the Asia-Pacific region” (29th January 2010, National Diet Record).

Compared with LDP members, it seems that more DPJ politicians have emphasised the significance of the U.S.-Japan alliance as the international public goods for regional security. Naoto Kan, who served as the Prime Minister from 2010 to 2011, made the speech at the Davos conference that “the U.S.-Japan alliance is

²¹⁹ He is considered a defence policy expert and viewed as a proponent of close ties with the US (Reuters 2010). He was also a trainee at the Matsushita Institute of Government and Management.

²²⁰ He served as the Parliamentary Vice Minister of Defence in the Kan Cabinet. From 1993 to 1995, he was a Visiting Scholar at the Center for U.S.-Japan Studies and Cooperation at Vanderbilt University and also belonged to other institutes. He is known as a defence expert and also served in such positions as the Senior Director of the Committee on National Security and Director of the Committee on Foreign Affairs.

becoming more crucial which plays a role as international public goods for the Asia Pacific countries for peace and prosperity” (31st January 2011, National Diet Record). According to Kan (2011), “A stable Japan-US alliance is essential and indispensable to many countries in the Asian region as well - a number of Asian leaders have told me this. The alliance is definitely international public goods” (Kan 2011). Sumio Mabuchi from DPJ also claimed that the U.S.-Japan alliance is the international public goods for peace and stability for the Asia-Pacific region (31st January 2011, National Diet Record). During the Noda administration which was the next administration of Kan’s, Koichiro Genba (or Gemba),²²¹ who served as Foreign Affairs Minister, also explained that “the U.S.-Japan alliance is the pillar (*kijiku*) of our diplomacy and the international public goods for peace and prosperity not only regionally but also globally. He used both the pillar (*kijiku*) and international public goods to stress the relevance of the alliance (21st October 2011; 25th October 2011, National Diet Record) which were also used in Noda’s speech at the Diet.²²² As it is elaborated in the earlier section, the ideas that the alliance is “the pillar of diplomacy” and “international public goods” have bolstered the importance of the alliance.

In academic discourse, the U.S.-Japan alliance has been increasingly seen as the provider of the “international public goods” in the Asia-Pacific region. Takashi Shiraishi²²³, President at National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies (GRIPS) in Japan, explicated that “The U.S.-Japan alliance is very international public assets which is important to be sustained...at least it is significant to maintain the alliance” (16th March 2010, National Diet Record). The report of “Prospects and Challenges

²²¹ He is a former trainee at the Matsushita Institute of Government and Management.

²²² He also expressed the aim for deepening the alliance with three pillars: security, economy, and culture and people exchange.

²²³ He is a well-known Japanese IR expert and also chaired the “Defence Manufacturing and Technology Base Research Committee” of Ministry of Defence during the Kan administration.

for the Formation of International Public Goods in the Era of “Smart Power”: ~ Deepening and Enlarging of the Concept of ‘an Alliance’ ~” was released by The Japan Forum on International Relations (JFIR) in October 2012. According to Przystup (2012), “security” is seen as “the preeminent public goods”. Miyaoka (2012) indicates that “It is increasingly common for Japanese politicians to describe the Japan-U.S. alliance as an international public good” (Miyaoka 2012, p. 36). Furthermore, some underscores the aspect of “peacebuilding” when indicating the international public assets. Shelter-Jones (2012) argues that “re-conceptualizing the alliance as a more ambitious form of peacebuilding would enrich its value for East Asian regional security and reinvigorate it as an ‘international public asset’ for a new global generation” (Shelter-Jones 2012, p. 6). There are growing attempts at heightening the relevance of the U.S.-Japan alliance in terms of their defence cooperation not only bilaterally but also regionally and globally. Oiwa (2008) also contends that “international public goods” indicates the roles of non-traditional security which implies broadening roles of the alliance.

Compared with the notion of “*kijiku*”, the U.S.-Japan alliance as “international public goods” has become more prevalent in political and academic discourse. Although some politicians such as Okada and Genba used both the pillar (*kijiku*) and international public goods to emphasise the relevance of the U.S.-Japan alliance, it seems that more Japanese politicians have perceived the U.S.-Japan alliance as international public goods. More details of the U.S.-Japan alliance as the international public goods were further elaborated by policy intellectuals and scholars by redefining the features of “international public goods” and incorporating the element of peacebuilding which may be more acceptable to the public with an emphasis on a non-military purpose. This malleable definition of “international

public goods” can be the reason why it has been prevalently used in political and academic discourse. In response to an altering security environment, the concept of “international public goods” may have become more useful for the discourse of the U.S.-Japan alliance that may help to be embedded as common sense in the neo-Gramscian sense.

c) Global Commons

The U.S.-Japan alliance has increasingly been seen relevant as the means to preserve “global commons”. Indeed, “international public goods” and “global commons” are used interchangeably in Japanese official documents yet “global commons” are tailored to strategic purposes which concern the security of air, sea, cyber and space. The idea of “global commons” is originated from the idea of the US government’s foreign policymaking, first explained by Posen (2003) relating to the notion of hegemony. He exemplifies that “the United States enjoys command of the commons—command of the sea, space, and air”, discussing the significance of “command of the commons” to support US’ hegemonic grand strategy (Posen 2003, p. 7).²²⁴ In a similar vein, Connelly (2010) argues that the liberal norms were incorporated into “global commons”.²²⁵ This insight is valuable in understanding the

²²⁴ He also adds that “Command of the commons creates additional collective goods for U.S. allies. These collective goods help connect U.S. military power to seemingly prosaic welfare concerns. U.S. military power underwrites world trade, travel, global telecommunications, and commercial remote sensing, which all depend on peace and order in the commons” (Posen 2003, p. 46).

²²⁵ According to him, “Embedding liberal norms in the global commons has long been a successful feature of US foreign policy” (Connelly 2010, p. 10). He also argues that this feature of US foreign policy which has been updated for the 21st century is intended to ensure the interests of all countries in the region including the United States, and peace and prosperity in the decades to come (Connelly 2010). This insight may be useful when considering the strengthening US transnational historic bloc with the strengthening alliance with its widening roles in consideration of US liberal ideas.

strengthening US transnational historic bloc in consideration of US liberal ideas in a neo-Gramscian sense.

The Japanese side has also adopted this notion to clarify the role of the alliance. Japan's Council on Security and Defence Capabilities Report (2009) states that "Militarily, the United States has controlled the international public space known as the global commons...U.S. control over the global commons has assured other countries to enjoy freedom of navigation in the high-seas, providing international public goods" (Japanese Council on Security and Defence Capabilities 2009). The report notes that the US has provided "international public goods" including assurance of access to the global commons for all countries which has strengthened the current international system, emphasising that the US alone is not able to provide the same level of public goods in the future where Japan shall support (Japanese Council on Security and Defence Capabilities 2009). When discussing "global commons" in relation to the U.S.-Japan alliance, establishing "the rule of law", which is one of the major components for universal values, is seen as inevitable.²²⁶

It is visible within think-tanks reports of the U.S.-Japan alliance that "global commons" has become a crucial element. The report by the Centre of New American Century (CNAS), which is based in the US, and the Tokyo Foundation explains the global commons that "Management of the global commons involves power politics, and therefore entails not only military power but also legal and diplomatic efforts. Thus, in dealing with this challenge, a holistic approach integrating military, legal

²²⁶ The current Prime Minister Shinzo Abe made a speech at the Center of Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, remarking that "Japan must continue to be a guardian of the global commons, like the maritime commons, open enough to benefit everyone. Japan's aspirations being such, thirdly, Japan must work even more closely with the U.S., Korea, Australia and other like-minded democracies throughout the region. A rules-promoter, a commons' guardian, and an effective ally and partner to the U.S. and other democracies, are all roles that Japan MUST fulfill" (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 22nd February 2013).

and diplomatic means must be established” (CNAS & Tokyo Foundation 2010, p. 12). They also indicated that “One key component of the liberal international order has been access to the global commons, i.e. the maritime, air, space, and cyber domains that connect the world...A new core role that the Japan-U.S. alliance should serve is to ensure that the global commons remain available to all nations in the world” (CNAS & Tokyo Foundation 2010, p. 4).²²⁷

d) “US-Japan Alliance Sea Power”

“US-Japan Alliance Sea Power” can be regarded as an example of preserving global commons exemplified in the previous section. This can be seen as a traditional form of security at sea relating to the U.S.-Japan alliance based upon Mahan’s (1890) notion of seapower. Taro Aso, Foreign Minister during the first Abe administration, delivered his speech entitled “Japan and America: A Quest for a Unified Seapower” in 2008, saying that “Only when Japan and America formed a powerful naval alliance to check the Soviet expansion, did the overall alliance come to true maturity. Japan grew, also in that period, to build its own seapower. The naval alliance, therefore, has become public goods...I would argue that a joint seapower between Japan and America must be that leader” (Aso 2008). He emphasised the role of soft power and seapower to bolster the overall U.S.-Japan alliance with a seapower alliance.

The notion of a “U.S.-Japan Seapower alliance” was articulated by the Ocean Policy Research Foundation (OPRF), the Pacific Forum Center for Strategic and

²²⁷ It also notes that both the S and Japan should play a leading role in establishing norms and rules to manage the global commons (Study Group on the Future of the Japan-U.S. Alliance 2010).

International Studies (CSIS), the CNAS and the American Enterprise Institute (AEI) in the name of “US-Japan Sea Power Dialogue” relating to global commons in 2009 issuing a consensus report.²²⁸ According to Glosserman²²⁹ (2009), a consensus document is the proposal for a “United States-Japan Seapower Alliance for Stability and Prosperity on the Oceans” that was agreed by the participants and which dealt with energy issues, climate change and maritime security (Pacific Forum CSIS 2009). According to the consensual document on the U.S.-Japan Seapower Alliance, “The United States and Japan should restructure their seapower in strengthening their alliance arrangements, make it the common basis for international cooperation, and grapple with the problems involving ocean development and security” (Pacific Forum CSIS 2009). The report was submitted to Japan’s Ministry of Defence (MOD) on the 25th June 2009 (OPRI 2009). The submission of the report to the government shows the influences of these ideas about the U.S.-Japan alliance by exploring their potential functions in the realm of global commons.

The U.S.-Japan alliance functioning as seapower has been elaborated by scholars. Ford (2009) argues that “Although long-standing territorial disputes and contested maritime resources will increasingly challenge the region, the U.S.-Japan Seapower Alliance is well poised to address these problems. As two of the world’s most powerful economies, like-minded democracies, and leading naval powers, together the U.S. and Japan can play a leading role in ensuring the Asian region remains peaceful and prosperous” (Ford 2009, p. 2). According to her, due to the treaty

²²⁸ For several years, the OPRF, working with U.S. dialogue partners, has held a seapower dialogue that explores the two nations’ perspectives on the maritime domain. This effort has examined the importance of the oceans and their role in creating security and prosperity, changes in the maritime domain that our two governments need to prepare for, and ways to maximise efforts to ensure that this global commons remains available to all humankind.

²²⁹ He is executive director of the Pacific Forum CSIS, a think-tank specialising in security issues in the Asia-Pacific region.

alliance and the forward-deployed presence of U.S. forces in Japan, the US Navy and Japan's Maritime Self-Defence Forces have the closest, most interoperable maritime relationship and the U.S.-Japan Seapower Alliance can also promote greater regional exercises and maritime coordination mechanisms that can help minimising the risk of conflict or miscommunications associated with increasingly crowded regional waters (Ford 2009). The idea that the U.S.-Japan alliance as seapower may have become more pervasive due to China's recent maritime strategy. This illustrates that the "global commons" concept has been taken seriously by elaborating the notion of a seapower alliance between the US and Japan while it is one component of global commons.

e) The U.S.-Japan Alliance as Smart Power

After the George W. Bush, Jr. administration experienced a big loss in the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, the ideas of "soft power" and "smart power" were generated from the US side in 2009, which were also applied to the case of the U.S.-Japan alliance. During that period, Nye (2004) called for a more focus on soft power than hard power for national interests. Since the launch of the Obama administration, hard power and soft power were combined into smart power. The concept was used in the context of the U.S.-Japan alliance by the "Japan handlers", Armitage and Nye. The CSIS Commission on Smart Power Report (2007) indicates the basic stance of the US smart power strategy lies in "investing in the global good. That is, the United States will provide things people and governments in all quarters of the world want but cannot attain in the absence of American leadership" (CSIS 2007). One of the critical areas of this strategy is to reinvigorate the alliances and partnerships and

institutions in order to share the burden and to strengthen its justification in terms of providing the global good.

The notion of soft power influenced Japanese official documents. In 2005, Japan's MOFA introduced soft power in its annual Diplomatic Bluebook, describing the term as meaning "gaining respect and attracting others in the direction that Japan wants to move by means of Japan's philosophy and culture, rather than by military and economic coercion" (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2005). The Bluebook also indicates that, since Japan has denounced the use of force to wage war, it is a potential soft power given the popularity of its traditional as well as modern pop culture. Military power, which is often perceived to be hard power, can be a source of soft power depending on the context.²³⁰

The role of soft power in bolstering the U.S.-Japan alliance has been examined by scholars in the US. According to Deming (2012), "In the area of soft power, there are many opportunities for expanded bilateral and multilateral cooperation to provide public goods" (Deming 2012, p. 42).²³¹ Meeks (2010) argues that "the contemporary US-Japan alliance needs to be examined in the context of soft power dynamics with an emphasis on two dimensions: (1) changing international identities and (2) balancing domestic and foreign interests" (Meeks 2010, p. 24). Smith (2013) further exemplifies that "the questions of how Japan can make better use of its nonmilitary soft power to foster prosperity and stability in East Asia, and how the United States can augment Japan's efforts through the U.S.-Japan alliance...In addition, the U.S.-

²³⁰ It is pointed out that the "values-oriented diplomacy" which is based upon democratic values can be seen as a means of soft power (Interview with Noriaki Abe, 19th March 2014).

²³¹ These include: 1) Renewing the momentum toward open markets and expanded trade, with a particular focus on TPP, 2) Playing leadership roles in revitalizing international and regional organizations, including the UN, International Financial Institutions, APEC, and ASEAN plus 3, 3) and 4) Building a framework for enhanced cooperation on energy and climate change (Deming 2012).

Japan alliance can facilitate Japanese—and U.S.—soft power by making global issues a more prominent pillar of the overall alliance rather than using such cooperation as an ad hoc afterthought to the security agenda” (Smith 2013, p. 116). He argues that a democratic civil society is the most important aspect of Japan’s soft power which can best be highlighted through increased engagement with foreign partners (Smith 2013).

Not only scholars in the US but also those in Japan have been attentive to the role of soft power in the context of the U.S.-Japan alliance. Using the concepts of soft power and hard power, Kawakami²³² explained that “the U.S.-Japan alliance can be deepened horizontally in the aspect of soft power dealing with such global issues as terrorism, climate change, resource and energy problem, infectious problems, the support for poverty countries, financial problems and the control and abandonment of weapons of mass destruction that Japan can contribute its soft power and can cooperate with the US without difficulties” (14th April 2010, National Diet Record).²³³ Agawa (2008) exemplifies the case of the Iraq War in 2003, saying that “the case of the dispatch of members of Japan’s SDF to Iraq to assist in reconstruction efforts, and argues that it improved Japan’s national image in the United States...Soft power can indeed smooth the rough edges of hard power” (Agawa 2008, pp. 237–238). He observes that this case can be seen as an example of soft power as military troops using their capacity not for combat, but for the reconstruction and improvement of people’s living conditions in the former conflict

²³² He is a professor at Takushoku University (Japan) specialising in the U.S.-Japan alliance and also participates in U.S.-Japan dialogues organised by the CSIS.

²³³ He also explains that “On the other hand, deepening vertically relates to the facet of hard power such as US-Japan operations plan, strengthening US-Japan joint operation training, establishing adjustment mechanism, joint training against attacks to Japan, US-Japan cooperation on ballistic missile defence, information sharing, improving interoperability and a joint use of US bases in Japan (14th April 2010, National Diet Record).

area by sending members of the SDF corps of engineers for peaceful purposes (Agawa 2008). This may prove the fact that the U.S.-Japan alliance has worked better as smart power since the Iraq War in 2003.

In relation to “smart power”, the report on “Prospects and Challenges for the Formation of International Public Goods in the Era of ‘Smart Power’: ~Deepening and Enlarging of the Concept of ‘an Alliance’~” was released in October 2012.

Tatsuhiko Yoshizaki, from the Sojitsu Research Institute in Japan, explained from the economic point of view that,

The U.S.-Japan alliance should adapt itself to new economic reality. The ‘pro-status quo’ countries sharing the value of democracy and market economy should collaborate closely to the fragile global economy and possible tensions in international affairs. In other words, we need ‘a smart power coalition’ which can find ways to combine limited resources in successful strategies. Although it is hard to know whether ‘smart power’ will be used in the future to justify the relevance of the U.S.-Japan alliance, it shows how, especially from the Japanese perspective, the alliance should raise its relevance for its longevity (Yoshizaki 2011, p.7).

It is also pointed out that the realm of humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HA/DR) can be seen important as “soft power”,²³⁴ which supports the “smart power” of the alliance in the post-Cold War period (Ishihara 2011; Koga 2011).²³⁵ In

²³⁴ Japan Demining and Reconstruction Assistance Center (JDRAC), an NGO which was established by ex-Generals, can be seen as “capacity-building” or a soft aspect of HA/DR. Also, the MOD has separately been providing “private support” (Interview with Kenji Inoue, 26th March 2013). Kiba and Yasutomi (2013)’s “SDF’s ‘All Japan’ version of International Cooperation” illustrates the attempts of the MOD and JSDF between 2004 and 2010 on the basis of a Defence Plan.

²³⁵ “Strategic Assistance: Disaster Relief and Asia-Pacific Stability” (“The U.S.-Japan alliance and disaster relief” in Japanese) was launched as a collaborative initiative between The National Bureau of Asian Research (NBR) and the Japan Center for International Exchange (JCIE)—which highlights the importance of HA/DR in mitigating the severe impacts of natural disasters and other calamitous events in Asia, as well as exploring how close cooperation on HA/DR, or “strategic assistance,” can strengthen inter-regional relations (Japan Center for International Exchange 2013).

addition, Kamiya (2012)²³⁶ explains that the U.S.-Japan alliance can be enlarged from both the “collective hard power” and “collective soft power”.²³⁷

The rhetoric of soft power and smart power has been useful for policymakers and scholars to emphasise the relevance of the U.S.-Japan alliance. Not only among US but also Japanese foreign policymakers and some scholars support this approach. The Japanese MOFA favours this idea for Japanese diplomatic posture. This may reflect the Japan’s previous limited role in contributing as a US ally due to its constitutional and legal constraints while the factor of collective self-defence may change the alliance relationship between the US and Japan that is elaborated further in Chapter Four. Some have suggested Japan should use soft power as a substitute for the US’ hard power.²³⁸ The idea of smart power is a good example to illustrate the different roles that can be taken by the US and Japan in the context of its alliance relationship which is observable in terms of an asymmetrical relationship that is presented in Chapter Three.²³⁹ More particularly, with regard to Japan’s contribution to humanitarian assistance, it is indicated as the best means for Japan to exert its soft

²³⁶ He is professor of international relations at the National Defense Academy of Japan and a leading security expert on Japan.

²³⁷ According to him, “it will become increasingly difficult for an alliance to achieve its goals only using its collective hard power. Cultivation of collective soft power will be crucial. However, the strength of collective soft power of an alliance; i.e., how much attractiveness other international actors find in that alliance, will depend considerably on what it can do (or, to put it more correctly, how others perceive what it can do), in time of need, by utilizing its collective hard power. The prerequisite for an alliance to strengthen its collective soft power is, therefore, the solid maintenance (or strengthening) of its collective hard power” (Kamiya 2012, p. 10). Yet, he also notes that Japan should not solely rely on soft element but also the hard element. According to him, the image that “Japan cannot implement” should be overcome (Interview with Mataka Kamiya, 25th January 2013). This may relate to the idea of avoiding the “free-rider” logic.

²³⁸ It is argued that the SDF is making efforts to create a positive image of themselves through the interaction with local people (Interview with Noboru Yamaguchi, 14th December 2012).

²³⁹ However, it is remarked that the distinction between soft power and hard power is becoming blurry since the cyber security can be regarded as both hard and soft (Interview with Takashi Kawakami, 21st March 2013). It is also pointed out that the hard element of the U.S.-Japan alliance got strengthened (Interview with Yoshinobu Yamamoto, 14th March 2014). In regard to the soft element, it is noted that the realm of cyber security should be improved (Interview with Yasuhiro Izumikawa, 21st December 2012).

power instead of using hard power which may need a more military development which is already examined in Chapter Four by looking into expanding roles of the Japanese SDF in the realm of peacekeeping, HA/DR and CIMIC.

f) An Asymmetric yet Reciprocal Alliance?

The U.S.-Japan alliance has increasingly been characterised as “the balanced asymmetry” or “inherent asymmetry” (Yamaguchi²⁴⁰ 2012).²⁴¹ That is, the US provides the nuclear umbrella of strategic deterrence, offensive power projection, and global intelligence, surveillance and command and control while Japan, in turn, offers host nation support, complementary forces for its own defence, and bases for US forces (Giarra & Nagashima 1999).²⁴² Giarra (1999) claims that the US bases should be integrated into SDF operations, exemplifying “Most broadly, Tokyo benefits from the global missions assigned to U.S. forces based in Japan... This animates Japan’s foreign policy, and tend to align U.S. policies and actions with Japanese interests. They reinforce each other, to Japan’s interest” (Giarra 1999, p.131). In fact, the alliance as asymmetric has been one of the features which has been criticised by the opponents including the JCP and the Japanese Social Party (JSP). According to the JCP, “Breaking away from the Japan-U.S. military alliance

²⁴⁰ Noboru Yamaguchi was graduated from the National Defence Academy of Japan. He was a senior defense attaché at the Embassy of Japan in the US, deputy commandant of the Japan Ground Self-Defense Force (JGSDF) Aviation School, vice president of the National Institute for Defense Studies, and commanding general of the JGSDF Ground Research and Development Command. He also served as special advisor to the cabinet from March to September 2011.

²⁴¹ It is noted that it is impossible to become reciprocal considering the gap between the military capabilities of the US and Japan and the issue is related to “legal adjustment” of Japan (Interview with Takashi Shiraishi, 22nd March 2013).

²⁴² It is also remarked that, unless Article Five and Six of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty change, the asymmetrical relationship between the US and Japan will not change. He also questions whether it is sustainable in the middle term (Interview with Akihisa Nagashima, 29th March 2013). In a similar vein, it is noted that in order for the U.S.-Japan alliance to be symmetric, Article Six of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty needs to be discarded (Interview with Kenichi Takahashi, 19th April 2013).

[Japan-U.S. Security Treaty], to fully restore our national sovereignty, and aim to establish the non-aligned and neutral path” is one of the aims the party is pursuing for through “democratic change within the framework of capitalism” (Japanese Communist Party 2013). Nonetheless, the U.S.-Japan alliance relationship is increasingly regarded as “an asymmetrical yet reciprocal” alliance. This concept is crucial in considering changing perceptions of the U.S.-Japan alliance.

The features of an “asymmetrical yet reciprocal” alliance came into shape, especially after the politicians started to use the term. This description has often been used by politicians and scholars when explaining the alliance relationship. Such politicians as Seiji Maehara and Shigeru Ishiba²⁴³ have been stressing that the U.S.-Japan alliance has been reciprocal although it is asymmetrical. Maehara explained at the Japanese National Diet, saying that “the U.S.-Japan alliance relationship is asymmetric and reciprocal” while confidence-building at the military-to-military and governmental level is vital (21st October 2010, Japanese National Diet). At the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) meeting in 2008, as Minister of Defence, Ishiba described the U.S.-Japan alliance as an “asymmetric and reciprocal” relationship (Ministry of Defence 2008). These recent trends exhibit the acceptance of the alliance relationship between the US and Japan, while emphasis on the features of the “asymmetrical yet reciprocal” relationship has been more pervasive.

Moreover, Mathur (2004) indicates that the U.S.-Japan alliance went through a transformation from “being asymmetrical to a mutually beneficial and reciprocal”.²⁴⁴

²⁴³ He is a former Minister of Defense from 2007 to 2008 and known as a military geek (“*gunji otaku*”) who has a keen interest in military issues (Martin 2009).

²⁴⁴ It is also remarked that the U.S.-Japan alliance will become more reciprocal with the presence of collective self-defence and loosening the arms export policy (Interview with Noriaki Abe, 19th March 2013). In a similar vein, it is noted that while it may remain asymmetrical, the U.S.-Japan alliance may become reciprocal with collective self-defence (Interview with Isao Miyaoka, 10th

DiFilippo (2002) argues that “Those who stress the asymmetrical makeup of the bilateral relationship in the present period concern themselves with the imbalances relating to the security alliance. For them, the utilization of American efforts and resources for the protection of Japan still far exceeds the Japanese contribution to the security alliance” (DiFilippo 2002, p.61).²⁴⁵ Sakaguchi (2009) claims that “The Japan-U.S. Alliance is an asymmetric relationship of things and people, and consequently up to now both countries have harbored considerable doubts and dissatisfaction regarding the alliance, including the division of roles and various base problems” (Sakaguchi 2009, p. 29).

This may be caused by two factors. One is US pressure. Since the end of the Cold War, the US has been asking Japan to contribute more militarily by exercising collective defence. This was clear when the Armitage-Nye reports were released. The second Armitage Nye Report, released by Richard L. Armitage and Joseph S. Nye in February 2007, stated that “Japan must make the alliance a more balanced relationship by contributing fully in more of the sectors needed for its own national defense” (Armitage & Nye 2007). Sakaguchi (2009) analyses that “this shows, even half a century after the Japan - U.S. Alliance was formed, debate over the two countries’ contribution to the alliance continues” (Sakaguchi 2009, p. 29). They claimed the exercise of collective self-defence by Japan which should enable them to be involved. Because Japan is not able to exercise this right, it is their responsibility

January 2013). Masashi Nishihara also indicated that the U.S.-Japan alliance can be reciprocal (Interview with Masashi Nishihara, 9th April 2013).

²⁴⁵ He further explains that “The existing gap in the alliance between U.S. and Japanese military contributions and capabilities, that is, the asymmetries, legitimates the incremental approach that is embodied in the bilateral security arrangement...focusing on asymmetries and seeking to address them by following an incremental approach that is compatible with Japanese constitutional constraints, continues to lead Japan down the road of becoming a military minion of the United States in that it symbolically supports America’s hegemonic interests in the East Asia-Pacific region.” (DiFilippo 2002, pp. 64-65); It is also noted that regarding this relationship and collective self-defence, it is important for Japan to put emphasis on PKO (Interview with Toshihiro Nakayama, 9th January 2013).

that they cannot change the structural relationship between the US and Japan, which remains since the enactment of the San Francisco Treaty. On the other hand, Japan has been reluctant and some of the politicians have been sceptical of this due to their fear of “entanglement”. Another reason can be the rebuttal of the U.S.-Japan alliance as an “asymmetrical alliance”. This logic was often used by political parties which opposed to the remilitarisation of Japan. Particularly, the JCP has been critical of Japan to become “a dependent country” of the US. However, fewer political parties in Japan are using this logic, or rather more parties have begun to emphasise the relevance of the U.S.-Japan alliance as the examples of the “U.S.-Japan alliance as the pillar of Japanese diplomacy” illustrated. There seems to be an increasing embrace of the alliance as an asymmetric alliance.

Rhetorically Marginalised by the U.S.-Japan Alliance

In the context of the U.S.-Japan alliance, anti-base sentiments are generally expressed by local citizens through local media press and social movements. Much literature has focused on the counter-hegemonic forces in Okinawa due to its base issue. The counter-hegemonic arguments have been made with the emergence of “base politics” (Cooney 2008; Calder 2009). According to the prevailing analysis of the Okinawan culture and politics, strong norms of antimilitarism and pacifism, institutionalised by Okinawa’s distinctive historical experiences, lead Okinawans to resent and actively oppose the presence of the US bases (Cooley & Marten 2007, p. 568).²⁴⁶ More analysis has been elaborated by looking into Okinawa’s “anti-

²⁴⁶ However, they also indicate that “Although antimilitarist and antibase norms may inform the collective identity of a society, they do not necessarily generate actual political interests. Collective identities are important but often remain politically indeterminate when they are overridden by well-targeted material incentives to groups and individuals” (Cooley & Marten 2007, p. 579).

militarist” sentiments which may differ from a general understanding of “anti-militarism” that does not necessarily highlight the experiences in Okinawa. This section clarifies the recent voices against the U.S.-Japan alliance relationship which have existed in the postwar era. While the perspectives from Okinawa can be regarded as counter-hegemonic forces toward US hegemony, or the US-led historic bloc, with the bolstering U.S.-Japan alliance, this section analyses what problems exist in Okinawa in regard to US bases and how diverse their perspectives can be. Regarding the “rhetorically marginalised”, the following five keywords which can be interrelated each other are examined: a) anti-U.S.-Japan alliance, b) US bases in Japan, c) environmental problems and Osprey deployments, d) Status of Force Agreements (SOFA), and f) becoming an “equal” partner with the US.

a) Anti-U.S. Japan Alliance Sentiment

Among political parties in Japan, the JSP, which was renamed to the SDP, used to possess security policies which were anti-SDF and anti-U.S.-Japan alliance. The JCP has been persistent on its stance against the U.S.-Japan alliance since the postwar era. According to Lam (1996), “The JCP is the only established party that opposes the U.S.-Japan Alliance, the emperor system, ‘monopoly capitalism’ and the consumption tax. Since it was the only party to uphold the values of the traditional left, it stood to gain when the JSP vacated its position at the left of Japan's ideological spectrum” (Lam 1996, p.165). As is indicated earlier, the aim of the JCP is to abandon the Japan-U.S. military alliance (Japanese Communist Party 2013). Prior to the end of the Cold War, the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) promoted adherence to the Security Treaty while the opposition parties, led by the JSP, opposed it.

However, with the end of the Cold War, the JSP lost its political strength and the opposition forces, led by the DPJ, no longer opposed the Security Treaty (Ina 2005).²⁴⁷ As we can observe political parties in Japan, it is solely the JCP which is persistently opposed to Japan's alliance relationship with the U.S. Moreover, more political parties such as the Kokumin Shinto emphasise the significance of the alliance. In addition, there has been a growing acceptance of the U.S.-Japan alliance since the 3.11 Tohoku Earthquake and Tsunami with a closer cooperation between the US and Japan as a result of these natural disasters. Within the Okinawa prefecture, "Since the prefecture has historically had among the highest unemployment rates in Japan, the question of reducing the base presence has created severe political divisions within organized labor, which, in Japan, has traditionally been linked with the anti-American socialist and communist parties" (Cooley & Marten 2007, p. 575).²⁴⁸

Opposition to the U.S.-Japan alliance is marginalised. Envall (2013) examines Japan's reluctance to adopt "tying-hands strategies" in order to answer the following question: Why has the Japanese government not made greater use of the "Okinawa card" when negotiating alliance issues with the US?²⁴⁹ Alternatively, Kagotani and Yanai's (2014) research on the 1972 - 2006 Okinawa gubernatorial elections shows that external threats do encourage Okinawans to support pro-base candidates.

²⁴⁷ Yet, it is worth noting that there is an ideological fragmentation within the DPJ.

²⁴⁸ According to them, "Prior to the 1996 referendum, approximately 6,300 workers were members of the Okinawa Chapter of the All Garrison Forces Labor Union, a leftist organisation that participated in campaigns against the U.S. basing presence. However, this stance so dismayed certain members during the run-up to the 1996 campaign that they formed a breakaway group, the All Okinawa Garrison Forces Union, which proceeded to campaign openly against the referendum and to network with other opposition groups" (Cooley & Marten 2007, p. 575).

²⁴⁹ He "has instead argued that the most consistent factor shaping Japan's general reluctance, as well as its occasional shifts in approach, was the relationship between the threat perceptions of alliance managers and their awareness of Japan's rising direct dependence on the alliance. In terms of alliance management, this rising dependence was played out in Japanese worries about the country's credibility and reputation, and how these affected its capacity to signal a strong ongoing commitment to the alliance" (Envall 2013, p. 397).

According to them, the survey “results [of the elections show] that in the post-Cold War period, external threats surrounding Japan had been increasing whereas more Okinawans became supportive for US bases” (Kagotani & Yanai 2014, p. 10). They also claim that “Japan’s perceived security risk acts as a driving force behind the evolution of Okinawans’ vote choice because external threats encourage Okinawans to support a pro-base candidate” (Kagotani & Yanai 2014, p. 21). Hook and Son (2013) clarify that “Anti-base actors were not necessarily anti-alliance actors” (Hook & Son 2013, p. 37). In addition, in the past year, about twenty counter-demonstrators have gathered on the opposite side of the road with banners displaying messages surprisingly amicable to the US military presence displaying such banners as “You are our good friends” and “Thank you for protecting the island”.²⁵⁰

b) US Bases in Japan

Okinawa hosts about seventy-five percent of all US military bases in Japan, despite its small land size. In this regard, the first wave of anti-base movement in Okinawa was the island-wide struggle in the middle of the 1950s and the second was the anti-war and anti-base struggle that lasted from the second half of the 1960s through the early 1970s. The third one was the fall of 1995, when a new wave of struggle emerged in Okinawa, demanding the reduction and removal of US bases and the revision of the Status of the US Forces Agreement. According to Mulgan (2000), “US bases on Okinawa was not subject to the customary democratic consent

²⁵⁰ Yasunori Tedokon, a 50-year-old organiser of the counter-demonstration, said that “We want people to know that there also are people in Okinawa who feel an affinity with the U.S. military bases and soldiers” while Manabu Sato, professor of politics at Okinawa International University, said that generations born after 1972 tend to view the prefecture as no more unique than other regions in Japan. Compared to the previous generations, they are proud and comfortable with being Japanese, and it makes them “susceptible to conservative arguments” (Asahi Shimbun 2014).

procedures normally associated with the siting of large projects and facilities that have potentially negative social and environmental effects” (Mulgan 2000, p. 160).

These tensions exploded in September 1995 when three US servicemen sexually assaulted a young girl in Okinawa. In contrast to previous Okinawan grievances against US bases, this incident captured the attention and the outrage of the entire Japanese public. Opinion polls turned sharply against the U.S.-Japan alliance for the first time since the 1960s and mainstream politicians began challenging the logic of a US military presence in Japan. The US and Japanese governments responded by forming the SACO in November 1995. The committee announced in December 1996 that the US would adjust operations and return about 21 per cent of the land on Okinawa used by US bases, including the most controversial base, the US Marine Corps Air Station at Futenma (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1996).²⁵¹

“The Base Return Action Program” was a proposal by Masahide Ota aimed at the planned and gradual return of existing US military facilities in Okinawa by the year 2015, which is the target year for Okinawa’s grand design for the 21st century, “The Cosmopolitan City Formation Concept”, which proposes at constructing a multipurpose exchange network with various Asian countries that have climates and natural features similar to Okinawa’s as well as establishing Okinawa as a city equipped with all the functions of any advanced city. The Base Return Action Program was an attempt to enable the smooth, planned and gradual return of the bases that poses a great obstacle toward proceeding with such planning. However, after the defeat of Ota by Inamine, the last report of the SACO has become the pillar of administrating Okinawa bases instead of the Base Return Action Program

²⁵¹ Satoshi Morimoto, then Minister of Defence, suggested accompanying economic benefit with Henoko construction.

(Shimizu 2008). Shimizu (2008) points out that the planners of “The Base Return Action Program” and the SACO last report are entirely different. Whilst “The Base Return Action Program” was created by the Okinawa government, SACO report was based on the US-Japan discussions. Although the requests written in “The Base Return Action Program” were not ignored in the SACO report, the call for reviewing The Base Return Action Program was vocal due to the condition on “relocation” (Shimizu 2008).

The Okinawan problem and the local pressure on US bases throughout Japan is far from resolved. Governor Ota blocked the Japanese government’s effort to implement the Futenma relocation plan by rejecting permission for construction of the offshore base in January 1998. Although the governor came under increasing pressure from local politicians and businesses, who supported the offshore facility and wanted to develop the Futenma area after the base was relocated, his position has not budged. As a result, the centrepiece of the Special Action Committee’s agreement remains unimplemented. Indeed, in terms of the Okinawa issue, Eldridge (1997) explains that “In particular, its meaning for Okinawan- Japanese-American relations is obvious. Okinawans wanted a say in something that has fundamentally affected their daily lives for the past 50 years: the presence of the U.S. bases. This meaning was perhaps best underscored by Ken Miki, editor-in-chief of the *Ryukyu Shimpo*, when he said, ‘We in Okinawa needed to continue to speak up or else we wouldn't have been heard’” (Eldridge 1997, p. 904).

c) Environmental Problems and Osprey Deployments

Environmental contamination has been the focal issue in regard to US bases. Carcinogenic military toxics, which include fuels, oils, solvents, and heavy metals, have increased numbers of low-birth weight babies and higher incidences of cancer and leukaemia in adults and children which have infiltrated the land, water, and air in Okinawa, and require massive funding for environmental clean-up.²⁵² Military exercises in Okinawa with live ammunition have caused forest fires, soil erosion, earth tremors, and accidents that have had continual negative impacts on Okinawa's environment, which will require years to remedy. These exercises obliterate natural ecosystems, and leave lands barren and shell ridden for decades to come.²⁵³ Two of the main groups that claim for environmental protections are the Okinawa Environmental Network (OEN), which was formed in 1997, and Save the Dugong Foundation (SDF). The former group has protested against a major land reclamation project at the Awase Tidal Flats, investigating water pollution caused by livestock breeding in Southern Okinawa, and examining pollution from shooting on US bases. "Promotion of Dugong during the UN 2010 International Year of Biodiversity" included a demand that the Japanese government conduct an environmental assessment evaluation of planned military expansion in the Okinawan Dugong habitat.²⁵⁴

However, it is important to note that the OEN does not take an anti-US military presence in Okinawa. It is noted that "it clearly relishes the opportunity to work with officials from the U.S. military, as is evident by the presentation by the deputy

²⁵² Okinawa Peace Network of Los Angeles, http://www.uchinanchu.org/uchinanchu/history_current.htm.

²⁵³ Ibid.

²⁵⁴ Network for Okinawa (NO), <http://closethebase.org/environmental-issue/#sthash.IJEerJhr.dpuf>.

environmental officer of the Environmental Branch, Marine Corps, as part of the OEN's 2003 conference" (Taylor 2008, p. 276). Taylor (2008) also indicates that other environmental officers at US military have cordial relationship with the OEN. Also, the "US-Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation" of May 2006 recognises to promptly respond to environmental issues including the provision of reasonable access to the US Forces facilities or areas in consideration of environmental accidents.

In addition, at an international level, it is recognised that US bases have harmed the environment especially in Okinawa. For instance, "Yanbaru", which is located in the northeast mountain side of Higashi and Kunigami village in Okinawa, has a jungle warfare training centre of US Marine Corps with 7,500 hectares, while it is considered that there would be serious adverse effects on Yanbaru if the helipads are constructed and military exercises are carried out. The International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUNC) urged both the US and Japanese governments to adopt alternative options such as the "Zero Option (option for no construction) and the set-up of a protected area for Okinawa Woodpecker and Okinawa Rail (World Wildlife Fund Japan 2011).²⁵⁵ The issues on "environmental assessment" have been further problematic environmental issues surrounding by the US bases, particularly in Henoko and Takae in Okinawa. Such groups as the "Citizens' Network for Biodiversity in Okinawa" visited the Ministry of Defence in Okinawa in February 2014, asking for the details about environmental assessment. Hideki Yoshikawa, a member of the Citizens' Network for Biodiversity in Okinawa pointed out that the

²⁵⁵ Moreover, in order to terminate the construction of the helipads, people in Takae, Okinawa held a sit-in protest in front of the US-military bases. Takae is known as a place where guerilla war practices were held during the Vietnam War by the US army by using local citizens (Maedomari 2013).

information about dugongs is insufficiently delivered to the U.S. side (Ryukyu Shimpo 2014).

The Osprey deployment has been another problematic issue. The MV-22, which takes off like a helicopter and flies like an airplane, is replacing the aging CH-46 helicopters, being able to fly at a top speed of about 520 kilometres an hour and carry 24 soldiers, has twice the capability of the CH-46 in both speed and payload, while the safety of the hybrid aircraft has been called into question following crashes in Florida and Morocco in 2012 (Asahi Shimbun 2013). The US military has said the accident rate for the Osprey is well below the average rate for all US military aircraft. A total of 24 Osprey have been deployed to US Marine Corps Air Station Futenma in Okinawa Prefecture to date. According to the Defence Ministry, one or two Osprey took part in an integrated exercise slated for the 16th Oct 2012. The SDF also plans to include two Ospreys in a joint disaster preparedness drill planned later this month in Kochi Prefecture.

Being influenced by the crash of a US Air Force HH-60G Pave Hawk helicopter within U.S. Marine Corps Camp Hansen in Okinawa on the 5th August 2013, “The Targeted Village” was released which tells a story about Okinawa’s counter-movement against the deployment of MV-22 Osprey tilt-rotor transport aircraft at the Futenma air base which was shown in Tokyo. The film focuses on a court battle between the central government and the residents of Takae, as well as sit-ins and other protest activities by the residents aimed at blocking the construction of the helicopter landing zones in the US military’s Northern Training Area in the subtropical mountain forest district, exhibiting local residents’ feeling “targeted”²⁵⁶

²⁵⁶ The title derives from the fact that the village was used as a mock target in the 1960s to train US forces for the Vietnam War. The US military set up a mock Vietnamese village there and had residents of Takae dress up as Vietnamese farmers to lend a semblance of realism to the guerrilla

by the US military by means of Osprey (Kurokawa 2013). This further spread anti-Osprey campaigns to the mainland where U.S.-Japan joint exercises were planned a few months later (Asahi Shimbun 2013).

Conversely, there is a group called “the Okinawa Osprey fan club,” which cleans the fences around the MCAS Futenma in the Ginowan city, Okinawa that are often left by the protesters in order to display their appreciation for those who work and live on the base. It is noted that many volunteers who involved in this activities are the supporters for the Marine Corps including the Osprey fan club and “Operation Arigato” (Case 2013). This exhibits that, in regard to the Osprey deployments, there are both pros and cons with different perspectives on it. On the one hand, those who criticise it have concerns about the safety of the local citizens. On the other hand, those who support the deployments emphasise the relevance of the US Marine Corps for making efforts to protect Japan.²⁵⁷

d) Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA)

While the “asymmetric yet reciprocal” discourse is introduced and analysed in the section of “common sense”, it is worth noting that some argues against the nature of Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) which has been the pillar of the U.S.-Japan alliance. Maedomari (2013) argues that SOFA is represented as an “asymmetrical treaty” which defines the U.S.-Japan alliance. He also notes that the difficulty of revising it due to its intricacy.²⁵⁸ Ina (2005) explicates that “There are at least two

warfare training drills. The area is still being used for training for jungle warfare, including guerrilla attacks, infantry training and helicopter drills.

²⁵⁷ It is also remarked that Osprey deployments are used for defensive and humanitarian means (Interview with Naoyuki Agawa, 4th April 2013).

²⁵⁸ During his journalist career, he obtained “*Chii Kyoutei no Kangaekata*” which is regarded as a bible for MOFA officials in dealing with US bases in Japan that was crafted by Minoru Tanba.

points of view concerning the revision of the SOFA. One revisionist argument repudiates the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty and ultimately demands the withdrawal of American forces, while the other argument approves of the treaty itself. In practical terms, it is hard to differentiate between these two arguments” (Ina 2005, p. 43). According to Ina (2005), “Instead, an objective that is uniting the opposition forces is revision of the SOFA, with the main issues being criminal jurisdiction procedures and environmental problems. The former was highlighted by the 1995 rape and has aroused the emotions of the Japanese people. The latter, not foreseen in 1960 when the current SOFA was signed, provides further justification for a revision. Not only the opposition parties but also the ruling party find it difficult to oppose these issues” (Ina 2005, p. 43). For instance, the “Committed for the Revision of the SOFA and the Establishment of a True U.S.-Japan Partnership”, a group of non-partisan members of Japan’s Diet, was formulated.

An NGO group called “Realizing the Revision of the Japan - U.S. SOFA (*Nichibei Chii Kyotei Kaitei no Jitsugen Suru* NGO)” was created in 2002 led by Tsutomu Arakaki, who is an attorney in Okinawa and also a member of a special research group for US military base issues in the Human Rights Committee of the association with detailed knowledge of the agreement. On March 2014, the Japan Federation of Bar Associations released a statement about the revision of the Japan-US Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA). In the statement, they indicated their opposition to the landfill construction of Henoko in Nago to build a new base to replace U.S. Marine Corps Futenma Air Station. The association called for environmental rules and for the handing over of suspected criminals for indictment. Arakaki remarks that “It is important that the largest group of law professionals

He also interviewed with Tanba, reconfirming that it was created by him and is used by the MOFA (Maedomari 2013)

clarifies legal opinions on the agreement. It would have a significant impact on negotiations between Japan and the United States” (Ryukyu Shimpo 2014). Yet, this issue is less realised generating less news coverage in newspapers.

e) Equal Partner with the US

Another keyword that may be worth considering is the idea that Japan is becoming an “equal partner” with the US. This thinking is related to the nature of the U.S.-Japan alliance and questions the idea of an asymmetrical relationship with the US. The DPJ government under the Hatoyama administration wanted to renegotiate a US base realignment agreement concluded by the previous government in order to reduce the footprint of US forces in Japan, especially in Okinawa.²⁵⁹ The Hatoyama-led government was taking this action without compensating the US in other aspects of alliance. Although one of the mantras of this government is “a close and equal alliance”, equality could be interpreted to mean that Japan needs to do more, not less, in an alliance military context. Mulgan explicates that “the new Japanese administration interprets ‘equal’ to mean ‘less deferential’ to the United States in both internal alliance management and foreign policy. It has explicitly stated that it will decide future deployments of the Japanese military overseas not on the basis of US requests but strictly from the point of view of Japan’s own national interests” (Mulgan 2009). According to Shinohara (2013), Hatoyama’s attempt and failure to make the U.S.-Japan alliance “equal” is described as a “second loss”. Furthermore,

²⁵⁹ The DPJ’s 2008 ‘Okinawa Vision’ called for the relocation of the base out of Okinawa, or out of Japan.

McCormack (2011) analyses the documents released by the WikiLeaks in May 2011 which reveal the extent to which Hatoyama was betrayed by his own government.²⁶⁰

It is important to note that Japan's becoming an equal partner with the US has been considered from the US perspective while the focus of the issues is different and another question is whether it is realistic or not. One of the prominent reports that can be referred to is the Armitage - Nye Report in 2012. In that report, considering changing East Asian security circumstances including the "re-rise" of China and North Korean nuclear threats, "a stronger and more equal alliance" is required. The report remarks that "It is our view that Japan is at a critical juncture. Japan has the power to decide between complacency and leadership at a time of strategic importance...In choosing leadership, Japan can secure her status as a tier-one nation and her necessary role as an equal partner in the alliance" (CSIS 2012, p. 15). It also articulates that Japan should enable itself possessing collective self-defence which is seen as an "impediment to the alliance" in consideration of the triple crises of 3.11.²⁶¹

U.S.-Japan Alliance as Common Sense to be Problematic?

Changing Nature of Organic Intellectuals in the Context of the U.S.-Japan Alliance

Considering the five keywords that are examined in "rhetorical strategies", the U.S.-Japan alliance may have gradually transformed into "common sense" in the neo-Gramscian sense. "Organic intellectuals," consisting of not only politicians but

²⁶⁰ From the earliest days of the Hatoyama government, his senior officials had clandestine, one can fairly say conspiratorial, links with US officials, advising the Obama administration to stand firm, to understand that Hatoyama was a Prime Minister "with personality shortcomings" and other negative comments about him (McCormack 2011)

²⁶¹ The report also refers to the Yanai Committee report of 2006 which notes that the prime minister could by fiat put aside the Article Nine prohibition, as in antipiracy efforts in Djibouti.

also those who involved in the discussions about the U.S.-Japan alliance, have established the common sense for the U.S.-Japan alliance by taking into account the concepts generated from the US side such as “global commons” and “smart power”. They have crafted new components of the alliance relationship with an adoption of new concepts such as “international public goods”, “global commons”, and “smart power”. The U.S.-Japan alliance as the international public goods has been further elaborated by policy intellectuals and scholars by including peacebuilding, which can be more supported by the public with its non-military purpose. Interestingly, the idea that the U.S.-Japan alliance is “asymmetric and reciprocal” seems to be more pervasive and accepted which captures the evolving nature of the U.S.-Japan alliance.

In the context of the U.S.-Japan alliance, it is relevant to consider the Yoshida Doctrine since it is understood that it has characterised postwar Japan and the U.S.-Japan alliance relationship. In the neo-Gramscian terms, those who formulated the Japanese strategic posture based upon the Yoshida Doctrine can be seen as “organic intellectuals” prior to the end of the Cold War. Ikeda and Sato were both intimately associated with Yoshida and the members of so-called the “Yoshida School”. Pyle (1992) analyses that, under these administrations, the “Yoshida Doctrine was institutionalized and consolidated into a national consensus” (Pyle 1992, p. 32). We may observe that those who support the Yoshida Doctrine can be regarded as “traditional intellectuals” in the neo-Gramscian terms. According to Winkler (2012), the nature of conservative politicians in Japan is evolving. Thomas (2009) also exemplifies that traditional intellectuals used to be “the organic intellectuals of a previously emergent and now consolidated and dominant social class, unwilling, at best, or at worst, unable to, recognise their continuing political function” (Thomas 2009, p. 417).

The present organic intellectuals are not equivalent with those who fully supported the Yoshida Doctrine since there is a more diversifying notion of Japanese security policies with the emergence of “revisionists” including former Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi and Shinzo Abe (Samuels 2008). Additionally, those who support the U.S.-Japan alliance can currently be viewed as “organic intellectuals”. Regarding the U.S.-Japan alliance, as the previous section on the application of the neo-Gramscian “common sense” demonstrated, the relevance of the U.S.-Japan alliance has been emphasised by both US and Japan sides with such concepts as “international public goods”, “global commons” and “smart power”.

Emerging Counter-Hegemonic Forces, or Not?

At first glance, there seems to be a growing awareness of the problems relating to the U.S.-Japan alliance at various levels. According to Smith (2006), “Outside of government, new social forces and new norms of democratic practice have helped bring a multitude of voices to the debate” (Smith 2006, p. 45).²⁶² Hook and Son’s (2013) study demonstrates the salience of networked human and environmental security actors and their articulation of anti-alliance and anti-base discourse of both Japan and South Korea.²⁶³ They argue that “the articulation of internal threats to human and environmental security has become one of the major obstacles to the

²⁶² She also claims that “It is the combination of these varied, and often intersecting, forces within the societies that host American military forces that has produced the greatest impact on alliance management in Asia” (Smith 2006, p.45). This is applicable to other cities in Japan which have US bases such as Yokosuka, Kanagawa. Although the US Navy has been ported for a long time, there is an anti-US bases movement especially when group attacks, killing or rape incidents occur.

²⁶³ According to them, while the analysis on base politics has become a useful, there is no clear dividing line between alliance and base politics in real-life situations due to the following reasons: (i) the construction and relocation of military bases is one of the core components of alliance politics; and (ii) the so-called anti-base movements not only question basing issues, but problematise the validity of alliances as well (Hook and Son 2013, p. 18). They revisit the concept of “threat” considering it an “internal” one instead of an external threat which is acknowledged particularly in neo-realist terms.

management of alliances, as well as one of the catalysts behind alliance decisions to relax the requirements of national security” (Hook & Son 2013, p. 21). They cite such examples as “civil alliances forced the US and Japanese governments to revise the SOFA in the direction of expanding the scope of crimes covered, such as murders and rapes, to be tried under Japanese jurisdiction” (Hook & Son 2013, p. 28).²⁶⁴ It is true that counter-hegemonic forces have influenced the U.S.-Japan alliance which is part of *Pax Americana*.

However, considering the “rhetorically marginalised” by the U.S.-Japan alliance particularly those who are critical of the alliance, it seems that rather than coherent but divergent viewpoints do exist ranging from environmental concerns of US bases in Japan to economy in the local prefectures. The issue that can be highlighted is that the differentiation between “bases” and “U.S.-Japan alliance”. As some recognise, “anti-bases” and “anti-U.S.-Japan alliance” are different and it is acknowledged that when the problems surrounding the US bases are solved including environmental concerns, there is less resentments toward the alliance. In the case of the Sunagawa incident, according to Miller (2013), “The resistance at Sunagawa drew not only from the continued presence of U.S. forces and the ways in which they disrupted Japanese lives, posed a physical threat, or even challenged peace and independence; these protests were also about the principle of protecting an active and representative Japanese democracy (Miller 2013, p. 17). This may pose a question about the sustainability of resistance.

²⁶⁴ It should also be noted that the factors such as human and environmental security is also recognised at governmental level. The “2+2” documents have been updated by including these components, such as natural disasters and climate change while it may not be as precise as it should be.

Moreover, it seems that “anti-US-Japan alliance” sentiment has become less visible due to it widening security concerns not only traditional but also non-traditional forms of security. It is important to note that, increasingly, there is more attempt to obtain the recognition of the U.S.-Japan alliance particularly in the Okinawa prefecture. For example, the contents of lectures and workshops at Okinawa Peace Assistance Center (OPAC) have increasingly centred on the theme of raising awareness of the importance of the U.S.-Japan alliance. In consideration of anti-US bases in the past such as Uchinada, the Lucky Dragon, the Sunagawa incident involving “Bloody Sunagawa”, probably the current counter-hegemonic forces may have weakened not because of the lack of the opposition but rather due to the divergent interests of the groups. This section is not attempting to conclude that it is impossible to strengthen counter-hegemonic forces against the U.S.-Japan alliance. Still, the lack of coherent voices may be a reason why staunch supporters of the alliance and the acceptance of the alliance are increasing as the opinion polls exhibit.

Common Sense as Problematic?

The previous sections closely examine “rhetorical strategies” and the “rhetorically marginalised” in the context of the U.S.-Japan alliance. As has been exemplified earlier, organic intellectuals have played roles in developing the functions of the alliance in regard to “rhetorical strategies” while the actors that contribute to the “rhetorical marginalised” can be less centred. Terashima pointed out that “Japan is stuck in the structure of the U.S.-Japan alliance which does not allow them to become flexible to any scenarios” (7th March 2001, National Diet Record). Some are cautious of the overemphasis on the U.S.-Japan alliance as the pillar of Japanese diplomacy. Takeda and Muto (2012) have concerns about the continuity of the U.S.-

Japan alliance which is becoming like “oxygen” while this tendency is preferable according to Nye. Oshimura (2011) investigates the views of the Japanese on security, especially their way of thinking, realism, from the perspective of social thought, rather than military factors or trends of Japan-U.S. relations, in considering why Japanese stop thinking when they discuss security issues and how they could avoid this. Gramsci (1971) notes that there “must be a criticism of ‘common sense,’ basing itself initially, however, on common sense in order to demonstrate that ‘everyone’ is a philosopher and that it is not a question of introducing from scratch a scientific form of thought into everyone’s individual life, but of renovating and making ‘critical’ an already existing activity” (Gramsci 1971, pp. 330-1; Rupert 2000, p. 12).

Conversely, according to Watanabe and Ina (1998), the U.S.-Japan alliance can be regarded as a political alliance which is based on not only a military foundation but also on a broad political consensus such as the U.S.-U.K. alliance and diminishes the image of a military alliance for the Japanese society although it stems from a military feature. In Yeo’s (2011) account, “The prevailing security consensus surrounding Japanese elite strategic thinking presented a formidable obstacle for anti-base activists. Anti-base movements have not completely ‘failed,’ winning several tactical concessions over the past decade. However, ‘victory’ remained elusive as Japanese and U.S. officials presented new proposals to maintain a significant U.S. military presence on the island” (Yeo 2011, p. 84). It is remarked by Inoguchi, Ikenberry and Sato (2011) that “The U.S.-Japan alliance has been intensely bilateral in its origins and operations. Yet Japan has long been trying to get more global in terms of its own self-appointed role as a supporter of the U.S.-led system” (Inoguchi, Ikenberry & Sato 2011, p. 4). Not only has the relevance of the alliance

been strengthened but its nature as an “asymmetric alliance” has become accepted even in political discourse. Moreover, it is pointed out by Ina (2005) that there is a paradoxical truth that a stronger U.S.-Japan Security alliance will lead to a reduction in the burden of the bases. He argues that “the best way to reduce the burden of the bases is to make the U.S.-Japan Security Alliance more reciprocal” (Ina 2005, p. 48). He also remarks that “If the majority of Okinawans are opposed to the U.S.-Japan security framework, the strengthening of the alliance as a means of reducing the burden of the bases would probably appear as a contradiction in their eyes. The security alliance is, so to speak, a national consensus and there is little likelihood of a political party attempting to dissolve it at this time” (Ina 2005, pp. 49-50).

Furthermore, it is exemplified that “Okinawa discrimination” does exist in the context of the U.S.-Japan alliance. To clarify, it is not merely from the US or Japanese government perspective but rather the local people in Okinawa which is based upon “the logic of self-torture (*jigyaku*)” (Arasaki 2005; Miyamoto & Kawase 2010). It is understood that this has increasingly been embedded in the minds of intellectuals and business people in Okinawa. Some question how it is possible to come up with the Okinawa initiative with this mentality (Miyamoto & Kawase 2010, p. 29). This may also reflect the analysis about “the day of humiliation”, whereas “the day of recovering sovereignty” in mainland Japan. According to Ishihara (2012), he raised two reasons why it is “humiliation” for Okinawa. First, it is the moment when structural discrimination throughout Okinawa due to military colonialism was embedded by the US and Japanese governments. Second, being located as a “trust territory” due to the San Francisco Treaty also identified Okinawa as one of the islands which does not have autonomy (Ishihara 2012; McCormack & Norimatsu

2013). Mulgan (2000) also argues that the Okinawa base issue underscores the political dominance of the centre over the periphery in Japan (Mulgan 2000, p. 162).

Conclusion

This chapter illustrates how the idea of the “U.S.-Japan alliance” has become more acceptable as common sense in Japanese society in general. Although the concept of an “alliance” between Japan and the US raised controversies particularly in the public during the Cold War era due to the concerns about Japan’s remilitarisation, it seems that the “U.S.-Japan alliance” has become more accepted by the public as more politicians prefer to use the term the “U.S.-Japan alliance” as the pillar of regional and global security stability. The relevance of the U.S.-Japan alliance has been heightened not only because of the presence of the China’s rise or nuclear threats from North Korea, but also due to its contribution to many aspects such as maritime security and global commons. Considering the U.S.-Japan alliance as “rhetorical strategies” with its new characteristics and facets after the end of the Cold War, it seems that the allied relationship is indispensable for Japanese diplomacy. When he was Prime Minister, Koizumi argued that the U.S.-Japan alliance is the pillar for Japanese diplomacy, which covers not only the US but also other countries including China and Russia. Increasingly, politicians, bureaucrats, and scholars in Japan have developed the strengths of the U.S.-Japan alliance while being influenced by some US ideas such as “global commons” and “smart power”. In addition, “an asymmetrical yet reciprocal” form of the alliance has become the prevailing idea of the shape of the U.S.-Japan allied relationship. More Japanese politicians have used this logic which has also led the Japanese to stop thinking critically about the U.S.-Japan alliance. This feature may have bolstered the

relevance of the U.S.-Japan alliance. The concept of the “U.S.-Japan alliance” has become more prevalent in academic and public discourse which was seen as almost “taboo” in the postwar era.

The U.S.-Japan alliance may be increasingly becoming as common sense in a neo-Gramscian sense due to the changing security environment in the post-Cold War era. Although “alliance adrift” was controversial in the beginning of 1990s, the 1995 Okinawa rape incident and the DPJ government, the alliance is seen crucial as the “international public goods” or “global commons” according to the broadening categories of security. Non-traditional security issues such as humanitarian relief, peacebuilding and counter-terrorism have become increasingly important security issues in the post-Cold War period. The roles of organic intellectuals who are involved in managing the U.S.-Japan alliance have crafted new components of the alliance relationship. Particularly, with the adoptions of new concepts such as “international public goods”, “global commons”, and “smart power”, organic intellectuals have influenced the ideas of the U.S.-Japan alliance with additional meanings in regard to the post-Cold War environment and Japan’s security posture.

These key factors may have softened the militaristic character of the alliance by taking into account of non-traditional areas of security such as maritime security and HA/DR. Also, the present organic intellectuals are not equivalent to those who originally supported the Yoshida Doctrine as there is a more diversifying notion on Japanese security policies such as the emergence of “revisionists” (Samuels 2008). Considering all the previous chapters, the linkage between neo-Gramscianism and alliances has been articulated. The Conclusion Chapter is aimed at summarising the paper by exploring the “US-led historic bloc” in the neo-Gramscian sense by taking into account the analysis that was conducted in the chapters of the paper.

Conclusion Chapter: Neo-Gramscian Theory of Alliance as the Means to Go Beyond the Traditional Understanding of Alliances

Introduction

Traditionally, alliances tend to be regarded merely as military agreements, which is observable in the theory of alliance and existing literature on alliances. Yet, within transforming security environments, not only traditional but also non-traditional forms of security are emerging, which harness the salience of alliances. In the post-9.11 contexts, while alternative forms of state cooperation emerged such as “the coalition of willingness”, alliances did not disappear but instead have been enhanced in the political domain. The case of the U.S.-Japan alliance is not exceptional as this thesis demonstrates within the neo-Gramscian framework. Within the framework of the traditional account of alliance theory including alliance dilemma, the sustainability of alliances can hardly be explained due to its neorealist understanding of alliances and the existing assumption of alliances to be symmetrical. Hence, by comprehending the multidimensional facets of alliances it is crucial to consider not only the material but also economic and ideational roles of alliance politics that have not been considered in the existing theory of alliance. This enables us to understand the micro-levels of interactions among allies in the context of alliance politics which is much more intricate than the way the traditional theory of alliance is presented.

In order to understand alliance politics, this research intends to underscore the neo-Gramscian account of hegemony which is an important element to be considered in the contemporary period. Through neo-Gramscian theoretical lenses, various aspects of the alliance dynamics between the US and Japan are examined from Chapter Three to Chapter Six. Chapter Three presents the historical trajectory of the

U.S.-Japan alliance from neo-Gramscian perspectives by incorporating its key concepts including organic intellectuals and historic bloc. Chapter Four and Chapter Five illustrate the interaction of material, economic and ideational components of the alliance which has been further bolstered in the post-Cold War era. Chapter Six explores the U.S.-Japan alliance with a usage of discourse analysis by adopting the neo-Gramscian concepts including “common sense” and “organic intellectuals” to demonstrate the roles of the alliance in contributing to the US historic bloc in the region. Considering the earlier chapters, the Conclusion Chapter is intended to underscore the linkage between research questions and the main chapters that are explored from this theoretical perspective. More particularly, this chapter revisits the neo-Gramscian account of alliance theory to elaborate how the central research question is answered in consideration of the major chapters. In an attempt at answering the central research question: “Why has the U.S.-Japan alliance continued to endure and been strengthened? ”, this research project aims to explain the U.S.-Japan alliance from the neo-Gramscian perspective.

This chapter is structured as follows: first, the sub-research questions are deeply investigated by linking them to the earlier chapters. As is already indicated in the Introduction Chapter, four sub-research questions are answered on the basis of the analysis made in the earlier chapters from Chapter Three to Chapter Six by respectively being examined. Second, taking into account the responses to these sub-research questions, the central research question is analysed comprehensively with an attempt at refining the theory of alliances which is the research aim that is indicated in the Introduction Chapter. In consideration of the previous sections, the neo-Gramscian approach to the alliance is crystallised by further discussing the central research question: “Why has the U.S.-Japan alliance continued to endure and

been strengthened?” Lastly, prior to the conclusion section, the chapter demonstrates the potentials of neo-Gramscianism to understand alliances in the contemporary era, where not only traditional but also non-traditional forms of security are considered, by means of the neo-Gramscian theory of alliance. Taking into account contemporary political environments, the chapter explores the dynamism of alliance politics, which can be applicable to other forms of alliances that can be particularly asymmetrical in nature.

Revisiting Research Questions

In What Ways has the U.S.-Japan Alliance been Developed?

From the neo-Gramscian standpoint, Chapter Three investigates the historical trajectory of the U.S.-Japan alliance since the postwar period until the early post-Cold War period. While presenting the coercive and consensual dimensions of hegemony, the chapter illustrates how the U.S.-Japan alliance has become accepted as an alliance. While the U.S.-Japan alliance used to be unfamiliar to Japanese society, especially due to the asymmetric nature of the alliance, until the official usage in 1981, it is observable that, through the interactions of coercion and consensus, the US and Japan have made attempts to improve their alliance relationship. Although there can be an unclear distinction between coercion and consensus as exemplified in Chapters Two and Three where *gaiatsu* can be internalised, Chapter Three displays how the U.S.-Japan alliance has strengthened through the interplay of coercion and consensus. This exhibits that coercion alone cannot harness the alliance or the US hegemony, or the US-led historic bloc in the neo-Gramscian sense.

Likewise, the role of organic intellectuals is crucial to be taken into account which is also closely examined in this chapter. In the case of the Yoshida Doctrine, which has been the pillar of Japanese foreign policymaking in the postwar period, the chapter demonstrates clearly that the doctrine has gradually been embedded in Japanese foreign policymaking, being established “inductively” and evolving into a “revealed strategy” (Yamamoto, Noya, Inoue, Kamiya and Kaneko 2012).

Conservative politicians played influential roles in evolving the doctrine which also influences the U.S.-Japan alliance particularly in the military realm, but Japan’s usage of arms has been forbidden in the framework of its Japanese Constitution.

However, the chapter also illustrates Nakasone’s attempt to shift away from the Yoshida Doctrine that shows the different interaction of coercion and consensus. Instead of relying on the doctrine, the Nakasone administration was more responsive to US requests for remilitarising Japan with an attempt to become a more equal ally with the US. Moreover, unlike in postwar era and Cold War, the cases after the Cold War show how the U.S.-Japan alliance was redefined in order to enhance the functions of the alliance after the experiences of the Gulf War in 1991 and the North Korean nuclear crisis in 1993 and 1994. While the Gulf War is one of the examples which allowed Japan to rethink its defence posture under US pressures, coercive and consensual dimensions of the alliance interacted in different ways as the example of the Higuchi report illustrates. In consideration of the periods that were examined through the neo-Gramscian lenses, it is evident that coercive and consensual dimensions of the alliance have been operating and how the role of organic intellectuals was influential as the case of the Yoshida Doctrine shows.

*Has Japan Increasingly Come to Accept US Foreign Policies?*²⁶⁵

Chapter Four explores the interplay of material, institutional and ideational elements of the U.S.-Japan alliance at a bilateral level. Unlike the period when their alliance relationship was intrinsically “the relationship of people and things” (Nishihara 1997; Sakamoto 2000), the US-Japan alliance relationship may have become more reciprocal in regard to Japan’s increasing contribution to military training by enhancing joint interoperability and loosening its arms export controls. In regard to force interoperability, Japan has changed its defence posture in reflection of the US change in defence policy including transformation and dynamic deterrence. While Japan’s changing posture is based on its own national interest, the US influence is intrinsically one of the factors that affect defence policymaking as the U.S.-Japan alliance has been the pillar of Japanese foreign policymaking. Especially, HA/DR is one of the examples of the interaction of material, institutional, and ideational factors in the U.S.-Japan alliance. As for the military-industrial relationship, although the conflicts between the US and Japan were intense in the 1980s, the circumstances were ameliorated after the 1990s with cooperation on BMD. Also, the case of DUT is another good example of strengthening the alliance as well as influencing Japanese arms export policy.

However, it is important to remark that this does not necessarily indicate that the alliance has become more symmetric. Unless the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty is revised, the features of the alliance can hardly be changed. Nonetheless, particularly under the second Abe administration, Japan has been contributing to the rebalance in a number of ways by attempting to reinterpret its pacifist constitution and expand the

²⁶⁵ It is also pointed out that the US and Japan have jointly formulated new defence guidelines on missile defence, and further integrated in the realm of information sharing (Interview with Toshiaki Miura, 20th December 2012).

role of its SDF in global security operations. Under this administration, “proactive pacifism” has become the pillar of its security policy. Due to this seemingly transforming security posture of Japan with the fear of infringing pacifism, a wide range of media coverage has reported the danger of Japan’s remilitarisation. While there are strong supports for the U.S.-Japan alliance system in Japan, Japan needs to continuously restructure and modernise its security posture in response to the US rebalancing strategy.

Furthermore, it is widely known that “Japan’s handlers” have been encouraging Japan to loosen restrictions on “collective self-defence” with their reports. For instance, their 2012 “Armitage-Nye” report states that, “A shift in policy should not seek a unified command, amore militarily aggressive Japan, or a change in Japan’s Peace Constitution. Prohibition of collective self-defense is an impediment to the alliance” (CSIS 2012, p. 15). They also further notes that “3.11 demonstrated how out two forces can maximize our capabilities. When necessary, it would be a responsible authorization to allow out forces to respond in full cooperation throughout the security spectrum of peacetime, tension, crisis, and war” (CSIS 2012, p. 15).²⁶⁶ It is visible that the US and Japanese foreign policymaking in the realm of force interoperability and military-industry are becoming more integrated in the post-Cold War period with gradual processes.

²⁶⁶ However, Rinehart (2013) also remarks that “If Japan decides to exercise its right of collective self-defense (CSD), it would have complex effects on US-Japan security cooperation” (Rinehart 2013, p. 1).

Are Changing Features of the U.S.-Japan Alliance Leading to a Consolidation of the 'US-led Transnational Historic Bloc'?

Chapter Five shows that the U.S.-Japan alliance has encompassed not only military but also economic and ideational aspects. The investigation of the economic and ideational dimensions of the alliance exhibit in what ways it has been strengthened through the constellation of material, institutional and ideational elements. In the realm of the economy, the chapter shows in what ways liberalisation may have been promoted by linking the TPP to the U.S.-Japan alliance although the US and Japan had trade disputes in the past. This case illustrates that the ideational component of the alliance cannot be ignored in understanding how the alliance may have been strengthened. As Rupert's (2000) analysis on Fordism shows, "Cold War ideology played a crucial role in the political stabilization of Fordist institutions in the US," (Rupert 2000, p. 23) It is observable that the Japanese government made use of common values with the US by means of diplomacy based on ideas while the features can be different depending on administrations. The role of ideas remains important under the current administration that crafted the diplomacy at the centre of the U.S.-Japan alliance while developing its relationship with like-minded states especially in Southeast Asia.

Considering regionalisation in the Asia-Pacific and the U.S.-Japan alliance, the role of the alliance has broadened not only bilaterally but also regionally and globally, which can be the peculiar feature in the postwar era considering the "Free World" concept. This is not merely led by the US but also among US allies. Park (2012) pointed out that "Asia's pivot to US" has existed which illustrates not only from the US perspective but also from Asian perspectives. Most countries in the region had been repeatedly calling for a more active US presence throughout

Asia...[they] want peace, stability and economic prosperity, and most understand that these goals are better guaranteed with an active US regional presence” (Park 2012, p.2). The report by the Asia Foundation in 2008 also claims for US re-engagement with Asia during its preoccupation in the Middle East. In the realm of the military, increasing joint training has been made not only bilaterally but regionally considering the cases in the Asia-Pacific with the US-led alliance network. From the neo-Gramscian viewpoint, this trend illustrates not only the coercive but also the consensual aspect of US hegemony in the region where alliances play a role in enhancing its relevance, while counter-hegemonic movements including anti-American sentiments remain. In neo-Gramscian terms, the US-led historic bloc has been created with an increasing role of alliances in the Asia-Pacific. It can be difficult to explain regionalisation of alliances by adopting the alliance dilemma mechanism which does not necessarily answer the central question of why the U.S.-Japan alliance has strengthened.

Has the U.S.-Japan Alliance become Common Sense?

Chapter Six explores common sense and the roles of organic intellectuals in the U.S.-Japan alliance context in order to comprehend the strengthening relevance of the alliance. In this regard, the roles of political elites, who may become “organic intellectuals,” are seen as key actors to enrich the relevance of alliances at both domestic and international levels. Organic intellectuals have played a role to strengthen the existing hegemony, or historic bloc in the neo-Gramscian sense, by creating ideological forces. As has been illustrated in Chapter Six, the importance of the U.S.-Japan alliance has enhanced with other elements, which have been defined by organic intellectuals. Interestingly, the factors of the U.S.-Japan alliance have

been expanded by these actors by taking into account material, economic and ideational elements. In this respect, not only being reliant on the framework of alliance dilemma, but it is worth looking into the role of organic intellectuals and a formulation of common sense at domestic and international levels to comprehend the durability of alliances.

While counter-hegemonic forces against the U.S.-Japan alliance are also examined in this chapter, it also explores in what way the U.S.-Japan alliance has become pervasively common sense by taking into account counter-hegemonic discourse which still remains. For instance, the example of the Osprey deployment shows that, whereas there are opposing voices against this deployment, there is a movement in favour name the “Osprey fan club” which has praised the efforts of the US Marine Corp in Okinawa. Taking into account the complexity of the ideas toward the U.S.-Japan alliance and also the opinion polls by comparing the previous years, it is evident that the alliance may have transformed into common sense for security in Japan which differs from the early postwar period when there were more protests. However, in consideration of the recent discussions about collective self-defence which are also closely related to the U.S.-Japan alliance, the factor of “collective self-defence” may produce the different discourse about the alliance especially with regard to burden-sharing issues.

Why has the U.S.-Japan Alliance Continued to Endure and been Strengthened?

In consideration of the sub-research questions based upon the analysis presented from Chapter Three to Chapter Six, the central research question can be answered from the neo-Gramscian perspective, especially when we consider the neo-Gramscian concept of “historic bloc” which was also taken into account in each

chapter respectively. In particular, as is explored in Chapter Three in relation to the Yoshida Doctrine, the idea of “postwar consensus” is taken into account by linking it to the neo-Gramscian concept of historic bloc. It is worth investigating the Japanese understanding of postwar consensus while considering the formation of a US-led historic bloc as is exemplified in the earlier chapters. As is shown in the previous chapters, US-led alliances are seen as the tool for the hegemon to extend its control over other non-hegemonic states (Morrow 1991). In the following sections, the notion of “historic bloc” is closely examined in the context of the U.S.-Japan alliance by taking into consideration postwar consensus. Alliances can be defined alternatively as “the project of developing an organic (or relatively permanent) alliance between the major capitalist states with the aim of promoting a stable form of world order” (Gill 1991, p. 1).

Postwar Consensus and US Transnational Historic Bloc

The so-called “postwar consensus” still persists with remaining US alliances with other countries, which has the Cold War elements. As is exemplified in Chapters Three and Four, postwar consensus is intimately associated with the Yoshida Doctrine which has allowed Japan to depend on the US security guarantee, paid for with access to strategic bases in Japan, in order to revive its economy. Considering alliances in the postwar context, it is relevant to take into account the formulation of the US postwar hegemony, or the US-led historic bloc in the neo-Gramscian terms. Klein (1988) further clarifies about the neo-Gramscian idea of hegemony that “The integral organic hegemony of the post-war era is thereby gradually being tightened up and subjected to the domesticating pressures of political-military integration (Klein 1988, p. 143).

In regard to “hegemony”, he indicates that “The production of hegemony is not simply due to the efforts of one state over others; the production and distribution of organic hegemony involves relations of power and integration that can no longer be confined to the elites of one disarmament were a nonpartisan issue disconnected from other social conflicts along lines of class, race, gender, environmentalism and regionalism” (Klein 1988, p. 145). As is illustrated from Chapter Three to Chapter Five, it is evident that the U.S.-Japan alliance has developed which has also harnessed the US-historic bloc in the Asia-Pacific region. When the sub-research questions are considered which are: “In what ways has the U.S.-Japan alliance been developed?”; “Has Japan increasingly come to accept the US foreign policies?”; and “Are changing features of the U.S.-Japan alliance leading to a consolidation of the ‘US-led transnational historic bloc’?” The answers provided in the previous section support the central research question in neo-Gramscian terms.

Furthermore, in regard to the theory of alliance, as is indicated in Chapter One, realist view alliances to be entrapped or abandoned as negative, as well as dependence, which may have overlooked the durability of the contemporary era where the issues have been securitised not only to military but also economy and other elements of politics. Indeed, this research relies on the assumption that the U.S.-Japan alliance is already “entrapped” or “entangled”. Saruta²⁶⁷ (2014) presents “the syndrome of entrapment”, explaining that the second Abe administration possesses “the syndrome of entrapping [the US]” in regard to the Senkaku/Diaoyu/Diaoyutai territorial disputes unlike the period when Japan

²⁶⁷ She is Director of the “New Diplomacy Initiative (ND)”, a think-tank seeking to inspire diverse voices in political and diplomatic issues between the US and Japan

protected the Article Nine not to be entrapped in wars.²⁶⁸ While the concept of alliance dilemma remains important in analysing alliance relationship case-by-case, an exclusive focus on this notion may not be useful in understanding the durability of the alliance. This may also show a further connection with the international community which may be harder to “abandon” alliances especially in the case of the U.S.-Japan alliance.

Neo-Gramscian Theory of Alliance as an Alternative IR Approach in the Contemporary Era

By incorporating the neo-Gramscian account of hegemony, the central research question about the persistence of alliances is closely examined, which cannot be commensurate with alliance dilemma. Previous existing literature on alliances is built on the assumption that alliances are based upon an equal relationship as is exemplified in Chapter One. However, particularly the US-led alliances in the postwar era, alliances are not necessarily symmetric but rather asymmetric as the case of the U.S.-Japan alliance shows. As is illustrated in Chapter One, Morrow’s (1991) “autonomy-security” trade-off model has considered asymmetric relationships among allies which are relevant to be understood. In this respect, it is important to comprehend the hegemonic aspect of the alliances in consideration of alliances and their durability. Not only hegemonic states but non-hegemonic states should be taken into account in order to understand the sustainability of alliances which can be understood from the neo-Gramscian viewpoint. It is worthwhile to focus on the role of non-hegemonic states in formulating and sustaining hegemony.

²⁶⁸ She also emphasises the importance of the cooperation among think-tanks (5th July 2014, Iwate Nippo)

Furthermore, in terms of US hegemony and the Asia-Pacific region, while China on the rise, it is important to observe non-hegemonic states in the region in order to comprehend the sustainability of US hegemony, or the transition to Chinese hegemony. This also brings us to a different question: “whether it is possible for multiple hegemonies to exist or not,” which can be another relevant aspect to be considered in the context of hegemony. Considering recent international environment changes such as the rise of China, it is worth observing in what ways US hegemony may be likely to persist in the Asia-Pacific not only with the coercive but also consensual aspect of hegemony. The Center of Strategic and International Studies’ (CSIS) (2011) report on foreign assessments of US power indicates that despite US decline and China’s rise, they do not see a new order emerging in the next decade. Beeson (2009) also argues that the nature of hegemonic competition and transition is more uncertain and complex than theoretical understandings of hegemony assume. Whilst its power is in relative decline, the US presence is seen as important in the Asia-Pacific which can be viewed as a consensual aspect of US postwar hegemony.

The neo-Gramscian view on hegemony is rarely taken into account in the discipline of IR, especially in the realm of security. The discussions about “hegemonic transition” and “power transition” have been dominant, which are based on the neorealist account of hegemony. The neo-Gramscian perspective on hegemony is able to explain the interdependence of the allies with the usage of coercion and consent. In order to give a holistic picture of the alliance, the neo-Gramscian approach helps illuminate the understanding of the sustainability of the U.S.-Japan alliance. My assumption is that the mechanism of the alliance is not merely about alliance game or dilemma but also the construction of the relationships

among the allies. The continuity of the alliance itself also poses the questions of its current functions and its relevance in the contemporary world. In this regard, neo-Gramscianism can be suggested as an alternative IR theory by adopting it to alliance theory in light of the asymmetric nature of alliances. The neo-Gramscian account of hegemony is useful and the aspect of hegemony is inclined not to be considered in alliance contexts although “free-rider” theory takes into account hegemony. Among the literature on alliance, in regard to the idea of “hegemony”, most scholars adopted “hegemonic stability theory” where a hegemonic state plays a bigger role (Kindleberger 1973). If we consider asymmetric alliances not only in a military sense but in economic and ideational senses, it can be seen as a significant factor in the sustainability of alliances.

Conclusion

The Conclusion chapter demonstrates the integration of the neo-Gramscian account of hegemony to the theory of alliance based upon the analysis presented in previous chapters. This chapter revisits the central research question and sub-research questions on the basis of the investigation in the earlier chapters that adopted the neo-Gramscian perspectives. While the sub-research questions are respectively investigated taking into account the earlier chapters which adopt these theoretical concepts, the central research question is closely examined by considering the analysis in relation to the sub-research questions with a particular focus on the neo-Gramscian notion of historic bloc, which is crucial for understanding the nature of hegemony. Furthermore, this chapter shows the relevance of adopting the neo-Gramscian theory of alliance as an alternative IR approach to alliances in the contemporary era. While alliance theory has been reliant

in comprehending the dynamics of alliances in the contemporary era, there is limited recognition of the linkage between alliance and hegemony as it is exemplified explicitly in Chapter One. Although some scholars acknowledged that alliances are used as a tool by hegemonic state, it has not been closely investigated previously.

This research project aims at underscoring the role of US hegemony to strengthen alliances even after the Cold War in neo-Gramscian terms which is already explored in Chapter Five, in particular linking it to regionalism in the Asia Pacific. Although there are more quantitative approaches made to analyse the trends of alliances, the neo-Gramscian account of hegemony enables a better understanding of the durability of alliances with a closer investigation of the consolidation of a historic bloc with the interplay of both coercive and consensual components of hegemony. As explained in the previous section, the neo-Gramscian theory of alliance is developed as the means of understanding the contemporary alliances which may be different from the traditional account of alliances, especially with regard to an asymmetric alliance relationship which is less considered in the context of alliances but worth taking into account in order to comprehend the roles of non-hegemonic states which is crucial to be considered in the IR field. This neo-Gramscian view of hegemony is useful in understanding the contemporary power dynamics especially in the Asia-Pacific region.

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e. Interviewees List

SATO, Heigo, Professor, Takushoku University, Japan, 6 December 2012.

YUZAWA, Takeshi, Associate Professor, Hosei University, Japan, 11 December 2012.

YAMAGUCHI, Noboru, Professor, National Defense Academy, Japan, 14 December 2012.

MIYASHITA, Akitoshi, Professor, Tokyo International University, Japan, 14 December 2012.

MORI, Satoshi, Professor, Hosei University, Japan, 18 December 2012.

MIURA, Toshiaki, Editorial Writer, Asahi Shimbun, Japan, 20 December 2012.

IZUMIKAWA, Yasuhiro, Professor, Chuo University, Japan, 21 December 2012.

NAGAI, Masato, Politician in Yokosuka, Japan, 25 December 2012.

NAKAYAMA, Toshihiro, Professor, Aoyama Gakuin University, Japan, 9 January 2013.

MIYAOKA, Isao, Professor, Keio University, Japan, 10 January 2013.

SAHASHI, Ryo, Associate Professor, Kanagawa University, Japan, 11 January 2013.

KAMIYA, Mataka, Professor, National Defense University, Japan, 25 January 2013.

NISHIYAMA, Junichi, Deputy General Manager, Mitsubishi Heavy Industries (MHI), Japan, 4 March 2013.

KANEKO, Masafumi, PHP, Japan, 5 March 2013.

YUASA, Hiroshi, Sankei Shimbun, Japan 5 March 2013.

UMEMOTO, Kazuyoshi, MOFA, Japan, 7 March 2013.

WATANABE, Akio, Vice Chairman, RIPS, Japan, 7 March 2013.

KOTANI, Tetsuya, JIIA, Japan, 8 March 2013.

TAKAHASHI, Kazuhiro, National Defence University, Japan, 11 March 2013.

WATANABE, Tsuneo, Tokyo Foundation, Japan, March 2013.

YAMAMOTO, Yoshinobu, PHP, Japan, 14 March 2013.

TANIGUCHI, Tomohiko, MOFA, Japan, 14 March 2013.

ISHIKAWA, Taku, Associate Professor, Tokyo Eiwa University, Japan, 16 March 2013.

ABE, Noriaki, MOFA, Japan, 19 March 2013.

KAWAKAMI, Takashi, Professor, Takushoku University, Japan, 21 March 2013.

SHIRAISHI, Takashi, GRIPS, Japan, 22 March 2013.

CHIIWA, Yasuaki, NIDS, Japan, 25 March 2013.

SATAKE, Tomohiko, NIDS, Japan, 25 March 2013.

ISHII, Masafumi, MOFA, Japan 26 March 2013.

INOUE, Kenji, MOD, Japan, 26 March 2013.

YOSHIDA, Yuto, Mayor of Yokosuka, Japan, 26 March 2013.

AKIYAMA, Masahiro, Tokyo Foundation, Japan, 28 March 2013.

NAGASHIMA, Akihisa, Politician, DPJ, Japan, 29 March 2013.

TAMURA, Shigenobu, Politician, LDP, Japan 1 April 2013.

TANAKA, Hitoshi, Center for International Exchange, Japan, 1 April 2013.

NAKAMURA, Ryo, MOFA, 2 April 2013.

MICHISHITA, Narushige, Professor, GRIPS, Japan, 10 April 2013.

AGAWA, Naoyuki, Professor, Keio University, Japan, 4 April 2013.

SOEYA, Yoshihide, Director, Institute of East Asian Studies, Keio University, Japan, 4 April 2013.

AOI, Chiyuki, Professor, Aoyama Gakuin University, Japan, 8 April 2013.

YAMAGUCHI, Tsuyoshi, Politician, DPJ, Japan, 9 April 2012.

NISHIHARA, Masashi, RIPS, Japan, 9 April 2013.

URATA, Shujiro, Professor, Waseda University, Japan, 9 April 2013.

IWAMA, Yoko, Professor, GRIPS, Japan, 10 April 2013.

KUBO, Fumiaki, Professor, University of Tokyo, Japan 10 April 2013.

SUGIURA, Masatoshi, MOFA, Japan, 12 April 2013.

OSHIMURA, Takashi, Professor, Aoyama Gakuin University, Japan, 15 April 2013.

ONO, Motohiro, Politician, DPJ, 16 April 2013.

NAMATAME, Toru, MOD, Japan, 17 April 2013.

KINOSHITA, Takao, MOD, Japan, 18 April 2013.

TAKAHASHI, Kenichi, MOFA, Japan, 19 April 2013.

SUNOHARA, Tsuyoshi, Nikkei, Japan, 19 April 2013.

YACHI, Shotaro, MOFA, Japan, 22 April 2013.

MAKISHIMA, Karen, Politician, LDP, Japan, 25 April 2013.

Anonymous interview A: MOD, Japan, 5 December 2012.

Anonymous interview B: MOD, Japan, 6 March 2013.

Anonymous interview C: National Defense Academy, Japan, 12 March 2013.

Anonymous interview D: US Embassy, Japan, 18 March 2013.

Anonymous interview E: Japan Foundation, Japan, 27 March 2013.

Anonymous interview F: NIDS, Japan, 5 April 2013.